Quilichini-Paz v. Ramirez-Soto ( 1998 )


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  •   [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 97-2230
    MADELINE QUILICHINI-PAZ,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,
    v.
    ISMAEL RAMIREZ-SOTO, ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF PR.,
    Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Chief Judge,
    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
    Nilda M. Navarro-Cabrer and Navarro-Cabrer & Cruz-Martino on
    brief for appellant.
    December 4, 1998
    Per Curiam.  Third-party defendant, the Council on
    Higher Education of Puerto Rico ("CHE"), appeals from the
    district court's denial of summary judgment on the ground of
    Eleventh Amendment immunity.  "[P]retrial orders granting or
    denying Eleventh Amendment immunity [are] immediately
    appealable." Metcalf & Eddy v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer
    Authority, 
    991 F.2d 935
    , 937 (1st Cir. 1993).  Where, as in
    this case, the Eleventh Amendment issue is essentially one of
    law, this court affords plenary review to the district court's
    denial of immunity. 
    Id. at 938
    .
    To aid in determining whether a state-created entity,
    such as CHE, is an "arm of the state" entitled to Eleventh
    Amendment immunity, this court has identified a list of factors
    to be considered. See Metcalf & Eddy, 
    991 F.2d at 939-40
    .
    Applied to CHE, those factors weigh heavily in favor of
    immunity.  CHE lacks authority to generate revenue and relies
    on the Commonwealth treasury for its funding (it may also
    accept federal educational funds).  It is, therefore, unable to
    satisfy judgments against it from its own resources except as
    funds for that purpose are legislatively provided.  Compare id.at 942. CHE's powers - licensing and accrediting public and
    private universities as a condition to their legal right to
    operate within the commonwealth, coupled with its enforcement
    powers, such as the power to issue cease and desist orders and
    impose fines - are more governmental than proprietary. SeePuerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 
    897 F.2d 1
    , 12 (1st Cir. 1990)(ruling that PRASA's functions of setting
    and enforcing standards is governmental, not proprietary).  The
    statute creating CHE gives it "only such powers that are
    indispensable to exercise official functions in an area vested
    with great public interest such as higher education." 18
    L.P.R.A. 852.
    CHE is not separately incorporated. Compare Metcalf
    & Eddy, 
    991 F.2d at 942
     (noting that PRASA is separately
    incorporated in ruling that it is not an arm of the
    Commonwealth); Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Puerto Rico Ports
    Authority, 
    973 F.2d 8
    , 11 (1st Cir. 1992) (weighing factor that
    Ports Authority is a "public corporation" in ruling that it is
    not an arm of the Commonwealth).  Nor has the Commonwealth
    "explicitly insulated itself from any financial responsibility"
    with respect to CHE. Metcalf & Eddy, 
    991 F.2d at 940
    .  The
    Commonwealth exercises substantial control over CHE in that CHE
    members are appointed by the Governor with the advice and
    consent of the senate.  The Commonwealth's Secretary of
    Education serves as an ex-officio member of the Board.  This
    court has weighed such factors heavily in finding that an
    entity is an arm of the Commonwealth. See In re San Juan Dupont
    Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 
    888 F.2d 940
    , 943 (1st Cir. 1989);
    Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera Rios, 
    813 F.2d 506
    , 517
    (1st Cir. 1987); Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 
    575 F.2d 21
    , 25 (1st
    Cir. 1978).
    The only factors that weigh against immunity are
    CHE's powers to sue and be sued and to contract.  Those factors
    alone, however, are not sufficient to support the district
    court's denial of immunity.  See University of Rhode Island v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 
    2 F.3d 1200
    , 1207 n.11; Culebras
    Enterprises Corp., 
    813 F.2d at 517
    .  We conclude that the
    district court erred when it ruled that CHE was not an arm of
    the Commonwealth for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
    The district court's denial of CHE's motion for
    summary judgment and request for dismissal of all claims
    against it on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds is reversed.
    The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to
    dismiss the third-party complaint against CHE.
    cc: Mr. Baella-Silva, Ms. Rodriguez-Mora,
    Ms. Maldonado-Colon, Ms. Navarro-Cabrer