Nwankwo v. Nwankwo ( 1992 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    December 9, 1992 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]



    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ___________________


    No. 92-1624




    FERDINAND NWANKWO,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    KIMBERLY NWANKWO AND
    EDWARD MITCHELL,
    Defendants, Appellee.


    __________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE


    [Hon. Martin F. Loughlin, U.S. District Judge]
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    ___________________

    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
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    Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
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    Ferdinand Nwankwo on brief pro se.
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    Edward M. Kaplan, Sean M. Dunne and Sulloway & Hollis on
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    brief for appellees.
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    Per Curiam. This case involves two conflicting state
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    court child custody decrees. After a bench trial, the district

    court dismissed one of plaintiff's claims against defendant

    Kimberly Nwanko on jurisdictional grounds, and the others for

    failure to prove a claim. The claims against defendant Edward

    Mitchell were dismissed on the merits. As we have concluded that

    all claims against Kimberly Nwanko should have been dismissed for

    lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we partially reverse and

    vacate the judgment below, remanding for entry of a dismissal in

    accordance with this opinion. We affirm the dismissal on the

    merits of the claims against Edward Mitchell.

    Plaintiff was awarded physical custody of his two

    children by a temporary decree from a New Hampshire court in

    April, 1990. At the time of this order, his wife, defendant

    Kimberly Nwanko, and the children were residing in Florida. A

    few months later, a Florida court awarded custody of the children

    to Kimberly Nwanko, rejecting the New Hampshire court's decree on

    the ground that it had been issued without jurisdiction over the

    children. Plaintiff subsequently obtained a permanent custody

    and divorce decree from the New Hampshire court. Kimberly Nwanko

    did not appear in the New Hampshire action.

    Although plaintiff had appeared specially in the Florida

    action to seek recognition of the New Hampshire custody decree,

    he did not pursue a direct appeal. Instead, he returned to New

    Hampshire and filed a complaint in federal district court against

    Kimberly Nwanko and her father, Edward Mitchell. The complaint

















    claimed that the federal court had jurisdiction by virtue of the

    Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. 1738A ("PKPA").

    It sought an injunction enforcing the New Hampshire custody

    decree and an unspecified amount in damages for interference with

    plaintiff's parental rights, emotional distress, and expenses in

    seeking custody of his children.

    After the complaint was referred to a magistrate who

    issued a "report and recommendations," plaintiff amended his

    complaint. In an apparent attempt to cure the original

    complaint's jurisdictional defects, the amended complaint made no

    mention of the PKPA nor injunctive relief. Instead, it alleged

    diversity jurisdiction only, and sought damages above the

    jurisdictional amount for three state law tort causes of action

    against both defendants: intentional interference with parental

    custody, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a

    claim of uncertain legal origin, seeking reimbursement for the

    support and care of Fawn Mitchell, Kimberly Nwanko's child by a

    prior relationship.

    By motion shortly thereafter, however, plaintiff renewed

    his request for an injunction under the PKPA. And in later pre-

    trial and post-trial motions and responses to motions, plaintiff

    requested that the district court enforce the New Hampshire

    custody decree by virtue of either or both its federal question

    and diversity jurisdiction.





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    As the district court held, there was no basis for

    original subject matter jurisdiction over the PKPA claim under 28

    U.S.C. 1331, because the PKPA does not provide an implied

    private federal cause of action to determine which of two

    conflicting state custody decrees is valid. Thompson v.
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    Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182, 186 (1988). The PKPA is addressed
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    to the States and state courts. Congress did not intend thereby

    to entangle the federal courts in traditional domestic relations

    questions that "they have little expertise to resolve." Id. at
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    186 n.4. If plaintiff felt aggrieved by the Florida orders, his

    remedy was to appeal through the state courts. Id. at 187 ("State
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    courts faithfully administer the Full Faith and Credit Clause

    every day ... we can think of no reason why the courts'

    administration of federal law in custody disputes will be any

    less vigilant;" but the Supreme Court is available for ultimate

    review of "truly intractable" deadlocks).

    Nor was there subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the New

    Hampshire custody decree under the diversity of citizenship

    statute, 28 U.S.C. 1332. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct.
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    2206 (1992). Ankenbrandt, decided after the lower court issued
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    its opinion in this case, reexamined the theoretical

    underpinnings of the "domestic relations exception" to diversity

    jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme Court in Barber v.
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    Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 16 L. Ed. 226 (1859). The Court
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    determined that, given the long passage of time without any



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    expression of Congressional dissatisfaction, the exception is now

    rooted in the diversity statute itself. Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct.
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    at 2213.

