United States v. Ramirez-Negron , 751 F.3d 42 ( 2014 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 10-1524, 11-1388
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
GEOVANNY RAMÍREZ-NEGRÓN, a/k/a Lambe; OBED ALVARADO-MERCED,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
Rafael F. Castro Lang for appellant Geovanny Ramírez-Negrón.
José Luis Novas Debien for appellant Obed Alvarado-Merced.
Myriam Y. Fernández González, Assistant United States
Attorney, with whom Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States
Attorney, Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, United States Attorney, and
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
May 9, 2014
LYNCH, Chief Judge. Defendants Geovanny Ramírez-Negrón
("Ramírez") and Obed Alvarado-Merced ("Alvarado") were members of
a large drug trafficking conspiracy. Ramírez was a wholesaler of
cocaine, which the drug trafficking organization would process into
cocaine base (more commonly known as crack). Alvarado was a
street-level seller. Both defendants were indicted, along with 109
other members of the conspiracy; the two were charged with counts
of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute at
least one kilogram of heroin, five kilograms of cocaine, fifty
grams of cocaine base, and one hundred kilograms of marijuana, all
within 1000 feet of a public school, along with related conspiracy
charges. Both defendants pled guilty, agreed that the trial judge
would find the relevant drug quantities for sentencing, and
reserved the right to contest or appeal any drug quantities found.
After detailed evidentiary hearings, the district court sentenced
each to a Guidelines sentence: Ramírez to a term of 162 months'
imprisonment (a downward departure of 100 months from the bottom of
the Guidelines range), and Alvarado to a term of 132 months'
imprisonment (within the Guidelines range).
On appeal, Ramírez and Alvarado originally challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court's
factfinding with respect to Guidelines considerations -- namely
drug quantity and, for Ramírez only, leadership role. Ramírez
argued that the factfinding as to drug quantity in his case
-2-
depended entirely on unreliable hearsay and thus violated his due
process rights, and that there was insufficient evidence to support
a leadership finding. Alvarado argued that there was insufficient
evidence to support the drug quantity finding.
After we heard oral argument, the Supreme Court issued
its decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
The parties submitted supplemental briefing on the impact, if any,
of Alleyne, and both defendants argued that their sentences must be
reversed because they were imposed by virtue of judicial
factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence as to drug
quantities. The defendants admit they did not raise this issue at
trial or in their opening briefs on appeal.
We affirm. We hold that there was no Alleyne error at
all because all elements of the defendants' crimes of conviction
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) were admitted as part of
the guilty pleas and neither defendant was sentenced based on a
mandatory minimum sentence. We also reject the defendants'
respective evidentiary challenges.
I.
For purposes of these sentencing appeals, we consider the
facts from the change-of-plea colloquies, the presentence
investigation reports (PSRs), and the transcripts of the sentencing
hearings. See United States v. Ihenacho, 716 F.3d 266, 269 (1st
Cir. 2013).
-3-
The defendants belonged to a large drug trafficking ring
that operated in Ponce and Juana Díaz, Puerto Rico, from at least
2003. The organization sold cocaine base, cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana at several distribution points, including these: the
Ernesto Ramos Antonini ("Pámpanos") Public Housing Project, El
Tuque Ward, Rosaly Public Housing Project, and Salistral Ward in
Ponce, as well as the Kennedy Public Housing Project in Juana Díaz.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other
federal agencies, working with a division of the Puerto Rico Police
Department (PRPD), investigated the drug ring between November 2007
and June 2008. PRPD Agent Carlos León Acosta ("León") and other
officers interviewed cooperators, made arrests and drug seizures,
and conducted surveillance. The investigation covered all of the
drug points, but most of the surveillance occurred at Pámpanos.
While conducting that surveillance, the investigators, including
Agent León, took videos of the organization's activities,
ultimately capturing footage of drug dealing on 78 different days
at Pámpanos.
The investigation ultimately produced evidence, including
both the video footage and testimony from cooperating witnesses,
that both defendants were participants in the drug ring. Ramírez,
also known as "Lambe," was in charge of the distribution of all of
the narcotics sold at Salistral. Ramírez was also identified as
the wholesale supplier of cocaine for the entire organization by a
-4-
cooperating witness testifying before the grand jury; that
testimony was later admitted during Ramírez's sentencing hearing.
At the later sentencing hearing, Agent León clarified that the
cocaine Ramírez supplied was "cooked" into crack. Agent León
further explained that he had learned from a cooperating witness
that Ramírez received all of the profits from the heroin sold at
the Kennedy drug point. Ramírez joined the conspiracy no later
than 2005.
Alvarado was identified as a street-level seller in the
organization, dealing in crack, heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. He
was seen at the distribution point at Pámpanos in surveillance
videos on fifteen dates, and was filmed selling drugs on nine of
those days. Alvarado was involved in the conspiracy for at least
85 days.
On May 27, 2008, a grand jury indicted Ramírez and
Alvarado, along with 109 other members of the conspiracy, on seven
conspiracy and drug trafficking counts. The indictment charged
both with: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least
one kilogram of heroin, five kilograms of cocaine, fifty grams of
cocaine base, and one hundred kilograms of marijuana, all within
1000 feet of a public school (Count 1); aiding and abetting in the
distribution of each of those drugs and quantities listed within
1000 feet of a public school (Counts 2-5); and narcotics forfeiture
(Count 7). See 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 860,
-5-
853. Ramírez, but not Alvarado, was also charged with conspiracy
to possess firearms during a drug trafficking crime (Count 6). See
18 U.S.C. § 924(o).
Both defendants pled guilty to all charges but contested
the drug quantities attributable to them. Ramírez also contested
the two-level sentencing enhancement for leadership role that the
government sought. The district court held extensive hearings for
each defendant in the conspiracy to determine the drug quantity
individually attributable to each for sentencing purposes,
following United States v. Correy, 570 F.3d 373, 380, 382-84 (1st
Cir. 2009), and to determine whether any role enhancements were
justified.
The evidentiary hearings for both defendants showed that
the drug organization sold large quantities of its products.
Proceedings in both cases focused on Pámpanos as the drug point for
which the prosecution had the most available evidence. Pámpanos
operated 24 hours per day, with sellers working two twelve-hour
shifts. At least two sellers would work during each shift. The
drugs at Pámpanos and elsewhere were sold in individual baggies; a
"package" consisted of 25 baggies. During the course of the
investigation at Pámpanos, agents seized a collection of 399
baggies of crack. From that seizure, the agents learned that each
baggie contained approximately 0.2 grams of crack. Thus, each
package of 25 baggies contained approximately 5 grams of crack.
-6-
The drug ring primarily sold crack, but it also sold
lesser amounts of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, in that order.
At the sentencing hearings, Agent León testified that he could not
always tell during his surveillance whether a baggie contained
crack or cocaine, but he could distinguish heroin and marijuana by
their different packaging and appearance. He further testified
that, during an uninterrupted half-hour period of surveillance at
Pámpanos, a seller had been observed making approximately 25 sales
during a shift for which three sellers were active. He noted that
the drug points would sometimes make more sales than that, with
surveillance videos showing a single seller making seven or eight
transactions in just a few minutes, while at other times they would
be less busy, with "short periods" of a few minutes passing between
transactions. Agent León explained that he corroborated the level
of activity shown in this particular sample as relatively typical
by comparing it to videos from other days and by confirming it with
cooperators.
