HPY, Inc. v. Electric Power ( 1993 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    April 15, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 92-2370

    HPY, INC.,

    Plaintiff-Appellant,

    v.

    ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY, ET AL.,

    Defendants-Appellees.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


    [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Cyr, Circuit Judge,
    _____________
    Boudin, Circuit Judge,
    _____________
    and Burns, Senior District Judge.
    _____________________

    ____________________

    Francisco J. Amundaray-Rodriguez, Mirta E. Rodriguez-Mora,
    ____________________________________ __________________________
    Attorney, Department of Justice, Adrian Mercado and Mercado & Soto on
    ______________ ______________
    brief for appellant.
    Reina Colon De Rodriguez, Acting Solicitor General, Department of
    ________________________
    Justice, Carlos Lugo Fiol, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of
    ________________
    Justice, Arturo Trias, Miguel R. Garay Auban, Pedro Santiago-Torres,
    _____________ ______________________ _____________________
    Jorge Marrero Narvaez, and Trias, Acevedo & Otero on brief for
    _______________________ _________________________
    appellees.

    ____________________

    ____________________

    ________________________

    * Of the District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

















    Per Curiam. HPY, Inc., brought this action under 42
    __________

    U.S.C. 1983 against three public authorities in Puerto

    Rico, certain of their officials, and John Does 1 through

    1,000. The agencies are the Electric Power Authority, the

    Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority and the Rural

    Housing Administration. The heart of the complaint was the

    following allegation:

    On or about 1985, squatters, without
    valid title or authorization from the
    plaintiff started massive land invasions
    on said properties [belonging to
    plaintiff]. The squatters, also
    Defendants of [sic] this suit, encouraged
    and abetted by the other Defendants,
    proceeded to construct or build shacks
    and houses on Plaintiff's properties.

    This, said the complaint, comprised a deprivation of property

    rights "without due process and without due compensation."

    The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for

    failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In

    opposing the motion, HPY offered a few more factual

    allegations. Specifically, it alleged that squatters had

    occupied its land and that some or all of the named

    defendants had encouraged the invasion and abetted the

    squatters by supplying public facilities like power to the

    squatters and even constructing or assisting the squatters to

    construct shacks. The district court ultimately dismissed

    the complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim,

    observing that "we are as likely to squeeze blood from a



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    stone as we are to squeeze any more facts from this complaint

    . . . ." HPY appeals.1

    We affirm the district court. Section 1983 creates a

    claim for injuries done by anyone who "acting under color of"

    state law deprives the victim of any "rights, privileges, or

    immunities" protected under the Constitution. The original

    complaint did not explain what the named defendants had done

    under color of state law, but we will take the complaint on

    this appeal as illuminated by HPY's oppositions to the

    motions to dismiss. Even in this posture, and allowing HPY

    the benefits of liberal pleading rules, 5 Wright & Miller,

    Federal Practice and Procedure 1219 (1990), we cannot see
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    how HPY can premise a claim under section 1983 upon the facts

    alleged.

    We will assume arguendo that the color of state law
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    requirement is met as to the named defendants (since they are

    governmental entities and officials) and that HPY's property

    has been physically occupied and its value diminished. But

    if the actions of the named defendants are not authorized by

    local law or regulation, then there is no constitutional
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    violation so long as local law affords a remedy for any

    tortious misconduct. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533
    ______ ______


    ____________________

    1After filing its brief with this court, HPY filed two
    informative motions. One motion amended a page reference
    included in its brief; the second provided us with
    supplemental support for its argument. We grant both
    motions.

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    (1984) (unauthorized property seizure of state employees not

    a constitutional deprivation if state remedy afforded).

    Defendants assert that there is a remedy under local law, 32

    L.P.R.A. 3077. HPY neither alleged the absence of such a

    remedy in the complaint nor countered defendants' assertion

    in this court (HPY did not file a reply brief).

    Alternatively, if HPY is alleging that the abetting of

    the trespass is authorized by Puerto Rican law, conceivably a

    taking claim would arise and the Constitution would require

    compensation. But again there is no constitutional

    deprivation so long as Puerto Rico provides an appropriate

    remedy to secure compensation for takings. Williamson
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    Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194
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    (1985). Once again, the defendants assert that such a remedy

    exists under Puerto Rican law, see Culebras Enterprises Corp.
    ___ __________________________

    v. Rivera Rios, 813 F.2d 506, 513 (1st Cir. 1987), and once
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    again there is no contrary allegation in the complaint and no

    counter to defendants' assertion by way of reply brief.

    HPY also complains that the dismissal should have been

    without prejudice in light of the liberal leave-to-amend

    policies followed by the courts. Here, however, HPY filed an

    utterly uninformative complaint. We have effectively treated

    the additional material scattered in its three oppositions

    filed in the district court as amendments to the complaint.

    Even so, HPY has still failed to state a claim, nor has it



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    filed a reply in this court responding to the authorities

    just recited (which were set forth in the answering briefs).

    Accordingly, we do not think that the dismissal with

    prejudice represents an abuse of discretion.

    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 92-2370

Filed Date: 4/16/1993

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015