Alicea v. Caban ( 1999 )

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<pre>[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 98-1838 PABLO LUGO ALICEA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. JOSE L. CABAN, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Jos Antonio Fust, U.S. District Judge] Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, and Selya, Circuit Judge. Jos R. Franco for appellant. Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, Asst. Solicitor General, with whom Carlos Lugo Fiol, Solicitor General, and Edda Serrano Blasini, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief, for appellees. March 22, 1999 

SELYA, Circuit Judge. After a jury acquitted plaintiff- appellant Pablo Lugo Alicea (Lugo) of involuntary manslaughter, Lugo turned the tables and sued the prosecution team Secretary of Justice Pedro Pierluisi and District Attorneys Jos L. Cabn, Elmer Cuerda, Jaime Zambrana, and Mabel Ruiz for money damages in Puerto Rico's federal district court. Within a few weeks, Lugo filed an amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (permitting plaintiffs to amend once as of right before a responsive pleading is filed). The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Lugo did not oppose the motion, and the district court, after waiting nearly a year, granted the requested relief in a brief, unpublished rescript. We affirm, albeit on slightly different reasoning. See Hachikian v. FDIC, 96 F.3d 502, 504 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the court of appeals is not wedded to the trial court's rationale, but may affirm its ruling on any ground made manifest by the record); Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, Inc., 827 F.2d 859, 860-61 (1st Cir. 1987) (similar). Federal pleading requirements are liberal, but they are not entirely toothless. See Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988). Here, Lugo's complaint contains four statements of claim. Two do not articulate separate causes of action, but merely contain recitals of damages allegedly incurred. Of the other two, the first alleges an abridgment of Lugo's constitutional rights, and the second alleges violations of local law (specifically, Articles 1802 and 1805 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code). Because Lugo premises jurisdiction on the existence of a federal question, 28 U.S.C. 1331, we focus our attention on the first of these claims. Refined to bare essence, the claim in question recounts that, following an automobile accident in which a fatality occurred, the authorities charged Lugo with involuntary manslaughter. His complaint then recites that, in connection with the ensuing criminal trial, "the defendants produced two different croquis evincing two disparaging versions of how the accident took place," and that one defendant, Cabn, "ordered the sworn version of facts of one of the key witnesses to be changed in order to better accommodate the Government's official version." These acts, the complaint avers, constituted "an illegal, unjustified, abusive and excessive use of authority under color of law" and hence were "in violation of the Due Process Clause [of the] Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution." The district court did not err in ruling that these allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under federal law. In order to transform a garden-variety malicious prosecution claim into a claim that is actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a plaintiff must establish both (1) action under color of state law, and (2) a deprivation of a constitutional right in consequence of that action. See Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253-54 (1st Cir. 1996). Lugo's complaint adequately limns state action, but it does not allege a constitutional deprivation. The claim invokes the Fifth Amendment. As pertinent here, the Fifth Amendment guarantees both procedural due process and substantive due process. Neither guaranty helps Lugo. A section 1983 claim based on malicious prosecution cannot be maintained under the rubric of procedural due process where, as here, local tort law affords an anodyne for malicious prosecution. See Roche, 81 F.3d at 256; Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo- Guilln, 25 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Raldiris v. Levitt & Sons, 103 P.R.R. 778, 781 (1975) (confirming that Puerto Rico law grants such remediation). Such a claim is on even shakier ground when viewed under the substantive due process rubric. In recent years, both the Supreme Court and this court have held that there is no substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution. SeeAlbright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 n.4 (1994) (plurality op.); Meehan v. Town of Plymouth, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 1999) [No. 97-2235, slip op. at 7]; Roche, 81 F.3d at 256. Consequently, the district court did not err in dismissing, under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint that sought to transform a standard malicious prosecution case into a due process violation. Lugo offers two rejoinders, neither of which has much force. First, he says that he may have a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment. That is a theoretical possibility, see, e.g., Roche, 81 F.3d at 256 n.5 (noting that "the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a malicious prosecution claim might lie under 1983 on the basis of the Fourth Amendment"), but it is not the cause of action that Lugo asserted in his complaint. The facts, as pleaded, do not bring a Fourth Amendment violation to mind. At any rate, the district court was entitled to consider the claim that Lugo pleaded, and had no obligation to go outside the complaint in search of new and different causes of action. See Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514. This is especially so where, as here, Lugo did not deign even to file a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss. Second, Lugo says that the district court erred in not affording him an opportunity to amend his complaint. The short, fully dispositive answer to this remonstrance is that Lugo never asked the district court for leave to amend. We have held with a regularity bordering on the monotonous that a party who fails to seek available relief in the nisi prius court cannot anticipate receiving that relief in the first instance from this court. SeeViquiera v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) ("A party who neglects to ask the district court for leave to amend cannot expect to receive such a dispensation from the court of appeals."); Beaulieu v. United States IRS, 865 F.2d 1351, 1352 (1st Cir. 1989) (similar). We need go no further. Because Lugo failed to plead a cognizable federal claim, his pendent claims under Puerto Rico's Civil Code were properly dismissed as well. See Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1995); see also 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). Affirmed.</pre>

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Document Info

Docket Number： 98-1838

Filed Date： 4/1/1999

Precedential Status： Non-Precedential

Modified Date： 4/17/2021

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