Marshall v. Bristol Superior Court ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 13-1965
    RYAN MARSHALL,
    Petitioner, Appellee,
    v.
    BRISTOL SUPERIOR COURT,
    Respondent, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Chief Judge,
    Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
    Amy L. Karangekis, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
    Martha Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Kris C.
    Foster, Assistant Attorney General, were on brief, for appellant.
    Richard J. Fallon for appellee.
    May 23, 2014
    LYNCH, Chief Judge. Petitioner Ryan Marshall was granted
    a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2241, on double
    jeopardy grounds.     The writ bars Marshall's imminent prosecution
    for the murder of George Carpenter pending in the Bristol County
    Superior Court.
    Marshall was indicted in 2001 and convicted in 2006 as an
    accessory before the fact to Carpenter's murder. The Massachusetts
    Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") reversed that conviction in August
    2010.   It reasoned that although the evidence did establish
    Marshall's "active participation in, and presence during, the
    commission of the felony," the conviction could not stand where the
    conduct that was charged was required to have taken place before
    the felony was committed.     Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 
    931 N.E.2d 20
    , 43 (Mass. 2010).
    Following     the   SJC's     decision   in    Rodriguez,   the
    Commonwealth then indicted Marshall for murder.         Marshall moved to
    dismiss this latter indictment, arguing that the SJC's earlier
    reversal had been based on insufficiency of the evidence and,
    hence, that the Double Jeopardy Clause as incorporated against the
    states barred a second prosecution. In affirming the denial of his
    motion to dismiss, the SJC disagreed with Marshall, holding that
    its earlier reversal had been based on a variance between the crime
    charged and the crime proved at trial under state law. Marshall v.
    Commonwealth, 
    977 N.E.2d 40
    , 48 (Mass. 2012). Under both state and
    -2-
    federal law, it held that a second prosecution following a reversal
    based on such a variance does not give rise to a double jeopardy
    problem.    
    Id. Marshall filed
    a petition for habeas relief under 18
    U.S.C. § 2241 seeking to block his pending prosecution. On federal
    habeas review, the district court granted petitioner's request for
    relief.    Marshall v. Bristol Cnty. Superior Court, 
    951 F. Supp. 2d 232
    , 236 (D. Mass. 2013). The district court accepted petitioner's
    double jeopardy argument.       
    Id. at 235-36.
        In addition, the
    district court held that a newly asserted and hence unexhausted "ex
    post facto law" argument did not preclude it from granting relief.
    
    Id. at 234
    & n.1.    The Commonwealth has appealed.   The issuance of
    the writ was stayed pending our review.
    We reverse.   We hold that, under Tibbs v. Florida, 
    457 U.S. 31
    (1982), this court is bound by the SJC's interpretation of
    its earlier reversal and the requirements of Massachusetts law.
    Bound as we are to accept the SJC's interpretations of its own
    state law and its own decision in Marshall of what it held in
    Rodriguez, petitioner's double jeopardy argument necessarily fails.
    We also reject petitioner's ex post facto claim as patently without
    merit.
    I.
    The facts and background of the case are set forth in the
    two SJC decisions.    In the early morning of February 16, 2001, the
    -3-
    victim, George Carpenter, age 45, was socializing with friends at
    the home of Donna Medeiros, Marshall's mother.                
    Rodriguez, 931 N.E.2d at 26-27
    . Petitioner, his girlfriend, and his three friends
    -- Robert Tirado, Jonathan Torres, and Heather Lawrence -- arrived
    at the house soon after.1       
    Id. at 27.
    At   some   point,    an   argument   began   between    Marshall,
    Tirado, and the victim.        
    Id. The altercation
    between Tirado and
    the victim spilled out into the street when they left Medeiros's
    house.   When Carpenter got into his car and tried to drive away,
    Tirado slashed the front driver's-side tire.            
    Id. After driving
    1
    Tirado, along with Lionel Rodriguez, Orlando Badillo, and
    Dennis Smith, was charged with murder in the first degree, while
    Torres was indicted as an accessory before the fact to murder in
    the first degree. 
    Marshall, 977 N.E.2d at 42
    & n.4. Tirado and
    Torres were tried first; Tirado was convicted of murder in the
    second degree, and Torres was acquitted. 
    Rodriguez, 931 N.E.2d at 26
    n.4. After being tried together, both Badillo and Smith were
    convicted of murder in the second degree. 
    Id. Tirado's conviction
    was affirmed by the Appeals Court, see Commonwealth v. Tirado, 
    842 N.E.2d 980
    (Mass. App. Ct. 2006), as was the order denying his
    motion for a new trial, Commonwealth v. Tirado, 
    898 N.E.2d 890
    (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (table). Badillo's and Smith's convictions
    were reversed on the ground that certain medical evidence and
    testimony had been improperly admitted. Commonwealth v. Badillo,
    
