United States v. Barnett ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    April 16, 1993
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    No. 91-1890

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    MICHAEL BARNETT,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    _____________________

    No. 91-1891

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    BARRY JORDAN,

    Defendant, Appellant,
    _____________________

    No. 92-1778

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    BARRY JORDAN,

    Defendant, Appellant.



    ____________________


























    ERRATA SHEET


    The opinion of this Court issued March 29, 1993, is amended as
    follows:

    Page 22, line two of text after block quote, should read: . . .
    476 U.S. 1115 (1986) . . . .



























































    April 7, 1993
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 91-1890

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    MICHAEL BARNETT,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    _____________________

    No. 91-1891

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    BARRY JORDAN,

    Defendant, Appellant,
    _____________________

    No. 92-1778

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    BARRY JORDAN,

    Defendant, Appellant.



    ____________________



    3




















    ERRATA SHEET


    The opinion of this Court issued March 29, 1993, is amended as
    follows:

    Page 28, last line of text, should read: . . . since there were
    none.

























































    March 29, 1993
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 91-1890

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    MICHAEL BARNETT,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    _____________________

    No. 91-1891

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    BARRY JORDAN,

    Defendant, Appellant,
    _____________________

    No. 92-1778

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    BARRY JORDAN,

    Defendant, Appellant.



    ____________________



    5

















    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



    [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________


    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
    ___________

    Cyr and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
    ______________

    ____________________


    Gayle C. Wintjen with whom McGuinness & Parlagreco was on brief
    _________________ ________________________
    for appellant Michael Barnett.
    George F. Gormley for appellant Barry Jordan.
    _________________
    Joseph M. Walker III, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    _____________________
    A. John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
    __________________


    ____________________

    March 29, 1993
    ____________________







































    CYR, Circuit Judge. Appellants Michael Barnett and Barry Jordan
    CYR, Circuit Judge.
    _____________

    were charged, in a three-count indictment, with conspiracy to manufac-

    ture and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in viola-

    tion of 21 U.S.C. 846, possession with intent to distribute metham-

    phetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a) (1), and possession of a

    listed chemical in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(d)(1). Barnett was

    convicted on all three counts at trial; Jordan pleaded guilty to all

    three counts shortly after the commencement of trial. Each was

    sentenced to a thirty-year prison term and a ten-year term of super-

    vised release. On appeal, Barnett raises several challenges to his

    conviction, and joins Jordan in contesting the drug-quantity finding

    made by the district court at sentencing. We affirm.


    I
    I

    BACKGROUND
    BACKGROUND
    __________


    In March 1990, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA")

    began investigating a suspected conspiracy to manufacture and distrib-

    ute methamphetamine. Surveillance was initiated at three sites in the

    Scituate, Massachusetts area: the residences of each appellant and

    the residence of their codefendant, Timothy Fitzgerald.1

    Approximately a year before the investigation began, a trailer

    storage company had delivered a forty-foot trailer to Fitzgerald's


    ____________________

    1Fitzgerald was acquitted at trial.

    3

















    residence in Scituate. The employee who made the delivery later

    testified that the recipient of the trailer, known to him as "Tim,"

    instructed that the trailer be placed as far back as possible into the

    woods located on the property. Barnett subsequently rented the

    trailer from Fitzgerald.

    In early May, 1990, undercover DEA Agent John Kelly offered to

    sell Jordan hydriodic acid ostensibly stolen by Kelly.2 At their

    meeting, Jordan explained that his "chemist" had enough pseudoephed-

    rine to produce forty pounds (eighteen kilograms) of methamphetamine,

    but needed twenty pints of hydriodic acid for the manufacturing

    process. During their tape-recorded conversation, Jordan agreed to

    buy twenty pints of hydriodic acid, and to provide Kelly with four

    ounces of methamphetamine in return. Jordan assured Kelly that he

    would receive four "uncut" ounces, and suggested that Kelly could

    double the volume by diluting the pure methamphetamine with an equal

    amount of "cut," then sell the resulting eight ounces for $2,000 an

    ounce.

    Jordan described the methamphetamine manufacturing process to

    Kelly, explaining that it took seven to eight days, and that his

    chemist produced ten pounds of methamphetamine in each batch. To

    allay Kelly's concern about the danger of a laboratory explosion,

    ____________________

    2Hydriodic acid, a listed chemical, is essential to methamphet-
    amine production using the "ephedrine reduction process," which also
    requires either ephedrine or pseudoephedrine; red phosphorus may also
    be used as a purifying agent. To convert the methamphetamine into
    powder for distribution, it is dissolved into freon liquid, then
    bubbled in hydrogen chloride gas.

    4

















    Jordan explained that his chemist had been manufacturing methamphet-

    amine for ten years, and volunteered that he had assisted the chemist

    in preparing eight to ten batches one summer.3

    As promised, on May 16, 1990, Kelly delivered two boxes contain-

    ing twenty half-liter bottles (approximately twenty pints) of hyd-

    riodic acid to Jordan. A different DEA agent followed Jordan to

    Barnett's residence, where he observed Jordan and Barnett unloading

    two boxes from the trunk of Jordan's car.

    The DEA conducted a series of aerial surveillance fly-overs

    during May 1990. A fly-over of the Fitzgerald residence on or about

    May 27 revealed an electrical power cord running from the main house

    to the trailer. (The ephedrine reduction process requires a power

    source to heat the chemicals.)

    Two subsequent fly-overs of the Fitzgerald residence were con-

    ducted using an infrared heat-detecting device which operates in

    either of two polarity modes: "white-hot" or "black-hot." When the

    device is in the white-hot mode, objects emitting heat appear white on

    an attached screen; in the black-hot mode, heat-emitting objects

    appear black. The device detected no heat emission from the trailer

    during a fly-over on May 28. On May 30, Massachusetts State Police


    ____________________

    3After pleading guilty during trial, Jordan submitted an affida-
    vit in which he insisted that these statements were mere "puffing,"
    intended to convince Kelly that he was willing and able to complete
    their transaction. The affidavit attests that Jordan knew nothing
    about the manufacture of methamphetamine, and that his only role in
    the enterprise was to obtain hydriodic acid in exchange for a small
    amount of money to support his heroin habit.