Agent León testified that he then extrapolated in order
to arrive at an estimate of total drug quantity. He explained that
this overall level of sales activity corresponded to about 50 sales
per seller per hour, and that with three sellers active (as there
were at the time this particular video was filmed) this would give
approximately 150 sales per hour at Pámpanos. Within those 150
transactions, Agent León then estimated that approximately 40
-7-
involved crack, and that the remaining 110 transactions involved
heroin, marijuana, or cocaine. From there, Agent León multiplied
the hourly sales of crack by 24, then multiplied by 0.2 grams per
sale, resulting in a total of approximately 200 grams of crack (40
packages, or 1000 baggies) sold per day at Pámpanos.
Agent León's estimate was slightly lower than the PSR's
overall estimate of 250 grams of crack sold per day at Pámpanos,
and was generally consistent with a cooperator's grand jury
testimony that he had sold 14 packages during his last day at
Pámpanos.1
The district court used Agent León's estimate to
determine the quantities of crack foreseeable by each defendant.
As to Ramírez, the government had asked the court to find that at
least 4.5 kilograms were foreseeable, explaining that this amount
is less than a single month's total sales of crack at Pámpanos
alone and noting that Ramírez had been involved in the conspiracy
for years, much more than the single month needed to prove 4.5
kilograms. The district court agreed that the government proved
that quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. It explained:
I provide full credit to the amount of drugs
that was determined by [Agent León] who had
surveillance, who performed surveillance in
1
If the cooperator's co-seller sold a similar number, the
two would have sold about 28 packages during their 12-hour shift.
If the other shift was similar, the drug point would have sold
about 56 packages in 24 hours. This is higher than, but still
comparable to, the estimate that Agent León gave.
-8-
Sal[i]stral and at Pampanos and who saw plenty
of television t.v. videos of the drug
transactions at Pampanos and at the Salistral
ward, and who interviewed the cooperators, and
who had access, as I had access, to the grand
jury transcripts.
That quantity triggered a base offense level of 38 for Ramírez.
The court then found that a two-level leadership enhancement was
justified, noting that "I could have gone higher [than two levels]
there. But the presentence report reflects only two levels. The
United States has not objected. So I go with two." The court then
applied another two-level increase for selling drugs in a protected
location and a three-level decrease for acceptance of
responsibility, leaving a total offense level of 39. This
corresponded to a 262 to 327 month Guidelines range, from which the
court departed downward by 100 months to impose a prison term of
162 months. The district court described Ramirez's crime of
conviction as 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (the baseline drug distribution
offense not premised on any specific quantity) and made no mention
of any mandatory minimum that might imply a conviction for an
aggravated version of the crime.2
2
The written judgment does not cite or rely on 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A). The dissent notes that it does recite a quantity
of 50 grams of cocaine base. However, the judgment also recites
quantities of one kilogram of heroin, five kilograms of cocaine,
and 100 kilograms of marijuana. That is because those were the
conspiracy-wide quantities charged in the indictment, and Ramírez
pleaded guilty to that count -- not because the district court
chose to insert its own quantity findings into the judgment.
-9-
As to Alvarado, the court calculated a lesser quantity.
The court noted that the government's evidence showed that Alvarado
had participated in the conspiracy for 85 days. It then rejected
the government's suggestion that it find a quantity of 4.5
kilograms. The court credited the evidence showing an average of
40 drug transactions per hour at the Pámpanos drug point, below
Agent León's estimate, and further estimated that crack was sold
"at a conservative rate of 20 baggies per hour" because it was "the
best-selling substance." That estimate was about half of the 40
baggies of crack per hour that Agent León had estimated were sold
at Pámpanos. From there, the court, again favorably to Alvarado,
assumed "the lowest average of cocaine base dose" that was
supported by the evidence, 0.075 grams (below Agent León's estimate
of 0.2 grams), which Alvarado had explicitly asked the court to
adopt. The court then found that these numbers gave a total of at
least 36 grams of crack sold daily, which yielded "a total of not
less than 3.06 kilograms" of crack sold over the course of
Alvarado's 85-day participation. The court concluded that, because
Alvarado knew the drug point operated 24 hours per day, the entire
quantity of 3.06 kilograms was foreseeable by Alvarado.
That finding corresponded to a base offense level of 36,
which was triggered by a quantity of at least 2.8 kilograms of
crack. After including an aggravating adjustment for selling drugs
in a protected location and mitigating adjustments for minor
-10-
participation generally, minor participation in drug trafficking,
and acceptance of responsibility, the court reached a total offense
level of 31, corresponding to a Guidelines range of 120 to 135
months. The court described Alvarado's crime of conviction as
§ 841(a)(1) and made no mention of any mandatory sentencing range
implying a conviction for an aggravated version of the crime. The
court sentenced Alvarado to a term of 132 months, within the
Guidelines range.3
II.
We first reject the defendants' newfound Alleyne
argument, then turn to the original issues on appeal.
In supplemental briefs filed after we heard oral
argument, both defendants argued that their sentences violate the
Sixth Amendment because they were imposed on the basis of
factfinding by a judge on a preponderance of the evidence standard
rather than by a jury on a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. See
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162-63. These arguments are meritless.
Alleyne instructs that a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by jury requires that "facts that increase
3
Both defendants also received supervised release terms of
ten years. Neither defendant had the prior convictions necessary
to trigger an extended supervised release term. Thus, this
supervised release term is well above any mandatory minimum that
could have applied -- five years under § 841(b)(1)(A), four under
§ 841(b)(1)(B), and three under § 841(b)(1)(C) -- and gives no
indication that the district court sentenced the defendants under
§ 841(b)(1)(A) rather than § 841(b)(1)(C).
-11-
mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury." Id. at
2163 (emphasis added). Alleyne is equally clear what the Sixth
Amendment does not require, explaining: "Our ruling today does not
mean that any fact that influences judicial discretion must be
found by a jury. We have long recognized that broad sentencing
discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the
Sixth Amendment." Id. In other words, factual findings made for
purposes of applying the Guidelines, which influence the sentencing
judge's discretion in imposing an advisory Guidelines sentence and
do not result in imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, do not
violate the rule in Alleyne. The holdings of the seven circuit
courts to have addressed this issue agree with our view. See,
e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, No. 13-30742, 2014 WL 968841, at
*1 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 2014) (per curiam) (holding that sentencing
judge may find facts that do not change mandatory minimum or
maximum statutory ranges); United States v. Robinson, No. 13-4384,
2014 WL 406782, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 4, 2014) (per curiam) (holding
that district court "retained the ability to make factual findings
necessary to calculate [defendant's] advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range" without submitting those questions to a jury); United States
v. Valdez, 739 F.3d 1052, 1054 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that, where
"[t]here is no indication . . . that the district judge thought her
sentencing discretion was cabined by a higher statutory minimum"
than that supported by the drug quantities charged or admitted by
-12-
defendant, district court's calculation of "a greater drug quantity
solely for purposes of determining [defendant's] Guideline range"
did not violate Alleyne rule); United States v. Holder, 549 F.
App'x 214, 215 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) ("[A]lthough judicially
determined facts are no longer relevant after Alleyne to deciding
the applicable mandatory minimum, the factual findings needed to
calculate a defendant's advisory Guidelines range are still within
the district court's province."); United States v. Baum, 542 F.
