NH Dept. of Admin. v. Ramsey , 366 F.3d 1 ( 2004 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1920 Volume II of II
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES; STATE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE
TREASURER; STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVID RAMSEY, JOHN LOVEDAY, JOHN TOOMEY, MELINDA CONRAD, WAYNE
ALDRICH, NORMAN JITRAS, MICHAEL ROSSI, JOHN SCARLOTTO, and
MARTHA YORK, as members of the N.H. Committee of Blind Vendors;
NEW HAMPSHIRE COMMITTEE OF BLIND VENDORS;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Nancy J. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Peter W. Heed, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellant.
Jack B. Middleton, with whom Andrea L. Daly, Laura B. Dodge,
and McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton were on brief, for appellee
New Hampshire Committee of Blind Vendors.
Mark B. Stern, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, with
whom Alisa B. Klein, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas P.
Colantuono, United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee
United States Department of Education.
Robert R. Humphreys on brief for Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of
America, American Council of the Blind, and National Educational
and Legal Defense Services for the Blind, amici curiae.
April 29, 2004
V.
We turn to the question whether the district court erred in
affirming, in large part, the federal arbitration panel's award of
prospective equitable relief.21
A. Challenges to the Arbitration Panel's Statutory Authority to
Issue Prospective Equitable Relief
In the administrative proceedings and before the district
court, New Hampshire raised many arguments challenging the scope of
the arbitration panel's statutory authority to issue prospective
equitable relief, but it has abandoned most of those arguments in
this appeal.22
The state does argue in this appeal, as part of its Eleventh
Amendment analysis, that the arbitration panel lacked authority to
21
New Hampshire has not argued that the panel could do
nothing more than declare rights of the private parties and the
state, and so has waived the argument.
22
None of the following five arguments, all of which the
state has urged at other stages in this case, are raised in the
state's briefs on appeal: (1) that the arbitration panel has no
remedial power whatsoever because the R-S Act authorizes only the
head of the state agency to fashion remedies; (2) that, even if the
arbitration panel had remedial power, that power does not extend to
ordering the state to terminate existing contracts for vending
before those contracts expire; (3) that the arbitration panel is
not authorized under the R-S Act, which applies only to federal
property, to issue relief as to state-owned rest areas; (4) that
the arbitration panel cannot award any relief at all for violations
of § 111(b) because there is no private right of action under §
111(b); and (5) that even if the arbitration panel could issue
relief for violations of § 111(b), it cannot issue relief as to
state-owned rest areas on toll roads built without federal funding,
such as the Hooksett rest areas. We do not reach any of these
issues, which have been waived.
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issue any relief at all because, as a matter of statutory
construction, R-S grievance procedures do not apply to § 111(b)
claims. To the extent this argument is a free-standing challenge
to the arbitration panel's statutory authority to award prospective
relief in this case, we reject it. The state is estopped from
making the argument, given its earlier position in 1998 that the
Blind Vendors' § 111(b) claims had to go through R-S grievance
procedures.
But even if the state were not estopped, its argument is wrong
on the merits. The R-S Act states that "[a]ny blind licensee who
is dissatisfied with any action arising from the operation or
administration of the vending facility program" may avail himself
or herself of R-S grievance procedures. 20 U.S.C. § 107d-1(a)
(emphasis added). The relevant language, again, of § 111(b) is:
In permitting the placement of vending machines, the
State shall give priority to vending machines which are
operated through the State licensing agency designated
pursuant to section 2(a)(5) of the Act of June 20, 1936,
commonly known as the 'Randolph-Sheppard Act' (20 U.S.C.
107a(a)(5)).
The issue is whether the "vending machines" to which § 111(b)
refers are within "the vending facility program" described in the
R-S Act, 20 U.S.C. § 107d-1(a); if so, R-S grievance procedures
apply to § 111(b) claims.
We answer in the affirmative, based on the plain language of
the R-S Act and § 111(b). The R-S Act does not define "the vending
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facility program." Neither statute expressly states what the
relationship is between the "vending machines" described in §
111(b) and "the vending facility program" created by the R-S Act.
Nonetheless, the text of § 111(b) is clear that the vending
machines to be given priority are those "which are operated through
the State licensing agency designated pursuant to . . . the
'Randolph-Sheppard Act' . . . ." Vending machines operated through
SLAs are, by definition, part of the R-S vending program. They are
operated by blind vendors licensed under the R-S Act, see 20 U.S.C.