    5

















    Trooper Richard Welby, who had relatively little experience with the

    infrared equipment, conducted another fly-over. Welby, erroneously

    believing the device was in the white-hot mode, observed that the

    trailer appeared white on the screen, and concluded that it was

    emitting heat. Subsequent analysis revealed, however, that the device

    actually was in the black-hot mode during the May 30 fly-over, and the

    infrared images, properly interpreted, indicated that the trailer was

    emitting no detectible heat.

    On the afternoon of May 30, a DEA agent followed Barnett to the

    Fitzgerald property. When Barnett disappeared down the driveway, the

    agent left his vehicle and surreptitiously followed on foot. The

    agent spotted the trailer and saw Barnett inside. The agent noticed

    several blue buckets, a white radiator, and two boxes in the rear of

    the trailer. As the agent watched, Barnett scraped the bottom of one

    of the blue buckets for approximately five minutes, then poured liquid

    into the bucket. Barnett left the trailer and entered the main house,

    returning with several paper towels with which he filtered the yellow

    slushy contents of the bucket, then poured the filtered substance into

    a gray painter's tray. Barnett made another trip to the main house,

    this time returning with clear plastic sandwich bags. He picked up

    the gray painter's tray, rocked it back and forth several times, then

    poured the yellow slushy substance into one of the bags, double-bagged

    it, and returned once again to the main house.

    The DEA agent returned to his vehicle, and waited for Barnett to

    drive away. After about twenty-five minutes, Barnett left the

    6

















    Fitzgerald property and drove to a shopping center, unaware that he

    was being followed by the agent. When the agent pulled into the

    shopping center parking lot, he noticed a second individual in Bar-

    nett's vehicle. The agent identified the second individual as appel-

    lant Jordan.

    On May 30, DEA Agent Lemon compiled the information obtained from

    the various surveillance operations (including the erroneous heat-

    imaging data interpretation) in an affidavit, which he attached to an

    application for a warrant to search the trailer on the Fitzgerald

    property, the Fitzgerald and Jordan residences, and a residence

    believed to be occupied by Barnett.

    The investigation culminated early the next morning when the

    search warrants were executed. First, agents searched the Fitzgerald

    trailer, unveiling a partially assembled laboratory containing an

    array of chemicals, including hydriodic acid, acetone, freon, and

    hydrogen chloride gas, and an assortment of equipment associated with

    methamphetamine production, including a radiator, a fan, flasks,

    tubes, and a heater-timer. Three ounces of methamphetamine crystals

    and a bucket containing approximately one pound of methamphetamine

    crystals in two and one-half pounds of an acetone/freon solution were

    also discovered. Subsequent analysis determined that the methamphet-

    amine found in the bucket was between 90 and 100 percent pure.

    DEA agents arrested Jordan and Fitzgerald at their respective

    residences. At Jordan's residence, agents seized a small quantity of

    a mixture containing heroin and methamphetamine, as well as a valium

    7

















    tablet, several hypodermic needles, and several publications describ-

    ing the methamphetamine manufacturing process. At Fitzgerald's

    residence, agents found a piece of paper listing the chemical ingredi-

    ents needed to produce methamphetamine using the ephedrine reduction

    process ("the Fitzgerald chemical list").

    Barnett no longer resided at the residence for which the fourth

    search warrant had been obtained. When DEA agents arrested Barnett at

    his new residence, he was advised of his Miranda rights and that the
    _______

    laboratory had been discovered at the Fitzgerald property. Agents

    searched Barnett's new residence,4 and discovered a warehouse re-

    ceipt. In response to a question from Agent Lemon about the receipt,

    Barnett revealed that the remaining equipment and chemicals were in a

    storage bin at the warehouse. A warrant was secured and the search of

    the storage bin uncovered approximately fifteen pounds of red phospho-

    rous, a seventy-pound drum containing an unspecified quantity of

    hydriodic acid, a fifty-kilogram container of pseudoephedrine slightly

    less than half full, and various other chemicals, glassware, cooking

    devices, protective gear and gloves.

    At DEA headquarters, after determining that Barnett had been

    advised of his Miranda rights, DEA agent Boeri engaged Barnett in
    _______

    conversation about the methamphetamine operation. In response to

    Boeri's questions, Barnett admitted that he was the "chemist," indi-

    cated that he had experienced no difficulty obtaining chemicals, and

    ____________________

    4Barnett contests the district court ruling that the warrantless
    search was consensual. See infra at pt. II.B.1.
    ___ _____

    8

















    explained that his methamphetamine was "ninety nine and one percent"

    pure as a consequence of the two "extra" manufacturing steps he

    performed.

    Five days into their joint trial, Jordan pleaded guilty to all

    counts. Thereafter, the jury convicted Barnett, and acquitted

    Fitzgerald, on all counts.



    II
    II

    DISCUSSION
    DISCUSSION
    __________


    A. Sentencing Issues
    A. Sentencing Issues
    _________________

    Barnett and Jordan challenge the sentencing court's determination

    that each was responsible for twenty-nine kilograms of pure metham-

    phetamine. Jordan alone contests the court's drug purity ruling. We

    review for clear error, see 18 U.S.C. 3742(e); United States v.
    ___ ______________

    Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 262 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, U.S.
    _____________ _____ ______ ___ _

    , 113 S. Ct. 220 (1992); United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 220
    _____________ ______

    (1st Cir. 1992), with a view to whether the factual findings made by

    the sentencing court were supported by a preponderance of the reliable

    information. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d
    ___ ____ _____________ _________________

    1148, 1155 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 54
    _____ ______ ____ ____

    (1991); United States v. Zuleta-Alvarez, 922 F.2d 33, 37 (1st Cir.
    _____________ ______________

    1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2039 (1991).
    _____ ______


    1.Drug Quantity
    1.Drug Quantity
    _____________

    The district court adopted the drug-quantity findings set out in

    9

















    the presentence reports ("PSRs").5 Each PSR provided, in relevant

    part:


    In this offense, the defendant secured a 50 kilogram drum of
    pseudoephedrine which would make 29 kilograms of pure metham-
    phetamine. There was every indication that they had the
    materials to produce this full amount. As such, the Drug
    Quantity Table under [s]ubsection (c), offenses involving at
    least 10 kilograms but less than 30 kilograms of pure metham-
    phetamine provides for a base offense level of 40.