App'x 724, 727 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that district court's
factfinding for Guidelines purposes, without altering mandatory
minimum, was permissible under Alleyne); United States v. Johnson,
732 F.3d 577, 583-84 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that judicial
factfinding of crack cocaine quantity does not violate Alleyne rule
where it does not alter mandatory minimum sentence); United States
v. Ibrahim, 529 F. App'x 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Because the
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory,
application of guidelines enhancements that do not increase the
statutory maximum or minimum penalty neither implicates nor
violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial."
(citation omitted)).
We flatly reject the proposition that all drug quantity
calculations made under the advisory Guidelines must be submitted
to a jury. That would be both contrary to Alleyne and an extension
of Alleyne. We are not empowered to do so under United States v.
-13-
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). Accord Valdez, 739 F.3d at 1054.
We also flatly reject the argument that, absent the imposition of
a mandatory minimum sentence, there is Alleyne error here. It is
evident from the statutory scheme that drug quantity is not an
element of every drug distribution crime, including under Alleyne.
See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162 (holding that, for Sixth Amendment
purposes, a fact is an element of the offense only when it alters
the available sentencing range). The "default" drug distribution
crime, with a sentencing range of 0 to 20 years, can be proven
without any allegation of quantity at all. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(C). This stands in sharp contrast to the aggravated
drug distribution crimes, in which some triggering quantity of
drugs must be proven. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B).4
Our decisions in prior cases hold that failing to prove
an individualized drug quantity is an Alleyne error only in cases
in which the defendant has been convicted and sentenced under the
4
Prior First Circuit cases have held that, in a drug
conspiracy case, the defendant's eligibility for a statutory
mandatory minimum sentence is controlled by an individualized drug
quantity attribution, see United States v. Colin-Solis, 354 F.3d
101, 103 (1st Cir. 2004), whereas his statutory maximum sentence is
controlled by a conspiracy-wide drug quantity attribution, see
United States v. Correy, 570 F.3d 373, 377 (1st Cir. 2009). It is
unclear whether this asymmetry may remain after Alleyne. The
parties here do not raise the issue, and we do not consider it. We
do note, however, that to the extent the dissent argues that the
availability of a life sentence as the statutory maximum shows that
the defendants were sentenced under the aggravated provisions of
§ 841(b)(1)(A) rather than the default provisions of
§ 841(b)(1)(C), that pre-Alleyne asymmetry defeats the conclusion.
-14-
aggravated version of the statute -- that is, where an enhanced
mandatory minimum applies. See, e.g., United States v. Delgado-
Marrero, 744 F.3d 167, 185-86 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v.
Pena, 742 F.3d 508, 509 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Harakaly,
734 F.3d 88, 90, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2013). Likewise, we have held
that no Alleyne error occurs where, as here, the defendant is
convicted of, and sentenced pursuant to the penalty provisions of,
the default crime. See United States v. Doe, 741 F.3d 217, 234
(1st Cir. 2013). No Alleyne error occurs when a defendant's
sentence is based entirely on Guidelines considerations without
changing the applicable mandatory minimum.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts of
this case as to each defendant. If Ramírez had been convicted of
an aggravated version of the crime, the mandatory minimums to which
he could have been exposed were 10 years for 50 grams or more of
cocaine base or 5 years for 5 grams or more; if Alvarado had been
convicted of an aggravated version, the mandatory minimums to which
he could have been exposed were 10 years for 280 grams or more of
cocaine base or 5 years for 28 grams or more. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372
(2010).5 As noted, Ramírez was sentenced to 162 months, while
5
The mandatory minimums of 10 years and 5 years are now
triggered by quantities of 280 grams and 28 grams of cocaine base,
respectively, due to amendments in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
(FSA), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010). Whether
a defendant is subject to pre- or post-FSA penalties depends on the
-15-
Alvarado was sentenced to 132 months, and both sentences were
explicitly based on Guidelines considerations.
A. Ramírez
As stated, no Alleyne error occurs when there is no
mandatory minimum sentence imposed which is triggered by judicial
factfinding. Ramírez's case fits this model. The record provides
no evidence that the district court made any findings to trigger a
10-year mandatory minimum; rather, it shows that the court imposed
a Guidelines sentence.6 That distinguishes Ramírez's case from
date of sentencing: defendants sentenced before the FSA's effective
date of August 3, 2010 are subject to pre-FSA penalties, while
those sentenced afterward are subject to post-FSA penalties. See
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (2012). Ramírez was
sentenced in March 2010 and so is subject to the pre-FSA penalties;
Alvarado was sentenced in March 2011 and so is subject to the post-
FSA penalties.
6
After calculating the Guidelines range, the court departed
downward from it, reasoning:
Based on a total offense level of 39 and a criminal
history category of I, the guideline imprisonment range
in this particular offense is from 262 to 327
[months] . . . .
The Court notes Mr. Ramirez has no diagnosis of any
mental disorder or [any] major physical depression.
However the Court is aware he has had a history of
marijuana use and Percocet pills. . . . The Court further
notes that even though the defendant has one criminal
[history] point the instant offense is his first
conviction of a felony offense. . . .
The Court recognizes the following mitigating [§]
3553 factors: First, he was the first defendant amongst
the leaders who plead [sic]. . . . The Court further
recognizes the defendant's stressful, tough, difficult
childhood . . . .
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned
factors and in order also to avoid sentencing
disparities, a variance in sentence will be imposed that
-16-
Alleyne, in which judicial factfinding "alter[ed] the legally
prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it." 133 S. Ct. at 2162.
Indeed, neither the judge nor either party at sentencing even
mentioned that a mandatory minimum was under consideration, and
there is no indication that the sentencing judge considered Ramírez
to have been convicted of anything other than the default crime.
Instead, the sentence was based only on Guidelines considerations.
Given that clear basis for the sentence, we cannot say that any
judicial factfinding altered Ramírez's legally prescribed
sentencing range. Ramírez has provided no evidence to the
contrary, and we see none in the record.7
Ramírez argues that Alleyne still governs because his
sentence, even if imposed under the Guidelines, exceeds the 10-year
mandatory minimum. We disagree. The fact that Ramírez's sentence
falls above the 10-year mandatory minimum is insufficient to
establish that the mandatory minimum governed or that an Alleyne
is sufficient but not greater than necessary.
Therefore, it is the judgment of this Court that
this defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 162
months as to counts one through five. This represents a
variance from the guidelines of over one hundred months.
The mandatory minimum played no part in this assessment.
7
Ramírez argues that a reference to the mandatory minimum at
his change-of-plea hearing shows that his sentence was based on the
mandatory minimum. Apart from the fact that this hearing occurred
more than ten months before his sentencing proceeding, there is no
evidence in the record that the district court considered that
earlier remark while imposing sentence.
-17-
error occurred. In Alleyne, the Court explained that the fact that
a sentence was available even without improper judicial factfinding
does not negate a Sixth Amendment error because the improper
factfinding would change the elements of the crime. See Alleyne,
133 S. Ct. at 2162. We think it follows that the fact that a
sentence is above a potential mandatory minimum does not create a
Sixth Amendment error where there has been no change in the
elements of the crime. Cf. United States v. Caba, 241 F.3d 98, 101
(1st Cir. 2001) (holding that no Apprendi error occurred where
district court sentenced defendant based on Guidelines range, even
though quantity of crack cocaine that district court found for
Guidelines purposes was high enough to allow higher statutory
maximum). There is no Alleyne error in Ramírez's case.
