United States v. Aherndt , 560 F.3d 69 ( 2009 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1254
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM AHRENDT,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Meritt,* and Howard,
Circuit Judges
David A.F. Lewis for appellant.
Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Paula D. Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
March 19, 2009
*
Of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. William Ahrendt1 challenges his
cocaine conspiracy conviction and 210-month sentence. He alleges
that the district court committed two errors at trial: declining
to order a reevaluation of his competency and excluding evidence of
a psychological evaluation. He also alleges that the court
committed two errors at sentencing by applying a leadership
enhancement and by failing to treat certain prior offenses together
when evaluating his criminal history.
I. Background
The following background facts on Ahrendt's role in the
cocaine conspiracy were elicited at Ahrendt's trial.
During the relevant time, Ahrendt lived in Bangor, Maine,
in an apartment from which he allowed others to "come and go." He
sold drugs out of his apartment, and provided drugs for people to
use while in his apartment. In November 2003, he met Sandra Hurd,
who took advantage of Ahrendt's "very high clientele" to "set up
shop" in his apartment selling drugs. Hurd solicited two other
individuals, Randy Brimley and Kelvin Deloatch, for the operation.
Hurd, Brimley and Deloatch were generally responsible for bringing
multiple shipments of cocaine per week from Massachusetts to
Bangor, Maine.2
1
This appeal is captioned "United States v. Aherndt," but we will
spell appellant's surname as he spelled it at trial: Ahrendt.
2
Other individuals were active in the conspiracy, but their roles
are not relevant here.
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On arrival in Bangor, some of the cocaine would be taken
to Ahrendt's apartment, although most of it was stored elsewhere in
Bangor. If there was not enough cocaine at Ahrendt's apartment,
someone other than Ahrendt would be dispatched to another location
in Bangor to replenish supplies. In Ahrendt's apartment, the
cocaine was weighed, packaged and sold to buyers who would come to
the apartment. Ahrendt was one of the people who would weigh the
cocaine. He was also one of the sellers, although Deloatch sold
the lion's share. In addition, some of the powder cocaine was
cooked into crack cocaine in the apartment. Brimley did most of
the cooking, although Ahrendt also cooked small quantities of
powder into crack. If either Deloatch or Brimley were present, one
of them would take money from the drug sales to store it elsewhere
in Bangor; if not, Ahrendt would hold the money until Deloatch or
Brimley arrived.
At his trial, Ahrendt acknowledged that he used drugs
himself, sold drugs, and gave drugs to other people. He also
acknowledged that he weighed cocaine with his own scales, packaged
it, and cooked powder cocaine into crack. He testified, however,
that he was not part of the conspiracy, that he was an "outsider"
and "kept in . . . the dark." He testified that he "didn't have
any specific arrangements with these individuals . . . . They came
and went, just like everybody else that came in my door."
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Several months of police investigation culminated in the
arrest of seven people, including Ahrendt, in April 2004. After
Ahrendt's arrest and his pre-trial incarceration at Fort Devens,
Massachusetts, issues arose as to his competency to stand trial.
On motion of his counsel, Ahrendt was evaluated by a forensic
psychologist on staff at Fort Devens who submitted a written report
to the court. This report relied on Ahrendt's mental health
records from both the Bangor Mental Health Institute (BMHI) and
from Acadia Hospital in Bangor, as well as on interviews with
Ahrendt.
Ahrendt had been hospitalized at BMHI from December 2001
to April 2002. He was treated for symptoms including suicidal
impulses, poor concentration and disorganized thoughts; treated
with antidepressants and an antipsychotic drug; and given multiple
diagnoses (Major Depressive Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
and Antisocial Personality Disorder). Between 2002 and 2004,
Ahrendt was treated on an outpatient basis at Acadia Hospital in
Bangor for "mood alterations, vague complaints of auditory
hallucinations, and multiple suicide threats." He was further
diagnosed with Major Depression, Recurrent, With Psychotic
Features; History of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Not Otherwise
Specified; and Personality Disorder with Histrionic and
Narcissistic Features. He was treated with a variety of
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psychotropic medications. Neither set of records discussed
Ahrendt's substance use.
The report posited that because Ahrendt was using drugs
during the pendency of his prior hospitalizations, his "degree of
drug use could possibly explain" the symptoms reported in his
medical records. The report concluded by diagnosing Ahrendt with
Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified and with substance
use-related diagnoses, but noted that these diagnoses did not
"appear to be impairing his level of functioning to consult with
his attorney or make rational decisions regarding his legal
matters."
After the submission of the report, the district court
held a competency hearing in January 2005. At that hearing, the
report was admitted into evidence without objection.3 The court
also engaged in a discussion with Ahrendt about his competency,
asking if he understood what was happening and explaining the legal
standard for competency in response to Ahrendt's questions. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled Ahrendt competent to
stand trial, pledging to "remain diligent regarding [the
competency] issue during the course of any further proceedings."