    Appellants insist that the court overestimated the capacity of their

    drug manufacturing operation and that their sentences should have been

    based exclusively on the quantity of methamphetamine seized.

    The sentencing guidelines direct that a defendant who is convict-

    ed of conspiring or attempting to commit any offense involving a

    controlled substance shall be assigned the same base offense level "as

    if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been completed."

    U.S.S.G. 2D1.4. Further guidance is provided in an application

    note:


    Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not
    __ ___ ______ ______ ____ ___
    reflect the scale of the offense, the sentencing judge shall
    _______ ___ _____ __ ___ _______
    approximate the quantity of the controlled substance. In
    making his determination, the judge may consider, for exam-
    ple, the price generally obtained for the controlled sub-
    stance, financial or other records, similar transactions in
    controlled substances by the defendant, and the size or
    ___ ____ __

    ____________________

    5Appellants mistakenly suggest that the court made no specific
    finding as to the quantity of drugs for which they were being held
    responsible. The court checked the box on the "Statement of Reasons"
    form attached to the judgment relating to each defendant, thereby
    clearly indicating that "[t]he court adopt[ed] the factual findings
    and guideline application in the presentence report." We therefore
    reject their Rule 32(c)(3)(D) claim.

    10

















    capability of any laboratory involved.
    __________ __ ___ __________ ________


    U.S.S.G. 2D1.4, comment. (n.2) (1991) (emphasis added).

    Three ounces of methamphetamine crystals, and a bucket containing

    an additional pound of methamphetamine crystals in two and one-half

    pounds of liquid, were seized. Nevertheless, the district court

    reasonably concluded that the quantity of methamphetamine seized did

    not accurately reflect the scale of the offense, see id., especially
    ___ ___

    in view of Jordan's admissions that his "chemist" had at hand the

    ingredients with which to produce forty pounds of methamphetamine, and

    in view of the equipment found in the trailer and storage facility,

    and the sizable quantities of precursor chemicals seized. Accord-

    ingly, under the sentencing guidelines the district court did not err

    in estimating the drug quantity.

    The court based its drug-quantity calculation on the amount of

    methamphetamine producible with fifty kilograms of pseudoephedrine.

    Barnett and Jordan object to this calculation because it disregards

    the undisputed fact that the fifty-kilogram drum contained only

    twenty-three kilograms of pseudoephedrine when it was seized. More-

    over, Jordan insists that the court's approximation of the quantity of

    methamphetamine was flawed because other essential precursor chemicals

    were not seized in the quantities required to produce twenty-nine

    kilograms of methamphetamine, in particular hydriodic acid.

    In approximating the producible quantity of controlled substance,

    the sentencing court may consider the amount of precursor chemicals


    11

















    possessed. See, e.g., United States v. Beshore, 961 F.2d 1380, 1383-
    ___ ____ _____________ _______

    84 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 241 (1992), and
    _____ ______ ___ ___

    cert. denied, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 243 (1992); United States v.
    _____ ______ ____ ____ _____________

    Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1456-58 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
    _____ _____ ______

    ___, 112 S. Ct. 1680 (1992); United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761,
    _____________ _______

    766 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Macklin, 927 F.2d 1272, 1281
    ______________ _______

    (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 146 (1991); United
    _____ ______ ______

    States v. Kingston, 922 F.2d 1234, 1236-38 (6th Cir. 1990), cert.
    ______ ________ _____

    denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2054 (1991); United States v.
    ______ _____________

    Smallwood, 920 F.2d 1231, 1236-38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
    _________ _____ ______

    ___, 111 S. Ct. 2870 (1991). Although the sentencing court must "'err

    on the side of caution'" in selecting from among plausible alternative

    drug-quantity estimates, United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 113
    ______________ _____

    (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1301
    _____________ ______

    (6th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 111 S. Ct. 273 (1990)), we
    _____ ______

    cannot conclude that its approximation is constrained by the precur-

    sor-chemical quantities actually seized, see Beshore, 961 F.2d at 1383
    ___ _______

    (approximation of drug quantity "does not require that every precursor

    chemical be present"). Rather, U.S.S.G. 2D1.4 expressly authorizes

    consideration of the size or capability of any laboratory. See United
    ____ __ __________ __ ___ __________ ___ ______

    States v. Havens, 910 F.2d 703, 705 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
    ______ ______ _____ ______

    ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 687 (1991) (explaining that a drug-quantity

    estimate "should be equal to the amount of drugs produceable if the

    precursor chemicals possessed by the defendant were combined with

    proportionate amounts of the missing ingredients including processing

    12

















    equipment"); see also United States v. Bertrand, 926 F.2d 838, 846
    ___ ____ _____________ ________

    (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no clear error in drug-quantity approximation

    based on capacity of methamphetamine lab, notwithstanding lack of

    hydriodic acid); Smallwood, 920 F.2d at 1237 (upholding drug-quantity
    _________

    finding notwithstanding absence of precursor chemicals); cf. United
    ___ ______

    States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 368-70 (1st Cir. 1989) (basing
    ______ _______

    approximation of drug quantity on discovery at defendant's residence

    of $68,000 believed to be proceeds from recent drug sale). As we see

    it, the quantity of essential precursor chemicals seized, like the

    capacity of the laboratory and the evidence relating to the overall

    scheme, see Smallwood, 920 F.2d at 1237-38, is but one among several
    ___ _________

    circumstantial factors appropriately considered in approximating drug

    quantities for sentencing purposes.

    We must determine whether the government presented sufficient

    reliable information to permit the court reasonably to conclude that

    appellants were responsible for a quantity of drugs at least equal to

    the quantity threshold for the assigned base offense level. See
    ___

    Sklar, 920 F.2d at 113. The base offense level assigned each appel-
    _____

    lant was 40, the level applicable to offenses involving between ten

    and thirty kilograms of unadulterated methamphetamine. A DEA chemist

    testified at trial that fifty kilograms of pseudoephedrine would yield

    twenty-nine kilograms of methamphetamine.6 Utilizing the same ratio

    ____________________

    6Jordan points out that the court did not state that it was
    relying on the DEA chemist's testimony, that the drug quantity approx-
    imation in the PSR is not attributed to the chemist, and that Jordan
    had no opportunity to cross-examine the chemist, who testified after

    13

















    one unit of pseudoephedrine per a .58 unit of methamphetamine

    the twenty-three kilograms of pseudoephedrine seized in the fifty-

    kilogram drum would yield approximately thirteen kilograms of metham-

    phetamine, a quantity sufficient to warrant the base offense level of

    40.