§ 107a(b) (licensees must be blind); id. § 107a(a)(5) (licensing
provisions apply to the operation of vending facilities on state as
well as federal property), to whom the SLA is required under the R-
S Act to provide vending facility equipment and initial stock,
see id. § 107b(2).23
Our plain-text reading makes sense from a functional
perspective. It is not surprising, for reasons of efficiency and
consistency, that Congress would intend R-S grievance procedures to
apply when a blind vendor complains that the state failed to
23
SLAs sometimes operate vending machines outside the R-S
Act. For example, in New Hampshire, the Bureau of Blind Services,
in addition to serving as the designated SLA under the R-S Act,
performs other functions in the state, such as conducting general
vocational training for the blind. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186-
B:4. Among those functions is the operation of vending machines on
state property under the state's "mini"-R-S Act. N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 186-B:9-15. But, to the extent that SLAs operate those
machines, they do so in their general capacity as agencies of the
state, not in their capacity as licensing agencies designated under
the R-S Act.
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provide the SLA priority, whether the vending machine be along the
interstate system or elsewhere. If enforcement were not
consolidated under one system, inconsistencies and unfairness might
arise from splitting grievance procedures between the USDOE and the
Federal Highway Administration.
The state cites, in support of a different argument, a March
13, 1984 Department of Transportation memorandum providing guidance
on implementing § 111(b) (the "1984 DOT Guidelines"). This
memorandum states, "The only application the [R-S Act] has to
Section 111 is to establish the licensing agency in each State that
is to be given priority. With the exception of rest areas on
Federal lands, none of the [R-S Act] requirements apply to vending
machines in Interstate rest areas." We read this statement, which
does not have the force of a regulation, as being concerned with
the additional substantive guarantees of the R-S Act: for example,
the provisions concerning vending income, which do not apply to
vending machines operated under § 111(b).24 The 1984 DOT Guidelines
never mention the issue of R-S grievance procedures. And the DOT
24
The R-S Act provides blind vendors an entitlement to a
percentage of all income generated by competing vending machines
operating on federal property whether or not blind vendors operate
the machines. 20 U.S.C. § 107d-3. See Comm. of Blind Vendors v.
District of Columbia, 28 F.3d 130, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1994). We agree
with the state that there is no indication that Congress intended
§ 111(b) of the STA Act to incorporate such a provision or
otherwise to impose such an obligation. This was also the view of
the Comptroller General of the United States in a letter dated
February 28, 1984 to Rep. Kennelly.
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used identical language in a memorandum on October 5, 1992 that
principally discusses the application of substantive requirements
of the R-S Act to vending machines in rest areas along interstate
highways. It is unlikely that the DOT intended to foreclose
application of R-S grievance procedures despite the plain language
of the R-S Act and § 111(b).
B. The Meaning of "Priority" in 23 U.S.C. § 111(b)
The arbitration panel held that "'priority' requires that
[state licensing agencies] be approached and be given a right of
first refusal before any other entity be approached to operate
these sites." This interpretation of "priority" in § 111(b)
involves two requirements: a timing requirement and a requirement
that the right of priority be waived in writing. First, the panel
held that priority requires that the SLA "receive an opportunity to
operate vending machines before any private vendor is even pursued"
(emphasis original). Second, it held that "before [the state]
approaches any other entity to operate machines at rest areas on
the Interstate Highway System," the SLA "must waive its right to a
priority in writing."
The state argues that the district court erred in upholding
the arbitration panel's interpretation of "priority." Although the
state does not differentiate between the two components of priority
outlined by the administrative panel, the state seems to be
challenging both. It argues that priority under § 111(b) requires
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only that the state confer on the SLA "an advantage not granted to
any other potential vendor," and that its policy of allowing
vending machines at a rest area to be operated through the Bureau
of Blind Services if and only if the Bureau matches the high bid
meets that definition.
Our review of the legal meaning of priority in § 111(b) is de
novo, subject to any applicable principles of deference. Griffiths
v. INS, 243 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2001).25 Examining the two
25
The parties dispute the level of deference, if any, owed
here. The district court applied Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which requires courts to accept,
in certain circumstances, an agency's reasonable construction of an
ambiguous statute. Id. at 843-44.
