Frappier v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ( 2014 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1774
MARK FRAPPIER,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Stahl and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Valeriano Diviacchi for Appellant.
Chad W. Higgins, with whom Brian M. LaMacchia, B. Aiden
Flanagan, and Goodwin Proctor LLP were on brief, for Appellee.
April 30, 2014
STAHL, Circuit Judge. On May 11, 2009, Plaintiff Mark
Frappier filed a five-count complaint in the Superior Court of
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, alleging various state-law claims
related to a mortgage refinancing. Defendant Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide") removed the case to federal court on
diversity grounds. The district court resolved certain claims as
a matter of law in Countrywide's favor and held a bench trial on
the remaining claims. After the trial, the district court entered
judgment in favor of Countrywide. This appeal followed. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm all of the district court's
rulings.
I. Background
The facts of this case are set forth in detail in the
district court's opinion. Frappier v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., No. 09-cv-11006, 2013 WL 1308602, at *4–15 (D. Mass. Mar. 31,
2013). We briefly reiterate them here only as necessary to provide
context for the issues on appeal.
Frappier resides in Southwick, Massachusetts. In June
1999, he and his wife purchased his mother's house ("the Property")
with a mortgage from Countrywide. In the years that followed,
Frappier took out multiple mortgages to finance home improvements,
initially with his wife and later in his own name after the couple
divorced. Frappier remarried and took out an additional mortgage
with his second wife. When that marriage ended in March 2006, the
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divorce agreement required Frappier to either sell the Property by
July 21, 2006, or refinance the mortgage in his own name by August
20, 2006. Frappier was unable to sell the Property, and he failed
to refinance by the August 20 deadline.
To cure his breach of the divorce agreement, Frappier
applied for a loan from Countrywide on September 19, 2006. The
loan for which he applied was a "stated income loan," otherwise
known as the "Fast and Easy" loan program. Under the terms of this
loan program, applicants would be approved if one had a credit
score at or above 680, verified employment, and a loan-to-property
value of less than eighty percent. Documentation of assets and
income was not required, but applicants had to personally verify
under criminal penalty that the information they provided was
accurate. The loan officer testified that Frappier stated his
monthly income as $5563, but Frappier claims he reported a lower
income figure.
Countrywide, following its normal underwriting process,
determined that Frappier had met the requirements for the Fast and
Easy loan program. At the closing, Frappier signed the
application, which listed his income as $5563 a month, and swore
under criminal penalty that the information in the application was
accurate. He also executed a Borrower's Certification, which
certified that he had provided accurate information regarding his
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income and assets. Countrywide issued the loan in October 2006
("October 2006 Loan").
On November 17, 2006, three weeks after the closing of
the October 2006 Loan, Frappier applied to Countrywide for a home
equity loan in the amount of $38,500.1 Countrywide approved this
loan as well, and it closed on December 13, 2006 ("December 2006
Loan").
Thereafter, Frappier made the scheduled payments on the
October 2006 Loan for fifteen months.2 In 2008, he changed jobs,
but his new employer let him go. Around the same time, Frappier
faced unusually high expenses for home heating bills and repairs to
his truck. He also suffered from an illness that hospitalized him
for a day and kept him out of work for some time. That winter,
Frappier attempted again to sell the Property, but he was not
successful. Because he was unable to make payments on his loan,
Countrywide foreclosed on the Property.
1
The district court did not directly address the facts
related to this second loan in the opinion it issued after the
bench trial. They are relevant, however, to Frappier's appeal from
the district court's denial of his motion to amend the complaint.
We take these facts from an earlier First Circuit opinion in this
case, Frappier v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 645 F.3d 51, 54–55
(1st Cir. 2011).
2
We do not know from the facts before us the extent of
Frappier's payments on the smaller December 2006 Loan.
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II. Procedural History
Frappier filed a complaint in Suffolk Superior Court on
May 11, 2009, alleging claims of unjust enrichment (Count I),
recission/equitable relief (Count II), breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count III), unfair and
deceptive acts in violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter
93A (Count IV), and negligence (Count V). All of the claims arise
from Frappier's contention that Countrywide used improper tactics
to draw him into loan agreements that the mortgagor knew he would
be unable to satisfy.
After removing the case to federal court, Countrywide
moved for summary judgment on all counts. Frappier opposed the
motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Frappier
argued at this stage that the court should consider both the
October 2006 Loan and the December 2006 Loan together as the basis
for his claims, although the complaint made no mention of the
December 2006 Loan. The district court granted Countrywide's
motion on all counts.
