United States v. Edelkind ( 2006 )


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  •               United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    Nos. 05-2125, 05-2228
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    JAMIE EDELKIND,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Morris E. Lasker,* Senior U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Boudin, Chief Judge,
    Torruella and Dyk,** Circuit Judges.
    Michael J. Liston, by appointment of the court, for appellant.
    Paul G. Levenson, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, and Kristina E.
    Barclay, Assistant United States Attorney, were on consolidated
    brief for appellee.
    October 31, 2006
    *
    Of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    **
    Of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
    BOUDIN, Chief Judge.        Jamie Edelkind was convicted of
    four counts of bank fraud directed against federally insured banks,
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1344
     (2000),1 and he now appeals.                      The story can be
    briefly told, reserving details for our discussion of specific
    issues       raised   on    appeal.     So    far     as   those    issues    concern
    sufficiency of the evidence, we set forth the facts assuming that
    the jury resolved credibility disputes and drew inferences in the
    government's favor.          United States v. Romero-Carrion, 
    54 F.3d 15
    ,
    17 (1st Cir. 1995).
    Facing bankruptcy in the summer of 2000, Edelkind
    concocted a false resume for his stay-at-home wife Linda, forging
    documents to make her appear to be a well-paid executive in a
    (sham) technology company he called "Apostille, Inc."                     Using the
    forged documents, Edelkind convinced a lender, America's Moneyline
    ("Moneyline"), to extend a mortgage of $800,000 in Linda's name in
    order       to   purchase   the   former     "Honey    Fitz"   mansion       in   Hull,
    Massachusetts.
    1
    Section 1344 makes it unlawful, inter alia, to "knowingly
    execute[], or attempt[] to execute, a scheme or artifice . . . to
    defraud a financial institution . . . ." For reasons explained in
    United States v. Brandon, 
    17 F.3d 409
    , 424 n.11 (1st Cir. 1994),
    the term "financial institution" is read restrictively in light of
    another definition, 
    18 U.S.C. § 20
     (2000), confining the statute's
    reach to certain types of financial institutions including banks
    that are "federally insured."     Brandon, 
    17 F.3d at 424
    .     The
    statute also makes it unlawful to deprive a financial institution
    of property by reason of fraud but the parties have focused upon
    the defrauding provision.
    -2-
    Edelkind then repeatedly refinanced the Hull property for
    larger and larger amounts, each time paying down outstanding
    previous loans and retaining the surplus or "cash out" amount.   He
    persuaded lenders to extend the loans on the basis of false
    representations and fabricated documents, including tax forms,
    showing Linda to be earning from $200,000 to over $1 million per
    year.   Specifically:
    •In September 2001, Edelkind refinanced
    the Hull property by securing a $1 million
    mortgage in Linda's name from South Shore
    Savings Bank ("South Shore"), a federally
    insured lender. He retained $143,781.53 after
    paying down the Moneyline loan.
    •In spring 2002, Edelkind used the
    property as collateral to obtain several home
    equity loans in Linda's name, including a
    $350,000 line of credit from Wells Fargo, a
    federally insured bank.
    •In March 2003, Edelkind refinanced the
    Hull property again, this time with a $2.1
    million    mortgage   in  Linda's   name   from
    Washington Mutual Bank ("Washington Mutual"),
    another federally insured bank. He retained
    $205,370.29 after paying off South Shore,
    Wells Fargo, and other lenders.
    •In August 2004, representing that
    Linda's income was $1.1 million a year,
    Edelkind obtained a $3.3 million loan through
    Fairmont Funding ("Fairmont"), a non-federally
    insured mortgage broker, which funded the loan
    with the approval of Aurora Loan Services
    ("Aurora"), itself a subsidiary of Lehman
    Brothers, a federally insured bank.     Lehman
    Brothers later purchased the loan. Edelkind
    used the proceeds to pay off the Washington
    Mutual loan and an additional $356,242.38 that
    had been run up on the Wells Fargo credit
    -3-
    line, leaving him with $569,878.83 in cash
    surplus.
