In Re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS ( 2014 )


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  •            United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 13-2498
    IN RE: GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
    ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
    [Hon. John J. McConnell, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Circuit Judge,
    Souter*, Associate Justice,
    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    William P. Devereaux, with whom James W. Ryan, Matthew C.
    Reeber, Misty G. Delgado and Pannone Lopes Devereaux & West LLC
    were on brief, for appellant
    Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with
    whom Peter F. Neronha, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
    appellee.
    February 20, 2014
    *
    Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
    Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
    HOWARD, Circuit Judge.      A venerable legal Latinism, lex
    non cogit ad impossibilia, teaches that the law does not compel the
    impossible.       Guided by that august adage, we hold that a subpoena
    duces tecum compelling the production of documents to a now-defunct
    grand jury cannot be enforced by civil contempt sanctions before a
    successor grand jury, and we accordingly vacate the district
    court's order holding the appellant in civil contempt.           We reject,
    however,       the   appellant's   additional    contentions   that   tribal
    sovereign immunity shielded it from subpoena and that the subpoena
    was unreasonably broad in scope.
    I.
    Because this case is under seal, we provide only a
    cursory rehearsal of the facts.             On October 2, 2012, appellant
    Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office ("NITHPO")
    was served with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a grand jury in
    the District of Rhode Island the previous month.1              The subpoena
    directed the custodian of NITHPO's records to appear before the
    grand jury with a series of documents on the morning of October 24,
    2012.       During the course of ensuing negotiations with NITHPO as to
    the scope of the subpoena, the government repeatedly extended the
    return date for the subpoena.              When these negotiations proved
    1
    Another subpoena duces tecum, not at issue on this appeal,
    was served on the Narragansett Indian Tribe. The Tribe and NITHPO
    proceeded jointly in resisting their respective subpoenas until
    September 2013, at which point the Tribe complied with the district
    court's order compelling production of the subpoenaed records.
    2
    fruitless, the government ultimately set a return date of February
    27, 2013.        On the last day before that deadline, NITHPO informed
    the government that it would not produce the subpoenaed records
    before the grand jury, asserting inter alia that tribal sovereign
    immunity shielded it from the grand jury's subpoena power.
    The sitting grand jury was subsequently discharged, and
    a new grand jury was empanelled in its place on April 16, 2013.                     On
    May 9, the government moved to compel NITHPO's compliance with the
    2012        subpoena,    representing   in       its    motion    that   although   the
    subpoena        had     been   issued   by       a     previous    grand   jury,    the
    investigation had been transferred to the newly-empanelled grand
    jury.        NITHPO objected to the government's motion and moved to
    quash the subpoena on grounds of tribal sovereign immunity and
    unreasonableness.
    On August 2, the district court entered an order granting
    the government's motion to compel and, except for some narrowing of
    the scope of the subpoena, denying NITHPO's motion to quash.                        The
    court ordered NITHPO to "comply with the October 24, 2012 grand
    jury subpoenas . . . at a mutually agreed upon date and time within
    30 days."2       After NITHPO's custodian of records failed to appear on
    the agreed-upon date, September 18, the government moved for a
    court order requiring NITHPO to show cause why it should not be
    2
    NITHPO filed a motion for reconsideration of this order,
    which the district court denied on September 16.
    3
    held in civil contempt for its noncompliance.                    The district court
    issued a show cause order on October 22, and after a contempt
    hearing the following month, adjudged NITHPO in civil contempt and
    imposed a fine of $500 per day of noncompliance beginning on
    December 4.       This appeal followed.
    II.
    NITHPO       raises     three       primary   arguments      on    appeal,
    contending        that    1)   the    underlying       subpoena    was     no   longer
    enforceable following the discharge of the issuing grand jury in
    April 2013; 2) NITHPO enjoyed tribal sovereign immunity from the
    grand jury's subpoena power; and 3) the subpoena was unreasonably
    broad in scope under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2).                    We address each
    argument in turn, reviewing de novo the district court's legal
    determinations as to enforceability and sovereign immunity, see
    Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 
    947 F.2d 11
    , 15 (1st Cir. 1991), and
    reviewing for abuse of discretion the district court's decision as
    to   reasonableness        under     Rule    17(c)(2),     see   United    States    v.