    The DEA chemist further testified that the ephedrine reduction

    process requires hydriodic acid in quantities from one to four times

    the amount of pseudoephedrine, depending upon the particular "recipe."

    Although the evidence does not establish the exact amount of hydriodic

    acid the defendants possessed, approximately ten liters were seized,

    along with an unspecified quantity found in a seventy-pound container

    at the warehouse. In addition, an empty seventy-pound hydriodic acid

    container was found at the trailer.

    Furthermore, Jordan admitted to Agent Kelly that he and the

    "chemist" had all the necessary ingredients, with the exception of the

    hydriodic acid being procured from Kelly, with which to manufacture

    forty pounds (eighteen kilograms) of methamphetamine immediately. The

    court also had before it the Fitzgerald chemical list, reflecting

    chemical quantities sufficient to produce at least twenty-nine kilo-

    ____________________

    Jordan had entered his guilty plea.
    "A sentencing hearing need not meet all the procedural safeguards
    and strict evidentiary limitations of a criminal trial." Zuleta-
    _______
    Alvarez, 922 F.2d at 36. The sentencing court may rely on extrinsic
    _______
    evidence which was not subjected to cross-examination, so long as
    there are "'sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
    accuracy.'" Id. at 36 (quoting U.S.S.G. 6A1.3). Jordan failed to
    __
    present any evidence at sentencing to refute the drug-quantity approx-
    imation in the PSR. We discern no clear error in the sentencing
    court's reliance on the DEA chemist's trial testimony.

    14

















    grams of methamphetamine. Some quantity of each chemical on the list

    was seized either from the trailer or the warehouse and in the size

    container specified on the list.7 Appellants' PSRs also contain the

    uncontroverted statements that Barnett produced approximately eight

    pounds of methamphetamine in December 1989 and that Jordan participat-

    ed in its distribution. Neither appellant presented countervailing

    drug-quantity or chemical-quantity evidence at sentencing.

    We discern no clear error. The district court had before it

    sufficient reliable information to support a finding that Barnett and

    Jordan were actually responsible for not less than ten kilograms of
    ___ ____

    methamphetamine, warranting a base offense level of 40.


    2. Drug Purity
    2. Drug Purity
    ___________

    An explanatory note appended to the Drug Quantity Table distin-

    ____________________

    7The Fitzgerald chemical list reads as follows:
    d-pseudoephedrine Hcl.
    50 kilo drum
    Hydriodic Acid
    4 - 70 lb drum

    Red Phosphorus
    15 lb
    R-IIFreon
    7 - 100 lb drums
    Methyl Alchohol [sic]
    (methanol)
    5 - 5 gal drums
    Acetone
    7 - 5 gal drums

    Among the seized chemicals were a partially filled fifty-kilogram drum
    of pseudoephedrine, one empty and one partially filled seventy-pound
    hydriodic acid drum, several one-pound bottles of red phosphorus, a
    100-pound drum of freon, several five-gallon containers of methanol,
    and two five-gallon acetone containers.

    15

















    guishes between the terms "methamphetamine (actual)" and "metham-

    phetamine":

    Unless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled sub-
    stance set forth in the table refers to the entire weight of
    any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
    the controlled substance . . . . The term[] . . . "[m]etham-
    phetamine (actual)" refer[s] to the weight of the controlled
    substance, itself, contained in the mixture or substance.

    U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c). The table prescribes a base offense level of 40

    for offenses involving between ten and thirty kilograms of "metham-

    phetamine (actual)," whereas the same quantity of adulterated "metham-

    phetamine" carries a base offense level of 36. Now, for the first

    time, Jordan argues that the record does not establish the purity of

    the methamphetamine for which he was held responsible, and that his

    base offense level should have been computed under the Drug Quantity

    Table entry for adulterated "methamphetamine" rather than "methamphet-

    amine (actual)."

    Issues not squarely raised in the district court will not be

    entertained on appeal. See United States v. Haggert, 980 F.2d 8, 10-
    ___ ______________ _______

    11 (1st Cir. 1992) (collecting cases). Although defense counsel

    consistently referred to base offense levels corresponding to

    adulterated "methamphetamine" rather than "methamphetamine (actual),"

    both at sentencing and in opposition to the PSR, at no time did he

    expressly raise drug purity as an issue in the district court.

    "Judges are not expected to be mindreaders. Consequently, a litigant

    has an obligation to spell out [his] arguments squarely and distinct-

    ly, or else forever hold [his] peace." United States v. Zannino, 895
    _____________ _______


    16

















    F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.) (internal citations and quotation marks omit-

    ted), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990). The drug-purity claim must
    _____ ______

    be deemed waived, as it was never raised below.8


    B. Suppression Issues
    B. Suppression Issues
    __________________

    1. The Consensual Search
    1. The Consensual Search
    _____________________

    Barnett filed a pretrial motion to suppress certain physical

    evidence and admissions, on the ground that he did not voluntarily

    consent to the warrantless search of his residence. The district

    court disagreed. We review for clear error. United States v. Wilkin-
    _____________ _______

    son, 926 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___, U.S. ___, 111 S.
    ___ _____ ______

    Ct. 2813 (1991); United States v. Twomey, 884 F.2d 46, 51-52 (1st Cir.
    _____________ ______

    1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 908 (1990). A warrantless residential
    _____ ______

    search violates the Fourth Amendment unless it comes within one of the

    "'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions[,]'"

    ____________________

    8The raise-or-waive rule will be relaxed only in exceptional
    cases involving a gross miscarriage of justice where the belated claim
    is "'so compelling as virtually to insure appellant's success.'"
    Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1979)
    ________ ___________________
    (quoting Dobb v. Baker, 505 F.2d 1041, 1044 (1st Cir. 1974)); see
    ____ _____ ___
    United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1992); Haggert, 980
    _____________ _____ _______
    F.2d at 10-11; Hernandez-Hernandez v. United States, 904 F.2d 758, 763
    ___________________ _____________
    (1st Cir. 1990). This narrow exception is unavailing in the present
    case.
    The sentencing court had before it evidence that Barnett per-
    formed extra manufacturing steps to assure maximum purity, that Jordan
    promised to deliver "uncut" methamphetamine to Agent Kelly, that
    Barnett boasted to Agent Boeri that his methamphetamine had been
    analyzed "ninety-nine and one hundred percent" pure, and that the
    methamphetamine seized at the trailer was between ninety and one
    hundred percent pure. Absent any evidence that the methamphetamine
    was diluted or adulterated in any manner, the sentencing court was
    presented with insufficient evidence to sustain Jordan's present drug-
    purity claim.

