Peralta Sauceda v. Lynch , 804 F.3d 101 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-2042
JOSE RICARDO PERALTA SAUCEDA,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH,*
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Torruella, Lynch, Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Carlos E. Estrada and Estrada Law Office, on brief for
petitioner.
James A. Hurley, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Benjamin C. Mizer,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and
Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration
Litigation, on brief for respondent.
* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Attorney General
Loretta E. Lynch has been substituted for former Attorney General
Eric H. Holder, Jr., as the respondent.
October 14, 2015
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Jose Ricardo Peralta Sauceda
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA)
affirmance of an immigration judge's (IJ) decision that he was not
eligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to meet his
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had
not previously been convicted of a "crime of domestic violence."
Peralta Sauceda concedes that he cannot provide competent evidence
that would compel a finding that he was not convicted of a "crime
of domestic violence." We deny his petition for review, consistent
with the views of five other circuits.
I.
Peralta Sauceda, a native and citizen of Honduras,
entered the United States illegally on December 23, 1993. On
December 11, 2006, Peralta Sauceda pleaded guilty to Count One of
a criminal complaint that charged him with assaulting his wife in
violation of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 207(1)(A), which
states that "[a] person is guilty of assault if: A. The person
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury or
offensive physical contact to another person." On August 29, 2007,
the Department of Homeland Security served Peralta Sauceda with a
Notice to Appear, charging him with removability as an alien
present without being admitted or paroled. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). At a preliminary hearing, he conceded
removability and requested cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1229b(b)(1). At the July 29, 2009 merits hearing, the question
was raised whether his assault conviction qualified as a "crime of
domestic violence" under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), thereby
disqualifying him from eligibility for cancellation of removal.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).
On September 19, 2013, after a series of appeals to and
remands from the BIA concerning the applicability of the modified
categorical approach to the Maine assault statute, the IJ issued
her final order pretermitting Peralta Sauceda's application for
cancellation of removal. In performing the modified categorical
approach analysis, the IJ found that the record as presented showed
that Peralta Sauceda had pleaded guilty to committing a domestic
violence crime, but that the record was inconclusive as to whether
he was convicted under the "bodily injury" prong or the "offensive
physical contact" prong of the Maine statute. As the BIA had held,
only a conviction under the "bodily injury" prong would qualify as
a federal "crime of domestic violence" and render him ineligible
for cancellation of removal.
The IJ had previously issued an order to the parties on
July 23, 2013, granting them additional time to provide "any other
part of the record of conviction" that could clarify under which
prong he was convicted. Peralta Sauceda informed the IJ on August
1, 2013 that he was unable to secure any other documents because
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the Superior Court of the county where he was convicted does not,
in misdemeanor cases, maintain copies of the documents he needed.
In light of this admission, the IJ held in her final
order that Peralta Sauceda was not eligible for cancellation of
removal because he had failed to meet his burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that his 2006 assault conviction was
not a "crime of domestic violence." The BIA affirmed. This
petition for review followed.
II.
Since "the BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ's ruling, and
discussed some of the bases for the IJ's opinion, we review both
the BIA's and IJ's opinions." Idy v. Holder, 674 F.3d 111, 117
(1st Cir. 2012). We review legal conclusions de novo, while
affording "appropriate deference to the BIA's interpretation of
immigration statutes." Ruci v. Holder, 741 F.3d 239, 242 (1st
Cir. 2013).
In removal proceedings, the statute provides that "[a]n
alien applying for relief or protection from removal has the burden
of proof to establish that the alien -- (i) satisfies the
applicable eligibility requirements." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A).
The applicable regulations similarly state:
The respondent shall have the burden of
establishing that he or she is eligible for
any requested benefit or privilege and that it
should be granted in the exercise of
discretion. If the evidence indicates that
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one or more of the grounds for mandatory
denial of the application for relief may
apply, the alien shall have the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that such grounds do not apply.
8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).
By requesting cancellation of removal, Peralta Sauceda
undertook the burden of proving his eligibility for relief.
Peralta Sauceda does not challenge the IJ's determination that
there was enough evidence in the record to place upon him the
burden of proving that he had not been convicted of a "crime of
domestic violence." In order to establish eligibility for relief,
Peralta Sauceda must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
he was not convicted under the "bodily injury" prong of the Maine
statute.
Peralta Sauceda states that the Maine courts do not
maintain such records as would establish under which prong of the
Maine statute he was convicted. His appeal essentially boils down
to the argument that he made good-faith efforts to find this
evidence, that its unavailability is not his fault, and so the
IJ's order is not fair. But that is not how a burden of proof
works. It is hornbook law that the allocation of the burden of
proof determines "which of two contending litigants loses when
there is no evidence on a question or when the answer is simply
too difficult to find." Burden of Proof, Black's Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014).
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Congress spoke clearly when it chose to place the "burden
of proof" on the alien requesting cancellation of removal. After
all, cancellation of removal is not a context in which the alien
is "in the dock facing criminal sanctions," but is instead one in
which the alien seeks "the government's largesse to avoid removal."
Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). We join five
other circuits who have held that an inconclusive record cannot
satisfy an alien's burden of proving eligibility for discretionary
relief. See Syblis v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 763 F.3d 348, 355–
57 (3d Cir. 2014); Sanchez v. Holder, 757 F.3d 712, 720 & n.6 (7th
Cir. 2014); Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 988–90 (9th Cir. 2012)
(en banc); Salem, 647 F.3d at 116–20; Garcia v. Holder, 584 F.3d
1288, 1289–90 (10th Cir. 2009). But see Martinez v. Mukasey, 551
F.3d 113, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2008).
III.
Peralta Sauceda also argues that it was improper for the
IJ not to consider the fact that his conviction was under a general
assault statute even though Maine now has a separate domestic
violence statute. But as Peralta Sauceda admits, the Maine
domestic violence statute was not passed until after he tendered
his guilty plea, making this argument irrelevant. His appeal to
Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (A.G. 2015), is
similarly misguided because Silva-Trevino concerned the
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determination of whether an offense qualifies as a crime involving
moral turpitude, not a crime of domestic violence.
IV.
The petition for review is denied.
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