Diaz-Zayas v. Comm. Social Sec. ( 1996 )


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    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 96-1283


    ANGEL M. DIAZ-ZAYAS,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Paul Ramos Morales on brief for appellant. __________________
    Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Charles E. Fitzwilliam, ______________ _______________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, and Donna McCarthy, Assistant _______________
    Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, on brief for
    appellee.


    ____________________

    December 3, 1996
    ____________________

















    Per Curiam. Claimant-appellant Angel M. Diaz-Zayas __________

    appeals from a decision of the district court affirming the

    decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services

    denying him social security disability benefits. We affirm.

    Appellant applied for disability insurance benefits

    alleging disability since November 15, 1979 due to nerves, a

    heart condition, and sinusitis. After a hearing, an

    Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that prior to the

    expiration of his coverage--on March 31, 1983--appellant had

    preventricular contractions, sinusal tachycardia, chronic

    anxiety disorder, and Ativan dependence. These conditions,

    the ALJ found, were severe but not equal to a listing. The

    ALJ also found that appellant possibly had occasional

    discomfort associated to these conditions, but that he did

    not have disabling physical or mental distress for a

    continuous period of twelve months. Based on these findings,

    and a finding that appellant could perform light work, the

    ALJ concluded that appellant was not disabled prior to the

    expiration of his coverage because he could have performed

    his former jobs as a machine operator or production helper.

    Appellant does not argue that the ALJ erred in

    finding that he has the capacity for light work. Instead, he

    argues that the ALJ erred in his findings regarding

    appellant's mental condition. We review the Secretary's

    decision under a "substantial evidence" standard; we will














    affirm that decision if it is supported by "'such relevant

    evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

    support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, __________ _______

    401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. _______________________ ____

    197, 229 (1938)); see also Manso-Pizarro v. Secretary of _________ _____________ _____________

    Health & Human Servs., 76 F.3d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1996). _____________________

    Contrary to appellant's suggestion, the ALJ was not

    required to accept the opinion of Dr. Garcia Saliva that

    appellant's mental condition disabled him from working.

    Assuming solely for the sake of argument that Dr. Garcia, who

    saw appellant on only one occasion, could be considered a

    treating physician, we note that there was conflicting

    evidence from other treating sources regarding appellant's

    ability to work. Indeed, appellant's therapists at the

    Mental Health Center encouraged him, on more than one

    occasion, to look for a job. In any event, the determination

    of disability is reserved to the Secretary. See 20 C.F.R. ___

    404.1527(e). We think the ALJ adequately explained his

    reasons for finding that appellant's mental condition did not

    preclude him from performing his past jobs as a machine

    operator or production assistant.1 1

    ____________________

    1We add that it is not obvious that Dr. Garcia's opinion 1
    is inconsistent with this finding. Dr. Garcia opined that
    appellant was disabled from performing his "usual work."
    Read in context, "usual work" appears to refer to appellant's
    past job as a service station attendant (the only job Dr.
    Garcia mentions). Dr. Garcia did not specifically address
    whether appellant was able to work as a machine operator or

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    Similarly, the ALJ was not required to accept the

    diagnoses of schizophrenia made by Dr. Carlos J. Nogueras and

    Dr. Luis Lozada Rivera, or the more specific findings made by

    Dr. Lozada regarding appellant's mental impairment. These

    diagnoses and findings were made in 1992, approximately nine

    years after appellant's insurance coverage expired. Cf. ___

    Deblois v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 686 F.2d 76, _______ ___________________________________

    79 (1st Cir. 1982) (observing that a claimant has the burden

    of establishing that his mental impairment was of a disabling

    level of severity prior to the expiration of his coverage).

    There is ample evidence in the record from both treating and

    non-treating sources to support the ALJ's finding that

    appellant suffered from an anxiety disorder--rather than

    schizophrenia--during the critical period. Moreover, the

    only mental residual functional capacity assessments in the

    record which focus on the critical period support the ALJ's

    finding of no disability.

    Affirmed. ________













    ____________________

    production helper.

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