    968 N.E.2d 942
    , at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (table). "Other than
    the improperly admitted evidence, the Commonwealth produced minimal
    evidence about Carpenter's physical condition after the assault and
    no evidence about the medical cause of his death." 
    Id. As to
    Rodriguez, the jury had found him guilty of murder in
    the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.
    
    Rodriguez, 931 N.E.2d at 25-26
    . On appeal, the SJC reduced his
    conviction to murder in the second degree because, although other
    properly admitted evidence established that Rodriguez had committed
    an unlawful killing, medical evidence and testimony pertinent to
    the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty was erroneously admitted.
    
    Id. at 34-39.
    -4-
    the car a short distance, the victim got out of the vehicle and
    continued arguing with Tirado.            
    Id. The violence
    escalated when
    Marshall and Torres, along with three more of their friends,
    arrived on the scene outside.            
    Id. With the
    exception of Torres,
    all of the men present attacked the victim, including one who hit
    him with a tire iron.          
    Id. at 27-28.
          Marshall kicked the victim
    twice and attempted to throw a trash barrel at him.                    
    Id. at 28.
    The perpetrators left the victim unconscious on the
    street,    and    when   police    arrived       they   found    him     bloody      and
    unconscious.       
    Id. Carpenter died
    later that day as a result of
    acute internal hemorrhaging due to blunt force trauma.                      
    Id. A. Trial
    The prosecution chose to indict Marshall as an accessory
    before the fact to murder in the first degree under Mass. Gen. Laws
    ch. 274, § 2 ("Whoever aids in the commission of a felony, or is
    accessory     thereto    before    the    fact    by    counselling,        hiring    or
    otherwise procuring such felony to be committed, shall be punished
    in   the   manner     provided    for    the    punishment      of    the   principal
    felon.").        
    Rodriguez, 931 N.E.2d at 39-40
    .                Marshall was not
    indicted for the murder itself.           Though the indictment charged him
    with   acts    before    the   murder    was     committed,     the    Commonwealth
    proceeded at trial under an "aiding" the murder theory, not under
    an accessory before the fact theory.              
    Id. at 40.
            At the close of
    the state's presentation of evidence, Marshall's counsel moved for
    -5-
    a required finding of not guilty, arguing that no evidence had been
    presented that, before the beating, Marshall had in any way
    "counselled, hired, or otherwise procured" the commission of the
    felony.    
    Id. The prosecutor
    agreed, but argued that there was
    sufficient evidence for the jury to convict on the aiding theory.
    