    LaRouche Campaign, 
    841 F.2d 1176
    , 1179 (1st Cir. 1988).
    A.          Enforceability
    In response to the district court's show cause order,
    NITHPO contended unsuccessfully that the district court could not
    enforce a subpoena issued by a defunct grand jury.                     NITHPO raises
    the same argument in this appeal, averring that civil contempt
    sanctions for noncompliance with a subpoena cannot be imposed
    4
    beyond the life of the grand jury under whose aegis the subpoena
    was issued.       The government in turn suggests that civil contempt
    sanctions are keyed to the life of the grand jury for which the
    contempt order was issued -- here, the grand jury empanelled on
    April    16,    2013.      The     parties'      arguments          rest    on   divergent
    interpretations of the applicable statute and caselaw, to which we
    presently turn.
    We have described the federal courts' contempt power as
    "one of the most potent weapons in the judicial armamentarium."
    Project B.A.S.I.C., 
    947 F.2d at 16
    .                   Although that authority was
    not codified until 1970, civil contempt sanctions "have been
    employed   against      recalcitrant        grand      jury    witnesses         since   the
    earliest days of the federal courts."                      Douglas C. Berman, Note,
    Coercive Contempt and the Federal Grand Jury, 
    79 Colum. L. Rev. 735
    , 735, 740 (1979); see also, e.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove &
    Range Co., 
    221 U.S. 418
    , 442 (1911).                       Unlike criminal contempt
    sanctions, "incarceration for civil contempt is not for the purpose
    of punishing recalcitrant respondents but rather is the modern
    'persuasive' tool that is used in substitution of the barbaric
    placing of stones on the subject's chest, which was formerly used
    to   literally     press     the    recipient         into    submission."          United
    States   v.     Marquardo,    
    149 F.3d 36
    ,   39     (1st    Cir.    1998).      An
    imprisoned civil contemnor is therefore said to "carr[y] the keys
    of his prison in his own pocket."                      Gompers, 
    221 U.S. at
    442
    5
    (internal quotation marks omitted).       In keeping with this coercive
    function, courts have long recognized that civil contempt sanctions
    are necessarily limited to the period in which the contemnor can
    unlock the figurative prison door by purging himself of contempt.
    See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 
    384 U.S. 364
    , 371-72
    (1966); Marquardo, 
    149 F.3d at 39-40
    ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings
    (Caucus Distribs., Inc.), 
    871 F.2d 156
    , 161-62 (1st Cir. 1989);
    United States v. Levine, 
    288 F.2d 272
    , 274 (2d Cir. 1961); Loubriel
    v. United States, 
    9 F.2d 807
    , 809 (2d Cir. 1926) (L. Hand, J.);
    United States v. Collins, 
    146 F. 553
    , 554 (D. Or. 1906).
    In Shillitani, involving two consolidated cases in which
    the district courts ordered recalcitrant grand jury witnesses
    imprisoned until they purged their contumacy or until two years had
    passed,   the   Supreme   Court   held   that   the   two-year   period   of
    confinement was inappropriate to the extent that it exceeded the
    term of the sitting grand jury.      As the Court explained,
    the justification for coercive imprisonment as
    applied to civil contempt depends upon the
    ability of the contemnor to comply with the
    court's order. Where the grand jury has been
    finally discharged, a contumacious witness can
    no longer be confined since he then has no
    further opportunity to purge himself of
    contempt.   Accordingly, the contempt orders
    . . . were improper insofar as they imposed
    sentences that extended beyond the cessation
    of the grand jury's inquiry into petitioners'
    activities. Having sought to deal only with
    civil contempt, the District Courts lacked
    authority to imprison petitioners for a period
    longer than the term of the grand jury. . . .
    Once the grand jury ceases to function, the
    6
    rationale for civil contempt vanishes, and the
    contemnor has to be released.
    
    384 U.S. at 371-72
     (citation and footnote omitted).          Shillitani
    did, however, leave open the possibility of reiterative contempt
    sanctions before successive grand juries: the Court explained in a
    footnote that although any given period of confinement for civil
    contempt could not last beyond the term of the sitting grand jury,
    "sentences of imprisonment may be continued or reimposed if the
    witnesses adhere to their refusal to testify before a successor
    grand jury."   
    Id.
     at 371 n.8.