The state argues that the district court erred in applying
Chevron deference. The state says, inter alia, that Chevron
deference is appropriate only when Congress has delegated authority
to the agency to implement the statute in question. See 1 Pierce,
Administrative Law Treatise § 3.5 (2002) ("Chevron [deference]
applies only when an agency adopts a construction of a statute it
implements" because only then has "Congress explicitly or
implicitly assigned to the agency the task of resolving all policy
disputes that arise under the statute."); cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844 ("[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer" (emphasis added)). Here, the state says, Congress
never delegated authority to interpret the STA Act to the USDOE or
its arbitration panels. Cf. 23 U.S.C. § 315 (delegating rulemaking
power to carry out the STA Act to the Secretary of Transportation).
The Blind Vendors respond that the state waived this argument in
district court and that, in any event, Congress did delegate power
to the federal arbitration panel to interpret § 111(b) because R-S
grievance procedures apply to violations of § 111(b).
The Blind Vendors also argue that even if Chevron deference
does not apply, the arbitration panel is still entitled to some
deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944),
because of the Department of Education's expertise in administering
blind vendor programs. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 234 (2001) (applying Skidmore deference based on "'specialized
experience and broader investigations and information' available to
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components of the arbitration panel's interpretation of priority in
turn, we affirm the district court in upholding the panel's
interpretation. Although we recognize that there are potentially
a number of other issues that could arise about operation of the
priority system, we confine ourselves to a review of the district
court's holding, as those other issues are not before us. We begin
by looking to the plain language of the statute. Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 1999).
1. The Timing Requirement
We turn first to the question whether "priority" under §
111(b) requires that the SLA be consulted before other vendors are
considered.
The STA Act does not expressly define the term "priority," and
the DOT, to which Congress has given rulemaking power to implement
§ 111(b), see 23 U.S.C. § 315, has not issued regulations or
interpretive rules defining the term. The state and Blind Vendors
both cite the same dictionary definition of priority:
Precedence, going before. A legal preference or
precedence. . . . When two persons have similar rights
in respect of the same subject-matter, but one is
entitled to exercise his right to the exclusion of the
the agency"). The state responds that Skidmore deference is
inappropriate because the arbitrators in this case were not members
of the Department of Education. Nothing in the record indicates
that the arbitrators here had any special expertise in this area.
We need not resolve this dispute over the appropriate level of
deference because we affirm the district court's decision to uphold
the arbitration panel's interpretation, regardless whether any
deference applies.
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other, he is said to have priority.
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).
The Blind Vendors argue that a priority involves "precedence"
and thus requires that the Bureau of Blind Services be offered the
contract before others. The state argues based on the same
definition that a priority is simply a "preference" accorded to
parties that otherwise have "similar rights" and thus requires only
that the STA Act be given some unique advantage in the bidding
process, such as the right to the contract if it matches the high
bid. While the state's argument is plausible, we think that it is
inconsistent with congressional intent.
Because the plain meaning is not entirely clear, we look to
other sources. Greebel, 194 F.3d at 192. One source is a
memorandum of guidelines issued by the DOT on March 11, 1983,
shortly after the passage of § 111(b) (the "1983 DOT Guidelines"),
which states:
Documentation demonstrating a positive initiative to
involve the designated Randolph-Sheppard Act State agency
will be required before the State highway agency proposes
alternative organizations or corporations to operate the
vending machines. However, if the designated Randolph-
Sheppard Act agency waives its rights in writing, the
State highway agency is free to negotiate agreements . .
. with any organization or corporation.
Under the 1983 DOT Guidelines, the state must attempt to negotiate
an agreement with the SLA before considering other vendors.
Although the 1983 DOT Guidelines are not entitled to Chevron
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deference because they are not binding regulations, they have
persuasive authority. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 234-35 (2001) (applying Skidmore deference to interpretive
rules). If Congress had disagreed with the 1983 DOT Guidelines, it
could easily have amended § 111(b) at some point in the last twenty
years to clarify its intent.