    17

















    Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (quoting Katz v.
    ___________ __________ ____

    United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)), which include consensual
    _____________

    searches, id. at 219, 228. The voluntariness of a consent to search
    ___

    turns on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. United
    ______

    States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth, 412 U.S.
    ______ __________ ___________

    at 227. Among the individualized factors bearing on the vulnerability

    of the consenting party are age, education, experience, intelligence,

    and knowledge of the right to withhold consent. More general consid-

    erations include whether the consenting party was advised of his or

    her constitutional rights and whether permission to search was ob-

    tained by coercive means or under inherently coercive circumstances.

    Id. at 226; Twomey, 884 F.2d at 51. Although sensitivity to the
    ___ ______

    heightened possibility of coercion is appropriate when a defendant's

    consent is obtained during custody, see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 240,
    ___ ___________

    n.29, "custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate

    . . . coerced . . . consent to search." United States v. Watson, 423
    _____________ ______

    U.S. 411, 424 (1976).

    Barnett argues that his consent was coerced, in that he was met

    at the door of his home by seven or eight law enforcement officers,

    with guns drawn. Immediately after he was arrested and handcuffed,

    the officers holstered their weapons and advised Barnett of his

    Miranda rights. Barnett was then asked if he would consent to a
    _______







    18

















    search of the premises.9 Barnett claims that he was never informed

    that he could withhold his consent, he was given no consent form, and

    he was led to believe that the officers already had a search warrant

    because they began searching the premises immediately upon entering,

    prior to requesting consent.

    Written consent is not essential to the establishment of a valid

    consensual search. See, e.g., United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377,
    ___ ____ _____________ _______

    382 (8th Cir. 1990) (search may be justified by voluntary oral consent

    even in the absence of valid written consent); United States v.
    ______________

    Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant's refusal to
    ________

    sign a consent form does not preclude a finding of voluntariness).

    Moreover, it is not essential that the officers first inform the

    consenting party of the right to withhold consent, though knowledge of

    the right to withhold consent is a factor to be considered in assess-

    ing voluntariness, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; see also Florida v.
    ___________ ___ ____ _______

    Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1984).
    _________

    Although Barnett testified that agents began "searching, looking

    under things," and "opening drawers and cabinets," Lemon testified


    ____________________

    9Barnett testified that, following his arrest, he was told by
    Agent Lemon: "Mike, we are just going to look around and take you
    down to the Marshfield Police Station, okay?" Barnett replied,
    "Okay." Barnett contends that he was merely acknowledging his arrest
    and inevitable booking, not consenting to a search of his residence.
    Based on Agent Lemon's testimony, however, the court found that
    Barnett was asked: "Mind if I look around the house?" and responded,
    "Go ahead. You'd probably get a search warrant anyway." The district
    court was presented with a pure credibility determination. We find no
    clear error in its determination that Lemon's version of the events
    was more credible.

    19

















    that a protective sweep was conducted immediately upon entering the
    __________ _____

    premises to ensure that no one else was present.10 Thereafter, ac-

    cording to Lemon, the agents "just [stood] around" until Barnett

    consented to a further search. We find no clear error in the trial

    court's credibility-based ruling that "a sweep search was conducted."

    Barnett's contention that the search conducted immediately upon

    entry led him to believe that the agents already had a search warrant

    cannot succeed in any event. The district court expressly found that

    Barnett responded as follows to Lemon's request for consent to search:

    "Go ahead. You'd probably get a search warrant anyway[]" (emphasis
    ______ _______ ______

    added), plainly implying Barnett's understanding that the agents had

    no search warrant and needed his consent.

    Notwithstanding the inherently unnerving effect of having numer-

    ous officers arrive at one's door with guns drawn, Barnett was no

    "newcomer" to law-enforcement encounters. See United States v.
    ___ ______________

    Kimball, 741 F.2d 471, 474 (1st Cir. 1984). Barnett had been convict-
    _______

    ed of at least eighteen prior offenses and arrested on at least eight

    previous occasions. Thus, we may fairly presume that he was "less

    likely than most to be intimidated by the agents' show of force."

    United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 244 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
    _____________ _________ _____


    ____________________

    10A sweep search is "narrowly confined to a cursory visual
    inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding," Mary-
    _____
    land v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). The officers are permitted to
    ____ ____
    take reasonable steps to ensure their safety, and may, "without
    probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other
    spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack
    could be immediately launched." Id.
    ___

    20

















    denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976), and cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
    ______ _____ ______

    In addition, before he was asked to consent to the search, all guns

    had been holstered and Barnett was advised of his Miranda rights,
    _______

    "'put[ting] him on notice that he [could] refuse to cooperate,'" id.
    ___

    (quoting Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158, 164 (1st Cir. 1967)).
    ______ _____________

    Finally, there was no evidence of overt or covert threats or pressure

    to exact Barnett's consent.

    In these circumstances, we conclude that Barnett's will was not

    overborne, nor his "capacity for self-determination critically im-

    paired." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225. Ultimately, as we are not
    ___________

    "'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

    committed,'" Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)
    ________ ______________

    (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
    _____________ ________________________

    (1948)), we find no clear error in the trial court's determination

    that Barnett's consent was voluntary.


    2. The Lemon Affidavit
    2. The Lemon Affidavit
    ___________________

    Next, Barnett claims that the district court erred in refusing to

    suppress evidence obtained as a result of alleged false statements in

    the affidavit supporting the search warrant application. Barnett

    contends that the erroneous heat-imaging test data in the Lemon

    affidavit was materially false or included with reckless disregard for

    its truth. Without it, says Barnett, the Lemon affidavit was insuffi-

    cient to establish probable cause to search the trailer.

