Lasalle-Concepcion v. Toledo-Davila , 569 F.3d 521 ( 2009 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-2048
JUAN CARLOS LASALLE-CONCEPCIÓN; LIZETTE DE LA CRUZ-LÓPEZ;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP LASALLE-DE LA CRUZ; SAMUEL ANTONIO VÉLEZ-
LUGO; ELBA IRIS MÉNDEZ-JIMENEZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP VÉLEZ-MÉNDEZ,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PEDRO TOLEDO-DÁVILA, COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO POLICE
DEPARTMENT; JOHN DOE; JANE ROE,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Farris* and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
Heriberto Güivas-Lorenzo and Güivas & Quiñones Law Offices,
PSC on brief for appellants.
Irene S. Soroeta-Kodesh, Solicitor General, Ileana Oliver
Falero, Acting Solicitor General, and Susana I. Peñagarícano-Brown
on brief for appellees.
June 18, 2009
*
Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. Juan Carlos Lasalle-Concepcion and Samuel
Antonio Velez-Lugo both suffered work-related injuries during their
service as police officers with the Puerto Rico Police Department
("the Department"). Both received medical treatment for roughly
six months to a year during the period 1996-1998. In 1999 the
Department notified each of the men that his employment had been
terminated because of his medical condition.
The officers then pursued administrative remedies and the
Board of Appeals of the Personnel System Administration ("the
Board") ruled in their favor. The Department promptly sought
judicial review, and the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals overturned
the Board, leaving the original terminations in force. In 2001,
the Department's Medical Board certified each man as capable of
returning to work; the Department's superintendent requested
reevaluation and in 2004 got the same result.
The two officers then filed this suit in federal district
court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 (2000), against the
Puerto Rico Police Department and its former superintendent,
arguing inter alia that the failure to reinstate them as police
officers violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 The district court dismissed the suit, holding that
1
Lasalle-Concepcion and Velez-Lugo were joined by their
spouses as plaintiffs and also alleged civil rights violations
under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments, but then
deserted these claims in their opposition to the motion to dismiss.
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plaintiffs had no protected property interest in reinstatement
under Puerto Rico law. The plaintiffs now appeal.
"Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, persons who possess a property interest in continued
public employment cannot be deprived of that interest without due
process of law." Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 2000). For this purpose, the Supreme Court looks to
state law to determine the existence and dimensions of such an
interest. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972). Subtleties may exist but they are not presented in
this case.
The officers concede in their complaint that they were
permissibly terminated in 1999, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25, § 3117(2006), but they assert a property right and legal expectation
under state law in reinstatement as officers once their
disabilities were resolved and the Medical Board certified them as
capable of resuming their work. Plaintiffs cite Article 18 of
Puerto Rico Law 53 as the source of this purported property
interest.
By its terms, Article 18 does not impose upon the police
department any such obligation. It merely recognizes that the
police department has discretion to decide whether an officer
should be reinstated: "Should the physical or mental disability
disappear, said member of the Force may be reinstated to service
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upon certification of the Medical Evaluation Board." P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 25, § 3117(b)(1) (2006). Whether or not the
superintendent proposed to defer to the Medical Board, the statute
created no property right.
By contrast, another Puerto Rico statute does create a
limited right of reinstatement for an employee who recovers after
sustaining an injury on the job. Workmen's Accident Compensation
Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, § 7 (2006) ("[T]he employer shall be
under the obligation to reserve the job filled by the laborer or
employee at the time the accident occurred . . . ."). The contrast
with Article 18's phrasing ("may" be reinstated) underscores the
lack of an entitlement in Article 18.
The Workmen's Accident Compensation Act does not apply to
the officers in this case because it includes requirements as to
the timing of an application for reinstatement that were seemingly
not met and cannot be met now. 11 L.P.R.A. § 7; Toro Cruz v.
Policia de Puerto Rico, 159 P.R. Dec. 339 (2003). The details need
not be discussed because that statute has not been invoked by the
officers in this court.
Affirmed.
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