United States v. Rivera-Lopez , 736 F.3d 633 ( 2013 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1060
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JORGE RIVERA-LÓPEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Baldock,* and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Miriam Ramos-Grateroles, for appellant.
Vincent J. Falvo, Jr., Attorney, Appellate Section, U.S.
Department of Justice, with whom Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Denis J. McInerney, Acting Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Víctor Acevedo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District
of Puerto Rico, and Michael C. Bagge, Assistant U.S. Attorney,
District of Puerto Rico, was on brief for appellee.
November 25, 2013
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Facing a five count indictment
on narcotics and firearm charges, Jorge Rivera-López ("Rivera")
entered into a plea agreement containing a waiver-of-appeal
provision. Pursuant to that agreement, he was sentenced to sixty
months of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release.
For the first six months of his supervised release, Rivera's
sentence also included a nighttime curfew and twenty-four-hour
electronic monitoring. He now seeks to appeal these two conditions
of supervised release, arguing that their imposition amounts to a
miscarriage of justice. Upon review, we find that Rivera's
appellate waiver extends to the contested conditions and,
consequently, dismiss his appeal.
I. Background
In August 2012, Puerto Rico Police Department officers
executed a search warrant of an apartment in which Rivera was
sleeping. Inside, the officers found two firearms and multiple
controlled substances. An indictment followed, charging Rivera and
his two co-defendants each with four counts of possession with
intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(1)(A)(i-ii).
Rivera subsequently entered into a plea agreement,
admitting guilt as to the firearms charge. In exchange for this
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guilty plea, the government recommended that all four counts of
narcotics possession be dismissed and that Rivera be sentenced to
a term of sixty months of imprisonment. Under a provision titled
"Maximum Penalties," the agreement made clear that Rivera faced "a
minimum term of imprisonment of five [] years and a maximum term of
life in prison" as well as "a supervised release term of not more
than five [] years." Another provision, titled "Waiver of Appeal,"
stated that Rivera would not seek appellate review of any "judgment
and sentence" that was in accordance with the agreement's terms and
recommendations.
The district court imposed the recommended term of sixty
months of imprisonment as well as a five-year term of supervised
release. For the first six months of supervised release, the court
further required Rivera to comply with curfew and electronic
monitoring conditions:
[Rivera] shall remain under curfew at his
residence of record from 6:00 pm to 6:00 am
for a period of six [] months to commence upon
his release from imprisonment. During this
time, he shall remain in his place of
residence, except for employment or other
activities approved in advance by the
probation officer. The defendant shall
maintain a telephone at his residence without
a modem, an answering machine, or a cordless
feature during the term of electronic
monitoring. He shall wear an electronic
device 24 hours a day . . . . He is ordered
to pay the daily cost of [the] Electronic
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Monitoring Device, according to his ability to
pay it.1
Rivera objected at sentencing, arguing that the
conditions were insufficiently related to the crime charged and
inconsistent with the sentences of his co-defendants, which did not
include curfew or electronic monitoring conditions. The district
court judge responded that "[i]n my courtroom, all gun cases
receive [these] condition[s]."
1
In his appellate brief, Rivera styled the requirement that he
maintain a phone line without a modem as a ban on home internet
use. In its briefs, the government did not contest this
construction of the issue and, in fact, wholly failed to discuss or
address the purported "internet ban." The government's position
was not elucidated until oral argument, where it asserted, for the
first time, that this condition was not an internet ban, but served
only the more limited purpose of ensuring a "clean" phone line for
electronic monitoring. As such, the government made clear its
belief that Rivera is free to maintain a second line with a modem
or to access the internet via any other available method throughout
his term of supervised release. Pursuant to our request, on
November 6, 2013 the government filed a letter with the court --
now part of the official docket -- restating this position in
writing. Therefore, while we note in passing the limits this court
has placed on the scope of internet bans, requiring a significant
nexus between internet use and the crime committed, see United
States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2009), we see no
need to address the argument further. Rather, we interpret the
condition as the government asserts we should: not as a ban on
internet use, but only as a requirement that Rivera maintain a
"clean" phone line. Indeed, the condition's language affirmatively
commands one particular action (i.e., the maintenance of a certain
type of phone line), but does not expressly prohibit any other,
including that of accessing the internet from home. Because
sentencing judges know well how to construct bans on internet use,
we trust that they will continue to do so explicitly when such
conditions are appropriate. Moreover, when imposing conditions of
electronic monitoring in the future, we expect that they will take
care to disabuse defendants of the mistaken but plausible
interpretation of this provision adopted by Rivera.
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Rivera now seeks to appeal these same conditions,
reasserting his objections below. Acknowledging that his
waiver-of-appeal was knowing and voluntary, he nonetheless asks
this court to vacate the conditions so as to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
II. Discussion
Where knowing and voluntary, an appellate waiver is
generally enforceable, absent indications that such a waiver would
work a "miscarriage of justice." United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d
14, 25 (1st Cir. 2001). We have declined to strictly delineate the
boundaries of this miscarriage-of-justice exception, choosing
instead to review claims wholesale, with an eye to the "character,
clarity, and gravity of the claim of error." United States v.