    Four   years   after   the   Supreme   Court's   decision   in
    Shillitani, Congress enacted Title III of the Organized Crime
    Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 
    84 Stat. 922
    , 932 (1970) (codified
    at 
    28 U.S.C. § 1826
    ), in an endeavor to "codify present civil
    contempt practice with respect to recalcitrant witnesses in federal
    grand jury and court proceedings," H.R. Rep. No. 91-1549, at 4008
    (1970).3   Section 1826(a) provides:
    Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or
    ancillary to any court or grand jury of the
    United States refuses without just cause shown
    to comply with an order of the court to
    testify   or   provide    other   information,
    including any book, paper, document, record,
    3
    Representative Poff, a House sponsor of the legislation,
    stressed its consistency with the traditional limitations on civil
    contempt recognized in Shillitani: "[U]pon the termination of the
    proceedings at which the witness was ordered to testify, the
    witness is entitled to his release because he could no longer obey
    the court's order if he wished to do so." 116 Cong. Rec. 35291
    (1970).
    7
    recording or other material, the court, upon
    such refusal, or when such refusal is duly
    brought to its attention, may summarily order
    his confinement at a suitable place until such
    time as the witness is willing to give such
    testimony or provide such information.      No
    period of such confinement shall exceed the
    life of–-
    (1) the court proceeding, or
    (2) the term of the grand jury,
    including extensions,
    before which such refusal to comply with the
    court order occurred, but in no event shall
    such confinement exceed eighteen months.
    The parties dispute the significance of both Shillitani
    and § 1826(a) in this case.      Their sharpest dissensus, however,
    concerns the import of our holding in Caucus Distributors, in which
    we relied on both Shillitani and § 1826(a) to hold that civil
    contempt fines could not extend "beyond the life of the original
    grand jury" and into the term of a successor grand jury.       
    871 F.2d at 161
    .   Our holding rested on Shillitani's conclusion that the
    justification   for   coercive   civil   contempt   vanishes   when   the
    contemnor can no longer purge himself:
    Perhaps our most significant difficulty
    lies in contemplating how, when witnesses have
    been subpoenaed, as here, both 'to appear
    . . . to testify' and to bring documents to a
    specific grand jury and that jury has been
    discharged, a court would handle attempts to
    purge. . . . [A] court would be placed in the
    anomalous position of determining whether the
    response of a witness in supplying or failing
    to supply documents facilitated or frustrated
    the work of a grand jury that no longer
    existed. . . . Particularly since it would be
    relatively simple -- and clear cut -- for a
    successor grand jury to reimpose coercive
    8
    sanctions,    we    prefer   not   to   enter   this
    thicket.
    
    Id. at 162
    .
    The government suggests that Caucus Distributors              is
    distinguishable from this case in that both the underlying subpoena
    and the subsequent contempt order were issued during the term of
    the first grand jury. In its estimation, the "original" grand jury
    contemplated in Caucus Distributors is the one before which the
    subpoena was enforced via contempt sanctions (here, the still-
    empanelled second grand jury); NITHPO, by contrast, implies that
    Caucus Distributors instead focused on the grand jury under whose
    auspices the underlying subpoena was issued in the first place
    (here, the defunct first grand jury).
    We find Caucus Distributors inconclusive on this point.
    Moreover,   although     the   government   highlights   the   language   of
    § 1826(a) limiting confinement to "the term of the grand jury . . .
    before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred,"
    we conclude that § 1826(a) also does not address the precise
    question presented in this case.         The issue before us is not the
    proper duration of the contempt order imposed during the second
    grand jury's term, but rather whether that contempt order, based on
    NITHPO's failure to comply with a previous grand jury's subpoena,
    was properly issued at all.
    The government's position is not without some support in
    the caselaw.   Confronted with a case similar to this one, in which
    9
    an initial grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum and the
    district court granted the government's motion to compel compliance
    during the term of a successor grand jury, the D.C. Circuit
    distinguished our holding in Caucus Distributors and held that the
    first grand jury's subpoena could be enforced during the term of
    the successor grand jury.        In re Sealed Case, 
    223 F.3d 775
    , 778
    (D.C.   Cir.   2000).    In    the   D.C.    Circuit's   view,   because    the
    successor grand jury had "indisputably carried the investigation
    forward," the concerns that we had stated in Caucus Distributors
    about determining "when an investigation has ceased" were not
    implicated.    