    Remarkably, the last of these loans was secured after the
    government in March 2004 had filed a three-count information
    charging Edelkind with bank fraud in connection with the loans from
    South Shore, Wells Fargo, and Washington Mutual. In early November
    2004,   Linda   and   her    children    fled   to   Norway.    Approximately
    $273,000 was wired to Norway and $47,000 withdrawn from ATMs in
    Massachusetts and Norway between August and December 2004.
    In February 2005, the government filed a superseding
    information     adding   a   fourth     count   directed   to   the   Fairmont
    transaction and including criminal forfeiture allegations under 
    18 U.S.C. § 981
    (a)(1)(C) (2000) and 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2461
    (c) (West Supp.
    2005) (subsequently amended 2006).            After a jury trial later that
    month, the district court entered a judgment of conviction on each
    of the four counts.      In June, the court forfeited the Hull property
    and two bank checks deemed to be funds derived from the offenses.
    In July, Edelkind was sentenced to 60 months in prison and ordered
    to pay restitution.
    Edelkind's first claim on appeal is that no proper
    verdict of conviction was ever returned by the jury.              Instead of
    having the jury return a written verdict of "guilty" or "not
    guilty" on each count, the district judge submitted to the jury a
    four-part form whose first question asked the jury to say ("yes" or
    "no") whether they "unanimously find that the government has proven
    -4-
    beyond a reasonable doubt that Jamie Edelkind knowingly executed or
    attempted to execute a scheme to defraud" South Shore.      The form
    then asked the same question as to Wells Fargo, Washington Mutual,
    and Fairmont, respectively.
    The jury returned a written verdict of "yes" on all four
    counts.     The judge then asked the foreperson, "As I read your
    verdict, your answer, whether you find the defendant guilty as to
    Count 1, is 'yes'; on Count 2 is 'yes'; on Count 3 is 'yes'; and
    Count 4 is 'yes.'   Am I correct?"   The foreperson responded, "Yes."
    Defense counsel declined the judge's offer to poll the jury and
    also did not inquire whether the jury intended its verdict to be
    one of "guilty" on each count.
    Although we have not adopted a flat rule against special
    interrogatories in criminal cases, they pose special dangers. See,
    e.g., United States v. Spock, 
    416 F.2d 165
    , 182 (1st Cir. 1969)
    (progression of special questions can exert judicial pressure on
    jury). They also sometimes offer benefits, notably in very complex
    criminal cases, where they can reduce risk of juror confusion.
    See, e.g., United States v. Palmeri, 
    630 F.2d 192
    , 202 (3d Cir.
    1980).    The present appeal better illustrates the dangers than the
    benefits.
    Edelkind's broadest claim is that no guilty verdict was
    delivered by the jury on any of the counts.      The form did not in
    terms ask whether Edelkind was guilty, and his appellate counsel
    -5-
    suggests that the foreperson's response when questioned by the
    trial judge was ambiguous.     Counsel posits that the foreperson
    might have meant only that the "yes" lines had been checked--not
    that the jury had intended to find Edelkind "guilty" of the
    offenses specified in the indictment.
    Nothing in the rules requires a written verdict at all.
    See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31.   Here, there was a written verdict which,
    if ambiguous, was clarified when the judge asked whether the
    defendant has been found "guilty" on each count.   The lack of any
    objection when the foreperson answered and the judge proceeded to
    enter a judgment of conviction shows that trial counsel had no
    doubt that the jury had equated its verdict with guilt.   There was
    no error, plain or otherwise, in treating the verdict as one of
    guilty on each count.
    A narrower version of the argument, also made on appeal,
    has more bite.    Edelkind points out that the phrasing of the
    verdict form itself omitted, for each count, an element of the
    statutory offense--specifically, that the defrauded institution be
    one that was federally insured.    This is itself an example of the
    problems with using detailed verdict forms rather than simply
    asking whether the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.
    Nevertheless, we conclude that there was no prejudicial
    error in the omission of the federally insured requirement from the
    verdict form. Special verdicts are not required in criminal cases,
    -6-
    and, when they are used, there is no automatic requirement that a
    special verdict form include every element of the offense so long
    as the jury is instructed as to all elements.           See, e.g., United
    States v. Stonefish, 
    402 F.3d 691
    , 699 (6th Cir. 2005).           Here the
    jury was specifically instructed that they “must be convinced
    beyond a reasonable doubt” of each of the four elements of the
    offense,   including   (as   one   of   the   four   elements)   that   “the
    financial institution in question was federally insured.”