B. Alvarado
Alvarado likewise was not sentenced based on a mandatory
minimum, but rather was sentenced under the Guidelines. While
pronouncing sentence with respect to Alvarado, the district court
explained:
Based on a total offense level of 31,
and a criminal history category of I, the
guideline imprisonment range is from 120 to
135 months with a fine range of 15,000 to
20,000, plus a supervised release term of 10
years. . . .
Now, the Court does not provide any
downward departure as a mitigating
circumstance related to diminished mental
capacity because of the report which the Court
received on August 26th, 2010 from the
-18-
forensic evaluation performed by Dr. Manuel A.
Guttierrez. . . .
Therefore, the sentence for this
defendant is to be imprisoned for a term of
132 months as to counts one, two, three, four,
and five to be served concurrently with each
other.
This sentence, like Ramírez's, was based on Guidelines
considerations. It did not depend in any way on a mandatory
minimum, nor is there any indication in the record that the
sentencing judge considered Alvarado to have been convicted of an
aggravated version of the crime to which a mandatory minimum would
have attached. Thus, as with Ramírez's sentence, no Alleyne error
occurred with respect to Alvarado's sentence.8
III.
We now turn to the defendants' challenges to the adequacy
of the evidentiary base for the district court's findings of fact
in support of its Guidelines sentences.
A. Ramírez
1. Use of Hearsay Evidence
Ramírez's principal argument is that the district court
based its Guidelines factfinding, and thus its sentence, on
8
Given the facts outlined in this opinion, no reasonable
jury could have found that the defendants were responsible for drug
quantities below the respective thresholds triggering the mandatory
minimum sentences. As a result, even if an Alleyne error occurred,
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harakaly, 734 F.3d
at 95-96.
-19-
unreliable hearsay evidence, in violation of his due process
rights.
Reliable hearsay is, of course, admissible during
sentencing proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Cash, 266 F.3d
42, 44 (1st Cir. 2001). Ramírez cites cases from other circuits
finding due process violations when the district court "reli[ed] on
accomplice hearsay without adequate indicia of reliability," United
States v. Corral, 172 F.3d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1999), or when
allegations that were "false or unreliable . . . made the basis for
the sentence," United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 606 (9th
Cir. 2012). See also United States v. Robinson, 164 F.3d 1068,
1070 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Huckins, 53 F.3d 276, 280
(9th Cir. 1995). He also cites to United States v. Tavano, 12 F.3d
301, 305-07 (1st Cir. 1993), in which this court vacated a sentence
on due process grounds where the district court had refused to
consider evidence of drug quantity favorable to the defendant that
had not been introduced at trial. From these cases, Ramírez argues
that sentences based entirely on unreliable hearsay evidence
violate due process.
Even assuming, without deciding, that Ramírez's
formulation of the rule is correct, this argument fails. There is
no indication that the hearsay testimony used was unreliable.
Indeed, the district court squarely confronted the question of the
reliability of the hearsay testimony with respect to foreseeable
-20-
drug quantity. The court found that the hearsay testimony was
corroborated by Agent León's own surveillance and his review of the
surveillance videos other officers had taken. With respect to the
hearsay evidence pertaining to Ramírez's leadership role, the
district court likewise addressed the reliability question
directly, noting that "the information is quite reliable" because
it was supported by Agent León's personal knowledge and observation
of the videos, as well as the court's own independent review of
those videos.
Because the district court carefully ensured that the
evidence it relied upon was corroborated, Ramírez's sentence was
not driven by the admission of unreliable hearsay. Thus, the due
process rule that he cites is not implicated. Ramírez does not
argue that a due process violation may occur even when the hearsay
is reliable, as the district court permissibly found here.
2. Sufficiency of Evidence of Leadership
Ramírez further argues that the evidence of his
leadership role in the conspiracy was insufficient to justify the
district court's finding that he was a leader, which triggered a
two-level Guidelines enhancement. This argument, however, is
waived because Ramírez explicitly abandoned it during the
sentencing hearing. At the final hearing, the following exchange
took place:
THE COURT: . . . You realize that I read a
transcript that [Ramírez] is also a leader.
-21-
Your leader undoubtedly. I don't think you
are challenging the two point that is are
[sic] being provided, right.
MR. RIVERA: No. No. Those two points no. It
is gist [sic] if I could argue for just a
little bit.9
When asked directly, in other words, counsel for Ramírez explicitly
abandoned any challenge to the leadership enhancement. This waived
any argument that the evidence did not show Ramírez's leadership
role. See United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st Cir.
2002).
Even if Ramírez had not waived this argument, we would
still find the two-level enhancement justified. The Guidelines
provide that, when contemplating a leadership enhancement, courts
should consider factors such as:
the exercise of decision making authority, the
nature of participation in the commission of
the offense, the recruitment of accomplices,
the claimed right to a larger share of the
fruits of the crime, the degree of
participation in planning or organizing the
offense, the nature and scope of the illegal
activity, and the degree of control and
authority exercised over others.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. (n.4) (2012). Here, the district court
heard evidence that Ramírez had been entitled to "all the profits
for heroin" sold at the Kennedy drug point, and that he was an
owner of the Salistral drug point. Together with his role as a
9
Ramírez's counsel went on to reiterate the argument that
the drug quantity calculation was not supported by reliable
evidence, then turned to mitigating factors.
-22-
wholesale supplier across several different drug points, this
evidence shows, at a minimum, that Ramírez had claimed a right to
a larger share of the criminal profits, performed a greater degree
of planning or organizing the offenses, engaged in a wide scope of
the illegal activity, and exercised a substantial degree of control
and authority over others. That is sufficient to justify the
leadership enhancement.
B. Alvarado
Alvarado argues that the district court's findings on
drug quantity in his case were not supported by the evidence
presented at the sentencing hearings.
We review the district court's factual decisions
regarding drug quantity for clear error. See United States v.
Green, 426 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2005). Drug quantity findings may
"be based on approximations" as long as those approximations
"represent reasoned estimates of drug quantity." United States v.
Ventura, 353 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2003). A defendant may be held
responsible only for drug quantities "foreseeable to [that]
individual." United States v. Correy, 570 F.3d 373, 380 (1st Cir.
2009). Foreseeability encompasses "not only . . . the drugs [the
defendant] actually handled but also . . . the full amount of drugs
that he could reasonably have anticipated would be within the ambit
of the conspiracy." United States v. Santos, 357 F.3d 136, 140
(1st Cir. 2004).
-23-
The district court found that a quantity of 3.06
kilograms of crack cocaine was reasonably foreseeable to Alvarado.10
This finding was not clearly erroneous. It was based on the most
lenient assumptions toward Alvarado that the record allowed:
quantities of just 0.075 grams per baggie, based on Alvarado's
request that the court use that more favorable estimate; just 20
baggies of cocaine base per hour, based on a conservative estimate
from Agent León's testimony about the amount of activity at
Pámpanos and amply supported by video footage; 24-hour operation of
Pámpanos, based on Agent León's testimony and grand jury testimony
from cooperators; and 85 days' worth of participation in the
conspiracy, based on the favorable assumption that Alvarado did not
participate before the date of the first recording on which he
appeared or after the date of the last recording. Each of these
conclusions was a "reasoned estimate," Ventura, 353 F.3d at 88,
directly grounded in the evidence, and none was clearly erroneous.