    Id.
       (citing    Caucus      Distribs.,   
    871 F.2d at 161
    )
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The D.C. Circuit, like the government on this appeal,
    also pointed to our observation in Caucus Distributors that "a
    subpoena issued by one grand jury may be used to obtain evidence
    for a second grand jury."            Caucus Distribs., 
    871 F.2d at
    160
    (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Sutton), 
    658 F.2d 782
    , 783
    (10th Cir. 1981) (upholding a district court order commanding
    delivery of documents subpoenaed by an expired grand jury)).               That
    isolated sentence, however, cannot bear the weight placed upon it.
    Because the government in Caucus Distributors did not move to
    compel compliance before the second grand jury, we did not have
    occasion, as we do now, to determine the enforceability of the
    first grand jury's subpoena before a successor grand jury. Indeed,
    10
    we cited Sutton     for this proposition only in describing the
    underpinning of the government's unsuccessful argument in Caucus
    Distributors.     As an "observation[] . . . not essential to the
    determination of the legal questions then before the court," this
    statement is therefore non-binding dicta.         Arcam Pharm. Corp. v.
    Faría, 
    513 F.3d 1
    , 3 (1st Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
    omitted); see also Dedham Water Co., Inc. v. Cumberland Farms
    Dairy, Inc., 
    972 F.2d 453
    , 459 (1st Cir. 1992).4
    To the extent that Sutton and Sealed Case approve the use
    of the contempt power in the circumstances now before us, we
    disagree   with   those   decisions.   Such   a    rule,   allowing   the
    imposition of contempt sanctions even where a contemnor is unable
    to purge himself of contumacy before the subpoenaing grand jury,
    would vitiate the coercive rationale for civil contempt.              The
    4
    The government also points to cases in which we have held
    that the government can transfer materials presented before one
    grand jury to a successor grand jury. See, e.g., In re United
    States, 
    441 F.3d 44
    , 63 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Contenti,
    
    735 F.2d 628
    , 631 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984). These cases are not germane
    to the question presented here, however, as they address whether
    evidence already obtained by the first grand jury is transferable
    to the second grand jury, not whether the second grand jury can
    obtain new evidence by enforcing its predecessor's subpoena.
    We also find distinguishable the Fifth Circuit's decision in
    United States v. Stevens, 
    510 F.2d 1101
    , 1106 (5th Cir. 1975).
    Although Stevens upheld a civil contempt order based on the
    appellant's noncompliance with a previous grand jury's subpoena,
    the first grand jury's subpoena had expressly ordered the appellant
    to testify before the second grand jury after its empanelment.
    Stevens therefore addressed the distinct question of whether the
    first grand jury was authorized to order the appellant's
    "appearance before a grand jury not yet empanelled." 
    Id. at 1104
    .
    11
    second grand jury may have taken up the investigation, but the
    subpoena was issued in the name of, and ordered the production of
    records before, the first grand jury at a specified date and time.
    As Judge Hand stated in Loubriel, NITHPO's "duty [to testify] . . .
    was measured by the subpoena, the only process under which [NITHPO]
    could be required to appear and to testify at all." 
    9 F.2d at 809
    .
    That subpoena "did not require [NITHPO's] attendance before any
    other than the [October 2012] grand jury."     Id.; see also In re
    Grand Jury, August, 1965 (McClintock Merchantile Co.), 
    360 F.2d 917
    , 918 (7th Cir. 1966) (finding "no basis for anxiety that the
    respondent can be required to appear . . . before some other grand
    jury" under a subpoena "direct[ing] attendance on a certain day, at
    a certain hour, before the August term, 1965 of the grand jury").
    It follows as a matter of logic that NITHPO could only comply with
    the subpoena so long as the issuing grand jury was in existence.
    In this case, the subpoenaing grand jury was dead to
    begin with.5    It had expired even before the government moved to
    compel compliance with its subpoena.     The district court's order
    granting the motion to compel therefore ran afoul of the maxim "lex
    non cogit ad impossibilia" -- literally, "[t]he law does not compel
    to impossible ends,"6 Black's Law Dictionary 1844 (9th ed. 2009).
    5
    Cf. Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol (1843).