    As reaffirmed by the Court in Ankenbrandt, the "domestic
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    relations exception" is a narrow one. In order to assure

    decisions by those with the greatest judicial expertise and the

    resources to enforce them, the exception "divest[s] the federal

    courts of the power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody

    decrees." Id. at 2215. But federal courts retain jurisdiction
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    over cases involving intra-family torts, unless abstention is

    otherwise required by the Younger or Burford abstention doctrines
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    to avoid interference with pending state proceedings, important

    and difficult questions of state policy, or effectuation of state

    decrees. Id. at 2216; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);
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    Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), cited by Court
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    as among authorities extending Younger abstention to civil cases;
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    Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Colorado River Water
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    Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976),
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    cited by Court for basic abstention principles.

    In Ankenbrandt, the domestic relations exception was held
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    inapplicable to a claim seeking damages against a father and his

    companion for alleged child abuse. The claim there only

    peripherally touched on domestic relations issues because the

    plaintiff "in no way" sought the issuance of a divorce, custody

    or alimony decree. Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2215. Nor were
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    there any issues of status to be resolved that might interfere

    with effectuation of a state court decree. Id. at 2216.
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    By contrast, here plaintiff's real aim, as stated in his

    original complaint, was to obtain direct enforcement of one of

    two conflicting state court custody decrees. Thus there was no

    subject matter jurisdiction over the original complaint.

    Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2215. And although plaintiff
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    attempted to cure the jurisdictional deficit by filing an amended

    complaint seeking only damages, the inherent infirmity of the

    state tort claims pleaded in that document belied the pleading's

    genuineness as a predicate for jurisdiction.1 If there was any

    doubt, the real purpose of this suit quickly reappeared in the

    contradictory relief plaintiff sought by motion.

    Because plaintiff appeared pro se and the facts were
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    somewhat murky, the district court liberally construed his

    pleadings and motions. And the defendants apparently never



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    1. From the outset, it was a legal impossibility for plaintiff
    to succeed on these state law claims, because, as he admitted,
    there was no custody decree in his favor when defendant Kimberly
    Nwanko moved with the children to Florida. At least one
    essential element of the claim was thus always missing, although
    the language of the complaint tended to obscure the temporal
    sequence of events. Plante v. Engel, 124 N.H. 213, 217, 469 A.2d
    ______ _____
    1299, 1302 (1983) (tort claim for "interference with parental
    custody" lies "where a parent has been awarded custody of a child
    by a court decree and the noncustodial parent abducts the
    child"); Morancy v. Morancy, 134 N.H. 493, 593 A.2d 1158 (1991)
    _______ _______
    (tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
    requires showing of "outrageous" conduct). While plaintiff may
    have believed that the state law should be changed, that
    question, too, was beyond the competence of the federal court in
    a diversity case.

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    objected for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. But even when

    the parties are content to have the case decided on the merits,

    where the suit's transparent purpose is to embroil the district

    court in a dispute involving conflicting custody decrees, the

    suit must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.4

    See Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382
    ___ _______________________________ ____

    (1884), quoted in Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475
    __________ ______ __________________ __________

    U.S. 534, 546 (1985) ("The first and fundamental question is that

    of jurisdiction ... this question the court is bound to ask and

    answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without

    respect to the relation of the parties to it"); Louisville &
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    Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (it is the duty of
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    appellate court to see to it that lower court's jurisdiction not

    exceeded, even when parties do not complain). See also Sutter v.
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    Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981) (under former version of
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    domestic relations exception, case properly dismissed where

    plaintiff's complaint stated civil rights action but, with its

    "constitutional cloak removed" actually sought enforcement of

    probate court's custody order). Accordingly, all claims against

    Kimberly Nwanko must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

    jurisdiction.


    ____________________

    4. The district court seemingly recognized that the case should
    have been dismissed earlier. In ruling on a post-judgment motion
    several months later, it described the dismissal of the claims
    against Kimberly as "in essence" for lack of jurisdiction, and
    the dismissal of the claims against Edward Mitchell as "in
    essence" on his motion for summary judgment.


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    The claims against Edward Mitchell, however, stand on a

    different footing. Those claims do not seem to have inevitably

    involved resolution of the parties' status, enforcement of any

    custody decree, nor interference with any pending state

    proceedings. They were thus were not barred for lack of subject

    matter jurisdiction by the domestic relations exception or

    related abstention doctrines. Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2215.
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    Under state law, however, they, too, were apparently infirm from

    the outset, and might properly have been dismissed on a motion

    for failure to state a claim or, as the district court later

    said, on a motion for summary judgment. The factual findings

    underlying the court's conclusion that plaintiff had not

    sustained his burden of proof against defendant Edward Mitchell

    were not clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); DesRosiers v.
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    Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991). We have considered
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    plaintiff's other assertions of legal and factual errors in the

    disposition of these claims and find them without merit. We

    therefore affirm the judgment dismissing the claims against

    Edward Mitchell on the merits.

    The judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against

    Kimberly Nwanko is reversed, vacated and remanded for entry of a
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    dismissal on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

    The judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Edward

    Mitchell is affirmed.
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