Perez-Santos v. Malave ( 2001 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1016
MARIO PEREZ-SANTOS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
JOSE A. MALAVE, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Selya and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Mario Perez Santos on brief pro se.
Robert J. Sanchez Ramos, Solicitor General, Vanessa Lugo
Flores, Deputy Solicitor General, and Sigfredo Rodriguez-Isaac,
Assistant Solicitor General, on brief for appellees.
November 28, 2001
Per Curiam. Mario Pérez-Santos appeals pro se from
the district court’s denial of his motion for default
judgment against Jose A. Malavé and dismissal of the
complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c) provides, in relevant part,
that “[f]or good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default.” “After an entry of default, a court may
examine a plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether it
alleges a cause of action. In making that determination it
must assume that all well pleaded factual allegations are
true.” Quirindongo Pacheco v. Rolon Morales, 953 F.2d 15, 16
(1st Cir. 1992). Review of the district court’s dismissal of
the complaint is de novo. See Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez,
212 F.3d 617, 621 (1st Cir. 2000).
The district court did not err in dismissing Pérez’
claims against Malavé and co-defendant Víctor Fajardo under
the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. The private right of
action created by § 552a(g) of the Privacy Act is limited to
actions against agencies of the federal government and does
not apply to state agencies or individuals. See Dittman v.
California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999); Polchowski
v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 1983); Wren v. Harris,
675 F.2d 1144, 1148 n.8 (10th Cir. 1982). Therefore, the
Privacy Act did not create a private right of action against
Malavé and Fajardo in their personal or official capacities.
Pérez referred in his complaint to the violation
of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, without any
explanation of how those rights were violated. On appeal,
he stated that the district court erred in dismissing his
Fourth Amendment claim, but again did not make any developed
argument in support of that statement. Therefore, the
argument is waived. See Aponte Melendez v. Ortiz Otero, 964
F.2d 1225, 1226 n.1 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that “[a]lthough
appellant’s brief on appeal once again makes cursory
reference to a first amendment claim, the claim is supported
by no ‘developed argumentation.’ Accordingly, we deem it
waived”).
The district court judgment denying Pérez’ motion
for default judgment and dismissing the complaint (without
prejudice to the Puerto Rico law claims being brought in the
Puerto Rico courts) is affirmed.
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