    6
    This principle is discussed more thoroughly in Herbert
    Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims 237-46 (6th ed. 1884). It is
    perhaps most familiarly embodied in the common-law contractual
    12
    See Collins, 146 F. at 554.                NITHPO could not produce documents
    before a grand jury that no longer existed, and therefore "could,
    of course, be no longer compelled to discharge a duty which had
    ended."     Loubriel, 
    9 F.2d at 809
    ; see also In re Grand Jury
    Proceedings, Thursday Special Grand Jury Sept. Term, 1991, 
    33 F.3d 342
    , 347 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The subpoenas issued by the September
    Term 1991 grand jury . . . clearly do not have force as a result of
    the    expiration   of       that   grand    jury.");    accord    In    re   Special
    Investigation No. 195, 
    454 A.2d 843
    , 846 (Md. 1983) ("The grand
    jury was dead.           There was no one to whom the subpoena was
    returnable.    .    .    .    It    thus    was   impossible      to    enforce   the
    subpoena.").
    The impossibility of compliance in turn left NITHPO
    unable to purge itself of contempt. The proverbial key in NITHPO's
    pocket fit a lock that no longer existed.               Cf. Gompers, 
    221 U.S. at 442
    .    We accordingly take guidance from Shillitani's dictate that
    civil contempt sanctions are inappropriate when a contemnor "has no
    further opportunity to purge himself of contempt."                      384 U.S. at
    doctrine of impossibility, which excuses a party's contractual
    performance "[w]here the means of performance have been nullified,
    making performance objectively impossible."       30 Williston on
    Contracts § 77:25 (4th ed. 2013); see also, e.g., Taylor v.
    Caldwell, 122 E.R. 309, 314 (K.B. 1863) ("The principle seems to us
    to be that, in contracts in which the performance depends on the
    continued existence of a given person or thing, a condition is
    implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the
    perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the performance.");
    The Tornado, 
    108 U.S. 342
    , 351 (1883) (applying rule of Taylor).
    13
    371.    Because it was impossible for NITHPO to purge itself of
    contempt, the contempt order served no coercive purpose and was
    therefore    improperly      entered.        See    Loubriel,   
    9 F.2d at 809
    (following discharge of the subpoenaing grand jury, appellant
    "could not be lawfully detained thereafter, merely to compel
    compliance with the subpoena"); Sara Sun Beale et al., Grand Jury
    Law    and   Practice    §   11:17    (2d.    ed.    2013)   ("[T]he   witness's
    confinement cannot last longer than the session of the grand jury
    before which the witness was subpoenaed, because the termination of
    the grand jury's session ends the witness's ability to comply with
    the court's order, and thus ends the possible coercive effect of
    the civil contempt sanction."); see also Levine, 
    288 F.2d at 274
    .
    In parting, we note that the government has argued that
    this conclusion would establish "an arbitrary and formalistic rule
    requiring reissuance of subpoenas upon each transfer between grand
    juries," which "merely creates a trap for the unwary prosecutor and
    an incentive for would-be contemnors to engage in delaying tactics,
    as happened here."           Of concern to us, however, is that the
    government's proposed alternative -- allowing reiterative civil
    contempt     sanctions       before     future      grand    juries    based    on
    noncompliance with an old subpoena -- would render the grand jury
    subpoena process all but meaningless.               Particularly since we and
    other courts have long recognized that a prosecutor may simply
    "obtain subpoenas issued in blank by the court, fill in the blanks,
    14
    and have the witnesses served without consulting the grand jury,"
    In re Melvin, 
    546 F.2d 1
    , 5 (1st Cir. 1976) -- a point that the
    government itself stresses on this appeal -- we see no great
    administrative difficulty in requiring, as a precondition to the
    use of coercive contempt power, the issuance of a new subpoena for
    each new grand jury.        If the current grand jury or a successor
    desires information from a recalcitrant NITHPO, the government need
    do no more than obtain a new, enforceable subpoena.                That is a
    small price to pay for access to "one of the most potent weapons in
    the judicial armamentarium."      Project B.A.S.I.C., 
    947 F.2d at 16
    .
    B.      Tribal Sovereign Immunity
    Although   our    holding    that   the   expired   grand   jury's
    subpoena   was   unenforceable    would     ordinarily    render    NITHPO's
    remaining challenges moot, this case falls within the "capable of
    repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine.