    Id. The trial
    judge, reasoning that the crime of being an
    accessory before the fact is "largely identical to the joint
    venture doctrine," denied the motion, 
    id., and the
    jury convicted
    in February 2006, 
    id. at 25.
    B.          First SJC Decision: Commonwealth v. Rodriguez
    A co-defendant, Lionel Rodriguez, and Marshall appealed
    to the SJC.      Marshall argued that the denial of his motion was in
    error because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
    being an accessory before the fact.       
    Id. at 40.
      The SJC agreed
    with Marshall; it reasoned first that "the actions of one who
    'aids' and 'accessories before the fact' are not the same, and are
    separate and distinct forms of accomplice liability."      
    Id. Given this
    "separate and distinct" conclusion, the SJC reasoned, "the
    indictment charging Marshall improperly defined the offense on
    which he was tried . . . [and] the [trial court] submitted the case
    to the jury with improper instructions, as [it] told the jury that
    they could convict Marshall as an accessory before the fact if he
    'aided in the commission of the murder of [the victim].'"        
    Id. at 42-43.
        Those instructions were in error because they were not
    -6-
    consistent with the indictment, which charged conduct that took
    place before the felony was committed.           
    Id. at 43.
    The SJC added that the evidence did establish Marshall's
    "active participation in, and presence during, the commission of
    the felony," and noted that the state "should have simply added
    Marshall's name to that portion of the indictment alleging murder,
    without reference to Marshall's acting as an accessory before the
    fact."2     
    Id. The SJC
       concluded     that   "because       the   evidence
    presented   was   legally      insufficient    to    warrant    a    finding   of
    Marshall's guilt as an accessory before the fact, Marshall's motion
    for a required finding of not guilty should have been allowed."
    
    Id. In a
    footnote, the SJC expressly noted that Marshall could not
    be retried as an accessory before the fact.            
    Id. at 43
    n.34.
    C.          Second SJC Decision: Marshall v. Commonwealth
    The Commonwealth indicted Marshall again, this time
    charging him with murder for his involvement in the killing,
    pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 1.                Marshall moved to
    dismiss the indictment, claiming that the second prosecution was
    barred by double jeopardy, arguing that "murder is a form or a
    'species' of lesser included offense to accessory before the fact
    to murder."    
    Marshall, 977 N.E.2d at 41
    (internal quotation marks
    omitted).     The state trial judge (who was not the original trial
    2
    Petitioner claims that the prosecution chose to indict him
    as an accessory before the fact "so that [he] would not get the
    benefit of lesser included crimes such as manslaughter."
    -7-
    judge) denied the motion, and Marshall appealed to a single justice
    of the SJC pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, § 3.                 
    Id. at 42.
    The justice reserved judgment and presented the issues to the full
    SJC.       
    Id. The SJC
    rejected Marshall's argument and concluded that
    the second indictment was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause
    as   incorporated.          The   SJC   began   from    the   proposition    that
    "[m]urder, prosecuted on a theory of aiding and abetting, is not a
    lesser included offense of accessory before the fact to murder.
    Rather,      the    two   are   different   species    of   the   same   crime."
    
    Marshall, 977 N.E.2d at 45
    .              The SJC rejected the portion of
    Rodriguez that appeared to read "aiding" the commission of a felony
    to be a "separate and distinct" crime from acting as an accessory
    before the fact.3          
    Marshall, 977 N.E.2d at 46-47
    .           The Marshall
    court reasoned that "[a]lthough grounded in the language and
    structure of the statute, [the Rodriguez] construction of § 2 goes
    too far, and is an outlier among our recent decisions regarding the
    3
    As the Marshall court explained:
    Whether the defendant engages in conduct before the
    commission of the victim's murder to ensure its
    accomplishment, aids in its commission by others,
    or commits the murderous assault himself, he is
    liable for murder and, if convicted, will be so
    punished.   We cannot say, then, that each is a
    wholly independent theory of 
    liability. 977 N.E.2d at 47
    .
    -8-
    scope of accomplice (or joint venture) liability."4                      
    Id. at 45.
    Thus,       Marshall,       addressing    a    question    of    state    legislative
    interpretation,             modified      Rodriguez's           interpretation     of
    Massachusetts' murder statutes.
    After interpreting the Massachusetts aiding and abetting
    statute, the SJC turned to the double jeopardy implications of
    Rodriguez.       The SJC acknowledged that the state cannot retry a
    defendant       when    a    conviction       is    overturned    for    insufficient
    evidence, but a state may do so
    [1] where other theories (supported by
    evidence at a first trial) would support a
    defendant's conviction in the second, see
    Commonwealth v. Fickett, [
    526 N.E.2d 1064
    ,
    1068 n.4 (Mass. 1988)], or [2] where a
    conviction is reversed on appeal because of a
    variance between the indictment and the proof
    established at trial.    See Commonwealth v.
    Ohanian, [
    370 N.E.2d 695
    , 698 (Mass. 1977)].
    4
    In particular, the Marshall court noted its 1997 decision
    in Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 
    679 N.E.2d 1007
    (Mass. 1997), which found
    that, "[a]lthough [section two] 'continue[d] to use the term
    'before the fact,' the phrase now appears to be a vestige of
    history, as [recent] statutory changes 'abrogate[d] the distinction
    between principals and accessories before the fact.'" 
    Marshall, 977 N.E.2d at 46
    (third and fifth alterations in original) (quoting
    