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed in part. With
respect to the December 2006 Loan, the court held that:
Countrywide argues . . . that the attack on the December
loan is an independent claim for a different transaction
essentially forfeited because Frappier did not mention
the December second home mortgage or any facts pertaining
to it in his complaint. This is correct and a new
transaction cannot be asserted for the first time at
summary judgment. However, the district court might on
remand allow an amendment to the complaint.
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Frappier v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 645 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir.
2011). Despite allowing for the possibility of an amendment to the
complaint, the First Circuit nevertheless held that certain claims
failed as a matter of law, affirming the dismissal of the
negligence and rescission/equitable relief claims in their entirety
and the covenant claim as it related to the December 2006 Loan. It
vacated the dismissal of the covenant claim as it related to the
October 2006 Loan, however, and it vacated the dismissal of the
unjust enrichment and 93A claims in their entirety.
On remand, Frappier filed a motion to amend the complaint,
seeking to include allegations about the December 2006 Loan. The
court denied the motion on December 12, 2011. On March 16, 2012,
Countrywide filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with
respect to the breach of good faith and fair dealing claim (Count
III) and to strike Frappier's jury demand. The district court
granted the motion in both respects. On April 23 and 24, 2012, the
court held a bench trial on the remaining claims: unjust enrichment
(Count I) and violations of chapter 93A (Count IV). It entered
judgment in favor of Countrywide on both counts. After the trial,
Frappier filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52
for amended or additional findings of fact, or, in the alternative,
for a new trial under Rule 59. The court denied that motion and
Frappier appealed.
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III. Analysis
On appeal, Frappier challenges the denial of his motion
to amend, his request for a jury trial, and his post-trial motion
for amended factual findings or a new trial. He also challenges
the district court's judgment on the pleadings resolving Count III
in Countrywide's favor. After careful consideration, we find no
grounds for reversing any of the district court's decisions.
A. Denial of Motion to Amend
On October 27, 2011, Frappier moved to amend his
complaint to include allegations related to the December 2006 Loan.
The district court denied the motion on the grounds of undue delay
and undue prejudice. We review a denial of a motion to amend for
abuse of discretion. Watson v. Deaconess Waltham Hosp., 298 F.3d
102, 109 (1st Cir. 2002).
The district court did not err, much less abuse its
discretion, in this instance. As the district court noted, the
proposed amendment came over two years after the initial complaint
was filed and a year after the district court ruled on the summary
judgment motions. Nothing prevented Frappier from pursuing this
amendment earlier. As the borrower, Frappier certainly had
sufficient information about the December 2006 Loan to allege
claims related to that transaction at the outset of litigation, and
he very likely could have amended his complaint, had he wished to
do so, prior to summary judgment.
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The district court correctly decided that the timing of
the amendment constituted undue delay. "[P]rotracted delay, with
its attendant burdens on the opponent and the court, is itself a
sufficient reason for the court to withhold permission to amend."
Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004).
The district court was also correct that the amendment would
unfairly prejudice Countrywide, given the likelihood that the
amendment would require additional discovery. See id.
("Particularly disfavored are motions to amend whose timing
prejudices the opposing party by requiring a re-opening of
discovery . . . .") (internal quotation mark omitted). Thus, we
affirm the denial of the motion to amend.3
B. Judgment on the Pleadings
"The standard of review of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same
as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Marrero-
Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). We "review de
novo a district court's decision to allow a motion to dismiss,
3
Frappier also argues that the amendment is unnecessary,
because facts related to the December 2006 Loan came out during
discovery. His argument on this point appears to confuse the
pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 with the
rules governing the admissibility of evidence at trial. In any
case, this court has already held the December 2006 Loan was a
separate transaction that could not be asserted as a basis for a
claim in this case unless the district court exercised its
discretion to allow an amendment. Frappier, 645 F.3d at 58.
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taking as true the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id.
Countrywide moved for judgment on the pleadings on Count
III, arguing that allegations of bad-faith conduct occurring prior
to the formation of a contract do not state a claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See AccuSoft
Corp. v. Palo, 237 F.3d 31, 45 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[T]he prohibition
contained in the covenant applies only to conduct during the
performance of the contract, not to conduct occurring prior to the
contract's existence, such as conduct affecting contract
negotiations."). As the district court noted, Frappier's theory of
liability in this case rests not on allegations of conduct that
occurred after the closing of the October 2006 Loan, but rather on
alleged misconduct during the application process.
In his opposition to the motion and again on appeal,
Frappier argues that he and Countrywide "had several interactions
prior to [the date of the closing] to which the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing applies."4 The district court rejected
that argument, because allegations regarding pre-closing agreements
"were not included in the operative complaint," and Frappier had
made no attempt "to amend his complaint to include any such
allegations in the wake of factual discoveries in the life of this
4
Among other things, Frappier points to a "Lock-In Agreement"
dated September 19, 2006, and a verbal "pre-approval agreement"
sometime in early October.