    The defendant's next argument is that the verdict form
    and the jury instructions charged him with defrauding Fairmont and
    not with defrauding Lehman Brothers, and that he could not properly
    be convicted of defrauding Fairmont, which was not a federally
    insured institution. The district court’s initial jury instruction
    (which was given orally but later provided to the jury in written
    form) described count 4 as charging Edelkind with executing “a
    scheme to defraud . . . upon Fairmont Funding, LTD, which [is a]
    financial institution.”      The special verdict form submitted to the
    jury asked, as to count 4, whether the government had proved
    a scheme to defraud Fairmont Funding, LTD in
    connection with a loan . . . originated by
    Fairmont   Funding,  LTD,   and  subsequently
    assigned to Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB.
    Just before the court read the jury instructions and
    provided the jury with the special verdict form, Edelkind filed a
    motion for judgment of acquittal arguing that “Count Four is
    entirely dependant on Fairmont Funding [and] the Government has
    -7-
    failed to prove federal jurisdiction” because Fairmont is not a
    financial institution under 
    18 U.S.C. § 20
    .       The basis for defense
    counsel's motion was that Edelkind had to know that a "financial
    institution" would be the ultimate victim of his fraud.                  The
    district judge rightly found this position to be at odds with
    Brandon, 
    17 F.3d at 425
    , and rejected the motion for acquittal.
    After the instructions were read to the jury, defense
    counsel orally objected to them and to the verdict form on the
    ground   that   Fairmont   was   not   a   financial     institution,    and
    reiterated   his   position   that   Edelkind   needed    to   know   that   a
    "financial institution" would be injured.       The court then provided
    a curative instruction stating that “Lehman Brothers but not
    Fairmont was a financial institution." Since the court had already
    told the jury that a financial institution had to be defrauded or
    deprived of money by fraud,2 the jury was informed that it could
    not convict on the theory that the defendant had defrauded Fairmont
    alone.
    It is quite true that the curative instruction came late
    in the day and apparently Edelkind's counsel did not ask for a
    2
    The instructions required that the jury find that Edelkind
    executed “a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud a financial
    institution or (2) to obtain any of the money . . . under the
    custody or control of a financial institution by means of false or
    fraudulent pretenses.” The court specified that “scheme to defraud
    a financial institution” meant “any deliberate course of conduct by
    which someone intends to deceive or cheat that financial
    institution and to obtain – and intends to obtain something of
    value, such as money.”
    -8-
    transcript page reflecting it to accompany the original written
    instructions sent into the jury room; but the curative instruction
    was virtually the last instruction that the jury heard before
    retiring. Nor was defense counsel entitled to have the jury ignore
    the fraud upon Fairmont; on the government's theory of the case,
    false representations to it were the instrument by which money was
    secured from Lehman Brothers.
    The question then becomes whether the jury was adequately
    advised that it needed to find fraud on Lehman Brothers.           In this
    respect both the verdict form and the instructions were deficient.
    The verdict form made only passing mention of Lehman Brothers as
    having acquired the loan. While the "cured" instructions generally
    required a finding that a financial institution had been defrauded
    and   that    Lehman   Brothers   was   a   financial    institution,   the
    instructions failed to specifically identify Lehman Brothers as
    allegedly defrauded.
    Edelkind did not request revision of the verdict form or
    an instruction that, in order to convict on count 4, the jury had
    to find that Lehman Brothers was defrauded.             Indeed, Edelkind's
    counsel objected (unsuccessfully) to any mention of Lehman Brothers
    in the supplemental instruction. Counsel had good reason to direct
    attention away from Lehman Brothers; but Edelkind was surely on
    notice that the government's own theory of the case was that Lehman
    Brothers had been the victim of the fraud (albeit indirectly)
    -9-
    because the fraud on Fairmont had operated to deprive Lehman
    Brothers of its money.3
    Under these circumstances, we conclude that Edelkind's
    failure to object to the instruction and verdict form as omitting
    Lehman Brothers makes those errors reviewable only for plain error.
