United States v. Perez-Perez ( 2013 )


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  •                 Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 12-1321
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    JOSÉ RAFAEL PÉREZ-PÉREZ,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Selya and Lipez,
    Circuit Judges.
    Luis A. Guzmán Dupont on brief for appellant.
    Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Nelson
    Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
    Division, and Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney,
    on brief for appellee.
    March 15, 2013
    Per Curiam.    Law enforcement officials in Puerto Rico
    designed a sting operation to ensnare corrupt police officers who
    were providing protection services to drug dealers.              Defendant-
    appellant José Rafael Pérez-Pérez was caught in this net.            A jury
    convicted   him   on   three   counts   charging   conspiracy,   attempted
    distribution of drugs, and possession of a firearm in relation to
    a drug-trafficking crime.        See 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846; 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A); see also 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    .
    The appellant now prosecutes a rifle-shot appeal, in
    which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
    these convictions.     See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.     He contends that the
    evidence is insufficient for a rational jury to find that he knew
    he was going to participate in a drug transaction.               He points
    principally to his own testimony — that he only agreed to provide
    armed protection to a transaction of diamonds or jewels — in
    support of this argument.
    The standard of review applicable to an appellant who
    moves for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 at the close of
    evidence is daunting. We must take the evidence and all reasonable
    inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government.
    United States v. Singh, 
    222 F.3d 6
    , 8 (1st Cir. 2000).           As part of
    this tamisage, we must assume the credibility of all testimony
    favorable to the government. See United States v. Fenton, 
    367 F.3d 14
    , 18 (1st Cir. 2004).         Here, moreover, the appellant failed
    -2-
    properly to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal; thus, an
    even higher obstacle looms.     We will reverse his convictions only
    if the verdict threatens to work a clear and gross injustice.       See
    United States v. Hicks, 
    575 F.3d 130
    , 139 (1st Cir. 2009).
    The appellant cannot overcome either standard of review.
    Taking the testimony of the government's principal witnesses,
    Héctor Cotto-Rivera and Héctor López-Terrón, as true — as we must
    — the evidence suffices to permit the jury to find each and every
    element of the offenses of conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Specifically, the evidence permits the jury to find that the
    appellant knew that he was involved in a drug transaction.          The
    testimony of the government's witnesses reveals that the appellant
    was   specifically   informed   that    he   would   guard   a   cocaine
    transaction.    In addition, the video recordings presented by the
    government reveal that packages resembling cocaine were within the
    direct view of the appellant, who stood in close proximity while
    the packages were inspected by the purported drug buyer.         No more
    is exigible to reject the appeal.
    We need go no further.      The judgment of the district
    court is summarily affirmed.    See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
    Affirmed.
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-1321

Filed Date: 3/15/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014