    Ortiz, 679 N.E.2d at 1010
    ).
    -9-
    
    Id. at 47-48.5
      The Marshall court reasoned that this case falls
    somewhere between these two "exceptions" to the double jeopardy
    rule, and that while Rodriguez had not employed the "variance"
    language precisely, it "essentially concluded . . . that such a
    variance was fatal: the defendant was convicted of a crime for
    which he had not been indicted."   
    Id. at 48.
      Ultimately, the SJC
    concluded, there was no double jeopardy problem with the state's
    decision to prosecute Marshall for a second time for the crime
    proved at the first trial.   
    Id. 5 Federal
    law recognizes these exceptions to double jeopardy
    under the heading "procedural dismissals." Evans v. Michigan, 
    133 S. Ct. 1069
    , 1075 (2013) ("Procedural dismissals include rulings on
    questions that 'are unrelated to factual guilt or innocence,' but
    'which serve other purposes,' including 'a legal judgment that a
    defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be punished'
    because of some problem like an error with the indictment."
    (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Scott, 
    437 U.S. 82
    ,
    98 & n.11 (1978))); see, e.g., United States v. Lanzotti, 
    90 F.3d 1217
    (7th Cir. 1996) (allowing new trial where earlier conviction
    reversed on ground that facts did not support direct violation of
    Illinois gambling statute and aiding and abetting theory was not
    fairly communicated by instructions); Parker v. Norris, 
    64 F.3d 1178
    , 1180-82 (8th Cir. 1995) (allowing retrial under premeditated
    murder provision after government charged and convicted defendant
    under felony murder provision that did not apply to the defendant's
    acts); United States v. Todd, 
    964 F.2d 925
    , 929-30 (9th Cir. 1992)
    (allowing retrial on related offense of sexual contact where
    government charged and convicted defendant under sexual intercourse
    statute that did not apply to defendant's acts); United States v.
    Miller, 
    952 F.2d 866
    , 870-74 (5th Cir. 1992) (allowing retrial on
    permissible theory of mail fraud after conviction on legally
    deficient "intangible rights" theory had been overturned); United
    States v. Davis, 
    873 F.2d 900
    , 903-07 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).
    -10-
    D.           Section 2241 Petition and District Court Decision
    Marshall then filed a § 2241 petition in the district
    court, arguing that because the initial reversal of his conviction
    was based on insufficient evidence, his second indictment and
    pending trial were barred by double jeopardy.        Marshall v. Bristol
    Cnty. Superior 
    Court, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 233
    .           He also asserted
    that the SJC's changing interpretation of the aiding and abetting
    statute was impermissible as it created an ex post facto law.            
    Id. at 234
    .
    The district court noted that petitioner's ex post facto
    claim was not raised before the state court and had not been
    exhausted. It held, however, without any supporting citation, that
    "exhaustion is not required when the ground for the Writ is double
    jeopardy."    
    Id. at 234
    n.1.    The district court did not address the
    merits of Marshall's ex post facto claim.
    As to petitioner's double jeopardy claim, the federal
    district court agreed with Marshall's characterization of the SJC's
    decision in Rodriguez      as resting on an insufficiency of the
    evidence finding.     The district court held that Marshall's second
    indictment    was   prohibited   by   the   Double   Jeopardy   Clause    as
    incorporated. 
    Id. at 235-36.
    It cited Burks v. United States, 
    437 U.S. 1
    (1978), in which the Court held that a defendant cannot be
    tried a second time after a reviewing court has found that the
    -11-
    evidence presented was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.
    