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Newton, 
    891 F.2d 944
    , 949
    (1st Cir. 1989).    Edelkind says that trial counsel had a duty to
    object only to mistakes inimical to his client's interest, not to
    ones that would undermine any verdict against his client.            The
    potential of such errors to undermine the verdict is why an
    objection is required at the time--not an excuse for failing to
    make a timely objection.
    Edelkind also says that the errors were "structural,"
    requiring   reversal   without   regard   to   prejudice.    "Structural
    errors" comprise a small category of mistakes so identified by the
    Supreme Court, but generally exclude erroneous jury instructions
    (despite the fact that they "preclud[e] the jury from making a
    finding on the actual element of the offense").             See Neder v.
    United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    , 9-10 (1999) (collecting examples).        The
    error in Neder itself–-the omission of an element of the offense
    3
    For example, at the charge conference, defense counsel
    stated: "And it's the government's view that when a defendant deals
    with somebody like Fairmont Funding . . . and then they happen to
    sell their . . . paper to a federally insured bank like Lehman
    Brothers, that you just assume the risk so-to-speak."
    -10-
    from the instructions-–was not deemed structural; mere lack of
    clarity is clearly a lesser error and not "structural."
    To establish "plain" error, Edelkind must show (1) error,
    (2)   plainness,    (3)    prejudice,     and   (4)   an   outcome    that     is   a
    miscarriage of justice or akin to it.           United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732-37 (1993). The flaws in the initial instructions and
    verdict form were error and only partly corrected as to the former;
    we will assume that any remaining error was plain.                   The problems
    for Edelkind are to show prejudice and miscarriage of justice.
    The banking institutions defrauded in the first three
    counts were federally insured.              As to count 4, the evidence
    (discussed below) amply permitted a reasonable jury to find that
    Lehman Brothers was defrauded. Therefore Edelkind cannot show that
    the   mistakes     probably     altered   the   outcome     or     undermine    our
    confidence in the verdict, United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 81-82 (2004); Olano, 
    507 U.S. at 734
    , let alone constitute
    a miscarriage of justice.
    Turning to the sufficiency of the evidence, Edelkind's
    attack on this ground is directed only to count 4.                 The government
    questions whether his motion for a judgment of acquittal in the
    district court preserved all of the claims he now makes under this
    head.   Because we find that the evidence was sufficient in each of
    the   aspects    raised,   we    bypass   the   waiver     issue    (which   poses
    difficulties of its own).
    -11-
    Section   1344,    as   already    noted,     makes    criminal   the
    knowing execution of a scheme to defraud a federally insured bank.
    See note 1, above.       Neither Fairmont nor Aurora was federally
    insured.     Edelkind   says    that   there    is   no    proof   that   Lehman
    Brothers, although federally insured, was the intended or direct
    victim of his scheme to defraud, and therefore the scheme cannot
    have been one "to defraud a financial institution" as defined by
    Congress.
    The statute says that the scheme to defraud a protected
    financial institution must be "knowingly" executed. In Brandon, 
    17 F.3d at 425
    , this court held that the government does not have to
    show that the defendant knew which particular bank might be injured
    or that it was federally insured.           
    Id. at 426
    .     The statute gives
    fair warning that bank fraud is unlawful: one who defrauds a bank
    simply assumes the risk that the victim is federally insured.                 
    Id.
    The greater difficulty, and the main focus of Edelkind's
    objection, concerns whether Lehman Brothers was in fact defrauded.
    Edelkind secured the count 4 loan from Fairmont, which was not
    federally insured.       But the government offered evidence that
    Fairmont did no more than "table fund" the loan, that is, it agreed
    to make the loan only if another lender first agreed to purchase
    the loan thereafter. The other lender, on the government's theory,
    was Lehman Brothers.
