McLeod v. State of Maine ( 2000 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1095
GILLIAN MCLEOD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
Caroline J. Gardiner on brief for appellant.
Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, Marci A. Alexander,
Assistant Attorney General, and William R. Stokes, Assistant
Attorney General, on brief for appellee.
June 28, 2000
Per Curiam. After a thorough review of the
parties submissions and of the record, we affirm. In order
to establish that an exception to abstention under Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), would be appropriate,
appellant must show that the “extraordinary circumstances”
in question “render the state court incapable of fairly and
fully adjudicating the federal issues before it.” Id.(quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975)).
This is a “narrow exception” to the Younger abstention
doctrine. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611
(1975); see also United Books, Inc. v. Conte, 739 F.2d 30,
34 (1st Cir. 1984). The irreparable injury that is
threatened must be one “‘other than that incidental to every
[] proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.’”
Younger, 401 U.S. at 47 (quoting Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943)).
Appellant has not alleged facts showing that the
state court is somehow incapable of adjudicating this matter
including the federal issues, nor has she alleged an injury
that is different “than that incidental to every [child
protection] proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.’”
Id. Appellant’s argument that her federal action would not
interfere with the state action is unsupported by detailed
argument and is inherently unpersuasive; the conduct of
parts of the same controversy in federal court, after a
state proceeding has begun, is an interference with the
state proceeding. Further, it appears that if the federal
court were to grant the relief she requests, its judgment
would conflict with the previous order of the state court to
“cease reunification.” Abstention is most appropriate in
such circumstances.
Thus, the lower court correctly abstained from this
matter. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 434-35 (1979)
(since state courts traditionally have addressed important
matters of family relations, allegation that those relations
are threatened by ongoing state proceedings is insufficient,
standing alone, to justify exception to abstention
doctrine).
Affirmed. 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).
-3-