Rossello-Gonzalez v. Vega-Gutierrez ( 2007 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 06-1448, 06-1449, 06-1450
HON. PEDRO J. ROSSELLÓ-GONZÁLEZ; LUIS FORTUÑO; MIRIAM RAMÍREZ;
NANETTE GUEVARA; ARNOLD GIL-CARABALLO; LARRY SEILHAMER;
JOSÉ SÁNCHEZ; JUAN F. RAMÍREZ; JAVIER RODRÍGUEZ-HORTA,
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
ANÍBAL ACEVEDO-VILÁ; AURELIO GRACIA-MORALES, individually
and in his capacity as President of the Puerto Rico Electoral
Commission; GERARDO A. CRUZ, individually and in his capacity
as a member of the Puerto Rico Electoral Commission;
THE PUERTO RICO ELECTORAL COMMISSION, a/k/a
The Commonwealth Election Commission,
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
SILA MARÍA CALDERÓN, Mayor, individually and in her
capacity as Governor of Puerto Rico;
THE INCOMING GOVERNMENT TRANSITION COMMITTEE,
Defendants/Cross-Appellees,
THOMAS RIVERA-SCHATZ, individually and in his capacity as a
member of the Puerto Rico Electoral Commission; JUAN DALMAU-
RAMÍREZ, individually and in his capacity as a member of
the Puerto Rico Electoral Commission,
Defendants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Selya, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Pedro E. Ortiz-Álvarez,
Johanna M. Emmanuelli-Huertas, and Law Offices Pedro Ortiz-Álvarez
were on brief, for appellants/cross-appellees.
James F. Hibey, with whom Romeo S. Quinto, Jr., Howrey LLP,
Luis Berríos-Amadeo, Special Counsel, and Cancio, Nadal, Rivera &
Díaz were on brief, for appellees/cross-appellants.
Susana I. Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General,
Department of Justice, with whom Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts,
Solicitor General, Mariana D. Negrón-Vargas, Deputy Solicitor
General, and Maite D. Oronoz-Rodríguez, Deputy Solicitor General,
were on brief, for cross-appellee Sila María Calderón.
March 13, 2007
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. The main issue in this case is
whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
award attorneys' fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ("[T]he court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs
. . . ." (emphasis added)). After careful consideration, we
determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and
we affirm the denial of attorneys' fees to both parties.
Background
On November 2, 2004, a general election was held in
Puerto Rico, pitting Pedro J. Rosselló-González and Luis Fortuño,
candidates on the New Progressive Party ticket for Governor and
Resident Commissioner, against Aníbal Acevedo-Vilá and Roberto
Prats-Palerm, candidates on the Popular Democratic Party ticket.1
After the balloting was conducted, a series of disputes arose
between the parties as to the procedures for issuing and counting
absentee ballots, whether a general recount should be conducted,
and whether certain ballots known as "three-mark split" ballots
should be counted. A more detailed description of these claims may
be found in our first opinion in this case, Rosselló-González v.
Calderón-Serra, 398 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004).
1
Rubén Berríos-Martínez and Edwin Irizarry-Mora were also
candidates for Governor and Resident Commissioner under the Puerto
Rico Independence Party ticket.
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On November 10, Rosselló-González and others (the
"Plaintiffs")2 filed suit against then-Governor Sila María
Calderón-Serra, Acevedo-Vilá, and others (the "Defendants")3
alleging constitutional violations arising out of the conduct of
the election. Specifically, Plaintiffs asked for a preliminary and
permanent injunction ordering Defendants (1) to perform a full
recount of all of the votes cast in the general election, (2) to
ensure that all persons who had requested absentee ballots had
received them, and to count all absentee ballots received within
thirty days of the injunction, (3) to set a uniform standard for
treatment of split ballots, and (4) to refrain from spending any
money on the transition before the recount was completed. On
November 23, the district court ordered that all of the ballots be
recounted and that the disputed "three-mark split" ballots be
segregated and not adjudicated.
Defendants brought an interlocutory appeal of the
district court's recount order. We issued our opinion on
December 15, 2004.4 Id. We ruled that "the Rosselló complaint
2
The Plaintiffs also include Fortuño, as well as voters who cast
regular ballots in the election and voters who cast absentee
ballots.
3
The Defendants also include the Puerto Rico Electoral Commission
(the "CEC"), Aurelio Gracia-Morales (president of the CEC), Gerardo
A. Cruz, Thomas Rivera-Schatz, Juan Dalmau-Ramírez (members of the
CEC), and the Incoming Government Transition Committee (a
government entity).
4
The opinion was corrected on January 28, 2005.
