-
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 98-1995 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. JULIO RAMIREZ-BURGOS, Defendant, Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, Senior U.S. District Judge] Before Stahl, Circuit Judge, Kravitch,* Senior Circuit Judge, and Lipez, Circuit Judge. Timothy C. Blank, Barry S. Pollack, and Dechert Price & Rhoads on brief for appellant. Camille Velez-Rive, Assistant United States Attorney, Jorge E. Vega-Pacheco, Assistant United States Attorney, and Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. May 18, 1999 *Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. Per curiam. A jury convicted defendant Julio Ramirez- Burgos of aiding and abetting two armed carjackings, see 18 U.S.C. 2119 and 2, and using a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, see 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Initially, the district court sentenced defendant to concurrent 360-month terms on the counts of conviction pertaining to the carjackings (Counts One and Two), and a consecutive 60-month term on the firearm count (Count Three). On May 21, 1997, we affirmed Ramirez's convictions and sentences in all respects except insofar as the sentences for Counts One and Two exceeded the respective statutory maximums of 300 months and 180 months. See United States v. Ramirez-Burgos,
114 F.3d 1170(table),
1997 WL 268695, at ** 2-8 (1st Cir. 1997) (unpublished decision). In doing so, we vacated "so much of the sentence as reflects a higher [than the statutory maximum] term for Counts One and Two" and "remanded to the district court with directions that the court enter a sentence in accordance with [our] decision." Id. at ** 8. On remand, the district court entered an "Order Correcting Sentence on Remand." In the order, the court committed defendant "to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of three-hundred (300) months as to Counts One and Two, to be served concurrently with each other . . . ." The order made clear the district court's intention to sentence defendant at the statutory maximums on Counts One and Two, but overlooked the fact that the statutory maximum on Count Two is 180 months, and not the 300-month statutory maximum applicable to Count One. Defendant appeals again, challenging the 300-month sentence imposed on Count Two and asserting that the district court erred in failing to hold a post-remand sentencing proceeding at which his lawyer could appear and present arguments on his behalf. Defendant also advances three challenges to his sentences and convictions that are either new or were addressed in our earlier opinion: (1) the government violated defendant's due process rights by taking inconsistent factual positions at his sentencing and at the sentencing of a cooperating co-defendant with respect to the "serious bodily injury" and "reckless endangerment for flight" enhancements defendant received; (2) defendant's convictions are unlawfully tainted because the government provided his co-defendant with things of value in exchange for his cooperation; and (3) the court abused its discretion by failing to specify the extent of its two upward departures from the guideline sentencing ranges applicable to defendant's convictions. As our remand was solely for the purpose of correcting defendant's sentences on Counts One and Two to the extent they exceeded the applicable statutory maximums, the court did not err in simply issuing a written order without convening a separate sentencing proceeding. Nor was defendant entitled to have the court entertain the three attacks on his convictions and sentences that he now advances and readvances. See United States v. Ticchiarelli,
171 F.3d 24, 30-33 (1st Cir. 1999) (when resentencing after a remand, district court should consider only new arguments or new facts made newly-relevant by the intervening decision of the court of appeals). In so ruling, we reject as insufficiently elaborated in light of defendant's failure to meet head-on the government's assertion that defendant knew at his original sentencing that his co-defendant had not received "serious" bodily injury or "reckless endangerment for flight" enhancements defendant's suggestion that he previously was prevented from raising his "inconsistent factual positions argument" because his co-defendant's sentencing was conducted under seal. Finally, because there is absolutely no doubt that the district court intends to sentence defendant at the statutory maximum on Count Two (with the sentence on Count Two to run concurrent to the lawful 300-month sentence on Count One), and because we already have confirmed that such sentences are lawful, we exercise our statutory discretion to "modify . . . any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before [us] for review," 28 U.S.C. 2106, and order that the district court's sentencing judgment be modified so as to commit defendant "to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of three-hundred (300) months as to Count One, one-hundred and eighty (180) months as to Count Two, to be served concurrently with each other, and sixty (60) months on Count Three, to be served consecutively to Count One." Affirmed as modified.
Document Info
Docket Number: 98-1995
Filed Date: 5/26/1999
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021