    Id. The district
    court granted the petition, saying that the state
    cannot be allowed to pick and choose
    successive theories of murder and to proceed
    upon successive trials for each of its new
    theories. The Commonwealth must stand on its
    theory of murder alleged at the first trial or
    otherwise the principle of one trial for each
    crime, which is at the core of the Double
    Jeopardy Clause, would be nullified.
    
    Id. at 236.
    The Commonwealth argues to us that the petition should be
    denied in full for failure to satisfy the exhaustion requirement as
    to the ex post facto argument, and that, even if Marshall meets the
    exhaustion requirement, the second indictment does not violate the
    Double Jeopardy Clause as incorporated.
    II.
    "[W]e, as a federal habeas court reviewing a petition
    under section 2241, must defer to the SJC's findings of fact but
    must undertake plenary review of that court's resolution of issues
    of law."    Gonzalez v. Justices of Mun. Court of Bos., 
    382 F.3d 1
    ,
    7 (1st Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), judgment vacated on other
    grounds, 
    544 U.S. 918
    (2005), and reinstated, 
    420 F.3d 5
    (1st Cir.
    2005).6    We review a district court's disposition of a section 2241
    6
    The Commonwealth does not challenge this de novo standard
    of review under section 2241, as opposed to the deference owed to
    a state court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
    Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
    -12-
    petition de novo.      Espinoza v. Sabol, 
    558 F.3d 83
    , 91 (1st Cir.
    2009).
    Petitioner claims two grounds for relief in his § 2241
    petition.     First, petitioner claims that, in changing "accessory
    before the fact" to a "theory" of murder from a separate crime, the
    SJC's decision in Marshall gave rise to an unconstitutional "ex
    post facto law."      Second, petitioner claims that his prosecution
    for murder is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
    A.           "Ex Post Facto Law": Unexhausted But Frivolous
    Petitioner    claims   first   that   the    SJC's   decision   in
    