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case." It further held that Frappier had waived this argument
because he did not "identify or develop such a theory during
discovery, initial disclosures, or any pretrial filings." Finally,
the district court observed that the substance of any alleged pre-
closing agreements would not have any bearing on whether
Countrywide breached the covenant implied in the October 2006 loan.
We see no error in the district court's reasoning on this issue.
Frappier raised one additional argument that the district
court did not squarely address, which we find equally groundless.
He claims that the October 2006 Loan was a type of installment
contract "that can be breached on a monthly basis every time a loan
payment is made." Therefore, Frappier concludes, Countrywide
breached the covenant each month by accepting payments that it knew
Frappier could not afford. It is well-established, however, that
"a party's acting according to the express terms of a contract
cannot be considered a breach of the duties of good faith and fair
dealing." Big Yank Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 F.3d
308, 313 (6th Cir. 1997); Terry A. Lambert Plumbing, Inc. v. W.
Sec. Bank, 934 F.2d 976, 983 (8th Cir. 1991); Kham & Nate's Shoes
No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990) ("Firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to
enforce them to the letter, even to the great discomfort of their
trading partners, without being mulcted for lack of 'good
faith.'"); 23 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 63:22 (4th ed.
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2013). Accordingly, Countrywide's acceptance of payments under the
agreed-upon terms of the mortgage does not give rise to a claim of
bad faith.
C. Right to a Jury Trial
Once it entered judgment on the pleadings for Count III,
the district court determined that Frappier did not have a right to
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment on the remaining claims
for unjust enrichment and violation of chapter 93A. Although it is
undisputed that the unjust enrichment count does not require a jury
trial, Frappier reiterates on appeal his argument that he was
entitled to a jury on his chapter 93A claim. The district court's
decision denying the jury request was based on Wallace Motor Sales,
Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 780 F.2d 1049 (1st Cir. 1985),
and more recent district court opinions that have followed Wallace.
While the district court's reliance on Wallace is understandable,
given that it is this court's most extensive discussion of the
issue, there are two reasons why that case is not dispositive here.
First, the parties in Wallace stipulated that there was
no right to a jury under chapter 93A, see 780 F.2d at 1064, so the
issue was not contested in that case.5 Second, the parties based
5
The court in Wallace addressed whether the court could make
factual findings related to chapter 93A claims that were contrary
to the jury's earlier findings related to another claim in the
case. 780 F.2d at 1063–67. The court's analysis proceeded from
the assumption, based on the party's stipulation, that there was no
right to a jury trial for the 93A claims.
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their stipulation on Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1983), in
which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that
there was no right to a jury for chapter 93A claims under the
Massachusetts Constitution. It is true that in Wallace we stated
that "the reasoning employed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in Nei is determinative of the seventh amendment issue." 780
F.2d at 1064. But the settled rule is that a litigant's right to
a jury under the Seventh Amendment for state-law claims in federal
court is a matter of federal, not state, law. See Ed Peters
Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry Co., 215 F.3d 182, 186 (1st Cir.
2000); Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., 962 F.2d 120, 122 (1st Cir.
1992) (per curiam). Therefore, the analysis in Nei does not answer
the question in this case.
Subsequent to the decision in Wallace, the Supreme Court
reiterated the two-part test for determining the right to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment: courts (1) "compare the
statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of
England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity"; and
(2) "examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or
equitable in nature." Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No.
391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court has stressed that "[t]he second inquiry is the
more important." Id. The court in Wallace did not have occasion
to apply this analysis, perhaps because the parties in that case
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did not dispute the issue. But we have held that chapter 93A
allows a litigant to seek both legal and equitable relief. Gerli
v. G.K. Hall & Co., 851 F.2d 452, 454 (1st Cir. 1988). In light of
the importance of the nature of the remedy under federal law, a
litigant seeking legal relief in federal court under chapter 93A
may be entitled to a jury. Regardless of any contrary language in
Wallace, the question remains an open one in this circuit.
This case does not require us to answer that question.
Even if the district court deprived Frappier of his Seventh
Amendment right, the denial of a jury trial is subject to a
harmless error analysis. Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co.,
207 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2000); In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15,
25 (1st Cir. 1982). The error is harmless "if the evidence meets
the standard for a directed verdict." Segrets, 207 F.3d at 64.