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alleges the violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right, and
thus, presents a colorable claim under § 1983 for subject-matter
jurisdiction purposes." Id. at 15. Nevertheless, we held that
Plaintiffs' case "presents even less cause for federal
intervention" than in prior cases where we abstained from
intervening. Id. at 18. Accordingly, we vacated the preliminary
injunction and ordered the district court to dismiss with prejudice
all of Plaintiffs' claims "relating to the adjudication of the
three-mark ballots, and all claims relating to the simultaneous
general canvass/recount issue." Id. We also dismissed without
prejudice the claims relating to the absentee ballots and Puerto
Rico Law 197. Id.
Both parties moved for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, and Defendants requested attorneys' fees as a sanction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The district court referred the matter to
a magistrate judge, who issued a report and recommendation denying
Plaintiffs' fees and granting Defendants' fees. Plaintiffs filed
an objection to the adoption of the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation. The district court agreed with the magistrate
judge that Plaintiffs were not prevailing parties and thus were not
entitled to legal fees. However, the district court found that the
absentee ballot claim presented an "enfranchisement claim" that
might be recognized as justiciable under Partido Nuevo Progresista
v. Barreto Pérez, 639 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1980), and that Plaintiffs
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received substantial relief on this claim, albeit not backed by
judicial imprimatur. Furthermore, the district court found that
Plaintiffs had a colorable claim under Puerto Rico law to a
simultaneous recount and canvass, and that such a claim could have
been brought under the supplemental jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367. Additionally, the district court noted that a claim that
the split ballots were adjudicated inconsistently (as Plaintiffs
had initially alleged) might have been a valid claim under Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), but that after the litigation commenced,
it appeared that the ballots would be adjudicated consistently.
Accordingly, the district court found that Plaintiffs had stated
colorable, non-frivolous claims, and as such, Defendants were not
entitled to attorneys' fees.
Discussion
We review an award of attorneys' fees for "manifest abuse
of discretion, and 'a reviewing court customarily defers to the
trial judge, whose intimate knowledge of the nuances of the
underlying case uniquely positions him to construct a condign
award.'" Díaz-Rivera v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 377 F.3d 119, 124 (1st
Cir. 2004) (quoting Gay Officers Action League v. Puerto Rico, 247
F.3d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 2001)).
We begin by addressing Plaintiffs' request for attorneys'
fees. Section 1988 states that a plaintiffs may be entitled to
attorneys' fees in the discretion of the district court only if he
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or she is a "prevailing party." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A party is
a prevailing party "when actual relief on the merits of his claim
materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by
modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits
the plaintiff." Gay Officers Action League, 247 F.3d at 293.
Furthermore, the change in legal relationship must be brought about
by "judicial imprimatur." Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. W.
Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001). The
district court found that Plaintiffs were not prevailing parties
because they did not receive any final relief backed by judicial
imprimatur.
Plaintiffs claim that they received some actual relief on
their claims when the district judge issued orders asserting
jurisdiction over the absentee ballots and directing Defendants to
perform a recount by counting all ballots but segregating and not
adjudicating the disputed three-mark split ballots. However, we
later reversed the judgment of the district court and dismissed all
of Plaintiffs' claims. Rosselló-González, 398 F.3d at 18 ("We
VACATE the issuance of the preliminary injunction with the
direction that the District Court dismiss with prejudice all claims
in the Rosselló complaint relating to the adjudication of the
three-mark ballots, and all claims relating to the simultaneous
general canvass/recount issue. The District Court is also directed
to dismiss without prejudice the claims relating to the absentee
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ballots, and any alleged violations of Puerto Rico Law 197."). It
is clear that where an appellate court has reversed a district
court's rulings in favor of plaintiffs and has dismissed their
case, such plaintiffs cannot be "prevailing part[ies]" because any
relief they obtained lacks judicial imprimatur. See, e.g., Altman
v. Bedford Central Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2001)
("[G]iven our reversal of the district court's rulings in favor of
plaintiffs on their First Amendment claims, the district court's
award of attorneys' fees to them as 'prevailing parties' must also
be reversed." (citation omitted)); Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch.
Activities Assoc., 103 F.3d 720, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1997) ("A
plaintiff cannot qualify as a prevailing party if the only basis
for his claim of success on the merits is a judgment that has been
reversed on appeal."). Although Plaintiffs initially received some
injunctive relief from the district court, our later vacation of
that injunction and dismissal of all claims precludes Plaintiffs
from now claiming to be "prevailing parties" for the purposes of 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). Although Plaintiffs argue that they nevertheless
obtained relief when Defendants changed their position on the
absentee ballot and recount issues, those positions were not the
result of judicial imprimatur. As such, the district court was
correct to deny attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs.
We now come to Defendants' request for attorneys' fees.
