United States v. Pubill Rivera ( 1992 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    February 10, 1992




    ___________________
    No. 91-2208




    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    EDGARDO PUBILL RIVERA,

    Defendant, Appellant.


    __________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


    [Hon. Gilberto Gierbolini, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ___________________

    Before

    Torruella, Circuit Judge,
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    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
    ____________________
    and Selya, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    ___________________

    Jose Antonio (ABI) Lugo on brief for appellant.
    _______________________
    Robert S. Mueller, III, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Lee
    ______________________ ________
    Warren, Chief Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, William H.
    ______ ___________
    Kenety and Daniel F. Lopez-Romo, United States Attorney, on brief
    ______ ____________________
    for appellee.



    __________________

    __________________


















    Per Curiam. Appellant, Edgardo Pubill-Rivera, appeals
    __________

    from the decision of the United States District Court for the

    District of Puerto Rico denying his request for release pending

    trial.

    BACKGROUND
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    Appellant was indicted, along with over 25 other

    persons, on charges of conspiring to possess cocaine with the

    intent to distribute it and with aiding and abetting the

    possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute it. The

    amount of cocaine involved was over 10,000 kilograms. According

    to the government, appellant played a leading role in this large

    drug trafficking conspiracy. A detention hearing was held on

    September 20, 1991. The hearing revealed the following evidence.

    Appellant has seven children, several of whom he

    supports. He has lived with his common-law wife for the past

    eight years. At the time of his arrest, appellant was employed

    at the gas station owned by his father. He was receiving

    approximately $2,500 per month as salary. Appellant owns the

    home in which his father lives; it is worth approximately

    $80,000. Appellant refused to divulge the existence of other

    financial assets to pretrial services. Appellant stated that

    friends and family were willing to post eight parcels of real

    estate worth over $440,000 as security for bail.

    As for appellant's past criminal activity, he has three

    prior narcotics convictions. Upon his first conviction,

    appellant was sentenced to probation. However, probation















    subsequently was revoked due to a violation of the terms of this

    release. Nonetheless, appellant averred that he had been

    released on bail in all three cases and always had appeared in

    court when required.

    The government cross-examined appellant's sister. In

    addition to the home in which their father lives, appellant's

    sister stated that she, appellant and their father own a

    laundromat and that appellant owns a second home. She stated

    that she had, on one occasion, purchased a bank check for $8,000

    or $9,000 for her brother; she did not know how her brother had

    obtained the money for this check. The government also proffered

    the following evidence. Although appellant's tax return showed

    a yearly income of only $24,000, appellant owned assets that

    indicated unexplained sources of income. These assets included a

    condominium, a $68,000 speedboat apparently paid for in cash,

    $195,000 in real estate equity and three bank accounts.

    Appellant has a passport and has travelled outside of the United

    States. In addition, when he was arrested he possessed two fake

    drivers' licenses. Finally, under the Sentencing Guidelines,

    appellant probably would be subject to a minimum sentence of 25

    years.

    The magistrate judge before whom the hearing was held

    ordered appellant detained prior to trial. He considered the

    magnitude of the drug enterprise of which appellant was a part

    and the length of the minimum sentence to which appellant could

    be exposed. Based on these factors, the magistrate judge


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    concluded that appellant could not be trusted to follow any

    conditions of release. In addition to finding that appellant

    would pose a danger to the community if released, the magistrate

    judge determined that the seriousness of the charges appellant

    faces, along with the unexplained sources of income, provided

    appellant with the incentive to flee. The district court judge

    affirmed the detention order, rejecting appellant's argument that

    18 U.S.C. 3142(g) prevented the magistrate judge from

    considering defendant's sources of income.