    -12-
    Edelkind argues on appeal that Lehman Brothers was not
    the   victim   of   his    scheme   to    defraud    because   his   fraudulent
    statements about his wife's credentials and earnings never reached
    Lehman   Brothers;    he    says    the   misrepresentations     only    reached
    Aurora, Lehman Brothers' non-federally insured subsidiary.                   So,
    Edelkind says, he never defrauded Lehman Brothers as section 1344
    requires.
    Neither the statute nor the case law fully instructs just
    how tight a factual nexus is required to allow a jury to decide
    that a scheme, formally aimed at one (uninsured) company, operates
    in substance to defraud another (insured) entity with whom the
    defendant has not dealt directly.            In our view the statute does
    apply where the federally insured institution takes part in an
    integrated transaction and is thereby injured by the defendant, who
    intended to defraud another party to the transaction.                   Scienter
    exists, the causal connection is sufficient, and under Brandon the
    defendant cannot escape liability by virtue of his ignorance of the
    overall arrangement.
    Here,    the   government      offered    evidence   that     Lehman
    Brothers' forms and guidelines were used by Fairmont and Aurora in
    table funding the loan, that a Lehman Brothers official (not just
    its subsidiary Aurora) signed off on the loan before Fairmont made
    it, and that Fairmont transferred the loan to Lehman Brothers--not
    to Aurora--about a month after the closing between Edelkind and
    -13-
    Fairmont.    Thus the loan--although formally made by Fairmont--was
    from the outset part of an integrated transaction, the first step
    of which was dependent on approval by Lehman Brothers, and the pre-
    planned second step of which was a transfer of the mortgage to
    Lehman Brothers itself.
    Given these predicates--Edelkind's intent to defraud, the
    integrated transaction, and the financial injury to which Lehman
    Brothers was exposed--the jury was entitled to find that Edelkind
    defrauded   Lehman   Brothers,   a   federally   insured   bank.4   The
    situation would be quite different, and liability might well be
    doubtful, if the involvement of the federally insured entity was
    not contemplated at the outset and came about later from a separate
    transaction, for example, by the happenstance of an insured bank
    purchasing an earlier loan under-secured because of an earlier,
    independent fraud.     We leave such line-drawing for a case that
    poses the issue.
    We turn now to an ancillary order of forfeiture following
    the jury verdict.     In this criminal proceeding, the government
    sought forfeiture, pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 981
    (a)(1)(C) and 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2461
    (c), of the Hull property used in the scheme and of
    $579,805.73 in proceeds traceable to the final loan. Edelkind
    4
    Edelkind says the government offered no proof that Lehman
    Brothers was federally insured on the day that it took over the
    Fairmont loan, but Lehman Brothers was insured when it approved the
    Fairmont loan, thus exposing itself to ultimate loss.
    -14-
    argues that the two forfeiture statutes invoked by the government
    do not allow this forfeiture to be implemented in a criminal
    proceeding, but rather only in a separate civil proceeding.5
    The argument turns upon a difference in the scope of the
    main federal statutes governing civil and criminal forfeitures, 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 981
    , 982, on a bridging statute, 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2461
    (c),
    and on a related factual premise. The civil forfeiture statute, 
    18 U.S.C. § 981
    (a)(1)(C), pertinently subjects to forfeiture any
    property "which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable
    to"   a   violation    of   section     1344;        by   contrast   the   criminal
    forfeiture    statute,      
    18 U.S.C. § 982
    (a)(2)(B),    subjects     to
    forfeiture "any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds
    the person obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of" such
    a violation (emphasis added).
    Edelkind    says     that   the        property   forfeited    here   was
    obtained by his wife and therefore is not property that he ("the
    person") ever obtained.          Therefore, he concludes, the property was
    open to a civil forfeiture action but not a criminal one.                         The
    government answers by saying that the bridging statute, 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2461
    (c), allowed it to rely upon the civil forfeiture provision
    5
    There is good reason to think that Edelkind waived this
    argument at sentencing. When the judge stated that "there is no
    legal question that forfeiture will be required. I haven't heard
    the defense counsel argue to the contrary," defense counsel then
    replied: "I think we are out of it at this point, Your Honor." No
    mention was made of the argument now made on appeal. Nonetheless,
    we reach the merits to resolve the issue definitively.