Nor was there clear error in the total finding of 3.06 kilograms of
cocaine base resulting from those factors.
Alvarado points to these assumptions in his favor as
evidence that the findings were unreliable. He argues that the
district court's unwillingness to adopt the government's evidence
10
The offense level in the Guidelines would have been
triggered by a finding as low as 2.8 kilograms. We need not
consider the differences between the two quantities, however,
because the district court's finding of the larger quantity was
sufficiently supported by the record.
-24-
wholesale reveals that the court found that evidence unconvincing,
but that "if there was no sufficient basis to conclude legally, and
reliably that 40 [crack] transactions occurred every hour [as Agent
León testified], then there is no sufficient basis to conclude
either that 20 transactions per hour took place." That argument
fails. Determining drug quantity is "likely to require . . . the
exercise of sound judgment" on the part of the district court, and
a district court's decision to make "reasonable" estimates in favor
of the defendant is not itself grounds for concluding that the
evidence is unreliable. United States v. Bernier, 660 F.3d 543,
548 (1st Cir. 2011); see also id. at 548-49 (approving, "without
serious question," the district court's "measured approach, [which]
evaluated the testimony carefully, and erred, if at all, on the
side of caution" by "us[ing] conservative figures and low-end
estimates"). That principle controls here: the district court's
use of conservative estimates was part of a measured and scrupulous
approach to calculating the quantity foreseeable to Alvarado. It
does not show that the calculation lacked justification entirely.
IV.
We affirm.
- Dissenting Opinion Follows -
-25-
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. As this case
stands, both defendants pleaded guilty to all but the alleged drug
quantity, and no jury played a part in the district court's finding
regarding this essential element of the charged offenses. Their
sentences cannot rest on an element that was neither pled to nor
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the
defendants' sentences are required to be vacated, and the case
remanded for resentencing. See United States v. Alleyne, 133 S.
Ct. 2151 (2013).
In this appeal, defendants originally challenged their
sentences on evidentiary grounds. After oral arguments, but while
our decision here was still pending, the Supreme Court decided in
Alleyne that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence
that a defendant stands to receive is an element of the offense
that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
2156. Understandably, because Alleyne had not been decided, the
district court did not inform defendants Ramírez and Alvarado of
this right. Instead, the district court made determinations of
drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence, without
submitting this question to a jury, and sentenced defendants under
a mandatory minimum, in violation of Alleyne. This was clear
error on the part of the court. My brethren disagree.
Although the district court acted within the bounds of
the law as it stood at the time of sentencing, the law has changed,
-26-
and the district court's reliance on what was, at the time, an
accepted practice, cannot save the sentence from running afoul of
the Sixth Amendment. My colleagues rely on assumptions, which I
will dispel, to reach a result that I find flies in the face of
what is now a clearly established constitutional right.
I. Background
I take no issue with the majority's recitation of the
facts and only add, and perhaps reiterate, what I find is relevant
to respectfully espouse my view that they are mistaken.
A. Procedural History
In May 2008, a grand jury returned a seven-count
indictment against Alvarado, Ramírez, and 109 other co-defendants
for, inter alia, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1). The defendants,
who had initially pled not guilty, changed their pleas to guilty,
refusing however, to concede that they were responsible for any
specific drug amount. Drug quantity, and thus, the statutory range
of punishment they would be exposed to, would be determined during
sentencing.
In order to uphold its opinion, the majority is of the
view that mandatory minimums were never at play during sentencing
proceedings for either defendant. The district court made no
mention of the phrase, they contend, hence it must be that the
court considered only the Guidelines at sentencing, and proceeded
-27-
to sentence both defendants, according to the Guidelines, and
within the zero-to-twenty year statutory range of the subsection of
§ 841 that does not require a finding of drug quantity.
The record shows otherwise, and contravenes my brethren's
assumptions and no-harm-done conclusion. Perusal of the
transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings, the
sentences imposed, and other parts of the record provide more than
enough detail to trump any doubt that mandatory minimums were
definitive, and integral to the sentencing proceedings. As I will
elaborate in more detail, the exchanges between the court and
counsel are particularly relevant to defeating the majority's view.
They clearly establish that the district court was at all times
considering a statutory range of ten years to life, which, under §
841 (b)(1)(A) required a drug quantity determination of 280 grams
in the case of cocaine base.
To the extent the drug quantities attributable to each
defendant -- and the mandatory minimums that go with them -- were
determined by the district court, rather than a jury, and were
found by a preponderance of the evidence, the Alleyne error is
inescapable.
B. Change of Plea Hearing
During the change of plea hearing held for defendants on
May 8, 2009, both indicated that they intended to contest the drug
quantity amounts attributed to them, as well as their roles in the
-28-
conspiracy, during the sentencing proceedings. To be sure, both
defendants refused to admit any drug quantity. A lengthy exchange
between the court and counsel ensued regarding, inter alia, the
applicable statutory minimum as to each defendant.
Discussions of the mandatory minimum in the change of
plea hearing began when the government declared that the maximum
sentence the defendants were exposed to was a "term of life
imprisonment, [and] at least ten years of supervised release," and
specifically as to the conspiracy charge, "up to life imprisonment
. . . . and a minimum of ten years." Tr. for Chg. of Plea Hr'g. at
46-47. Later on, the judge remarked that "[t]he statutory is
clear. It's ten to life as to all." Id. at 53, 54.
But that was not the end of it. A discussion then
followed regarding the ability of each defendant to enter a
straight guilty plea to an indictment where each substantive count
carries a ten-year mandatory minimum, while not conceding drug
quantity. The district court expressed concern that, with such a
guilty plea, it could not sentence defendants to less than the ten-
year minimum, regardless of what could later be proven at
sentencing. Id. at 58-59. Counsel for Alvarado maintained,
however, that each defendant was entitled to an individualized drug
amount determination, and that if the minimum quantity threshold
was not proven, the ten year mandatory minimum could not be
imposed. Id. at 60.
-29-
The district court then briefly revisited our decision in
United States v. Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2004). In
Colón-Solís we held that to apply a mandatory minimum sentence for
a drug conspiracy coconspirator, the court must make an
individualized finding, by a preponderance of the evidence,
ascribing the triggering drug quantity to that coconspirator. Id.
at 103. Enlightened by that principle, the district court then
remarked that "[i]n order to determine the applicable minimum, the
court, notwithstanding any other statement made, as to each and
every one of the counts, reserves the specific individual
sentencing amount . . . . which may be below the statutory minimum
of ten years." Tr. for Chg. of Plea Hr'g. at 70-71. The question
of the applicable statutory minimum was in the mind of all players,
and was left open for determination at the sentencing proceedings.
The U.S. Probation Office representative then proceeded
to compose the PSR. It underwent several changes and amendments as
a result of court orders and objections from defendants, mostly
regarding drug quantity attributions. A final PSR was submitted to
the district court in January 2010, and it reflected a 56 grams-
per-day amount sold at Pámpanos, and an offense level of 33. Once
again, both Ramírez and Alvarado objected to the drug quantity
assessment in the sentencing memoranda they filed prior to their
sentencing hearings.
