Perez-Colon v. Camacho ( 2003 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-2676
MANUEL PEREZ-COLON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ALEX CAMACHO, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lipez and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Manuel Perez-Colon on brief pro se.
H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, Miguel A. Fernández,
Assistant United States Attorney, and Germán A. Rieckehoff,
Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
September 5, 2003
Per Curiam. Appellant Manuel Perez-Colon appeals from the
judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint which
sought the return of $3,000 allegedly seized from him upon his
arrest. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that appellant had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
. . . correctional facility until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted."). For the following reasons, we
vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
In 1998, a jury convicted appellant of various drug
offenses, and, in 1999, the district court sentenced him to life
imprisonment. On January 18, 2002, appellant escaped from custody.
Appellant's freedom was short-lived, however, as he was arrested on
February 6, 2002. At the time of his arrest, appellant alleges
that the U.S. Marshals seized the following items from him: (1) an
automobile; (2) a watch; (3) some jewelry; and (4) $3,000 in cash.
Everything but the cash was returned to appellant's family.
Appellant attached to the complaint a document entitled "Federal
Prisoner's Property Receipt." This document indicates the receipt
of the $3,000 and is signed by Alex Camacho, the Marshal who
apparently had taken the money from appellant.
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When appellant failed to get the cash back, he wrote a
letter to the chief of the U.S. Marshals Service in Puerto Rico
asking for the return of the money. Apparently this letter was
unsuccessful because appellant filed the instant complaint on
September 18, 2002. In his complaint, appellant claimed that his
due process rights had been violated; in particular, he averred
that the cash had not been subject to forfeiture proceedings, but
rather had just disappeared. As relief, appellant requested, among
other things, an order that the U.S. Marshals return the $3,000.
Because the district court dismissed the complaint before
the defendants had responded, we must treat the dismissal as a sua
sponte one. See Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31,
36 (1st Cir. 2001). This type of dismissal -- "a dismissal on the
court's own initiative, without affording the plaintiff either
notice or an opportunity to be heard -- is disfavored in federal
practice." Id. As a result, "[w]e will uphold a sua sponte order
of dismissal only if the allegations contained in the complaint,
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are patently
meritless and beyond all hope of redemption." Id. at 37. Such
dismissals are reviewed de novo. Id.This complaint, construed in appellant's favor as it must
be, is not "beyond all hope of redemption." That is, if it turns
out that the money was seized from appellant by the U.S. Marshals
as part of appellant's arrest, and separate from his re-
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incarceration, appellant probably is entitled to file a complaint
for the return of the money without having to exhaust any remedies.
The sticking point is that the receipt for the $3,000
specifically states that it is a "prisoner's" receipt. This
receipt suggests that the money, in fact, was confiscated from
appellant at the time that he re-entered prison. In that case, it
certainly is arguable that prison grievance procedures must be
exhausted before the filing of a complaint for the return of the
money. See Owen v. Kimmel, 693 F.2d 711, 713-15 (7th Cir. 1982)
(requiring exhaustion of a claim that prison officials confiscated
the plaintiff's furniture so long as the prison's grievance
procedures met the standards set out in former § 1997e).
In the situation where property is seized at the time of
an individual's arrest, the controlling case is United States v.
Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 1995) (per curiam). In that case,
we held that "district courts have jurisdiction to entertain
collateral due process attacks on administrative forfeitures," and
that "such challenges may be pursued in a civil action under 28
U.S.C. § 1331." Id. at 511. Although Giraldo was decided before
the enactment of the exhaustion requirement contained in §
1997e(a), there is no indication in our case law, or in the case
law from other circuits, that this requirement applies to actions
for the return of property seized incident to an arrest. See,
e.g., Gonzalez-Gonzalez, 257 F.3d at 35-38 (citing Giraldo and
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remanding a motion for the return of property seized when the
defendant was arrested where there were facts in dispute regarding
the adequacy of the notice of forfeiture provided to the defendant;
no discussion of exhaustion); United States v. Minor, 228 F.3d 352,
355-57 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a prisoner may file an action
for the return of property seized at the time he was arrested and
locating the source of such a right of action in the Constitution;
no discussion of any exhaustion requirement); United States v.
Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 375-77 (3d Cir. 1999) (where criminal
proceedings have ended, a Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) motion for the
return of property seized during the defendant's arrest is to be
"treated as a civil proceeding for equitable relief"; no discussion
of an exhaustion requirement).
Because there are factual issues concerning the
circumstances under which appellant's money was confiscated, the
district court's sua sponte dismissal cannot be upheld. Therefore,
this case must be remanded to the district court for further
proceedings. We, of course, express no views as to whether the
claim has any potential merit, or whether it might be subject to
dismissal on some other ground or on a better-developed record.
Vacated and remanded.
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