    -15-
    in the criminal case. The statute, as it stood between 2000 and
    2006, provided (emphasis added):
    If a forfeiture of property is authorized in
    connection with a violation of an Act of
    Congress, and any person is charged in an
    indictment or information with such violation
    but no specific statutory provision is made
    for criminal forfeiture upon conviction, the
    Government may include the forfeiture in the
    indictment or information in accordance with
    the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
    upon conviction, the court shall order the
    forfeiture of the property . . . .
    Edelkind argues that section 2461(c) does not apply in
    this case because a "specific statutory provision is made for
    criminal forfeiture upon conviction," namely, section 982, which
    expressly applies to violations of the bank fraud statute.                The
    government responds that section 982 was not available in this case
    on Edelkind's own premise that the forfeited property was not his
    own, and therefore it could use the bridging statute to enforce
    section 981 in the criminal case.
    Edelkind's best argument is that Congress could not have
    intended   section   2461(c)   to   apply   to   offenses   for   which    it
    deliberately drafted criminal forfeiture provisions narrower in
    scope   than   the   corresponding     civil     forfeiture   provisions.
    Otherwise, section 2461(c) would override the extra limitations
    that Congress imposed in the original criminal forfeiture statute
    (here, the requirement that the defendant personally obtain the
    property forfeited criminally).
    -16-
    The government's response is that section 2461(c), as it
    stood when this case was tried, fills the gap between criminal and
    civil forfeiture by making criminal forfeiture available in every
    criminal case that the criminal forfeiture statute does not reach
    but for which civil forfeiture is legally authorized.            On this
    view, Edelkind's own argument that the criminal statute did not
    reach the property (because it was not his) shows why the civil
    statute is available (because the property was traceable to the
    fraud).
    The case law is of little help. Edelkind cites to United
    States v. Croce, 
    345 F. Supp. 2d 492
    , 496 (E.D. Pa. 2004), but it
    has since been repudiated by the Third Circuit, see United States
    v. Vampire Nation, 
    451 F.3d 189
    , 199 (3d Cir. 2006).       United States
    v. Day, 
    416 F. Supp. 2d 79
    , 86 (D.D.C. 2006), followed Croce but
    United States v. Schlesinger, 
    396 F. Supp. 2d 267
    , 275 (S.D.N.Y.
    2005), came out the other way.
    Neither language nor case law is conclusive, but it seems
    to us that Congress intended for section 2461 to apply in this
    situation.   This intuition is supported by the legislative history
    of the bridging statute itself.         Far from wanting to limit the
    substantive reach of the criminal forfeiture statute, Congress made
    clear in enacting the bridging statute that it hoped to encourage
    the use of criminal forfeiture procedures, with their greater
    protections,   "whenever   any   form    of   forfeiture   is   otherwise
    -17-
    authorized by statute."         H.R. Rep. 105-358(I), 
    1997 WL 677201
     at
    *35-36 (1997).6       Our intuition is further confirmed by Congress'
    later     amendment   that    resolves     doubts   for     the   future   in   the
    government's favor.      See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Authorization
    Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, § 410 (2006).
    Thus, if Edelkind is right that section 982(a)(2) would
    not authorize forfeiture in this case, then "no specific statutory
    provision" provided for criminal forfeiture upon his conviction,
    and   section    2461(c)      authorizes    the     court    to   apply    section
    981(a)(1)(C) to fill the gap.        If Edelkind's premise is wrong and
    section 982(a)(2) would authorize criminal forfeiture in this case,
    then section 2461(c) does not apply--but neither has Edelkind been
    prejudiced by the government's citation error.                See Rule 7(c)(3).
    The last issue on this appeal concerns the calculation of
    Edelkind's sentence.         The sentencing guideline range is driven in
    part by the amount of loss resulting from the offense and in part
    by other factors.      U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b).          Using the 2004 edition of
    the guidelines, the district court determined that Edelkind's
    violations had inflicted a net loss exceeding $1 million--bringing
    the offense level to 23, §2B1.1(a)(1), (b)(1)(I); and that a
    6
    See also H.R. Rep. 106-1048, 
    2001 WL 67919
     at *61 (2001)
    (Congress intended to make criminal forfeiture available "wherever
    federal law allows for civil forfeiture of property involved in a
    specific crime..."); H.R. Rep. 105-358(I) at *35 (stating that the
    purpose of the amendment was to "give the government the option of
    pursuing criminal forfeiture as an alternative to civil forfeiture
    if civil forfeiture is otherwise authorized.").