Prevailing defendants in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-8-
may be granted attorneys' fees only "upon a finding that the
plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith."
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978); see
also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-16 (1980) (applying the
Christiansburg Garment Co. standard to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case).
"In determining whether this standard has been met, the court must
assess the claim at the time the complaint was filed, and must
avoid the post-hoc reasoning that, because the plaintiff did not
ultimately prevail, the claim must have been frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation." Tang v. Dep't of Elderly
Affairs, 163 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1998). Even if the Plaintiffs'
action was frivolous, it is within the discretion of the district
court to deny fees. Id. at 15 ("[T]he district court still retains
discretion to deny or reduce fee requests after considering all the
nuances of a particular case."). The district court found that
Plaintiffs' action was not frivolous, and thus exercised its broad
discretion to not award attorneys' fees.
We have often said that a district court is best placed
to evaluate attorneys' fees requests; the district judge who
presided over the case has "intimate knowledge of the nuances of
the underlying case" which "uniquely positions him" to determine
whether a prevailing defendant is entitled to a fee award. Gay
Officers Action League, 247 F.3d at 292. We may overturn the
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denial of attorneys' fees to defendants only if "it clearly appears
that the trial court ignored a factor deserving significant weight,
relied upon an improper factor, or evaluated all the proper factors
(and no improper ones), but made a serious mistake in weighing
them." Id. at 292-93.
Here, the district court properly reviewed all of the
factors in this case. It evaluated the state of the Supreme Court
and First Circuit precedent at the time that Plaintiffs filed their
complaint, looked to the nature and quality of allegations in their
complaint, and appraised the quantum of evidence they submitted.
Defendants can point to no additional factor that the district
court should have considered. Furthermore, Defendants do not
identify any factor that was improperly considered. Defendants do,
however, contend that existing precedent at the time Plaintiffs'
case was filed did in fact preclude or limit the potential for
success on a number of their claims, and that this was an "improper
weighing" of the factors.
Even if Defendants can show that some of Plaintiffs'
claims could be construed as unmeritorious, this does not show that
the district court abused its discretion in finding that the
complaint as a whole was not frivolous, and that in any event,
attorneys' fees were not warranted in this case. To reverse for
manifest abuse of discretion, Defendants must show something other
than disagreement with the ultimate conclusion of the district
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court. See Cottrill v. Sparrow, Johnson & Ursillo, Inc., 100 F.3d
220, 227 (1st Cir. 1996) ("If writing on a pristine page, we might
have weighed the mix of factors differently -- but that is beside
the point. Absent a mistake of law or a clear error in judgment --
neither of which is evident here -- we must defer to the trial
court's first-hand knowledge and to its battlefield determination
that the specific facts of this case do not warrant a fee award.").
Accordingly, we can discern no abuse of discretion committed by the
district court in denying attorneys' fees under § 1988 to
Defendants.
Finally, defendants suggest that they are also entitled
to attorneys' fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A district court is
permitted to award fees when an attorney "multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927. As with a petition for fees under § 1988, "we accord
extraordinary deference to a district court's decision to deny
sanctions." McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A. v.
Rechberger, 280 F.3d 26, 44 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). As such, we review the district
court's decision to deny attorneys fees under § 1927 for abuse of
discretion.
The district court correctly identified the proper legal
standard to be applied in this case: § 1927 sanctions may be
awarded when "an attorney's conduct in multiplying proceedings is
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unreasonable and harassing or annoying." Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d
626, 632 (1st Cir. 1990). Thus, a party may be penalized under
§ 1927 only when it displays a "serious and studied disregard for
the orderly process of justice." United States v. Nesglo, Inc.,
744 F.2d 887, 891 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Kiefel v. Las Vegas
Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968)).
The district court did not explicitly state why it was
denying attorneys' fees under § 1927. However, "while we have
encouraged district courts to give reasons for denying sanctions,
we have not required them to do so" if the reasons for denying
sanctions are apparent from the record. McLane, Graf, Raulerson &
Middleton, 280 F.3d at 45. Here, the record supports an implicit
finding that Plaintiffs did not vexatiously multiply the
proceedings. Plaintiffs filed a complaint and later amended it.
Plaintiffs and Defendants proceeded to argue vigorously for and
against the relief sought. There is no allegation, for example, of
duplicative motions being filed or repeated refusals to comply with
court orders. To the contrary, most of Defendants' arguments for
sanctions under § 1927 are based on the alleged frivolity of
Plaintiffs' complaint, arguments which go mainly to Defendants'
request for attorneys' fees under § 1988, not under § 1927.
Accordingly, we do not find that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Defendants' request for § 1927 sanctions
against Plaintiffs and/or their attorneys.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. All parties shall bear their own costs.
Affirmed.
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