    As formulated by the Supreme Court, the exception applies where
    "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be
    fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there
    was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would
    be subjected to the same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 
    423 U.S. 147
    , 149 (1975); see also, e.g., ACLU of Mass. v. U.S.
    Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
    705 F.3d 44
    , 57 (1st Cir. 2013).
    Both criteria are satisfied here. First, the current grand jury is
    continuing its predecessor's investigation and, in light of our
    15
    holding today, can reasonably be expected to issue a new subpoena
    to NITHPO.    Second, according to the government's brief, the
    current grand jury is presently set to expire in April 2014,
    leaving too short a period of time to fully litigate a new
    subpoena's validity.    See Thursday Special Grand Jury Sept. Term,
    1991, 
    33 F.3d at 347
     (finding an expired grand jury's subpoenas
    unenforceable, but holding that appellants' objections to the
    subpoenas' validity were capable of repetition yet evading review);
    see also In re Sealed Case, 
    877 F.2d 976
    , 981 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
    We therefore turn to NITHPO's argument that, as a branch of the
    Narragansett Indian Tribe, it was immune to subpoena.
    Proceeding on the assumption that NITHPO is an arm of the
    Narragansett Indian Tribe whose sovereign immunity is coextensive
    with that of the tribe (a premise that the government does not
    dispute on appeal), the district court nevertheless determined that
    tribal sovereign immunity did not operate as a bar to the grand
    jury's subpoena power.    On appeal, NITHPO assigns error to that
    conclusion,   arguing    that   the   subpoena   "constitute[d]   a
    nonpermissible intrusion into the internal affairs of a federally
    recognized tribe, and thus, [that] its enforcement would violate
    tribal sovereign immunity."
    The Supreme Court has described Indian tribes as "unique
    aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
    members and their territory," Montana v. United States, 
    450 U.S. 16
    544, 563 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted), including
    sovereign immunity from suit, see Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg.
    Techs., Inc., 
    523 U.S. 751
    , 754 (1998).        Nevertheless, the Court
    has   been    "careful   to   note    that,   through   their   original
    incorporation into the United States as well as through specific
    treaties and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the
    attributes of sovereignty."      Montana, 450 U.S. at 563; see also
    Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
    
    447 U.S. 134
    , 154 (1980) ("[T]ribal sovereignty is dependent on,
    and subordinate to, [] the Federal Government . . . ."); United
    States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
    309 U.S. 506
    , 512 (1940) ("It is
    as though the immunity which was [the tribes'] as sovereigns passed
    to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal properties
    did.").
    Other circuits have accordingly recognized the United
    States as a superior sovereign from whose suits the tribes enjoy no
    sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla.
    v. United States, 
    698 F.3d 1326
    , 1331 (11th Cir. 2012); Reich v.
    Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 
    95 F.3d 174
    , 182 (2d Cir. 1996);
    Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 
    18 F.3d 1456
    , 1459 (9th Cir.
    1994); United States v. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 
    827 F.2d 380
    , 382-83 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Yakima Tribal Court,
    
    806 F.2d 853
    , 861 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. White Mountain
    Apache Tribe, 
    784 F.2d 917
    , 920 (9th Cir. 1986), even where
    17
    Congress has not specifically abrogated the tribes' immunity, see
    EEOC v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 
    400 F.3d 774
    , 781 (9th Cir. 2005).
    Even   assuming   arguendo       that    the   enforcement   of    a   subpoena
    represents a "suit" against a tribe for purposes of sovereign
    immunity (a premise that the government contests), we find no
    reason to depart from this bedrock principle, and accordingly
    conclude that tribal sovereign immunity provides no refuge from the
    subpoena power of a federal grand jury.
    For the sake of completeness, we further note that, even
    if the tribes did originally enjoy sovereign immunity from federal
    grand jury process, Congress has abrogated that immunity through
    the enactment of federal criminal statutes extending to Indian
    country "the general laws of the United States as to the punishment
    of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive
    jurisdiction of the United States." 
    18 U.S.C. § 1152
    ; see also 
    id.