    -18-
    further two level enhancement (to 25) was required because--in the
    words of the guideline--"the defendant derived more than $1,000,000
    in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions as a
    result of the offense."      
    Id.
     §2B1.1(b)(13)(A).
    At sentencing, the judge proposed to use an offense level
    of 25, and defense counsel began to argue that the net loss was
    under $1 million, which would have substantially reduced the
    offense level; but counsel conceded that if the gross receipts
    enhancement   applied,   the   language   of   section   2B1.1(b)(13)(D)
    prescribed a minimum offense level of 24 regardless of a smaller
    net loss.   The judge, it appears, adopted this solution, departing
    downward slightly in the final sentence.7
    Edelkind does not dispute that he inflicted gross losses
    in excess of $1 million; but he says that the "gross receipts"
    enhancement should not have been applied because the gross receipts
    were derived not by Edelkind, but by his wife--in whose name the
    Hull property had been acquired and to whom the proceeds of the
    refinancing   loans   were   directed.    He   adds   that   a   prenuptial
    agreement with his wife provided that property and assets obtained
    by her were to be and remain her personal property.
    7
    An adjusted offense level of 24, given Edelkind's criminal
    history, corresponded to a range of 63 to 78 months. Because the
    judge thought that the criminal history points overstated
    Edelkind's past wrongdoing, the judge departed downward to the 60-
    month sentence ultimately imposed.
    -19-
    The district court rejected this argument, reading the
    guideline to refer not to a defendant's formal legal control of the
    gross receipts, but instead to his individual culpability.                 The
    district judge stated: "It seems to me that if you procure funds
    for somebody else and the other person gets the advantage of it,
    that your moral responsibility is the same whether you take the
    money or not, particularly if the person you get it for is your
    wife."       We review de novo the meaning of the guideline.         See United
    States v. Alli, 
    444 F.3d 34
    , 37 (1st Cir. 2006).
    What case law exists largely supports a realistic rather
    than     a     formal   approach     to    applying   the   "gross   receipts"
    enhancement.        Several cases support the enhancement where the
    wrongfully obtained funds went to a company controlled by the
    defendant even though the funds were held in the corporation's
    name.        See United States v. Pendergraph, 
    388 F.3d 109
    , 113 (4th
    Cir. 2004) (defendant had controlling interest in company and "thus
    controlled the fraudulently acquired funds"); United States v.
    Stolee, 
    172 F.3d 630
    , 631 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (defendant
    was "the sole owner and president" of the company); United States
    v. Bennett, 
    161 F.3d 171
    , 192-93 (3d Cir. 1998) (defendant had 100%
    interest in company).        Compare       United States v. Colton, 
    231 F.3d 890
    ,    911-12     (4th   Cir.     2000)    (distinguishing   non-controlling
    interest).
    -20-
    To sustain the result in this case, it is enough here to
    hold that the enhancement is not automatically defeated because
    formal ownership of the "gross receipts" is in another.                Rather,
    given its aim, the guideline may be applied where the defendant
    either     controls   (even   though      indirectly)   the   fraud   proceeds
    attributed to him or where he causes them to be lodged in another
    with the expectation that he will enjoy the benefits.               Whether any
    lesser showing would suffice need not be decided.
    This reading distinguishes property that goes solely to
    a co-conspirator and, on the affirmative side, it charges the
    defendant with proceeds that he controls or enjoys.             Such proceeds
    can, as a matter of language, be regarded as individually derived
    by the defendant.     Given the guideline's concern with culpability,
    this reading makes far more sense than making the guideline turn
    solely upon formal ownership under state marital or real property
    law.
