Brae Asset Fund v. Walsh ( 1996 )


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  • [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    No. 96-1049
    BRAE ASSET FUND, L.P.,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    WELD MANAGEMENT, INC.,
    Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Chief Judge,
    Cyr and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
    John  A. Doonan,  with whom  Doonan &  Graves, Debra  Csikos, and
    Acquisition Management, Inc. were on brief for appellant.
    Joseph K. Mackey, with whom Kearney & Gleason, P.C.  was on brief
    for appellee.
    December 3, 1996
    Per  Curiam.   Following  oral argument  and a  careful
    Per  Curiam.
    review  of the briefs and the entire  record on appeal, we affirm
    the summary  judgment entered in  favor of Weld  Management, Inc.
    ("Weld"),  essentially for  the  reasons stated  by the  district
    court.         Largely on the strength of inapposite authorities,
    see, e.g., Den  Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l  Bank of Boston, 
    75 F.3d 49
     (1st Cir. 1996); Cofman v. Acton Corp., 
    958 F.2d 494
     (1st
    Cir. 1992),  appellant Brae Asset Fund,  L.P. ("Brae") asserts on
    appeal  that  the plain  literal import  of  the language  in the
    limited recourse  loan guaranty    drafted by  its predecessor in
    interest, Bank of New England, and executed by Weld's predecessor
    in interest,  E.  Denis  Walsh,  Inc.     should  be  disregarded
    because  the parties could not have intended that a loan guaranty
    be rendered  meaningless as  the district court's  interpretation
    essentially does.  Brae's argument fails.
    Even assuming that the  guaranty language is ambiguous,
    Brae  did not generate a trialworthy issue of material fact, see,
    e.g., Den  Norske Bank AS, 
    75 F.3d at 53
    , since  it proffered no
    extrinsic evidence (e.g.  circumstances surrounding  negotiations
    or execution  of guaranty, "usage  of trade" evidence,  course of
    dealing) which might enable  a reasonable factfinder to determine
    that the  parties  meant  the limited  recourse  guaranty  to  be
    unlimited, as Brae urges.  See  
    id. at 55-59
    .  In fact, Brae  has
    not  so much as intimated that any such extrinsic evidence exist-
    ed, nor  indicated, for example, whether  the original guarantor,
    E. Denis Walsh,  Inc., even  owned property which  it might  have
    2
    mortgaged to secure its loan guaranty.  Absent extrinsic evidence
    sufficient to generate  a material issue of  fact, its opposition
    to summary judgment was unavailing.  See 
    id.
    Accordingly, the district  court judgment is  affirmed;
    Accordingly, the district  court judgment is  affirmed;
    costs to appellee.
    costs to appellee.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-1049

Filed Date: 12/3/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021