The 1983 DOT Guidelines are consistent with how Congress has
viewed "priority" under the R-S Act. We note at the outset that we
look to the priority provision of the R-S Act because of its
similarity in language and purpose to § 111(b), not because we
think that it is somehow incorporated in § 111(b). Although §
111(b) incorporates R-S grievance procedures because, as we have
explained, the § 111(b) program is part of the "vending facility
program" under 20 U.S.C. § 107d-1(a) of the R-S Act, there is no
language in the STA Act or the R-S Act indicating that § 111(b)
necessarily incorporates the R-S Act's "priority" provision, 20
U.S.C. § 107(b). Section 111(b)'s only reference to the R-S Act is
to 20 U.S.C. § 107a, which is an entirely different section from
that containing the priority provision.
Instead, our reason for looking to the R-S Act is that
Congress uses the term "priority" in the R-S Act in a manner almost
identical to its use of the term in § 111(b). Compare 23 U.S.C. §
111(b) ("In permitting the placement of vending machines, the state
shall give priority to vending machines which are operated through
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the State licensing agency designated pursuant to . . . the
'Randolph-Sheppard Act' . . . ."), with 20 U.S.C. § 107(b) ("In
authorizing the operation of vending facilities on Federal
property, priority shall be given to blind persons licensed by a
State agency as provided in this chapter . . . ."). This parallel
language was not accidental. Congress was clearly aware of the R-S
Act in drafting § 111(b), given that § 111(b) directly references
the R-S Act. Where Congress uses the same term in the same way in
two statutes with closely related goals, basic canons of statutory
construction suggest a presumption that Congress intended the term
to have the same meaning in both contexts. See Sullivan v. Stroop,
496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (applying the "normal rule of statutory
construction that identical words used in different parts of the
same act are intended to have the same meaning" to a single term
used in two separate, but related, statutes (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
This presumption can be rebutted when there is some indication
that the term is intended to serve different purposes in each
statute, see Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct.
1236, 1245 (2004), but we see no basis for that conclusion here.
The state relies on the 1984 DOT Guidelines, which state that
"[t]he only application the [R-S Act] has to Section 111 is to
establish the licensing agency in each State that is to be given
priority." This statement, however, indicates only that the DOT
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does not see § 111(b) as incorporating the substantive provisions
of the R-S Act. As we have said, our reliance on the use of the
term "priority" in the R-S Act is not based on a belief that §
111(b) necessarily incorporates the priority provisions of the R-S
Act. The 1984 DOT Guidelines tell us nothing about the issue at
hand: whether the priority provisions of the R-S Act and § 111(b)
have different purposes.26
26
The state also presents several other arguments that the
priority provisions of the R-S Act and § 111(b) serve different
purposes. First, the state argues that the R-S Act's use of the
term is "specifically limited to the section describing the
Secretary's authority to proscribe [sic] regulations regarding this
subsection." This contention is refuted by the plain language of
§ 107(b), in which Congress expressly created the priority
requirement in addition to giving the Secretary rulemaking powers
to enforce that requirement.
Second, the state urges us to infer from Congress's failure to
expressly incorporate the priority provisions of the R-S Act into
the STA Act that Congress intended the two priority provisions to
have different purposes. We see no basis for such an inference.
Courts regularly presume words in closely related statutes to have
the same meaning where Congress has declined to expressly
incorporate one statute's interpretation of the term into the
other. See, e.g., Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d
1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[I]t cannot be presumed that the
[same] term has two different meanings in these closely related
statutes."); United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir.
1991) ("[W]e normally impart the same meaning to the same phrase
throughout related statutes . . . .").
Third, taking out of context language from Sentinel
Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189 (11th Cir. 1991), the
state argues that § 111(b), unlike the R-S Act, is merely a
delegating statute that "does not purport to authorize any type of
scheme, discretionary or not, for the substantive regulation of
vending machines at interstate rest areas" (emphasis in original).
Instead, the state suggests, § 111(b) leaves the task of defining
the precise contours of priority entirely to the states. We
disagree. Congress expressly created a federal priority
requirement, and there is no indication that Congress intended to
create state-by-state variations. The state misreads Sentinel.
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We turn to the use of "priority" in § 107(b) of the R-S Act.