    United States v. Castellano, 
    349 F.3d 483
    , 485-87 (7th
    Cir. 2003), relied upon by Edelkind, is arguably sound on its own
    facts and easily distinguishable.           There the defendant had founded
    the company holding the proceeds but did not own any stock; and
    only a modest portion ($200,000) of what the fraud netted the
    company could be traced through to the defendant's compensation.
    So   far   as   Castellano    is   read   to   make   state   law   formalities
    -21-
    conclusive, it would conflict with the realistic approach taken by
    other circuits, which we follow here.
    The pre-sentence report notes that "[w]ith the borrowed
    money, Edelkind... financed a lavish lifestyle for himself and his
    family."     Although Edelkind objected to certain details in the
    report's assertion, the thrust of the report is supported by other
    evidence and reasonable inference.      Thus, the record confirms that
    Edelkind enjoyed the fruits of the scheme to defraud, and having
    masterminded the scheme and enjoyed benefits from it, Edelkind
    himself "derived" the illegal loan proceeds within the terms of the
    guideline.
    Edelkind next says that the $1 million gross receipts
    figure can be met only if the Fairmont loan proceeds are included--
    it being the largest of refinancings–and that they should not be
    included because under section 2B1.1(b)(13)(A) of the guidelines,
    the receipts exceeding $1 million must be derived "from one or more
    financial institutions" (emphasis added).        As noted, Fairmont was
    not a financial institution within the meaning of section 1344.
    However,   the   guideline   has    its   own   definition   of
    "financial institution" which includes "any state or foreign bank,
    trust company, credit union, insurance company, investment company,
    mutual fund, savings (building and loan) association, union or
    employee pension fund;... and any similar entity, whether or not
    insured by the federal government."           §2B1.1 Application Note 1
    -22-
    (emphasis added).          In other words, it is the character of the
    institution     and    not     federal       insurance     that    matters      to    the
    guideline.
    Fairmont was described by its witness at trial as "a
    mortgage bank, mortgage lender" and referred to in its affidavit as
    a "licensed private mortgage lender." Edelkind offers us no reason
    to   think   that    Fairmont       falls    outside    the     circle    of   "similar
    entities," and the case law confirms a broad interpretation.
    United States v. Ferrarini, 
    219 F.3d 145
    , 161 (2d Cir. 2000)
    ("premium finance company" is within the application note); see
    also   Brandon,       
    17 F.3d at 426
          (using   the     term    "financial
    institution" colloquially to include uninsured mortgage brokers).
    Finally, Edelkind points to an apparent computational
    error in determining the amount of net loss from his frauds--the
    figure that drove the initial determination of his offense level
    (before the gross receipts enhancement).                        The district court
    calculated    the     gross    amount       of   the   frauds    and   then,     as   the
    guideline provides, subtracted the present value of the mortgaged
    Hull property, which remained available to offset the losses.
    U.S.S.G. §2B1.1 Application Note 3(E).
    In calculating the value of the Hull property, the
    district     judge    picked    a    figure      between   the    widely       differing
    estimates offered by the government and by Edelkind.                       Well after
    sentencing, it emerged from a newly discovered memorandum that--in
    -23-
    making his own calculation--the district judge had apparently
    adopted a final net loss figure $500,000 higher than he had
    intended. At sentencing, counsel knew the final figure adopted but
    not the judge's private miscalculation.
    The time for correcting the sentence had passed, Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 35(a), and this appeal had already been lodged with this
    court.    The district judge said at a post-sentencing conference
    concerning the calculation error that he would leave the matter to
    this court, which could remand, if necessary.              The judge said that
    he was not prepared to say whether use of the lower net loss figure
    he had intended would have made any difference to the sentence.
    It is clear that the error did not matter.            The district
    court    used   an   offense   level   of     24   in   determining   Edelkind's
    sentence before departing downward.                As already explained, the
    gross receipts enhancement prescribed a minimum offense level of 24
    regardless of the net loss.        §2B1.1(b)(13)(D).         Edelkind concedes
    in his brief that "[i]f the §2B1.1(b)(13) enhancement applies"--as
    we have found that it does--"the offense level would rise to 24 in
    both cases."     Thus, the net loss figure, whether in error or not,
    had no ultimate effect on the sentence.
    Affirmed.
    -24-