Chance v. United States ( 1996 )

USCA1 Opinion

          May 23, 1996

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]



                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



                                 ____________________





        No. 95-1526



                                   ASTOR D. CHANCE,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                          v.



                                       TAIWAN,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.


____________________



        No. 95-1573

        No. 95-1629





                                   ASTOR D. CHANCE,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                          v.



                          UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________



                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

                                 ____________________



                                        Before



                                 Selya, Cyr and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
______________

                                 ____________________



            Astor D. Chance on brief pro se.
_______________





                                 ____________________





                                 ____________________



                 Per  Curiam.     We   affirm  the  judgments   in  these
___________



























            consolidated appeals substantially for the reasons recited by



            the district court.  We add only the following comments.



                 1.  The Government of Taiwan  is amenable to suit in the



            United  States only  in  accordance  with  the terms  of  the



            Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.



            1602-11.   See,  e.g.,  Millen Indus.,  Inc. v.  Coordination
___   ____   ____________________     ____________



            Council  for North American Affairs,  855 F.2d 879, 883 (D.C.
___________________________________



            Cir.  1988)  ("all  laws,  including  the  FSIA,  [that  are]



            applicable to  nations also apply to  Taiwan"); see generally
_____________



            Argentine Republic  v. Amerada Hess Shipping  Corp., 488 U.S.
__________________     ____________________________



            428,  443 (1989) (FSIA "provides the sole basis for obtaining



            jurisdiction  over a  foreign  state in  the  courts of  this



            country").  Plaintiff is mistaken in arguing that the  FSIA's



            applicability  to Taiwan  is  affected by     4(b)(7) of  the



            Taiwan Relations Act, 22  U.S.C.   3303(b)(7), which provides



            simply that the  capacity of Taiwan "to  sue and be  sued" in



            United  States  courts  is  not altered  "by  the  absence of



            diplomatic relations or recognition."  His further suggestion



            that Taiwan's amenability to suit is  affected by the Torture



            Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.



            73  (set  forth  in note  following  28  U.S.C.    1350),  is



            likewise misplaced.



                 2.    For the  reasons  enumerated  in Saudi  Arabia  v.
_____________



            Nelson, 507  U.S. 349  (1993), plaintiff's attempt  to invoke
______



            the  "commercial  activity"  exception  to  the  FSIA  proves







                                         -2-



























            unavailing.  In particular, because  the governmental conduct



            of which  he complains  is "peculiarly sovereign  in nature,"



            id. at 361,  his action cannot be regarded as  one "based ...
___



            upon an act  outside the  territory of the  United States  in



            connection with  a commercial  activity of the  foreign state



            elsewhere ...."  28 U.S.C.   1605(a)(2).



                 3.   Finally, we reject the  procedural objection voiced



            by  plaintiff in  Nos.  95-1573 &  95-1629.   Inasmuch  as  a



            frivolous complaint can properly be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.



               1915(d) on  a  sua sponte  basis,  see, e.g.,  Neitzke  v.
__________          ___  ____   _______



            Williams,  490 U.S. 319, 324,  330 (1989), the  court did not
________



            err in dismissing  these actions in advance  of its indicated



            twenty-day deadline.  Plaintiff, we note, has made no  effort



            to  buttress  his substantive  arguments  in  this regard  on



            appeal.



                 Affirmed.
_________











































                                         -3-