The R-S Act does not define "priority," and the Department of
Education, which is authorized to promulgate regulations to
implement the R-S Act, see 20 U.S.C. § 107(b), has not defined the
term in its regulations. But the legislative history of the R-S
Act is clear that Congress intended "priority" to signify more than
a mere preference. Before 1974, the R-S Act provided a
"preference" rather than a "priority" to blind vendors: "In
authorizing the operation of vending stands on Federal property,
preference shall be given, so far as feasible, to blind persons
licensed by a State agency as provided in this chapter . . . ." 20
U.S.C. § 107 (1970) (repealed 1974). This changed in 1974, when
Congress determined that "the program has not developed, and has
not been sustained, in the manner and spirit in which the Congress
intended." R-S Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, §
201(1), 88 Stat. 1617, 1622 (1974). Congress found that "to
[e]nsure the continued vitality and expansion of the Randolph-
Sheppard program," it had to "establish a priority for vending
facilities operated by blind vendors on Federal property." Id. §
201(3). To give effect to this amendment, "priority" must be
Sentinel held that § 111(b) does not directly impose obligations on
the state in the sense that the state can choose not to participate
in the program by not placing vending machines in interstate rest
areas. 936 F.2d at 1196. Sentinel did not say that once a state
does choose to participate, § 111(b)'s requirement of priority
somehow imposes no obligations.
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understood to mean something more than the state's definition of
the term as a simple preference. "When Congress acts to amend a
statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and
substantial effect." Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 701 (1995) (quoting Stone v. INS,
514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995)).
More importantly, the legislative history shows that Congress
specifically intended the "priority" requirement in the R-S Act to
give blind vendors a prior right to negotiate, through their SLAs,
the operation of vending facilities on federal property. The
Senate Committee Report to the 1974 amendments explained:
The insertion of the term 'priority' underscores the
Committee's expectation that where a vending facility is
established on Federal property, it is the obligation of
the agency in control of such property, the Secretary of
[Health, Education, and Welfare], and the State licensing
agency to assure that one or more blind vendors have a
prior right to do business on such property, and
furthermore that, to the extent that a minority business
enterprise or non-blind operated vending machine competes
with or otherwise economically injures a blind vendor,
every effort must be made to eliminate such competition
or injury.
S. Rep. No. 93-937, at 15 (1974) (emphasis in original). Congress
was aware of these 1974 amendments to the R-S Act when it enacted
§ 111(b) in 1983. We note that we see no basis to assume that, by
conferring a prior right to negotiate, Congress intended to give
SLAs the right to operate vending machines no matter how
unreasonable, in light of congressional purposes, their bids may
be.
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2. The Waiver Requirement
The next question is whether the arbitration panel was correct
to interpret "priority" as requiring additionally that the state
obtain a written waiver from the Bureau before approaching other
vendors. We answer that question in the affirmative, finding that
a waiver requirement is the interpretation most consistent with
Congress's likely intent. This waiver requirement operates as a
bargaining chip for the SLA; it does not guarantee a bid will be
successful even if entirely unreasonable given congressional
intent. See 1983 DOT Guidelines, supra.
Congress intended "priority" to increase significantly
opportunities for blind vendors. That was certainly true in the
analogous context of the R-S Act. The statutory findings
accompanying the 1974 amendments to the R-S Act, which added the
term "priority" to the statute, state an intent to "adopt
legislation to [the] end" of "doubling the number of blind
operators on Federal and other property under the Randolph-Sheppard
programs within the next five years." R-S Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 201(2), 88 Stat. 1617, 1622 (1974).
Given this intent, it is unlikely that Congress intended
"priority" to confer upon SLAs only the right to be approached
before states award contracts to other vendors. The timing
requirement alone, absent any other protections, would leave states
free simply to approach their SLAs first, reject their offers, and
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then open contracts for competitive bidding. SLAs would be
afforded no meaningful priority at all.
For similar reasons, it is also unlikely that Congress
intended "priority" to be met by the state's Tie Rule or Match Rule
(which are, in any event, inconsistent with the timing
requirement). Counsel for the state conceded the ineffectiveness
of the Tie Rule in oral argument, noting that "the chances of [the
Bureau] submitting exactly the same or higher bid [as other
vendors] might be vanishingly slim" in a sealed bidding process.
The Match Rule is also problematic. The state has not denied that
the Bureau of Blind Services simply lacks the resources to match
high bids. In both instances in which the Bureau has bid on
contracts, it has been significantly outbid by private vendors. In
1997, the winning bid was from Coca-Cola Foods for $84,000; the
Bureau bid $7,200. In 1999, the winning bid was from Good Morning
Sales, Inc., for $283,577; the Bureau bid $32,650. Thus, as a
practical matter, the Match Rule offers the Bureau no advantage at
all. Congress created a priority requirement in § 111(b) because
it recognized precisely this problem: that SLAs generally have
difficulty offering the highest bids in a competitive bidding
process.
