UPIU, Local 14 v. International Paper ( 1995 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1075
UNITED PAPERWORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
LOCAL 14, AFL-CIO-CLC, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
Jeffrey Neil Young, with whom McTeague, Higbee, Libner,
MacAdam, Case & Watson was on brief for appellants.
Jane B. Jacobs, with whom Andrew E. Zelman and Klein,
Zelman, Briton, Rothermel & Dichter, L.L.P. were on brief for
appellee.
September 7, 1995
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. The plaintiff-appellants,
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge
United Paperworkers International Union, Local 14, AFL-CIO, and
International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 246, AFL-
CIO (the "Unions"), appeal the district court's decision on
summary judgment in favor of International Paper Company (the
"Company"), ruling that a recall agreement between the Unions and
the Company became unenforceable upon the Unions'
decertification. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
The Unions and the Company agree that there are no
material facts in dispute. The Company owns and operates a paper
mill in Jay, Maine known as the Androscoggin Mill (the "Mill").
Between 1965 and March 1993, employees at the Mill were
represented for purposes of collective bargaining by the Unions.
Throughout that time, the Unions and the Company have been
parties to a series of collective bargaining agreements setting
forth the terms and conditions of employment at the Mill. In
June 1987, when the Company and the Unions could not reach an
accord over a succeeding collective bargaining agreement, members
of the Unions engaged in an economic strike. The Company hired
replacement workers during the strike.
In October of 1987, the Company laid off 151 striking
employees (the "Employees"). All but three of these Employees
had recall rights for twelve months after layoff.1 The twelve
1 The other three employees resigned in 1989 pursuant to a
pension offer negotiated by the Unions. Therefore, these three
employees are not at issue in this case.
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month period in which the Employees were eligible for recall
expired before the parties began strike settlement negotiations.
On November 16, 1987, certain Mill employees petitioned
the National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB") to hold a
decertification election to determine whether the Mill employees
desired continued representation by the Unions. The actual
election was delayed for over a year.
On October 9, 1988, the Unions ended their strike and
made an unconditional offer to return to work. Between October
18 and October 26, 1988, the Unions and the Company negotiated
and executed an agreement setting forth terms and procedures
under which former strikers would be recalled as replacement
workers left and their positions became available. During
negotiations, the Unions raised the issue of the 151 Employees
who had been laid off in October 1987 and whose recall rights had
technically expired. The final recall agreement provided, with
limited exceptions, that the 151 laid off Employees would be
among the employees recalled under the agreement.
In April 1989, at the Unions' request, portions of the
recall agreement were renegotiated and amended to include lists
setting forth the order in which employees were to be recalled.
The 151 laid off Employees were included on these lists. Both
the October 1988 agreement and the April 1989 amended agreement
were silent as to its duration or termination. The
decertification petition was pending throughout the negotiations.
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In July 1989, the NLRB conducted a decertification
election at the Mill. Of the employees eligible to vote, 616
voted for decertification, and 361 voted against. After
investigating and holding a hearing on the Unions' challenge to
the election, the NLRB issued a decision upholding the election
results and dismissing the Unions' objections. The Unions thus
became decertified as of March 30, 1993. Both parties
acknowledge that upon decertification, the then-existing
collective bargaining agreement, which would otherwise have been
effective until September 30, 1993, became null and void.
In August 1993, the Company advised the Unions and
several of the 151 laid off Employees that as a result of the
Unions' decertification, the Employees no longer had recall
rights. The Unions thereafter filed this action in the United
States District Court for the District of Maine, contending that
the recall agreement, unlike the collective bargaining agreement,
survived the Unions' decertification and thus remained binding on
the Company.
Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the
district court issued its decision on December 1, 1994. The
district court found that there was no indication in the recall
agreement itself that the parties intended it to survive
decertification, despite the fact that the decertification
petition had been filed and was pending during the negotiation of
the agreement. The court explained that because the recall
agreement establishes rights for a category of represented
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employees, and explicitly specifies that its terms are to prevail
if there is any conflict with "other provisions of the labor
agreement," the recall agreement is "tied directly to the
collective bargaining agreement," such that it contemplates
"ongoing union involvement." Because the recall agreement would
affect the Company's negotiations with a new union seeking to
represent a majority of employees, and would "perpetuate a
limited portion of the elements ordinarily covered by a
collective bargaining agreement," the recall agreement cannot be
said to be independent of the collective bargaining agreement.
Therefore, the court reasoned, the recall agreement did not
survive decertification. Accordingly, the court granted summary
judgment in the Company's favor.
DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION
A. Standards of Review
A. Standards of Review
In general, summary judgment is proper only if no
genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Therefore, a party seeking summary judgment must make a
preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Once this showing is made, the non-movant must point to
specific facts demonstrating that there is a trialworthy issue.