    The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing pursuant to


    21

















    Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Franks findings are reviewed
    ______ ________ ______

    for clear error. United States v. Cole, 807 F.2d 262, 268 (1st Cir.
    ______ ______ ____

    1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). The questions for us are
    _____ ______

    (1) whether Barnett established by a preponderance of the evidence at

    the Franks hearing that the affidavit was perjurious, or prepared with
    ______

    reckless disregard for its truth, and (2) whether the affidavit,
    ___

    without the false material, was insufficient to establish probable

    cause for the search. If so, the warrant was void and the fruits of

    the search must be suppressed. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
    ______

    Barnett claims that the heat-imaging data Trooper Welby provided

    to Lemon, see supra at pp. 5-6, was either deliberately or recklessly
    ___ _____

    false, because Welby failed to inform Lemon that he lacked training

    and experience in operating the device and failed to examine the

    device prior to the May 30 flyover to determine which polarity mode

    was operative.

    The district court finding that Welby did not act in bad faith

    was not clearly erroneous. There is no evidence that Welby intention-

    ally misinterpreted the data from the infrared equipment. Rather, the

    evidence strongly suggests, just as the court found, that Welby

    sincerely believed, albeit mistakenly, that the equipment was in the

    "white-hot" polarity mode during the fly-over.

    Neither is there evidence that Lemon knew that the heat-imaging

    data was incorrect. Nevertheless, Barnett argues that Lemon's failure

    to make note, in the affidavit, that Welby had little experience with

    the heat-imaging equipment was a material omission made intentionally

    22

















    or with reckless disregard for the truth. Although the district court

    made no direct finding on this issue, we need not pursue the matter as

    the affidavit would have been sufficient without the challenged data.


    "[I]f an affiant knowingly includes a false statement in a
    warrant affidavit, the warrant will stand if, 'when material
    that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disre-
    gard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in
    the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable
    cause.'"


    United States v. Veillette, 778 F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
    _____________ _________ _____

    denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72).
    ______ ______



    The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is met if the magistrate

    had a "'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that a search would

    uncover evidence of wrongdoing." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236
    ________ _____

    (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
    _____ ______________

    Without regard to the incorrect heat-imaging data, the Lemon affidavit

    established probable cause to search the trailer.11 The suppression

    ____________________

    11We summarize some of the more salient information in the affi-
    davit:
    (1) In March 1990, a cooperating individual informed Lemon that
    Barry Jordan and a man known as "Barney" were manufacturing metham-
    phetamine in the South Shore area, possibly in Scituate. According to
    the informant, Jordan and "Barney" manufactured ten pounds of metham-
    phetamine in November or December of 1989.
    (2) Jordan told DEA undercover agent Kelly that he and his
    chemist had 160 pounds of chemicals, and needed only hydriodic acid to
    manufacture forty pounds of methamphetamine. Kelly supplied the
    hydriodic acid in exchange for Jordan's promise to give Kelly four
    ounces of methamphetamine.
    (3) Clandestine methamphetamine labs typically have air vents or
    ducts to dissipate toxic fumes; photographs of the trailer revealed a
    "black bordered area" which Lemon, based on his experience, believed

    23

















    ruling was not clearly erroneous.

    C. Severance
    C. Severance
    _________

    Next, Barnett claims that denial of his severance motion violated

    his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, as a consequence of the

    prejudice occasioned by the admission in evidence, at the joint trial,

    of codefendant Fitzgerald's post-arrest statements, see Bruton v.
    ___ ______

    United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), and that he was further prejudiced
    _____________

    by the testimony of Fitzgerald's spouse, Sheryl.

    At trial, Agent Lemon testified as follows:


    I advised Mr. Fitzgerald that we had done a search on the
    trailer in his backyard. I advised Mr. Fitzgerald that we
    had found a speed lab, a methamphetamine lab. I told him
    that I believed another person was the chemist, and I also
    told Mr. Fitzgerald that I believed he knew who the other
    person was and that this other person was a chemist . . . .
    He told me he knew who this other person was, but that he did
    not know that this person was involved with a clandestine
    laboratory. He stated that he knew him or this other person
    socially and that he would go out on occasion and have a few
    drinks with this other person. . . . Mr. Fitzgerald told me
    that he rented the trailer out to this other person and that
    it was used for construction. . . . Mr. Fitzgerald told me
    that he . . . did not know what was going on out in the

    ____________________

    to be a trapdoor or venting area for a clandestine laboratory inside
    the trailer.
    (4) The pattern of electricity consumption suggested the pres-
    ence of a clandestine lab. The electricity bills showed a dramatic
    increase in December 1989, the time period during which Jordan and
    "Barney" manufactured ten pounds of methamphetamine.
    (5) During a DEA flyover on May 26, 1990, a DEA agent first
    observed a power cord running between the trailer and the main house.
    During a May 28 flyover, two Massachusetts State Troopers observed the
    same cord.
    (6) A DEA agent observed Barnett mixing and straining a "yellow,
    slushy mixture" at the trailer on May 30.
    (7) The trailer was located in a remote, wooded location, an
    ideal site for a clandestine laboratory.

    24



























































































    Barnett objected and moved to strike on Bruton grounds.12 The court
    ______
    trailer, and I then asked Mr. Fitzgerald how he could explain

    what Mr. Fitzgerald told me was that he was in the trailer,
    the hydrio[d]ic acid label that was found in his coat, and

    he saw the bottles of hydrio[d]ic acid, and that he removed
    one of the labels because he wanted to find out what it was.











































    Lemon's testimony relating his own extrajudicial statements to Fitz-

    25
    13Although Barnett moved to strike the "entire conversation," he
    did so on Bruton grounds only. No separate objection was made to
    ______
    given.
    against Fitzgerald. No limiting instruction was requested, offered or







    Fitzgerald about "the chemist," no Bruton problem was presented and no
    ______
    the Lemon testimony related the extrajudicial statements Lemon made to
    _____
    There was no confrontation clause violation. First, insofar as








    12At sidebar, the following exchange occurred:

    ____________________
    hearsay objection was made.13 Even Fitzgerald's extrajudicial state-
    ____________
    sustained the Barnett objection, but allowed the testimony to stand
















    T H E C O U R T :


    MR. HORAN:I would still contend that all along [for Barnett]:
    the statement was sanitized so to speak, but the implication







    MR. KENDALL:He will. What the Government would [AUSA]
    is still clear by the Government that the person who is being











    confessing to anything" and was a mere "fact witness" is reversible
    anything. He's a fact witness.
    T H E C O U R T :
    talked about here is Michael Barnett.


