Jones v. MBTA ( 1997 )


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  • [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    No. 97-1273
    SAMUEL JONES,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY AND CHRISTOPHER
    J. BLACH,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
    Samuel Jones on brief pro se.
    Merita A. Hopkins and Dawna McIntyre on brief for appellees.
    November 6, 1997
    Per  Curiam.   Samuel Jones  appeals  from the  district
    court's dismissal of  his action asserting federal  and state
    claims against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
    (the "MBTA") and  Christopher Blach, an employee  of the City
    of Boston.  We affirm.
    First, given  Jones's settlement agreement with the MBTA
    which  resolved  all  of  his claims  against  the  MBTA, the
    district  court properly  dismissed  the  action against  the
    MBTA.   See  C. Wright, A.  Miller &  E. Cooper,  13A Federal
    Practice and  Procedure     3533.2,  at  233  (2d  ed.  1984)
    (settlement moots  a case).1   Second,  the grant  of summary
    1
    judgment against Jones on his federal claim against Blach was
    also  proper.   Counsel  for  Jones  expressly  informed  the
    district  court that  he  did not  intend  to oppose  summary
    judgment on that  claim, and Blach's summary  judgment motion
    correctly  explained  why the  allegations  in  the complaint
    failed to state a claim for relief.  On appeal, Jones has not
    explained why,  under those  circumstances, it  was error  to
    grant  summary judgment for Blach.  Third, the district court
    did  not  abuse  its  discretion  by  declining  to  exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims against Blach
    once the court had dismissed the federal claims.  Counsel for
    Jones  essentially asked the court to  dismiss the claims and
    1In view  of our  finding, there is  no need  to determine
    1
    whether the MBTA was a party on appeal.
    -2-
    made no argument  in support of exercising  jurisdiction over
    those claims.  Under state  law, Jones could have refiled the
    state claims in state court.  See M.G.L. c. 260,   32 (claims
    dismissed for  "any matter of  form" may be refiled  in state
    court  for one year after their  dismissal); Duca v. Martins,
    
    941 F. Supp. 1281
    , 1295  n.14 (D.  Mass.  1996) (dismissing
    state  law  claim  without  prejudice  after  dismissing  the
    plaintiff's federal  claim because M.G.L.  c. 260,    32 gave
    the plaintiff one year in which to refile his claim  in state
    court) (citing Liberace v. Conway,  
    31 Mass. App. Ct. 40
    , 43,
    
    574 N.E.2d 1010
    , 1012, review denied, 
    411 Mass. 1102
    (1991)).
    On appeal, Jones  suggests that the claims may  "now" be time
    barred in state court,  but that fact has  no bearing on  the
    propriety of  the court's  earlier decision  not to  exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction  over the  state claims.   Finally,
    Jones has not  explained why his malicious  prosecution claim
    could properly have been brought under   1983.   See Roche et
    ux. Roche  v. John Hancock Mut.  Life Ins. Co.,  
    81 F.3d 249
    ,
    256 (1st  Cir. 1996) ("garden-variety"  malicious prosecution
    claims cannot  be brought  under   1983).   In  addition, his
    counsel  represented to the district court that the malicious
    prosecution claim  was a state  law claim, and, as  such, the
    court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
    over it.
    Affirmed.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-1273

Filed Date: 11/10/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021