Chimeno v. Pion ( 1997 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-2157
ALBERT J. CHIMENO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DANIEL A. PION, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Boudin and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
Albert J. Chimeno on brief pro se.
Marc DeSisto, Kathleen M. Powers and DeSisto Law Offices on brief
for appellees.
October 24, 1997
Per Curiam. Upon review of the parties' briefs and the
record on appeal, we conclude that there was no abuse of
discretion in the two evidentiary rulings of which plaintiff-
appellant complains.
In the district court action, plaintiff accused two
Woonsocket, Rhode Island police officers of using excessive
force and of assault and battery during the course of
plaintiff's arrest following an altercation with the officers
during a stop for traffic violations. The jury found for the
defendants.
In this appeal, plaintiff challenges two evidentiary
rulings of the trial court. Determinations concerning the
admissibility as well as the exclusion of evidence are left
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court
will reverse only if the district court abused its
discretion. See Knowlton v. Deseret Medical Inc., 930 F.2d
116, 124 (1st Cir. 1991).
First, plaintiff challenges the trial court's decision
not to admit into the record a state court decision vacating
his convictions for the traffic violations that prompted the
initial stop. The district court was within its discretion,
because the issue of whether plaintiff actually committed the
traffic violations for which he was stopped was not relevant
to whether the police officers used excessive force in the
course of his arrest. Plaintiff did not challenge the
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legality of the arrest per se, and in any event the
subsequent decision to vacate his convictions for the traffic
violations is only marginally relevant, if at all, to whether
the police officers had a sufficient basis for stopping him
at the time they did.
Second, plaintiff challenges the trial court's decision
to admit his "mug shot" on grounds that it was substantially
more prejudicial than probative. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. The
trial court was within its discretion, as the lack of visible
injuries on plaintiff's neck in the photograph was relevant
in that it tended to undermine his testimony that the
defendants had choked him during the arrest. Moreover, the
risk of prejudice from the photograph was minimal. The
photographs were of the very arrest that gave rise to the
lawsuit, and thus -- unlike mug shots for prior arrests --
had no tendency to imply past criminal conduct. Cf. United
States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1978) (requiring
safeguards for the introduction of prior mug shots to avoid
eviscerating the rule generally forbidding evidence of prior
criminal acts).
The judgment of the district court in favor of the
defendants-appellees is summarily affirmed. Loc. R. 27.1.
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