National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735
(1st Cir. 1995). An issue is "genuine" when the evidence
relevant to it, viewed in the light most flattering to the non-
moving party, is "sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational
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factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either side." Id.(citation omitted). Because the summary judgment standard
requires the trial court to make a legal determination rather
than to engage in factfinding, appellate review is plenary.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Steamship Clerks Union
1066, 48 F.3d 594, 602 (1st Cir. 1995).
This standard is the norm. Having stated it, however,
we must note that under our precedent, in certain, somewhat
unusual cases, this standard does not apply. In a nonjury case,
when the basic dispute between the parties concerns only the
factual inferences that one might draw from the more basic facts
to which the parties have agreed, and where neither party has
sought to introduce additional factual evidence or asked to
present witnesses, the parties are, in effect, submitting their
dispute to the court as a "case stated." Steamship Clerks, 48
F.3d at 603 (citing Federaci n de Empleados del Tribunal Gen. de
Justicia v. Torres, 747 F.2d 35, 36 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer,
J.)). The district court is then "freed from the usual
constraints that attend the adjudication of summary judgment
motions," and may engage in a certain amount of factfinding,
including the drawing of inferences. Id.By the same token, the appellate court may assume that
the parties considered the matter to have been submitted to the
district court as a case ready for decision on the merits. Id.The standard for appellate review consequently shifts from de
novo review to clear-error review; that is, the district court's
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factual inferences should be set aside only if they are clearly
erroneous. Id. (citing United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d
741, 744 n.1 (1st Cir. 1985)).
In the instant case, the parties cross-moved for
summary judgment, yet both agreed that there was no dispute over
the basic facts of the case.2 Nor did either party give any
indication that it intended to present additional evidence or
witnesses, or request a jury trial. The only dispute in the case
stems from the inferences that the parties claim must be drawn
from those basic facts -- what legal significance should be
ascribed to those facts. In effect, therefore, the parties
submitted their case to the district court as a case stated. See
Steamship Clerks, 48 F.3d at 603 (holding same in virtually
identical procedural circumstances). Similarly, the parties both
state in their appeal briefs and during oral argument that they
agree upon the basic material facts of the case. Accordingly, we
are bound to apply the more deferential clear-error standard of
review when examining the inferences drawn by the district court.
Id. The district court's legal conclusions nevertheless engender
2 Of course, the mere fact that the parties moved simultaneously
for summary judgment does not automatically change the district
court's analysis or render the customary standard of appellate
review obsolete. Unless the special circumstances described here
are present, "the nisi prius court must consider each motion
separately, drawing inferences against each movant in turn, and
the court of appeals must engage in de novo review." Steamship
Clerks, 48 F.3d at 603 n.8 (citing El D a, Inc. v. Hern ndez
Col n, 963 F.2d 488, 492 n.4 (1st Cir. 1992); Griggs-Ryan v.
Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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de novo review. Id. (citing McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 354
(1st Cir. 1994)).
B. The District Court's Decision
B. The District Court's Decision
The Unions' primary contention on appeal is that the
district court erred as a matter of law, and that its ruling is
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Retail Clerks
Internat'l Ass'n Local 128 v. Lion Dry Goods, 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
Specifically, the Unions argue that the Lion Dry Goods decision
compels the legal conclusion that the recall agreement in the
instant case is an enforceable contract. We think that the
Unions' argument ascribes too much to the Lion Dry Goods case and
too little to the district court's decision here.
In addressing the issue of whether the recall agreement
survived the Unions' decertification, the district court began by
noting that "decertification ends the enforceability of any
collective bargaining agreement," and observing that both parties
concede that the Company is no longer obliged to negotiate or
bargain with the Unions or to honor the terms and conditions of
the previous collective bargaining agreements. Going on to
discuss the issue of the recall agreement's continued viability,
the court explained:
[The recall agreement was] [d]rafted
at a time when the Unions were still
certified as majority bargaining
representatives, [and] it requires that
the Unions receive a copy of any recall
notice sent to unreinstated strikers.
The recall contract establishes rights
for this category of represented
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employees and affects their seniority.
Indeed, it specifies that its terms are
to prevail if there is any conflict with
"the other provisions of the labor
agreement" . . . . Thus, the recall
agreement is tied directly to the
collective bargaining agreement: it
supersedes or amends any conflicting
portions of the collective bargaining
agreement; it affects seniority rights
under the collective bargaining
agreement; and its notice requirement
contemplates ongoing union involvement.
To say that this contract survives, then,
would affect any negotiations with a new
union that might seek to represent a
majority of International Paper employees
and in the meantime would perpetuate a
limited portion of the elements
ordinarily covered by a collective
bargaining agreement . . . . The
conclusion is therefore unavoidable that
this recall and seniority contract does
not survive decertification.
I do not need to decide whether a
company and a union can ever make an
agreement that will be enforceable after
a decertification. Here, there is no
indication in the recall agreement that
the parties intended it to survive
decertification . . . . I conclude that
on the undisputed record the recall
agreement became unenforceable upon
decertification of the Unions.