Nor do we think that Congress intended to limit priority under
§ 111(b) in a way analogous to the provisions of the R-S Act
governing the operation of cafeterias (rather than the placement of
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vending facilities). The R-S Act provides that
[t]he Secretary [of Education], through the Commissioner,
shall prescribe regulations to establish a priority for
the operation of cafeterias on Federal property by blind
licensees when he determines, on an individual basis and
after consultation with the head of the appropriate
installation, that such operation can be provided at a
reasonable cost with food of a high quality comparable to
that currently provided to employees, whether by contract
or otherwise.
20 U.S.C. § 107d-3(e). Had Congress intended to limit § 111(b)
priority similarly, it could easily have done so. The cafeteria
provision, § 107d-3(e), was present in the R-S Act at the time
Congress was drafting § 111(b). See Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 206(e),
88 Stat. 1617, 1627 (1974). Congress could have drafted § 111(b)
to mirror the language of § 107d-3(e) instead of § 107(b), but it
chose not to.
We conclude that the arbitration panel's interpretation should
be upheld because it most closely adheres to Congress's likely
intent in § 111(b). Our interpretation is reinforced by the 1983
DOT Guidelines, supra, which allow the state to negotiate with
other parties if the SLA signs a written waiver of its priority
rights.
Our reading is further bolstered by the fact that New
Hampshire itself seems to understand that Congress intends
"priority" to impose a waiver requirement. New Hampshire has
enacted its own mini-R-S Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186-B:9-15,
which offers almost identical vending opportunities to the blind on
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state property as offered on federal property under the R-S Act.
Compare N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186-B:9-15, with 20 U.S.C. § 107 et
seq. Although it does not use the term "priority," § 186-B:13
provides that
No person in control of the maintenance, operation and
protection of any state property may offer or grant to
any other party a contract or concession to operate a
vending facility unless:
(a) He has notified blind services and has attempted
to make an agreement with blind services for a licensed
blind person to operate a vending facility; and
(b) He has determined in good faith that blind
services is not willing to establish a vending facility
on such property.
The state statute, §§ 186-B:9-15, does not apply to this case only
because New Hampshire has exempted interstate highway sites --
sites where New Hampshire needed federal permission to have any
vending facilities at all -- from the statute's coverage. See N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 230:30-a. Why New Hampshire carved out an
exception, for property along the interstate highway system, from
its normal adherence to R-S Act standards is unclear. But, to the
extent that New Hampshire sought to mirror the R-S Act in § 186-
B:9-15, it supports our view of what New Hampshire believes
Congress to mean by "priority" under § 107(b) of the R-S Act and
thus under § 111(b) of the STA Act.
C. Preemption of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 230:30-a
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The state argues, in the alternative, that even if the
arbitration panel was correct about Congress's likely intent as to
the meaning of priority, an administrative agency cannot find state
law preempted unless Congress "clearly expressed" an intent to
preempt state law. Because no such clear expression is present in
§ 111(b), the state argues that N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 230:30-a is
not preempted.
This argument is based on a mistaken understanding of the law
of preemption. New Hampshire's obligations under § 111(b) are
defined by federal law. New Hampshire may pass statutes
implementing particular procedures for carrying out those
obligations, as N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 230:30-a does. But to the
extent that those state laws directly conflict with the
requirements of federal law, the Supremacy Clause requires that
they be given no effect. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2). This is
true even in the absence of an express congressional statement of
an intent to preempt. Id. ("In the absence of an express
congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually
conflicts with federal law." (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983))).
Here, § 230:30-a directly conflicts with the priority requirement
of § 111(b). Section 230:30-a requires the "director of plant and
property management" to "put out bids for the installation and
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maintenance of the vending machines" and provides that "any bidder
shall be eligible to bid for this service . . . ." This open
bidding system conflicts with § 111(b)'s requirement that states
first approach their SLAs and open the contract up to other bidders
only after the SLA has waived its priority in writing. Section
230:30-a is therefore preempted.
VI.