Pursuant to that standard, we review the district court's
conclusions of law de novo and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to Frappier. Id. We do not "consider the credibility of
witnesses, resolve the conflicts in testimony, or evaluate the
weight of the evidence." Id. at 65. A directed verdict is
appropriate if "the evidence does not permit a reasonable jury to
find in favor" of Frappier. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
We have no trouble concluding that a directed verdict
would have been appropriate here. This is not a close case. Of
the numerous deficiencies in Frappier's chapter 93A claim, we need
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only focus on one that is dispositive — Frappier failed to prove
causation.
The undisputed evidence shows that Frappier made timely
payments on the October 2006 loan for approximately fifteen months.
Then in the winter of 2008, according to Frappier's own testimony,
he was plagued with a series of serious financial difficulties. He
suffered an illness that required hospitalization and forced him to
miss work; he faced unexpected expenses for the repair of his
vehicle and unusually high home heating bills; and he switched to
a new job with the prospect of better money, but the new job did
not last. Frappier acknowledged that these circumstances were not
predictable. As these difficulties piled up, Frappier became
delinquent on the October 2006 Loan.
The district court held that "the reasonable conclusion
from the evidence was that Frappier's [] hardships caused his
default, not the October 2006 Loan." 2013 WL 1308602, at *19. We
agree. Frappier was able to pay the loan until a series of
unfortunate circumstances overwhelmed his financial situation.
There is no basis in the evidence for concluding that it was
Countrywide, rather than Frappier's unexpected financial
difficulties, that caused him to default. "In the absence of a
causal relationship between the alleged unfair acts and the claimed
loss, there can be no recovery." Mass. Farm Bureau Fed'n, Inc. v.
Blue Cross of Mass., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 660, 665 (Mass. 1989).
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Therefore, the evidence in this case meets the standard for a
directed verdict. Thus, even if the district court erred in
denying Frappier a trial by jury, the error was harmless.
D. Motion for Amended Factual Finding or a New Trial
After trial, Frappier moved for amended or additional
findings of fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) or for
a new trial under Rule 59. Trial courts have considerable
discretion in deciding whether to grant Rule 52(b) motions. Nat'l
Metal Finishing Co. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d
119, 125 (1st Cir. 1990). Unless the decision involves a question
of law, our review is for abuse of discretion. Id. Similarly,
"[a]ppellate review of orders refusing new trials [under Rule 59]
is tightly circumscribed." Colasanto v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
100 F.3d 203, 212 (1st Cir. 1996). "[W]e will not intervene unless
we ascertain that the outcome is against the clear weight of the
evidence such that upholding the verdict will result in a
miscarriage of justice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Frappier makes two arguments related to his post-trial
motion. First, he asserts that the district court's judgment was
based on an "incomplete statement of [his] claims." According to
Frappier, the district court was not sufficiently attentive to four
specific allegations: that Countrywide (1) "failed to verify
Frappier's employment"; (2) "violated M.G.L. c. 93A and other
Massachusetts and federal lending laws"; (3) "failed to make
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several initial and final disclosures — which are required by state
and federal truth-in-lending laws — to Frappier before and after
closing"; and (4) "imposed substantial harm on Frappier." In
Frappier's view, the "failure to address these claims denied [him]
his basic right to have his complaint construed in such a way as to
do justice," necessitating either additional findings of fact or a
new trial.
Even a cursory review of the district court's opinion
reveals this argument to be baseless. See Frappier, 2013 WL
1308602, at *10, *19 (finding that Countrywide verified Frappier's
employment); id. at *15–19 (finding no violation of chapter 93A);
id. at *13, *19 (finding that Frappier received all the required
disclosures); id. at *19 (finding that Countrywide's conduct was
not the cause of any harm to Frappier). Frappier's argument
suggests that he would have preferred a fuller explanation of these
issues, but it is not a legal error to draft a concise opinion.
The district court addressed Frappier's claims and supported its
conclusions more than adequately.
Second, Frappier claims that the district court failed to
address the "substance of [his] case," which "concerns
Countrywide's responsibility . . . to engage in fair, non-predatory
lending practices in its dealings with Frappier." He argues that
the district court missed the mark by focusing its analysis of the
chapter 93A claim "almost exclusively [on] the origin of the false
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income figure attributed to Frappier, while ignoring the larger
context through which Countrywide processed and underwrote its
loans to Frappier." He also points to a number of additional
Massachusetts statutes and regulations that Countrywide supposedly
violated.
This argument does not merit extensive discussion. We
have carefully reviewed the district court's disposition of the
chapter 93A claim, and we find that it is thorough, well-reasoned,
and correct. The other statutes and regulations cited by Frappier
either do not apply to this case or do not affect its outcome. In
sum, Frappier has not identified any basis for reversing the
district court's denial of his motion for new factual findings or
a new trial.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's
rulings.
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