    Marshall, 977 N.E.2d at 45
    -- characterizing accessory before the
    fact as a separate theory of murder as opposed to a separate
    offense, abrogating the portion of Rodriguez interpreting the
    Massachusetts aiding and abetting statute -- had the effect of
    "creat[ing] an ex post facto law for Mr. Marshall in violation of
    Article I of the U.S. Constitution."          Petitioner failed to exhaust
    state remedies with respect to this claim.               We reject it on the
    merits nonetheless.7
    Ordinarily, "[p]rinciples of comity and federalism push
    in   favor   of   giving   state    courts,   without     premature   federal
    interference,     a   meaningful    opportunity     to    consider,   and    if
    7
    Because we reach the merits of petitioner's "ex post facto
    law" claim, we need not decide whether the "total exhaustion
    requirement" that applies to habeas petitions filed pursuant to 18
    U.S.C. § 2254, Rhines v. Weber, 
    544 U.S. 269
    , 274-78 (2005), also
    applies to petitions filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2241.
    -13-
    necessary to correct, claims of legal error in state criminal
    prosecutions."    Pike v. Guarino, 
    492 F.3d 61
    , 71 (1st Cir. 2007).
    However, "exhaustion is a prudential principle rather than a
    jurisdictional limitation," 
    id., and "where,
    as here, a habeas
    petitioner's unexhausted claim is patently without merit, . . . the
    interests of judicial economy" recommend "dispos[ing] of that claim
    once and for all," Coningford v. Rhode Island, 
    640 F.3d 478
    , 483
    (1st Cir. 2011); see also Granberry v. Greer, 
    481 U.S. 129
    , 135
    (1987) (explaining that a federal habeas court may reach the merits
    of   an   unexhausted   claim   "if   it     is   perfectly   clear   that   the
    applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim").
    For the same reason, this court need not decide whether
    to abstain from deciding petitioner's ex post facto claim under
    Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
    , 44–45 (1971), which cautions that
    federal courts should generally refrain from enjoining pending
    state court proceedings.8        Like exhaustion, "Younger is not a
    jurisdictional bar based on Article III requirements, but instead
    a prudential limitation on the court's exercise of jurisdiction
    grounded in equitable considerations of comity."               Spargo v. N.Y.
    State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 
    351 F.3d 65
    , 74 (2d Cir. 2003);
    accord Benavidez v. Eu, 
    34 F.3d 825
    , 829 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Younger
    abstention is not jurisdictional, but reflects a court's prudential
    8
    The issue of Younger abstention was not raised by the
    Commonwealth in the district court. We do not address the issue of
    whether the Commonwealth's waiver would be excused.
    -14-
    decision not to exercise jurisdiction which it in fact possesses."
    (emphasis in original)). The interest of comity is not advanced by
    forcing state courts to consider frivolous claims.           In addition,
    the Commonwealth has itself asked for dismissal on the grounds that
    petitioner's   ex   post   facto   claim    is   without   merit   and    has
    extensively briefed the issue.
    "As the text of the [Ex Post Facto] Clause makes clear,
    it 'is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does
    not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government.'"
    Rogers v. Tennessee, 
    532 U.S. 451
    , 456 (2001) (quoting Marks v.
    United States, 
    430 U.S. 188
    , 191 (1977)).            Marshall's "ex post
    facto law" claim is mislabeled.        He asserts a due process claim.
    The Supreme Court has recognized that "limitations on ex post facto
    judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process."
    
