Mangan v. Davis , 84 F. App'x 104 ( 2003 )

Not for publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1839
THOMAS M. MANGAN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
J. SCOTT DAVIS, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Thomas M. Mangan, on brief pro se.
G. Steven Rowe, Attorney General and Melissa Reynolds O’Dea,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees J. Scott Davis
and Karen G. Kingsley.
James B. Haddow and Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, on brief for
appellee Thuy Thi Rumo.
December 30, 2003
Per Curiam. We have reviewed the record and the parties'
submissions. We affirm the lower court's judgment on the ground
that the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction under the
principles set out in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).
Appellant Thomas M. Mangan ("Mangan") claims that the
appellees violated his constitutional rights during the proceedings
before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court; that these alleged
violations tainted those proceedings; and that the result of those
proceedings -- his disbarment -- is therefore called into question.
If the federal court were to exercise jurisdiction here, it
effectively would be second-guessing the Maine SJC's decision that
Mangan received a fair trial and that he should be disbarred. This
is precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits.
It does not matter to our analysis whether Mangan
explicitly raised a federal constitutional claim in the state court
proceedings. The relevant inquiry is not whether a particular
argument was raised in the state court. Rather, the relevant
inquiry is whether the constitutional challenge is of a general
nature (e.g., a claim that the rules governing disbarment
proceedings violate due process), or whether, instead, it targets
particular actions taken by the appellees and/or the court during
the proceedings and approved of by the SJC. See generally Feldman,
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460 U.S. at 486. Mangan's claims clearly are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine because he alleges that certain actions in the
state court proceeding by bar counsel and by the complainant
violated his constitutional rights; he does not allege that the
state rules themselves are unconstitutional. Mangan's claims are
"inextricably intertwined" with the state court claims. See
Sheehan v. Marr, 207 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2000). Thus, the
federal courts (other than the United States Supreme Court) may not
exercise jurisdiction over those claims.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27(c).
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