    Let's assume it is. He [Fitzgerald] is not confessing to




    nett, or, conversely, it is only to Fitzgerald.

    Barnett contends that the court's comment that Fitzgerald "was not
    agree to is the statement will not be admitted against Bar-
    How is this based under the Bruton issue?
    ______
















    error. This argument is baseless.
    ments to Lemon neither identified nor inculpated Barnett, but merely

    related factual observations established by other independent evi-

    dence. Second, assuming the jury did deduce, as seems likely, that

    Lemon and Fitzgerald were referring to Barnett, Fitzgerald's state-

    ments nonetheless did not entail the sort of "'powerfully incriminat-

    ing' effect of one accomplice pointing the finger directly at another,

    without subjecting himself to cross-examination." United States v.
    ______________

    DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1190 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937
    __________ ____ ______

    (1979), and cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979), and cert. denied, 444
    ____ ______ ____ ______

    U.S. 983 (1979) (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135). See also United
    ______ ___ ____ ______

    States v. Greenleaf, 692 F.2d 182, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1982), cert.
    ______ _________ ____

    denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983) (finding no Bruton violation where
    ______ ______

    codefendant's statement was not "powerfully incriminating."). Not

    only did Fitzgerald not confess guilt, he in no manner admitted to
    _______

    knowledge of Barnett's guilt. Thus, Fitzgerald's admissions to Lemon
    _________

    inculpated neither Barnett nor Fitzgerald.14

    ____________________

    gerald in the guise of reciting Lemon's investigative efforts.

    14Whatever prejudice might otherwise have resulted from the joint
    trial was minimized by precautions the district court took to forfend
    against it. After the pretrial severance motion was denied, the
    government stipulated that any testimony relating post-arrest state-
    ments by Fitzgerald would not refer to Barnett by name and the dis-
    trict court firmly admonished against "any mention of [Barnett]" in
    connection with Fitzgerald's statements.
    Barnett nevertheless maintains that the court committed revers-
    ible error by failing to instruct the jury that Fitzgerald's extraju-
    dicial statements were not admissible against Barnett, even though
    Barnett did not request a limiting instruction, either at the time of
    the ruling or at the time of the final jury charge, and even though he
    did not object to the charge. The claim must be deemed waived, United
    ______
    States v. Mateos-Sanchez, 864 F.2d 232, 238 (1st Cir. 1988); United
    ______ ______________ ______

    26

















    Barnett submits that severance was warranted, nonetheless, to

    avoid the cumulative prejudice from Fitzgerald's extrajudicial state-

    ments and the testimony of Sheryl Fitzgerald.15 The severance

    ruling is reviewable for abuse of discretion, reversible only if it

    "'deprived defendant of a fair trial, resulting in a miscarriage of

    justice.'" United States v. Tejeda, 974 F.2d 210, 219 (1st Cir. 1992)
    _____________ ______

    (quoting United States v. McLaughlin, 957 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir.
    _____________ __________

    1992)); see also United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 922 (1st
    ___ ____ _____________ ________

    Cir. 1991) (severance is committed to the sound discretion of the

    trial judge, reversible only on a showing of manifest abuse). While

    incidental prejudice is sometimes unavoidable in a joint trial, only a


    ____________________

    States v. Rawwad, 807 F.2d 294, 296 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482
    ______ ______ ____ ______
    U.S. 909 (1987), especially since it seems highly likely that the
    trial court would have viewed it as a reasonable tactical decision for
    defense counsel to refrain from requesting an instruction recalling
    the jury's attention to Lemon's testimony. "We have been extremely
    reluctant 'to increase the heavy burdens already imposed on trial
    judges in criminal cases' by mandating that the district courts act
    sua sponte to override seemingly plausible strategic choices on the
    ___ ______
    part of counselled defendants." United States v. De La Cruz, 902 F.2d
    _____________ __________
    121, 124 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Reveron Martinez,
    _____________ ________________
    836 F.2d 684, 687 (1st Cir. 1988)). Furthermore, we are confident
    that there was no plain error. The absence of a limiting instruction
    did not "seriously affect the fundamental fairness and basic integrity
    of the proceedings," United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 100 (1st
    _____________ _______
    Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844 (1987).
    ____ ______

    15Barnett identifies two aspects of Sheryl Fitzgerald's testimony
    as especially prejudicial: (1) that Barnett entered the Fitzgerald
    house several times on May 30, leaving with clear plastic sandwich
    bags in his possession on one occasion; and (2) that, after Barnett
    left on the evening of May 30, she found a piece of paper bearing
    handwriting different than her husband's, and gave it to her husband
    to deliver to Barnett. Barnett does not mention, in this connection,
    some of Sheryl Fitzgerald's other testimony. For example, she testi-
    fied that she rented the trailer to Barnett.

    27

















    strong showing of substantial prejudice will warrant reversal.

    McLaughlin, 957 F.2d at 18.
    __________

    The "heavy burden" of demonstrating the unfair prejudice required

    for reversal has not been met. See United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d
    ___ _____________ _______

    1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1991). First, the record does not disclose that

    this issue was preserved at trial, as Barnett neither objected to

    Sheryl Fitzgerald's testimony, nor requested a limiting or cautionary

    instruction. Second, Barnett identifies no basis for excluding her

    testimony, either at a joint trial or a separate trial. Thus, al-

    though her testimony inculpated Barnett, there was no unfair preju-

    dice.


    D. Criminal Rule 35
    D. Criminal Rule 35
    ________________

    Barnett appeals from the dismissal of his motion to correct

    sentence pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a), which sought a downward

    departure due to diminished mental capacity.16 The district court


    ____________________

    16Barnett claims that he suffers from short-term memory loss.
    Mental and emotional conditions generally are not grounds for downward
    departure. U.S.S.G. 5H1.3. See United States v. Lauzon, 938 F.2d
    ___ _____________ ______
    326, 333 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 U.S. 450 (1991);
    ____ ______
    United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254, 257 (1st Cir. 1990). Never-
    _____________ _______
    theless, a guideline policy statement provides as follows:

    If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suf-
    fering from significantly reduced mental capacity not result-
    ing from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower
    sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which
    reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the
    offense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does
    not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public.