    Rogers, 532 U.S. at 456
    .
    But even recast as a due process argument, petitioner's
    claim fails.   Constraints on judicial retroactivity are rooted in
    "core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in
    particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear on the
    constitutionality    of    attaching      criminal   penalties     to    what
    previously had been innocent conduct." 
    Id. at 459
    (citing Bouie v.
    City of Columbia, 
    378 U.S. 347
    , 351, 352, 354-355 (1964)).
    Petitioner cannot seriously contend that he lacked fair notice that
    -15-
    participation in a fatal beating constituted criminal conduct.
    Petitioner's fair notice claim is utterly meritless.
    B.         Double Jeopardy
    It is black letter law that "the Double Jeopardy Clause
    precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the
    evidence legally insufficient."     
    Burks, 437 U.S. at 18
    ; see also
    Benton v. Maryland, 
    395 U.S. 784
    , 794-95 (1969) (holding that the
    "double    jeopardy"   protection   of   the   Fifth   Amendment    was
    incorporated into the Fourteenth, and hence also carries to the
    States).    By contrast, where reversal is based upon a variance
    between the crime charged in the indictment and the crime proved at
    trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is no bar to retrial.             See
    Montana v. Hall, 
    481 U.S. 400
    , 404 (1987) ("It is clear that the
    Constitution permits retrial after a conviction is reversed because
    of a defect in the charging instrument.").
    Rodriguez, were it standing alone, could be read as
    giving conflicting signals. On the one hand, the decision does use
    the phrase "the evidence was 
    insufficient." 931 N.E.2d at 43
    .   On
    the other hand, the decision uses that phrase in the context of a
    discussion emphasizing the mismatch between the crime charged in
    the indictment and the crime proved at trial.9          In addition,
    9
    Rodriguez said:
    [T]he indictment charged conduct that took place
    "before the said felony was committed," an element
    that we have stated is required under G.L. c. 274,
    § 2, to establish guilt as an accessory before the
    -16-
    Rodriguez noted that Marshall could have been convicted pursuant to
    a corrected indictment.           See 
    id. ("To charge
    Marshall with this
    conduct, the Commonwealth should have simply added Marshall's name
    to   that   portion    of   the    indictment    alleging    murder,   without
    reference to Marshall's acting as an accessory before the fact.").
    By itself, the SJC's decision in Rodriguez could be
    thought     to   be   ambiguous.      Marshall    resolved    any   ambiguity,
    explaining:
    Although the proof of liability at trial, and
    the jury instructions that accompanied it,
    would have sufficed if the defendant had been
    indicted simply for the murder itself, they
    were at variance with the wording of the
    indictment. Although we did not employ this
    term specifically, we essentially concluded in
    Rodriguez . . . that such a variance was
    fatal: the defendant was convicted of a crime
    for which he had not been 
    indicted. 977 N.E.2d at 48
    . Marshall held that the reversal in Rodriguez was
    based upon a defect in the charging instrument, language of
    "insufficien[cy]" notwithstanding.
    And a federal habeas court is bound by that holding.
    "[T]he meaning attached to an ambiguous prior reversal is a matter
    fact. In this case, the evidence was insufficient
    to satisfy this requirement, for there was no
    evidence at trial that Marshall, before the felony
    took place (as was required by the indictment, the
    statutory prescribed indictment form, and G.L. c.
    274, § 2), counselled, hired, or otherwise procured
    the felony to be committed. Rather, the evidence
    established his active participation in, and
    presence during, the commission of the 
    felony. 931 N.E.2d at 43
    (emphasis added).
    -17-
    of state law."            
    Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 47
    n.24 (citing Greene v.
    Massey,      
    437 U.S. 1
    9   (1978)).      For    that   reason,    the     SJC's
    "construction of its prior opinion binds this Court."                         
    Id. at 46-47.
    We are similarly bound by the state court's construction of
    its state statutes and other issues of state law.               E.g., Wisconsin
    v. Mitchell, 
    508 U.S. 476
    , 483 (1993) ("There is no doubt that we
    are bound by a state court's construction of a state statute.").
    The Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in Tibbs.
    In    that   case,    the    Florida   Supreme       Court's   initial    decision
    reversing the defendant's conviction left unclear whether reversal
    was based on "insufficient evidence" or rather on "weight of the
    
    evidence." 457 U.S. at 38-39
    . Following a retrial and conviction,
    the Florida Supreme Court issued a second opinion clarifying that
    its earlier reversal had been based on "weight of the evidence."
    
    Id. The defendant
    argued on appeal, among other things, that the
    earlier reversal had, in fact, been based upon insufficiency, and,
    as a result, that the Double Jeopardy Clause as incorporated barred
    his retrial.       The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction following
    retrial, reasoning that "[a]ny ambiguity in Tibbs I . . . was
    resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs II."                    
    Id. at 46.
    The state court's "bind[ing]" construction of its earlier decision
    established        that    the   defendant's    "successful     appeal     of    his
    conviction rested upon a finding that the conviction was against
    the weight of the evidence, not upon a holding that the evidence
    -18-
    was legally insufficient to support the verdict."   
    Id. at 46-47.
    "Under these circumstances," the Court concluded, "the Double
    Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial."     
    Id. at 47.
        On like
    reasoning, we conclude that the grant of the petition here was in
    error.
    III.
    The district court's grant of petitioner's request for
    habeas relief is reversed.    Habeas relief is barred, and the
    petition is dismissed with prejudice.
    -19-