Latin American Music Co. v. Cardenas Fernandez & Assoc., Inc. ( 2001 )

[Not for Publication - Not to be Cited as Precedent]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1443
LATIN AMERICAN MUSIC COMPANY, INC.; ASOCIACION DE COMPOSITORES
Y EDITORES DE MUSICA LATINO AMERICANA (ACEMLA),
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CARDENAS FERNANDEZ & ASSOC., INC.; DAVID MALDONADO, D/B/A
DAVID MALDONADO ENTERTAINMENT; CFDM THEATRICAL PRODUCTIONS, LLC;
PABLO CABRERA; PROMOTORES LATINOS, INC.; CENTRO DE BELLAS ARTES
CORP.; CORPORACION PARA EL FOMENTO DE LAS ARTES Y LA CULTURA,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Stahl, and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
Freddie Perez-Gonzalez, with whom Freddie Perez Gonzalez &
Assoc., was on brief for appellants.
Francisco A. Berosa, with whom Adsuar Muniz & Goyco, P.S.C.,
was on brief for appellees.
February 23, 2001
Per Curiam. This dispute involves musical compositions
performed in the off-Broadway production of the play “Quien Mato
a Hector Lavoe?”1 (the “Play”) and subsequently in San Juan.
Appellants Latin American Music Co., Inc. and Asociacion de
Compositores y Editores de Musica Latino Americana, Inc. claim
that they own copyrights in several of the songs used in the
Play. They sought a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order to prevent any further performances of the
Play by appellees, the Play’s producers and directors. The
district court denied both the temporary restraining order and
the preliminary injunction.
In order to demonstrate entitlement to a preliminary
injunction, appellants must show that: (1) they will suffer
irreparable injury absent the injunction; (2) the injury will
outweigh the harm imposed on any defendant if the injunction is
granted; (3) they are likely to succeed on the merits of the
case; (4) the injunction does not adversely affect the public
interest. Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641
1 Translated: “Who Killed Hector Lavoe?”
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F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir. 1981).2 The district court correctly
stated this four-factor test, but denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction based solely on appellants’ failure to
meet the irreparable injury factor.
Under the ordinary four-prong test, it would normally
be sufficient for the district court to deny the preliminary
injunction on the ground that regardless of the likelihood of
success, there was no threat of irreparable injury, the
injunction was likely to damage the party subject to it, and
that the party seeking the injunction could be made completely
whole through damages if it prevailed.
However, in copyright cases, "irreparable harm is
usually presumed if likelihood of success on [a] copyright claim
has been shown." Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments,
Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 611 (1st Cir. 1988). This in no way
requires a district court to shut down a play on the eve of
production where, as here, there may be considerable doubt about
the strength of the copyright claims and some doubt about the
timeliness of the request for a preliminary injunction. But in
the face of an apparent threat of new productions continuing
2 Courts have extended the four-factor test to temporary
restraining orders. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Bishop, 839 F. Supp. 68, 70 (D. Me. 1993); Nation Magazine v.
Dep't of State, 805 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D.D.C. 1992).
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over a substantial period, it seems to us insufficient under
Concrete Mach. Co. simply to say that damages will redress any
and all harm.
The copyright claims in this case are complicated, and
nothing we say is intended to suggest a view that plaintiff is
likely to prevail, although this is likely to be the key issue
as to injunctive relief. Further, we do not know what
intervening developments have occurred as to play performances
(planned or actual) or as to the conduct of litigation since the
denial of temporary relief. Under the circumstances, we merely
vacate the denial of the preliminary injunction and remand for
further proceedings, including appropriate finding, under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 52(a)
It is so ordered.
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