"While the state is constitutionally free to operate its own
highway system, the federal government is not bound
constitutionally or statutorily to grant federal highway funds to
states which do not operate their systems in accordance with
federal guidelines." State of Nebraska, Dep't of Roads v. Tiemann,
510 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1975). Here, New Hampshire voluntarily
entered into two agreements with the federal government, one under
the STA Act and one under the R-S Act. As the panel found, the
state of New Hampshire has violated those agreements.
For the reasons stated above, we vacate enforcement of the
damages award and dismiss the damages claim; otherwise we affirm.
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APPENDIX
The arbitration panel made the following findings of fact:
6. Based upon legislative history and statutory
interpretation, the word "priority" as used in the
Randolph-Sheppard Act, is defined as a right of first
refusal.
7. Based upon memoranda issued by the U.S. Department of
Transportation after the passage of Section 111(b) of
TEA-21 [i.e., the STA Act], and based upon the meaning of
"priority" as interpreted under the Randolph-Sheppard
Act, N.H. Blind Vendors and state employees working with
the N.H. SLA in 1983 believed that the N.H. SLA was
entitled to, and should receive, a right of first refusal
to operate vending machines at rest areas on the
Interstate Highway System.
8. The N.H. SLA could have taken advantage of its priority
under Section 111(b) of TEA-21 by either having licensed
blind vendors operate and maintain the machines, or by
subcontracting with private vendors to operate and
maintain the machines.
9. The N.H. SLA was not given a right of first refusal to
operate machines at any of the rest area sites prior to
the New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services
putting the sites out for competitive bidding.
10. Had the N.H. SLA been given a right of first refusal to
operate machines at any rest areas in New Hampshire, it
would have placed machines at those sites through its
licensed blind vendors or by hiring private vendors as
subcontractors.
11. Despite the passage of RSA 230:30-a, various individuals
at Administrative Services negotiated with the N.H. SLA
in order to provide N.H. SLA with commissions from the
income earned at vending machines at rest areas on the
Interstate Highway System in exchange for a waiver of its
right to a priority.
17. Despite long-standing efforts by the N.H. Blind Vendors
and N.H. SLA to negotiate with Administrative Services to
receive a priority to operate vending machines at rest
areas, the N.H. SLA has been unsuccessful.
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26. In New Hampshire the SLA has never received any
commissions for any of the vending machines at any of the
rest areas on the Interstate Highway System.
28. There is no evidence that the State of New Hampshire has
ever made a good faith determination that the N.H. SLA
was unwilling to operate machines at any rest area sites,
nor is there any evidence that the N.H. SLA waived its
right to such a priority in writing [except as to the
Springfield location].
30. Since the enactment of RSA 230:30-a, the N.H. SLA's
priority to operate vending machines on the Interstate
Highway System has been intentionally violated by the
State of New Hampshire.
It also made the following rulings of law under federal law:
A. The rest areas at Hooksett, Springfield, Salem, Seabrook,
Canterbury, Lebanon, Sanbornton and Sutton on Interstate
Highways 89, 93, and 95 in New Hampshire are subject to
the provisions of Section 111(b) of TEA-21, and its
predecessors. Section 111(b) of TEA-21 gives states the
authority to place vending machines at rest areas on the
Interstate Highway System if they chose to do so, however
by doing so a priority must be given to the SLA.
B. In accordance with Section 111(b) of TEA-21, and based
upon litigation of the Randolph-Sheppard Act, 'priority'
requires that SLAs be approached and be given a right of
first refusal before any other entity be approached to
operate such sites.
C. The SLA must waive its right to a priority in writing
before it approaches any other entity to operate machines
at rest areas on the Interstate Highway System.
T. RSA 230:30-a, which excludes the applicability of RSA
186-B:9-15 at rest areas on the Interstate Highways in
New Hampshire, is in direct conflict with Section 111(b)
of TEA-21, because New Hampshire's state-owned rest areas
on the Interstate Highways in New Hampshire are governed
first and foremost by TEA-21, and based upon RSA 230:30-a
the N.H. SLA is not given a priority to operate vending
machines at rest areas, nor does it receive any of the
commissions earned at such rest areas.
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U. RSA 230:30-a is preempted by Section 111(b) of TEA-21.
W. Under RSA 230:30-a, the N.H. SLA is expected to compete
with private vendors, and thus has no priority to operate
vending machines at rest areas on the Interstate Highway
System.
(internal citations omitted)
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