-30-
C. Sentencing
1. Alvarado's Sentencing Hearings
Sentencing proceedings for Alvarado began on February 1,
2010, with an offer from the government to stipulate the drug
quantity for a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months; the ten
year minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A). The court acknowledged the
government's offer and, upon Alvarado's refusal to stipulate any
drug quantity, warned that by not accepting the stipulation, he was
exposed to a penalty that, according to the drug quantity found by
the court, may or may not reach the threshold for the mandatory
minimum. The court then stated that "[t]he burden of proof is on
the United States by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a
reasonable doubt standard because the amount is not an element of
the crime", and explained once again that if he were to accept the
government's offer, he would receive the mandatory minimum sentence
for 50 grams of crack of ten years. Tr. for Sent. Hr'g. for Def.
Alvarado, Feb. 1, 2010 at 7. Thereafter, there were several other
references to what amount of crack would trigger which statutory
minimum. Alvarado remained steadfast in his opposition to
accepting any drug quantity, and the government proceeded to
attempt to make its case.
Agent León was the main witness for the prosecution at
sentencing. His testimony was based on personal surveillance,
-31-
video recordings, his presence at a drug seizure, and information
relayed to him by cooperating witnesses.
Agent León testified that he conducted surveillance 10 to
15 times during daytime and approximately 15 times during nighttime
for 30- to 60-minute periods, and from a distance of 50 to 200
feet. He estimated that around 200 grams of crack were sold each
day, totaling six kilograms per month, based on his calculations
that each small baggy contained 0.2 grams of crack multiplied by 25
(the number of small baggies in a single package) and then by 40
(the number of packages sold per day). He stated that he made
these estimates on the basis of averages extrapolated from 30-
minute periods of video and from personal surveillance. In
addition, he stated that he reached that figure through interviews
he carried out with sellers who had become cooperators. These
cooperators were not presented as witnesses at sentencing. He also
interviewed the individual that made the video recordings who
personally saw transactions that were not in the videos. Finally,
he extrapolated from his presence at a drug seizure where 400 bags
of crack or cocaine were seized, and made a calculation as to how
much was sold at the drug point per day.11 Agent León nevertheless
conceded that drug sales were not the same every day.
11
On the third day of the sentencing hearing, Agent León
testified that "400 bags of coke" were seized, but on cross-
examination, stated that it was "400 bags of crack" that were
seized.
-32-
During the course of the investigation, 78 video
recordings were made by a cooperating witness who was also not
presented as a witness. A selection of the video recordings were
shown in edited form, jumping from one day to the next, skipping
days, and moving between different times of the day. The
recordings depicted sales of substances identified by Agent León as
"either cocaine or crack"; he could not identify which precisely.
Video recordings were not made when no drug transactions were
occurring.
Agent León's testimony regarding Alvarado specifically
was based on his personal surveillance and interviews with
cooperating witnesses, who were not presented as witnesses at
sentencing. He stated that he personally witnessed Alvarado at the
drug point during the night in March and in April 2008.
Coincidentally, no video recordings were made on those nights.
However, Agent León positively identified Alvarado in video
recordings on fifteen different days.
On March 14, 2011, the final day of sentencing
proceedings began with a discussion of how the Fair Sentencing
Act's new triggering drug quantities affected the mandatory minimum
sentence for Alvarado. Defense counsel stated there was perhaps
evidence to sustain 28 grams of crack, enough for a mandatory
minimum of five years, but certainly not enough for the 280 grams
that would trigger the ten year mandatory minimum. The government
-33-
retorted that it had proven Alvarado was responsible for 4.5
kilograms of crack, more than enough for the ten year minimum.
Throughout the evidentiary hearings, counsel for Alvarado
pointed to the want of reliability of the evidence presented by the
government. Specifically, counsel insisted that a considerable
part of Agent León's testimony relied on hearsay and double
hearsay, that his drug quantity calculations were often
inconsistent and his averages were exaggerated to the point of
being implausible, and that the videos were taken at different
intervals, with none being taken when transactions were not
occurring.
Nonetheless, the district court found that 3.06 kilograms
of crack were attributable to Alvarado for his role in the
conspiracy. The court discussed the guidelines, and arrived at a
sentencing range of 120-135 months. The court then imposed a
sentence within that range of 132 months for each count, to be
served concurrently, and a term of supervised release of ten years.
The minimum range determined by the court is the statutory minimum
for § 841(b)(1)(A). That section also mandates a term of
supervised release of no less than five years for those with a
criminal record, and ten years for those with certain kinds of
prior convictions.
-34-
2. Ramírez's Sentencing Hearings
At Ramírez's sentencing, Agent León testified that he
participated in the investigation of the Pámpanos drug point by
performing surveillance, reviewing surveillance videos,
interviewing cooperating witnesses, confiscating drugs, and
providing support to colleagues who conducted surveillance at
Salistral. Specifically, he conducted an investigation from
November 2007 until June 13, 2008, surveilled Pámpanos personally
25 to 30 times, and viewed 78 video recordings taken by a witness
at Pámpanos. He also seized 399 baggies of cocaine in an apartment
which a contracted chemist and lab supervisor, José Mercado,
estimated to contain 0.2 grams per baggy. However, no official
laboratory results were entered into evidence during the sentencing
hearings. Also, during his surveillance, Agent León never spotted
Ramírez, nor did he appear in any of the Pámpanos videos.
Ernesto Vidro, a cooperating witness, identified
Ramírez's role in the conspiracy during grand jury proceedings. At
sentencing, Agent León relayed this information, but Vidro was not
presented as a witness.
As to Pámpanos in particular, Agent León calculated
averages for transactions and drug quantities relying on
essentially the same information and dubious methodology as for
Alvarado.
-35-
Finally, Agent León testified that Ramírez's role as
supplier of cocaine to the Kennedy drug point to be cooked to
crack, was relayed to him by another cooperating witness, Ramón
González. González, who also offered grand jury testimony, was
also not presented as a witness at sentencing.
During the sentencing hearing, the district court
expressed concern about the evidence being presented:
This is a bench hearing and you don't know
because I may very well state that the hearsay
is of such magnitude in this case that it
borders and it tramples due process, because
up to now is pure hearsay as to liability and
ownership -- let me tell you all of the
hearsay I've heard, because I've put them down
here.
As to ownership, purely hearsay. As to
supplier, purely hearsay. As to quantity,
purely hearsay, up to now.
Tr. of Sent. Hr'g. for Def. Ramírez, Feb. 17, 2010 at 43.
The district court reiterated this concern as the hearings
continued and requested that the government file a legal memorandum
"as to a sentence based purely on hearsay."
As to Ramírez's sentence, the ten year mandatory minimum
was again a matter of discussion between the court and counsel.
Defense counsel alluded to the ten year supervised release term
Ramírez stood to receive and referenced an earlier statement by the
court that "a ten or twelve year sentence is not a Mickey Mouse
sentence," to which the court responded "[b]ut that doesn't mean
he's going to get a ten year sentence", clearly alluding to the
-36-
mandatory minimum. Tr. of Sent. Hr'g. for Def. Ramírez, Mar. 19,
2010 at 32.
