Zayas v. Commonwealth of PR , 163 F. App'x 4 ( 2005 )

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-2376
JUAN ZAYAS; EVA FRONTERA;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ZAYAS-FRONTERA;
ARIANNA M. ZAYAS-FRONTERA,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO;
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO;
DR. CÉSAR REY,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Gibson, John R.,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, Assistant Solicitor General, with
whom Salvador J. Antonnetti-Stutts, Solicitor General, were on
brief, for appellants.
Alfredo Fernández-Martínez, with whom Delgado & Fernández,
LLP, was on brief, for appellees.
December 21, 2005
*
Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. This appeal concerns the appropriate
educational placement for Arianna M. Zayas-Frontera, a 14-year-old
who suffers from a number of learning and emotional disabilities.
On June 4, 2004, Arianna's parents filed a claim against the
Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
("Department of Education"), contesting the Department's refusal to
enroll Arianna at a private school called Instituto Modelo de
Enseñanza Individualizada ("IMEI"). IMEI, the parents claimed, was
the appropriate placement for Arianna, given her particular
disabilities. The Department of Education, however, responded that
the Antonio S. Pedreira School ("Pedreira School"), a public
institution, was fully capable of meeting Arianna's needs and was
sufficient to satisfy the mandate that disabled children receive a
"free appropriate public education," as outlined in the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)
(A); § 1412(a)(1)(A).
After a bench trial and on-site inspections of both IMEI
and the Pedreira School, the district court held that IMEI was the
proper placement for Arianna for a transitional period of one year.
The court found dispositive the following factors: 1) Arianna's
emotional needs; 2) the unusual circumstance that Arianna had been
out of school for nearly four years; 3) Arianna's need for constant
supervision and an in-school psychologist; 4) her adverse reaction
to an exploratory placement at the Pedreira School; and 5) the fact
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that Arianna had communicated thoughts of hurting herself. In
light of these factors, the court held that it would be impossible
for Arianna to benefit from the opportunities available to students
at the Pedreira School. The court stated that "[o]nce Arianna's
psychological needs are addressed at IMEI, Arianna should be able
to attend a less restrictive school such as the Pedreira School."
The Department of Education here asks us to overturn the
decision of the district court. It again argues that placing
Arianna at the Pedreira School satisfies federal law. This issue
of placement is a mixed question of fact and law, i.e., one
requiring the application of "a legal standard to a particular set
of facts." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450
(1976); Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 990 (1st
Cir. 1990). "Absent a showing that the wrong legal rule was
employed . . . the district court's answer to a mixed fact/law
question is reviewable only for clear error." Roland M., 910 F.2d
at 990. In explaining the "clearly erroneous" standard, the
Supreme Court has stated that "[i]f the district court's account of
the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would
have weighed the evidence differently." Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
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We have reviewed the parties' briefs and the record on
appeal and considered the parties' arguments presented at the oral
argument, and we affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by the
district court in its opinion. We stress, as the district court
did, that Arianna's placement at IMEI is only temporary. It is
designed so that she might "catch up" with her fellow students and
so that she might receive an education that is tailored to her
social, psychological, and educational needs. Since the Department
of Education cannot at the present time provide the "free
appropriate public education" that Arianna requires, we agree with
the district court and hold that the Department of Education is
responsible for all costs associated with Arianna's provisional
placement at IMEI.
Affirmed.
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