Nguyen, 618 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2010) (recognizing that "[t]he
circumstances potentially justifying a refusal to enforce a waiver
on this ground are 'infinitely variable'" (quoting Teeter, 257 F.3d
at 25 n.9)). What is clear, however, is that the exception is to
"be applied sparingly and without undue generosity"; mere "garden-
variety" claims of error are insufficient to sustain an appeal in
the face of waiver. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26; see also United States
v. Miliano, 480 F.3d 605, 608 (1st Cir. 2007) (requiring, to
overcome an appellate waiver, "an increment of error more glaring
than routine reversible error").
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Rivera readily concedes that his decision to enter into
the plea agreement, including the waiver of appeal, was both
knowing and voluntary. He also admits that the district court made
sure he understood the nature of this waiver. Therefore, we take
up only the limited question of whether the contested conditions
amount to a miscarriage of justice. See Nguyen, 618 F.3d at 75.
Sentencing judges have broad discretion to impose
conditions of release so long as they are "reasonably related" to
(1) the underlying offense or character and criminal history of the
defendant; (2) the need to deter criminal conduct; (3) the goal of
protecting the public; or (4) the provision of rehabilitative
educational, health, or other treatment for the defendant.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); United States v.
Brown, 235 F.3d 2, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[T]he critical test is
whether the challenged condition is sufficiently related to one or
more of the permissible goals of supervised release."). Such
conditions must also "involve no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary." U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).
Rivera's argument is twofold. First, that the imposition
of the curfew and electronic monitoring conditions circumscribes
his liberty to a greater extent than necessary or appropriate.
Second, that the district court lacked any reasoned basis for these
conditions, as illustrated by the inconsistent sentences of
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Rivera's co-defendants and the overly broad statement that "all gun
cases" are subject to the same. In combination, he asserts that
these errors are of such significance that allowing his appellate
waiver to stand would shield from our review a miscarriage of
justice.
As an initial matter, the co-defendants' sentences are
not before us on this appeal, and therefore we decline to speculate
as to why the same conditions were not imposed on those
individuals. When "identically situated defendants" receive
significantly disparate sentences, red flags may indeed be raised.
United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 2006).
Where supported by reason, however, the mere existence of a
disparity in sentencing between co-defendants in no way
necessitates a finding of error. See, e.g., United States v.
Marceau, 554 F.3d 24, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2009). Certainly, no such
finding is required here, as Rivera did not even attempt to
substantiate his miscarriage-of-justice claim with proof that he
and his co-defendants were, in fact, identically situated.
Therefore, we focus our review only on whether the conditions of
Rivera's supervised release were so lacking in rationality or so
wholly unrelated to legitimate sentencing purposes as to
necessitate invalidating his waiver of appeal.
Even setting aside the district court's proffered
explanation that "all gun cases" receive the special conditions in
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question,2 the record suggests an alternative basis for their
imposition in Rivera's case. See United States v. Garrasteguy,
559 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[The] requirement [that
conditions be supported] can be satisfied without a written or oral
explanation . . . if we can infer the court's reasoning by
comparing what was argued by the parties or contained in the pre-
sentence report with what the court did." (citing United States v.
Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc)). At
sentencing, Rivera presented his long history of significant
substance abuse, failed treatment attempts, and suicidality as
factors in support of mitigation. He also requested that the
district court recommend him for participation in an appropriate
drug treatment program and receipt of mental health care while
incarcerated. In light of Rivera's choice to draw the court's
attention to his history of drug abuse and failed treatment
attempts, the curfew and electronic monitoring conditions can be
understood as efforts to assist in his rehabilitation.
Because of the waiver of appeal at play in this case, see
Miliano, 480 F.3d at 608 (requiring more than reversible error to
sustain a finding of a miscarriage of justice), we need not plumb
2
Noting the serious nature of the firearms charge, we might have
simply considered whether the conditions were a permissible
response to that conviction. Because Rivera has called our
attention to the disparity between the district court's claim that
all gun cases receive these conditions and the sentences of his co-
defendants, however, we review the record to see if there exists a
reasoned rationale for that distinction.
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the exact contours of a court's ability to impose such special
conditions. In fact, we explicitly decline to suggest that such
conditions, if squarely before us on appeal, would necessarily be
found appropriate, as we can easily conceive of instances where
past substance abuse is so unrelated to the crime charged or
separated by a sufficient passage of time as to make these
conditions unwarranted. See Brown, 235 F.3d at 7 ("The hallmark
that separates impermissible conditions from permissible ones is
whether, on a given set of facts, a particular restriction is
clearly unnecessary.").
As to the much simpler question of whether the conditions
are so clearly erroneous and unsubstantiated as to work a
miscarriage of justice, however, the answer is clear. They are
not. The miscarriage-of-justice standard is a steep obstacle for
potential appellants to overcome, see Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26, and
Rivera's history of drug abuse, charged conduct, and request for
treatment makes clear that the contested conditions are
sufficiently related to legitimate goals of sentencing as to fall
within the auspices of his waiver of appeal. Cf. Nguyen, 618 F.3d
at 76 (finding a condition of supervised release warranted, and
thus necessarily insufficient to overcome a waiver of appeal).
Thus, we hold that Rivera's knowing and voluntary waiver of appeal
bars his instant challenge.
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III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Rivera's appeal is
dismissed.
Dismissed.
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