Thereafter, the court reviewed the Government's
supplemental brief and the evidence admitted at the evidentiary
hearings, and found Ramírez responsible for 4.5 kilograms of
cocaine, resulting in a base offense level of 38. Notwithstanding
the court's earlier apprehension and defense counsel's repeated
objections, the court clarified that the drug quantity amount was
determined giving:
full credit to the amount of drugs that was
determined by the policeman who had
surveillance, who performed surveillance in
Sal[i]stral and at Pámpanos and who saw plenty
of . . . videos of the drug transactions at
Pámpanos and at the Salistral ward, and who
interviewed the cooperators, and who had
access, as I had access, to the grand jury
transcripts.
Id. at 44-45.
The court discussed the relevant guideline factors for a sentencing
guideline range of 262-327 months. Id. at 46. The court then
imposed a sentence within that range of 162 months, for five counts
charged. Upon release, Ramírez would be placed on supervised
release for ten years as to three of the counts, to run
concurrently.
Immediately thereafter, the court addressed Ramírez: "The
court has sentenced you way below the statutory maximum. So the
sentence is not illegal. I could have sentenced you to life." Tr.
-37-
of Sent. Hr'g. for Def. Ramírez, Mar. 19, 2010 at 52. Only § 841
(b)(1)(A) carries the possibility of a life sentence, and required,
at pre-FSA quantities which were applicable to Ramírez, a drug
quantity finding of at least 50 grams of cocaine base.
If there is any doubt that the district court's
imposition of sentence was guided by its reliance on the threshold
drug amount that triggers the mandatory minimum of ten years, the
record provides the proverbial nail in the coffin. The judgment
for Ramírez describes his offense as a conspiracy with intent to
distribute in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base, the triggering
amount for ten to life prescribed by § 841(b)(1)(A).
II. Discussion
On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's
findings at sentencing as to drug quantity. They essentially argue
that the court relied on hearsay, double hearsay, inconsistent
testimony and faulty calculations of average drug amounts based on
speculation, and unsupported by scientific data. After oral
argument, we ordered the parties to submit additional briefs on the
issue of whether the Supreme Court's recent decision in Alleyne v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), impacts this appeal. In
response to our supplemental briefing order, Ramírez and Alvarado
argue that Alleyne prohibits their sentences, because the district
court made individualized drug quantity determinations by a
-38-
preponderance of the evidence, without a jury's determination or
their admission.
As I believe I have established, the record leaves no
doubt that the district court was at all times weighing the
evidence while targeting the mandatory minimum. And it did so by
a preponderance of the evidence standard. That it also considered
and determined the guideline range does not negate this fact.
Accordingly, Alleyne squarely applies, and defendants hold the
upper hand.
The relevant statute of conviction prohibits the
"manufactur[ing], distribut[ing], or dispens[ing], or posess[ing]
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At the time of Ramírez's
sentencing, § 841 imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty
years to life for drug offenses involving more than fifty grams of
crack cocaine.12 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (viii) (2006),
amended by Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010)
(increasing this amount to 280 grams or more). If the defendant
was responsible for five or more grams of crack cocaine, the law
12
The triggering drug amounts were modified via the Fair
Sentencing Act. Though the parties do not dispute, and assume in
their briefs, that the old crack cocaine quantities and punishments
apply, my brethren point out that Ramírez was sentenced in March
2010, before passage of the FSA, and is thus subject to penalties
as they stood before the FSA. Alvarado, on the other hand, would
perhaps reap the benefits of the FSA's more lenient crack cocaine
amount provisions.
-39-
imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of five to forty years. 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), (viii) (2006), amended by Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372
(2010) (increasing this amount to 28 grams or more). Lastly, a
defendant could be sentenced to between zero and twenty years for
violating section 841 with any unspecified amount of crack cocaine.
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).13 These factual differences, the
defendants argue, mean that the district court could not impose any
sentence despite their guilty plea, because it only made individual
drug quantity determinations by a preponderance of the evidence.
They therefore urge us to vacate their sentences and remand.
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that "facts that
increase the mandatory minimum sentence" to which a criminal
statute exposes a defendant, are "elements [that] must be submitted
to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." 133 S. Ct. at
2158. This holding was merely an extension of the Supreme Court's
prior decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)
(holding that, besides a prior conviction, "any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
13
The FSA did not amend the relevant portion of this
provision.
-40-
We have already had occasion to grapple with Alleyne and
its implications. Recently, in United States v. Harakaly, 734 F.3d
88, 94 (2013) we recognized an Alleyne error in the context of a
guilty plea involving a drug offense under § 841. Although
Harakaly entered a straight plea of guilty, he had not admitted any
particular amount of drugs involved in the crime charged. Id. at
91 ("When asked whether Harakaly conceded any drug quantity,
defense counsel stated that he did not."). Harakaly's indictment
was silent on drug quantity. Id. Nonetheless, during sentencing,
the district court found Harakaly responsible for more than fifty
grams of methamphetamine, triggering a ten-year mandatory minimum
under § 841. Because we concluded that the district court violated
Alleyne, we found error, but held that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt given the overwhelming evidence of drug quantity
against Harakaly. Id. at 97.
Like the Harakaly court, the district court here erred
when it made individualized drug determinations for Alvarado and
Ramírez by a preponderance of the evidence, and set a statutory
minimum based on that determination. If the defendant waives his
right to a jury trial –- i.e., the right to, inter alia, have the
element of drug quantity proven beyond a reasonable doubt –- then,
in order to sustain a conviction, Alleyne logically requires the
defendant's admission of drug quantity. At the time they submitted
their guilty pleas, and all throughout sentencing proceedings,
-41-
defendants here specifically declined to admit to any drug
quantity. Therefore, to allow the judgment to stand as is, is to
sanction two convictions where an element of the offense has not
been pled to, or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; quite
a flight in the teeth of Alleyne.
As defendants' case was pending on appeal at the time the
Supreme Court handed down Alleyne, there is no question its holding
applies here. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328
(1987)("[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to
be applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct
review or not yet final. . . ."). Unlike Harakaly however,
defendants here did not preserve their Alleyne claims below, and
only argued the error on appeal after we ordered supplemental
briefing on the issue. Accordingly, review of Ramírez and
Alvarado's Alleyne claim, is for plain error. Cf. Harakaly, 734
F.3d at 94 ("This court reviews unpreserved Apprendi errors for
plain error and preserved Apprendi errors for harmless error.");
see also United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167, 184 (1st
Cir. 2014). Plain error review requires a defendant to show that
an error occurred; that the error was clear or obvious; and, that
the error affected substantial rights, or the outcome of the case.
United States v. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir. 2012). "Even
if a defendant can show all of this, we have discretion not to
-42-
intervene if we conclude that the error does not distort the
fairness or integrity of the lower court proceedings." Id.
On appeal, Alvarado exploits several aspects of Agent
León's testimony regarding drug quantity: that he did not know the
relative amounts of marijuana, heroin, and cocaine sold at the drug
point and could not conclude that crack was the substance most
sold; that he was unable to tell whether cocaine or crack was being
sold in any given transaction involving a white substance in a
transparent baggy; that his surveillance at the drug point was
partial and he made no notes; that he relied on unsupported
assertions of a cooperating witness that 1,000 baggies were sold
each day at the drug point; and that his testimony that 150
transactions occurred per hour was not credible. Additionally, he
argues that the video recordings were unreliable and any averages
derived therefrom lack empirical underpinnings. Specifically, he
claims that, since the video only recorded when there was movement
at the drug point, the footage did not represent an entire day's
worth of transactions nor did they account for fluctuations because
of weather or police activity. Further, it is alleged it was
impossible to determine from the recordings what substance was
being sold in those transactions. In relying on the videos,
Alvarado insists, Agent León made unsubstantiated and conclusory
assertions that out of an estimated 150 transactions per hour, 40
involved crack.