3
Defense counsel mentioned that Ahrendt disagreed with some of
the specific statements that Ahrendt had allegedly made to the
psychologist, but acknowledged that those statements did not affect
the conclusions in the report.
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At around this time, Ahrendt began sending letters to the
court. The letters expounded upon Ahrendt's personal philosophy
and view of the justice system.4 At an April 2005 hearing on an
unrelated issue, the court commented that "the letters could be
interpreted as threatening." Ahrendt's counsel responded that the
letters were not threatening, and that Ahrendt was "a person who
just lives in a different world than the rest of us."
At a May 2005 hearing on a request for a continuance,
Ahrendt's counsel reported that his client had been evaluated by
mental health professionals and in counsel's opinion, "there are
some serious problems there." At a July hearing on counsel's
motion to withdraw, which was denied, the court questioned Ahrendt
about his relationship with counsel. Ahrendt stated, "it basically
comes down to, sir, [that] your law stands against my beliefs, and
I'd like to represent my beliefs against your law, and that's it.
My law stands for love, and yours stands against the Almighty God,
and that's the battle." Ahrendt explained that he wanted to
4
We present a representative sampling of excerpts from Ahrendt's
letters. More than thirty letters were filed with the district
court between April 2005 and January 2007.
(1) "Follow your way sir and impose your justice. I hope your
soul was worth it!"
(2) "I liked our chat in your room of truth. I desire, and
would appreciate if we could do it again?"
(3) "I have already shown the Truth of you and your kind and
of what is it. HAHAHA! This Trial is 'you' nailing 'your' own
coffin shut. For Real. You seem to believe you are what makes up
Reality, the Truth. NOT! Wow, what a lust sir."
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"change [the justice] system" and asked the court, "Why don't you
help me do what I'm trying to accomplish?"
As trial approached, Ahrendt's counsel filed a notice of
intent to introduce as expert evidence the testimony of clinical
psychologist Dr. Jeffrey Aston. Based on interviews with Ahrendt,
Dr. Aston had prepared testimony that agreed with the Fort Devens
Report that Ahrendt was "technically competent," and offered
further explanation of Ahrendt's point of view and behavior.
[Ahrendt] is obviously given to a peculiar
turn of mind which interprets everything in
terms of a highly abstracted philosophy of
life . . . . In Mr. Ahrendt's view, the world
consists of persons who are motivated either
by negative selfishness ("Lust") or positive
altruism ("Love"). For him, drug use
resembles an almost sacramental consumption of
what the "Divine" Lovingly provides us, while
society's war on drugs is a misguided Lust to
control what others do.
The government filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude this
testimony. The court agreed with the government and ruled the
proffered testimony inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403,
explaining that the testimony had "a significant potential for
confusing and misleading the jury and causing unfair prejudice."
The court noted that such testimony might invite jury
nullification, stating, "[t]he sincerity of Mr. Ahrendt's belief
that he is entitled to the 'sacramental consumption' of drugs is
not properly before the Court."
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Several weeks before trial, the court permitted Ahrendt
to waive his right to counsel and represent himself, with his
former counsel serving as standby counsel. At this time, his
counsel had expressed concern that Ahrendt would not pursue a
sensible defense strategy. The court specifically asked if counsel
was requesting a reevaluation of Ahrendt's competency, and counsel
replied that he could not make such a request "in good faith."
At trial in September 2005, Ahrendt cross-examined the
government's witnesses, eliciting testimony bearing on the
credibility of at least one witness, and made a successful hearsay
objection. Ahrendt also testified in his own defense. Despite his
efforts, the jury convicted Ahrendt of conspiracy to distribute,
and to possess with the intent to distribute, both cocaine and
cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 & 841(a)(2).
In the presentence investigation report ("PSR") prepared
for Ahrendt's sentencing, he was given a two-level leadership
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for his role in the
conspiracy. The resulting offense level was thirty-four. The PSR
also listed four prior convictions. Although Ahrendt had been
sentenced for three of those offenses on the same day, and the
three offenses had occurred within one week of each other and had
similar characteristics, each conviction was counted separately, as
a "prior sentence" under § 4A1.2(a)(2). Ahrendt was accordingly
awarded eight criminal history points, putting him in Criminal
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History Category ("CHC") IV. See § 4A1.1 (two points awarded for
each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days).
Ahrendt's Guidelines Sentencing Range ("GSR"), based on an offense
level of thirty-four and a CHC of IV, was 210 - 262 months.
The court remarked at the commencement of the sentencing
hearing in January 2006 that it wanted to be as fair as possible to
Ahrendt, who responded, "Let me go home?" When Ahrendt was asked
if he objected to any of the findings, he stated that he objected
to "[t]he whole thing." The district court responded, "Defendant's
objection is noted and overruled" and the findings of the PSI were
adopted. Ahrendt was sentenced to the low end of the GSR, 210
months' imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release.
The court asked Ahrendt if he had any specific objection to those
terms, to which Ahrendt responded, "Disrespect is disrespect.