(Emphasis added)(footnotes omitted). In a footnote to this
discussion, the district court noted that Lion Dry Goods
"suggests that contracts with minority unions may be enforceable,
but the only matter actually decided there was that jurisdiction
existed under 301 [of the LMRA]."
We agree with the district court that Lion Dry Goods is
not dispositive of the issue in the instant case. Our reading of
that case indicates that the Supreme Court was only addressing
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the narrow issue of whether a strike settlement agreement between
a minority union and an employer constitutes a "contract" as that
term is employed in 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. 185(a).
Lion Dry Goods, 369 U.S. at 27. Reasoning that the language,
purpose, and legislative history of the statute do not support
the exclusion of such agreements from the purview of 301(a),
id. at 26-28, the Court held that claims for alleged violations
of such agreements are "cognizable" under 301(a). Id. at 29-
30.3
The parties in the instant case disagree over the scope
of the Court's holding in Lion Dry Goods; the Company contends
that it is merely a grant of jurisdiction, while the Unions
contend that it stands for the proposition that contracts between
unions and employers remain enforceable even after the union has
lost its majority representative status.
We need not resolve this dispute, however. Even
assuming arguendo that Lion Dry Goods holds, as the Unions claim,
that contracts between unions and employers are enforceable after
decertification, it cannot by any stretch be said to require that
all such contracts must be enforced regardless of the intentions
of the parties to the contract. Indeed, the district court did
not hold that recall agreements were as a general matter
unenforceable after decertification. It merely analyzed the
3 In so holding, the Court rejected arguments that the language
of 301 contemplated only those contracts between employers and
unions representing a majority of employees, explaining that the
language and history of the statute did not support such a narrow
construction. Id. at 28-29.
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agreement before it, and inferred from the undisputed facts that
the agreement had not been intended to survive decertification.
The Lion Dry Goods case, regardless of the scope of its holding,
is therefore inapposite, and the Unions' reliance on it
misplaced.4
Having disposed of this argument, we are left only with
the Unions' contentions that the district court drew
impermissible inferences in concluding, based on the undisputed
factual record before it, that the parties did not intend the
recall agreement to survive decertification. As we explained
supra, however, we review these inferences only for clear error.
After carefully examining the record, we can discern no such
clear error on the part of the district court.
The Unions challenge the district court's finding that
the recall agreement contemplated an "ongoing relationship"
between the parties and therefore could not have been intended to
4 Contrary to the Unions' arguments, the district court's
decision did not hinge on the fact that the Unions no longer had
majority representative status. Rather, the court explained that
because it found that the recall agreement, by its very terms,
was "tied directly" to the unenforceable collective bargaining
agreement, it had not been intended to survive the Unions'
decertification. In other words, the court's decision rested not
on the status of the Unions, but upon indicia of the parties'
intentions in negotiating the agreement.
We also reject the Unions' arguments that the district court's
concern that the recall agreement would affect a successor
union's ability to represent Company employees is "ill-founded"
in light of the Lion Dry Goods case. The parties in Lion Dry
Goods explicitly agreed that their contract would have effect
even after the Union lost its majority representative status, 369
U.S. at 22-23, a crucial fact markedly absent in the instant
case.
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remain in effect after the Unions' decertification. The Unions
concede that the provisions cited by the district court are
characterized accurately; the Unions urge, however, that "it
could just as equally be said" that the agreement was intended to
survive decertification. The Unions offer no facts or evidence
in support of this argument, nor do they claim that this actually
was the parties' intent. They also do not indicate how the
district court's inference was unreasonable or erroneous; they
merely claim that the opposite conclusion could have been made in
interpreting the agreement. We think that the district court's
inferences based on the undisputed record were well-supported and
reasonable. We certainly cannot say that they rise to the level
of clear error, so we must reject the Unions' argument on this
score.
Similarly, we are not persuaded by the Unions' argument
that the district court erred in concluding that the absence of
an expiration date in the agreement, among other indicia,
supported the inference that it was not intended to survive
decertification. We agree that the absence of an expiration date
could be interpreted to mean that the parties intended the
agreement to remain in effect until all employees' recall rights
were exhausted, regardless of the Unions' representative status.
We do not see, however, nor do the Unions point to, any reason
that the district court's conclusion to the contrary was
unreasonable. The decertification petition was pending
throughout the parties' negotiations, and neither party could
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have accurately predicted when it would take place. Certainly,
if the Unions had intended for the recall agreement to survive
their possible decertification, they could have bargained for
such a provision. We think that the absence of such a provision
or expiration date, under these circumstances, just as reasonably
supports the inference that the parties had not intended the
agreement to survive. We therefore find no error in the
district court's conclusion to this effect.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
Finding no clear error, we affirm.
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