-43-
Similarly, as to the specific issue of drug quantity,
Ramírez also identifies significant flaws with the government's
evidence. Ramírez likewise claims that the drug quantity evidence
introduced by the Government was unreliable and that his due
process rights at sentencing were violated. As to the evidence
introduced to determine the proper drug quantity amount
attributable to him from the Pámpanos drug point, Ramírez points
out that: the videos do not allow for proper differentiation
between crack and cocaine sold; the only evidence linking Ramírez
to the drug point is based on double hearsay of what one drug gang
leader allegedly told Vidro; reliance on information obtained from
Vidro was unreliable because his grand jury testimony reflects that
he could not remember how many baggies of cocaine were sold at the
drug point;14 the 0.2 gram per baggy figure was based on double
hearsay evidence from a laboratory supervisor without production of
written laboratory results nor any indication that the laboratory
supervisor weighed the drugs personally; and the estimates of
average daily amounts sold of 200 grams per day were based on
insufficient sampling based only on one day rather than a broader
set of days. Further, Ramírez notes the discrepancy between drug
14
In his grand jury testimony, Vidro stated that, "what I can
recall is the last day I worked I sold 14 packages of cocaine and
each one contained 25 baggies. . . . It was not a very good day,
not a bad day. It was just mid week, it was a Wednesday." When
asked on which days more drugs were sold at the drug point, Vidro
answered, "Fridays and Saturdays."
-44-
amounts attributable to various defendants from conduct at the
Pámpanos drug point, noting that, in Alvarado's case, the weight
determined per baggy was 0.075 grams while in his case, the weight
per baggy was 0.2 grams. As to Salistral, Ramírez argues that
since no videos were taken at the drug point and no drug quantity
determination was made as to that drug point, evidence drawing any
drug quantity amount attributable to him is unreliable.
In Harakaly, we affirmed the district court's conviction
under the more lenient harmless error standard, and found that
notwithstanding the Alleyne error, there was overwhelming evidence
of drug quantity sufficient to trigger the heightened penalty
provision. Harakaly, 734 F.3d at 96 (finding evidence of drug
quantity overwhelming where defendant, at the change of plea
hearing, acknowledged the accuracy of an account from a co-
conspirator that he had delivered to co-conspirator an amount of
drugs far exceeding the triggering amount). Here, the government
has marshaled no such evidentiary effort, and Ramírez and Alvarado
have accurately and appropriately pointed us to serious flaws in
the government's case. Perhaps most telling of all, is the
district court's own recognition that the evidence presented by the
government at sentencing, was largely hearsay and deficient to the
point of trampling due process.
If the Sixth Amendment still allowed the district court
to make drug quantity findings for determining mandatory minimums
-45-
by a preponderance of the evidence –- without any admission from
the defendants -– perhaps my conclusion would differ. However, the
Supreme Court has clarified the significance of mandatory minimum
sentences under federal law, and, on these facts, I find the
majority's view unpersuasive, that the application of Alleyne can
be avoided. Accordingly, the error here is plain. Furthermore,
given the serious evidentiary weaknesses in the government's case,
it is obvious that the conviction rests on evidence that would
likely not be admissible had the case, or the element of drug
quantity alone, been submitted to a jury. Under these
circumstances, the district court's Alleyne error clearly distorted
the fairness and integrity of the trial court proceedings.
Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 64.
In Delgado-Marrero, we found reversible error, under
plain error review, where the court, after trial and on a special
verdict question, failed to instruct the jury that the element of
drug quantity was to be determined beyond a reasonable doubt.
Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d at 188-89. We further noted that, due to
the shortcomings of the drug quantity evidence presented by the
government, this was not "a case in which the evidence tying the
defendant to the charged conspiracy involved drugs that were
indisputably in excess of the requisite amounts." Id. at 189.
(citations omitted). In Delgado-Marrero, the evidence of drug
quantity presented by the government was merely contestable, yet we
-46-
found that contestability enough to warrant reversal. In this
case, however, the evidence proffered by the government is clearly
unreliable and, moreover, likely inadmissible at a jury trial.
Therefore, Delgado-Marrero's reasoning on this point is all the
more persuasive, on these facts.
As to the proper remedy, our recent decision in United
States v. Pena, 742 F.3d 508 (1st Cir. 2014) suggests the way
forward. In Pena we found reversible Alleyne error where the
defendant pled guilty to an underlying drug offense, and the court
later found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that death had
resulted from the defendant's drug dealing, thus exposing the
defendant to a higher mandatory minimum sentence; an element not
pled to nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 514.
We remanded for resentencing for the underlying offense only,
excluding the "death resulting" charge, and refused to allow the
government, in part because of Double Jeopardy considerations, to
re-indict Pena and seek a conviction for "death resulting" by way
of a special sentencing jury. Id. at 509.
In Pena we recognized that, though perhaps not warranted
in every case, a typical solution for an Alleyne error is to remand
for resentencing. Id. at 515. We noted that "Post-Apprendi cases
are also instructive, because Alleyne is an extension of the
Apprendi doctrine" and that the remedy for an Apprendi error is
"usually a simple remand to the district court for resentencing."
-47-
Id. at 518 (internal quotations and citations omitted). We further
noted that "[e]ven on plain error review, several of our sister
circuits likewise held that a remand for resentencing by the
district judge on the charge of conviction was required." Id.
Indeed, as noted in Pena, the Second, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits have, on plain error review, remanded for resentencing
where, as here, the defendant pled guilty to drug crimes, but not
to drug quantity, and the lower court endeavored to make drug
quantity findings by a preponderance of the evidence in violation
of Apprendi. Id. at 518 n.12; see also United States v. Doe, 297
F.3d 76, 93 (2d Cir. 2002)(remanding for resentencing, on plain
error review, where defendant pled guilty to drug crimes without
specified drug quantity and the district court made quantity
findings by a preponderance standard); United States v. Campbell,
279 F.3d 392, 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2002)(same); United States v.
Cernobyl, 255 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001)(same). I would find
this occasion appropriate for following this same path, and would
order the district court to re-sentence Ramírez and Alvarado to
crimes that require no drug quantity determination.
Contrary to what my brethren suggest, my view of this
matter in no way encroaches on a trial court's fact finding
function at sentencing. A trial court's duty, and discretion, to
find facts in order to determine a proper sentence under the
guidelines remains untouched. However, "[e]stablishing what
-48-
punishment is available by law[,] and setting a specific punishment
within the bounds that the law has prescribed are two [very]
different things." Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163 (citation omitted).
Courts remain free to determine the appropriate sentence only
after, in the absence of a plea of guilty to all elements, a jury
has determined the adequate statutory range. The latter, it can no
longer do without the factual findings of a jury.
III. Conclusion
That the new sentences the district court might impose
pursuant to my proposed order -- within the twenty year maximum
allowed by § 841(b)(1)(C) -- could very well be identical to the
one the majority allows to stand today, is irrelevant. Though
resentencing might ultimately seem formalistic if the same sentence
results, whereas the facts found by the district court here
aggravated the legally prescribed range of punishment, the Sixth
Amendment has been disregarded. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
-49-