    U.S.S.G. 5K2.13.

    28

















    dismissed on the ground that it lacked the power to grant relief under

    Rule 35(a).

    Rule 35(a)17 expressly empowers a district court to correct a

    sentence only on remand from the court of appeals. United States v.
    _____________

    Carr, 932 F.2d 67, 69 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.
    ____ ____ ______

    Ct. 112 (1991). Rule 35(c), which permits the sentencing court to

    correct a sentence imposed as a result of arithmetical, technical, or

    other clear error, was not in effect either when the Barnett motion

    was filed or dismissed. Moreover, in this case we need not consider

    whether the district court had the inherent power to correct obvious
    _______

    sentencing errors, see United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065, 1067-68
    __________ ______ ___ ______________ ____

    (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 352 (1990); United
    _____ ______ ______

    States v. Cook, 890 F.2d 672, 674-75 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Carr,
    ______ ____ ___ ____ ____

    932 F.2d at 70-71, since there were none. As the sentence imposed on

    Barnett was in no respect unlawful or unreasonable, the motion to

    reconsider was properly dismissed.



    ____________________

    17Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) provides:

    The court shall correct a sentence that is determined on
    __
    appeal under 18 U.S.C. 3742 to have been imposed in violation
    ______
    of law, to have been imposed as a result of an incorrect
    application of the sentencing guidelines, or to be un-
    reasonable, upon remand of the case to the court
    ____ ______
    (1) for imposition of a sentence in accord with the findings
    of the court of appeals; or
    (2) for further sentencing proceedings if, after such pro-
    ceedings, the court determines that the original sentence was
    incorrect.

    Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) (emphasis added).

    29

















    E. Outrageous Government Conduct
    E. Outrageous Government Conduct
    _____________________________

    Barnett claims that the indictment should have been dismissed on

    due process grounds, since Agent Kelly's sale of hydriodic acid to

    Jordan constituted outrageous government conduct. Law enforcement

    conduct violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if it

    results in a denial of "'fundamental fairness, shocking to the univer-

    sal sense of justice.'" United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432
    _____________ _______

    (1973) (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
    ________ _______________________________

    234, 246 (1960)). See also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267,
    ___ ____ _____________ ______

    1272 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The Supreme Court has not foreclosed the pos-

    sibility that the government's active participation in a criminal

    venture may be of so shocking a nature as to violate a defendant's

    right to due process, notwithstanding the defendant's predisposition

    to commit the crime"). We find no due process violation.

    Because drug conspiracies are notoriously difficult to penetrate,

    courts consistently have allowed greater government involvement in

    drug-crime investigations. Panitz, 907 F.2d at 1273. Law enforcement
    ______

    infiltration of drug rings, and even limited investigative participa-

    tion in their unlawful operations, do not constitute outrageous

    government conduct violative of due process. Russell, 411 U.S. at
    _______

    432.

    Although Agent Kelly sold Jordan a precursor chemical which is an

    integral methamphetamine component, the government was neither the

    conspirators' sole source (hydriodic acid obtained from other sources

    was seized in the warehouse search), nor did the government initiate

    30

















    the criminal conduct. Jordan told Agent Kelly that Barnett had been

    producing methamphetamine for ten years. Other evidence revealed that

    Jordan and Barnett had manufactured eight to ten pounds of metham-

    phetamine in 1989. The sale of hydriodic acid to Jordan in these

    circumstances was a permissible investigative effort to infiltrate the

    suspected drug-related conspiracy. The district court properly denied

    the motion to dismiss on due process grounds.


    F. Cumulative Error
    F. Cumulative Error
    ________________

    Finally, as most assignments of error were baseless, we reject

    Barnett's contention that the cumulative effect of the many errors he

    alleges required reversal on due process grounds. We are well satis-

    fied that Barnett received due process: "[T]he Constitution entitles

    a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Delaware v.
    ________

    Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
    ___________

    The sentence of appellant Jordan and the conviction and sentence
    __________________________________________________________________

    of appellant Barnett are affirmed.
    _________________________________


















    31







Document Info

Docket Number: 91-1890

Filed Date: 4/16/1993

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015

Authorities (36)

United States v. John Tejeda, United States of America v. ... , 974 F.2d 210 ( 1992 )

alfred-m-johnston-individually-alfred-m-johnston-trustee-and-daniel , 595 F.2d 890 ( 1979 )

United States v. Novenda L. Cook , 890 F.2d 672 ( 1989 )

United States v. Darrell Paul Bertrand, United States of ... , 926 F.2d 838 ( 1991 )

Franks v. Delaware , 98 S. Ct. 2674 ( 1978 )

Maryland v. Buie , 110 S. Ct. 1093 ( 1990 )

United States v. Russell , 93 S. Ct. 1637 ( 1973 )

United States v. Frances Slade , 980 F.2d 27 ( 1992 )

United States of America, Cross-Appellant v. John Kingston, ... , 113 A.L.R. Fed. 835 ( 1990 )

United States of America, and Cross-Appellant v. Randolph ... , 947 F.2d 1445 ( 1991 )

United States v. George E. Veillette, Jr. , 778 F.2d 899 ( 1985 )

United States v. Lloyd R. Haggert , 980 F.2d 8 ( 1992 )

United States v. Hartley E. Greenleaf, Jr., United States ... , 692 F.2d 182 ( 1982 )

Robert William Gorman v. United States of America, Edward ... , 380 F.2d 158 ( 1967 )

United States v. Richard Alan Cepulonis, United States of ... , 530 F.2d 238 ( 1976 )

Arnaldo Hernandez-Hernandez v. United States , 904 F.2d 758 ( 1990 )

United States v. Stephen C. Twomey , 884 F.2d 46 ( 1989 )

United States v. Albert Weston, United States of America v. ... , 960 F.2d 212 ( 1992 )

Francis L. Dobb, Etc. v. George P. Baker , 505 F.2d 1041 ( 1974 )

United States v. Joseph Gerante , 891 F.2d 364 ( 1989 )

View All Authorities »