Gulf 95, Inc. v. Lariviere ( 2005 )


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  •                 Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 03-2714
    GULF 95, INC.,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,
    v.
    ROGER LARIVIERE,
    Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    MANDI SARDI
    Third-Party Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
    [Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Lipez and Howard, Circuit Judges.
    Christopher M. Mulhearn, with whom W. Mark Russo and Ferrucci
    Russo P.C. were on brief, for appellant.
    Joseph J. Brodigan, P.C., with whom Brodigan and Gardiner,
    Louis V. Jackvony, Jr. and Jackvony & Jackvony were on brief, for
    appellees.
    February 3, 2005
    Per Curiam.   Gulf 95, Inc. sued Roger Lariviere in Rhode
    Island superior court alleging that he had converted, for his own
    use and benefit, certain valuable property.         Following removal on
    diversity   grounds,   Lariviere    filed   an   answer   and   third-party
    complaint against Nandy Sarda1, the sole owner of Gulf, alleging
    breach of contract and seeking indemnification and contribution.
    Following a bench trial, the district court found in favor of Gulf
    on its conversion claim and rejected Lariviere's claims. The court
    entered judgment against Lariviere in the amount of $164,133.33,
    plus interest.     Lariviere brings this appeal to challenge the
    sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court's damages award.
    In the mid-1980s, Gulf purchased a number of steel and
    aluminum truss assembly systems for use in the construction of
    concrete buildings in Florida.      Each system is composed of either
    steel or aluminum trusses and component parts that allow the
    trusses to be assembled into forms.         When assembled, these forms
    permit a contractor to pour concrete decks on each level of a
    building under construction.       After completion of each floor, the
    forms can be moved up to the next floor with a crane.            These so-
    called “flying forms” eliminate the need to construct concrete
    forms at each level and thus increase the speed of construction
    1
    The third-party defendant, appellee, appears on the district
    court docket, and on our own docket, as “Mandi Sardi.” For the
    purposes of this opinion, however, we adopt the spelling of
    appellee's name reflected in the trial transcript and in appellees'
    brief, “Nandy Sarda.”
    -2-
    while lessening the cost.       As a result, truss assembly systems can
    be quite valuable.
    Gulf    used    its     truss   assembly   systems   to   build
    approximately 20 high-rise buildings during a five year period in
    the late 1980s.   After Gulf discontinued its Florida construction
    operation, the systems were removed, first to a storage site in
    Massachusetts, and subsequently to a site in Rhode Island owned by
    the Flexicore Corporation, a manufacturer of precast concrete slabs
    that, like Gulf, is wholly owned by Nandy Sarda.        The systems were
    stacked on pallets along the rear fence line of the Flexicore
    property and were never again used by Gulf or Flexicore.            Nandy
    Sarda's nephew, Anthony Sarda, prepared a written inventory of the
    truss systems when they arrived at the Flexicore plant in early
    1991.   Included on that inventory were 910 steel trusses, 244
    aluminum trusses, and the necessary component parts (also referred
    to as accessories).      Nandy Sarda's secretary subsequently printed
    an official version of the inventory for record-keeping purposes.
    In 1996, Anthony Sarda hired Lariviere as an independent
    contractor to perform maintenance on forklifts and other equipment
    at the Flexicore plant.         Before Anthony Sarda left Flexicore in
    September 1998, he undertook a second inventory of the truss
    assembly systems.     This second count (which was not reduced to
    writing) confirmed that the 1991 inventory was still accurate.
    -3-
    As Flexicore's operations wound down in the late 1990s,
    Lariviere's duties gradually transformed from that of repairman to
    that of caretaker.     By 1999, Lariviere assumed the role of the
    primary caretaker of the plant and was given access to the entire
    facility.    That same year, Nandy Sarda put the plant up for sale.
    Sarda's real estate agent suggested that, in order to facilitate a
    sale, the large amount of debris and equipment scattered across the
    property be cleared.
    At this point the litigants' stories diverge.          Lariviere
    claims that Nandy Sarda instructed him to clear the property of all
    debris, including the truss assembly systems, and that he and Sarda
    agreed that he could retain the proceeds from the sale of any
    material he could sell for scrap.            Sarda admits that he did
    endeavor to clear the site of debris, but denies having given
    Lariviere authority to scrap or sell any of the systems.             To the
    contrary,   Sarda   contends   that   he   told   Lariviere   on    multiple
    occasions that the systems were valuable and should not be sold or
    scrapped.
    Regardless, Lariviere made arrangements to begin removing
    the truss assembly systems from the property in late spring of
    2000.   He sold the steel trusses to two scrap metal companies and
    many of the aluminum trusses to independent scrap collectors.
    Lariviere collected approximately $10,500 for his efforts.            Sarda,
    who was living in Nevada at the time, was unaware of these
    -4-
    transactions.    Lariviere completed the clean-up of the site in
    December 2000.    By this time, all that remained of the truss
    assembly systems were 30 aluminum trusses.
    In the spring of 2001, Brooks Miner, a broker of concrete
    forms and related construction equipment, contacted Sarda about
    purchasing   Sarda's    truss   assembly     systems.       Although    Sarda
    previously had rebuffed similar overtures from Miner, he agreed
    this time to negotiate a sale and forwarded to Miner the 1991
    inventory.   Based on the inventory, Miner gave Sarda an estimated
    quote, see infra note 3, and then traveled to the Flexicore plant
    to inspect the systems himself.          When he arrived, he found that
    only 30 aluminum trusses remained.           Miner reported to Sarda his
    disappointment that most of the systems on the inventory were
    missing.     He did, however, agree to purchase the 30 aluminum
    trusses for $9,200.2
    Sarda was surprised to learn that the truss assembly
    systems were missing and immediately traveled to Rhode Island to
    inspect the site himself.        When Sarda confronted Lariviere in
    person, Lariviere      acknowledged   that    he   had   sold   many   of   the
    systems' components to various third parties.            Sarda and Lariviere
    attempted to retrieve the systems from those third parties but were
    2
    There was conflicting testimony as to whether Miner paid
    $9,200 or $9,270 for the 30 aluminum trusses.       But because
    Lariviere does not contest the issue, we adopt the $9,200 figure
    found by the district court.