    DISCUSSION
    __________

    Based upon the transcript of the detention hearing, the

    district court's findings and the parties' briefs, we now

    consider the merits of the appeal. A special standard of review

    applies to pretrial detention orders:

    We approach our task mindful of our
    obligation to afford independent review,
    tempered by a degree of deference to the
    determinations made below. Recognizing that
    appellate courts are ill-equipped to resolve
    factbound disputes, this standard cedes
    particular respect, as a practical matter, to
    the lower court's factual determinations.
    Hence, independent review represents an
    intermediate level of scrutiny, more rigorous
    than the abuse-of-discretion or clear-error
    standards, but stopping short of plenary or
    de novo review.
    _______

    United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 882-83 (1st Cir.
    _____________ _______

    1990) (citations omitted).

    The grand jury indictment provided probable cause

    to believe that appellant had committed an offense for which

    a maximum term of ten years or more is prescribed in the


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    Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et. seq. See
    __ ___ ___

    United States v. Vargas, 804 F.2d 157, 163 (1st Cir. 1986)
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    (per curiam). Thus, the statutory presumption contained in

    18 U.S.C. 3142(e) became applicable. This provides that

    "it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of

    conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the

    person as required and the safety of the community." To

    rebut this presumption, appellant need only produce "some

    evidence" to show that "what is true in general is not true

    in [his] particular case . . . ." United States v. Jessup,
    _____________ ______

    757 F.2d 378, 384 (1st Cir. 1985). This is a burden of

    production, not persuasion. Id. at 380-81. However, even
    __

    assuming appellant successfully rebuts the presumption by

    producing "some evidence," the bubble does not "burst." Id.
    __

    at 383. The burden of persuasion remains on the government,

    but the rebutted presumption retains evidentiary force: it

    becomes a factor to be considered in addition to the other

    relevant factors in 3142(g). United States v. Palmer-
    ______________ _______

    Contreras, 835 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
    _________

    On the facts before us we agree with the district

    court that a detention order was justified under the terms of

    the statute. Congress has made it clear that "the risk that

    a defendant will continue to engage in drug trafficking

    constitutes a danger to the 'safety of any other person or

    the community.'" S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Congress, 2d Sess.

    13 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3196. Here,
    ____________


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    there is the risk that appellant might return to the

    narcotics trade if released on bail; appellant's past

    convictions did not prevent him from continuing to engage in

    drug trafficking. Of relevance is the fact that he violated

    the terms of his probation which then was revoked. See,
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    e.g., United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 335 (4th Cir.
    ___ _____________ ________

    1985) (finding evidence that defendants would "continue to be

    involved in narcotics if released on bail" based upon fact

    that they had done so despite presence of prior convictions

    and parole supervision); United States v. Dominquez, 629 F.
    _____________ _________

    Supp. 701 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (detention on grounds of danger to

    community ordered where defendant drug suppliers continued to

    engage in drug-related activities even after government

    intervention).

    Appellant's evidence did not significantly negate

    the risk of danger established by the government. Indeed,

    most of his evidence did not relate directly to the issue of

    the "safety of community." Rather, the evidence of the

    number of persons willing to aid appellant in securing bail

    related to his community ties and the risk of flight

    question. As Congress has pointed out, community ties have

    no correlation with the question of the safety of the

    community. See S. Rep. at 24, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
    ___ ____________

    at 3207.

    In addition, the evidence concerning the

    undisclosed financial assets belonging to appellant and his


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    apparent access to large amounts of cash supports the

    district court's finding that appellant presents a risk of

    flight. Indeed, appellant has a passport and the apparent

    wherewithal to obtain false identification. Finally,

    appellant appears to belong to a large narcotics trafficking

    organization; further, he is not just a "mule." Compare
    _______

    United States v. Palmer-Contreras, 835 F.2d at 18 (despite
    ______________ ________________

    the fact that defendants were only mules, detention proper on

    risk of flight grounds where organization for which

    defendants worked appeared to have significant financial

    resources to assist flight).

    In conclusion, the seriousness of the charges

    against appellant, the stiff sentence he faces if convicted,

    the nature and size of the criminal enterprise to which he

    allegedly belongs, his apparent access to large amounts of

    cash and the fact that he continued to engage in drug-

    trafficking after three state drug convictions provide a

    solid foundation on which to base a detention order.

    The order of the district court is affirmed.

    The motion to dispense with oral argument is denied

    as moot.












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