    §   1153   (establishing    federal      jurisdiction    over     major   crimes
    committed in Indian country).           That grant of criminal jurisdiction
    necessarily    entails     the    authorization     of   investigative       and
    enforcement mechanisms such as the grand jury subpoena power.               See
    In re Long Visitor, 
    523 F.2d 443
    , 446-47 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he
    extension by Congress of federal jurisdiction to crimes committed
    on Indian reservations inherently includes every aspect of federal
    criminal procedure applicable to the prosecution of such crimes.");
    United States v. Boggs, 
    493 F. Supp. 1050
    , 1054 (D. Mont. 1980)
    18
    (stating that tribal sovereign immunity from grand jury process
    would   render   Indian   criminal      statutes   "almost   universally
    unenforceable"); cf. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 
    449 F.3d 16
    , 22, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) (holding that the
    Narragansett Tribe waived its sovereign immunity from the execution
    of a state search warrant by entering into a land claims settlement
    providing that "all laws of the State of Rhode Island shall be in
    full force and effect on the settlement lands").
    C.      Reasonableness
    NITHPO lastly argues that the district court should have
    quashed the subpoena as unreasonably broad and burdensome. Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 17(c)(2) authorizes a district court to quash or modify a
    subpoena "if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive."         A
    subpoena is presumed to be reasonable, and the recipient bears the
    burden of establishing its unreasonableness.        United States v. R.
    Enters., Inc., 
    498 U.S. 292
    , 301 (1991).
    As modified by the district court, the subpoena duces
    tecum seeks fifteen categories of documents spanning a five-year
    period, including, inter alia, contracts and correspondence between
    NITHPO and government entities, payroll records and documents
    concerning NITHPO employees and contractors, and meeting minutes.
    Citing United States v. Gurule, 
    437 F.2d 239
    , 241 (10th Cir. 1970),
    for the threefold proposition that "(1) the subpoena may command
    only the production of things relevant to the investigation being
    19
    pursued; (2) specification of things to be produced must be made
    with       reasonable   particularity;     and   (3)   production   of    records
    covering only a reasonable time may be required," NITHPO avers that
    the subpoena duces tecum is deficient under the latter two prongs,
    neither specifying the documents to be produced with "reasonable
    particularity" nor "covering only a reasonable time."
    District courts might indeed reach divergent conclusions
    as to the reasonableness of this subpoena, but that is not the
    standard      of   review   on   appeal.      Reviewing   only   for     abuse   of
    discretion, see LaRouche Campaign, 
    841 F.2d at 1179
    , we think that
    the denial of NITHPO's Rule 17(c)(2) motion fell within the wide
    bourn of the district court's discretion.7             NITHPO ultimately does
    little more than enumerate the categories of requested documents
    and generally protest "[t]he sheer amount of time and resources
    that would be required to comply" with the subpoena duces tecum.
    But all subpoenas demand some amount of time and resources from
    their recipients, and absent a more specific explanation of how the
    burden in this case is unreasonable, we decline to disturb the
    district court's judgment.          Cf. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 115
    7
    Given the standard of review, the two appellate cases on
    which NITHPO relies, United States v. Wencke, 
    604 F.2d 607
    , 612
    (9th Cir. 1979), and Margoles v. United States, 
    402 F.2d 450
    , 451-
    52 (7th Cir. 1968), are crucially distinguishable in that they
    merely held that quashing a subpoena was within the district
    court's discretion.    That alone does not compel the converse
    conclusion that the refusal to quash would have been an abuse of
    discretion.
    
    20 F.3d 1240
    , 1244 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that subpoena recipients
    failed to establish unreasonableness by "[s]imply citing the types
    of information sought by the government").
    As a last effort, NITHPO also reintroduces its tribal
    sovereign immunity argument in new garb, suggesting that "[w]hat
    constitutes an unreasonable intrusion into the workings of an
    entity is certainly different . . . when that entity is a sovereign
    nation that has recognized protections from interference with
    internal tribal matters."   We decline NITHPO's invitation to graft
    sovereign immunity considerations onto Rule 17(c)(2), and in any
    event, this assertion lacks force in light of our conclusion in
    section B supra.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the subpoena
    duces tecum was unenforceable after the expiration of the issuing
    grand jury. We therefore vacate the district court's order holding
    NITHPO in civil contempt. In the event a subpoena similar in scope
    is subsequently issued and NITHPO again challenges its validity,
    our holdings on tribal sovereign immunity and reasonableness of the
    subpoena shall apply to any such proceeding.
    21