    -5-
    unsuccessful.   This lawsuit ensued and was tried to the district
    court, which concluded that Sarda did not authorize Lariviere to
    scrap the systems; that the trusses were in complete and marketable
    condition at the time that they were scrapped; and that the fair
    market value of the systems at the time they were converted was
    $173,333.33.3   The court subtracted from that sum the $9,200 that
    Gulf had received from Miner for the 30 aluminum trusses and
    entered judgment for Gulf in the amount of $164,133.33, plus
    interest.
    3
    The district court's market value calculation was based upon
    the testimony of Miner. Having been in the business of buying and
    selling similar systems for 43 years Miner was competent to testify
    as to market value. He testified that it is customary to pay a
    percentage of the original purchase price, or list price, when
    buying a used truss assembly system, the discount depending on the
    condition of the equipment and the completeness of the set (i.e.,
    whether the system has all of its component parts).       Before he
    traveled to Rhode Island to inspect Gulf's equipment personally,
    Miner quoted Sarda an estimate of 30 percent of the list price for
    the systems reflected on the 1991 inventory. Miner testified that
    this 30 percent estimate represented the median of the standard
    value range (20 to 40 percent) for truss assembly systems of that
    age. His 30 percent estimate was based on dual assumptions that
    Gulf's systems included a complete set of accessories, and that
    they were in average condition for systems of their age. According
    to Miner, 30 percent of the list price yielded a range of between
    $260,000 and $300,000 for the entire set of Gulf's systems.
    Finding that the trusses had some surface rust, and that the
    accessories were not in good condition, the district court declined
    to use Miner's median estimate of 30 percent of the list price for
    its fair market value calculation. Rather, the court based its
    calculation on the low end of the standard range Miner had
    mentioned in his testimony: 20 percent of the list price. Twenty
    percent of the list price yielded a range of $173,333 to $200,000.
    Again, acknowledging the poor condition of the accessories, the
    court selected the low end of that range, $173,333, as representing
    Gulf's damages.
    -6-
    Lariviere's only developed argument on appeal is that the
    evidence did not support the district court's conclusion as to the
    fair market value of the truss assembly systems at the time they
    were converted in 2000. In pressing this argument, Lariviere makes
    two subsidiary assertions about the state of the evidence before
    the court:    first,     that   the    1991   inventory      provides    the   only
    credible evidence concerning the number of components in the
    systems,   but    that   the    1991   inventory      is   too   far   removed   to
    constitute probative evidence of the completeness of the systems at
    the time of conversion (in 2000); and second, that there was no
    evidence concerning the quality and/or condition of the systems at
    the time   of     conversion.      Because     of    these   evidentiary       gaps,
    Lariviere contends, the court had no basis for concluding that the
    systems had any value beyond their scrap value (established to be
    approximately $10,500) at the time they were converted.
    Lariviere's appeal is built on too stingy a reading of
    the record.      While it is true that the 1991 inventory provides the
    only documentary evidence in the record concerning the number of
    components in Gulf's truss assembly systems, there was no shortage
    of testimonial evidence on this issue.              This testimonial evidence,
    found credible by the court, was sufficient to ground the judgment
    entered. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (factual determinations made at
    a bench trial “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous”);
    United States v. 15 Bosworth St., 
    236 F.3d 50
    , 53 (1st Cir. 2001).
    -7-
    It was not clearly erroneous for the court to credit Anthony
    Sarda's testimony that his 1998 recount confirmed that all of
    Gulf's systems were still present on the property at that time.
    Nor did the court clearly err in choosing to credit Nandy Sarda's
    testimony that he did not observe any changes to the stacks of
    equipment during any of his visits to the plant throughout the
    1990s.    In sum, although Gulf did not provide the court with a
    written year 2000 inventory, there is no reason for us to question
    the court's determination that the systems remained complete up
    until the time they were converted.
    So too with the court's determination that the systems
    were of marketable quality.     On this point, the court reasonably
    credited testimony that Gulf stored the trusses in the customary
    manner:    the steel trusses were treated with baked-on paint to
    avoid rusting (the aluminum trusses were not painted because
    aluminum does not rust) and were stacked on pallets to elevate them
    from the ground.   There was credible testimony that trusses are
    customarily stored outside because of their size and because the
    weather does not ordinarily affect their condition when they are
    painted and stacked properly.    The court also reasonably credited
    the testimony of several witnesses, including the caretaker of the
    premises before Lariviere assumed the job in 1999, who testified
    that the trusses (though not the accessories) appeared to be in
    -8-
    good condition at various times as late as 1999.4      Although the
    court did conclude that the accessories had acquired significant
    rust due to improper storage, the court did not find that the
    accessories were non-functional.    Nor did the evidence compel such
    a finding.    Thus, we see no clear error in the line that the court
    chose to draw:    that the systems were in marketable condition, but
    because the accessories (an important component of the systems)
    were significantly rusted, only at a price at the lowest end of the
    range in which systems of that age ordinarily sell.   See supra note
    3.
    Affirmed.
    4
    These witnesses testified that, to the extent that rust was
    observed on the trusses, it was only surface rust, which the court
    reasonably accepted as being insignificant to the trusses' value.
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-2714

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/3/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024