That's all right." The court stated, "To the extent that is
interpreted as an objection, the objection's overruled."
On appeal, Ahrendt argues that the district court erred
in declining to order a reevaluation of his competency. He also
claims error in the court's exclusion, under Fed. R. Evid. 403, of
the psychological evaluation prepared by Dr. Aston. Ahrendt also
alleges sentencing errors in both the leadership enhancement and
the separate counting of his prior convictions.
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II. Discussion
A. Competency
A district court's competency determination, made after
a hearing on the defendant's competency to stand trial, will be
upheld unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Lebrón, 76 F.3d
29, 32 (1st Cir. 1996).
Ahrendt argues that despite the court's finding at the
competency hearing in January 2005 that he was in fact competent to
stand trial, later events cast sufficient doubt on that conclusion
such that the court should have ordered a reevaluation.
Determining competency to stand trial involves an inquiry
into whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). The obligation to
determine competency to stand trial is continuing, and persists
throughout a proceeding including through the sentencing phase.
See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975) ("Even when a
defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial
court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change
that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of
competence to stand trial.") A court must order a competency
hearing on motion from either the defense or the government, or sua
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sponte, "if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant
may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable
to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist properly in his defense." 18 U.S.C. §
4241 (emphasis added).
Ahrendt points specifically to two sets of communications
-- statements made by his counsel throughout the proceedings, and
Ahrendt's own statements and letters -- that he maintains
demonstrated the need for a reevaluation of his competency.
Ahrendt points to his counsel's statements that "[Ahrendt] is a
person who just lives in a different world than the rest of us" and
"there are some serious problems there," and also cites comments at
a September 2005 hearing reflecting concern over Ahrendt's defense
strategy. In addition Ahrendt argues that his own statements
indicate both that he was not fully aware of the nature of his
trial and sentencing, and that he was generally divorced from
reality. He cites his request that the trial court help him
accomplish his goal of changing the justice system, his comment at
his sentencing "Let me go home?" and the letters that he continued
to send to the court.
Neither counsel's statements nor Ahrendt's own statements
reach the "reasonable cause" threshold to require a sua sponte
hearing. Although defense counsel has a "unique vantage for
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observing whether her client is competent," United States v.
Muriel Cruz, 412 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 2005), counsel's observations
about "serious problems" and Ahrendt "liv[ing] in a different
world" are not of a tenor that would suggest cause to conduct a
competency evaluation. This is particularly true in the context of
Ahrendt's performance at trial, where he made a successful hearsay
objection and cross-examined government witnesses in an attempt to
show that the requirements for proving a conspiracy were not met.
While ultimately unsuccessful, his performance belies the
contention that he was "unable . . . to assist properly in his
defense." 18 U.S.C. § 4241. We also note that after the
competency hearing, the district court took an active role in
assessing Ahrendt's competency through the pendency of the
proceedings. The court and Ahrendt had lengthy discussions on
multiple occasions -- the hearings in July and September, at trial,
and at sentencing -- in which the judge questioned Ahrendt about
his understanding of various aspects of the process.
As to Ahrendt's own statements, we note that a
defendant's failure to grasp how the legal system and the
sentencing process operate can constitute reasonable cause for a
court to sua sponte order a competency evaluation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Giron-Reyes, 234 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2000)
(defendant's apparent inability to understand critical aspects of
the proceedings, including the role of the jury and the Sentencing
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Guidelines, suggested that defendant may not have been competent).
But Ahrendt's comments do not convey the lack of understanding
evidenced in Giron-Reyes. Ahrendt both demonstrated an
understanding of and participated in the proceedings. Although
Ahrendt argues that his letters to the court changed demonstrably
in tone and content during the pendency of the proceedings such
that the letters should have triggered a reevaluation of his
competency, counsel reported prior to trial that the letters had
been reviewed by Dr. Aston, who had not expressed an opinion that
there had been a change in Ahrendt's competency.
Short of reasonable cause to believe that Ahrendt was
mentally incompetent to stand trial, the district court was not
obligated to order a reevaluation. In light of Ahrendt's
demonstrated understanding and participation in the trial, neither
his own communications alone, nor in combination with statements by
counsel, constituted reasonable cause. Ahrendt had been evaluated
by qualified mental health professionals, both prior to the initial
competency hearing (the Fort Devens Report) and after it (the Aston
testimony). We have interpreted a qualified mental health
professional's report to be an important factor for the trial court
to consider when determining competency. See United States v.
Bruck, 152 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 1998) (when psychiatrist has found
defendant to be competent, trial court need not hold a competency
hearing absent extenuating circumstances); see also Lebrón, 76 F.3d
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at 32 (same). Here, the district court was presented with first
such reports, both of which concluded that Ahrendt was competent to
stand trial. We cannot say that it was clear error for the
district court to decline to order a reevaluation of Ahrendt's
competency to stand trial.
B. 403 Ruling
Evidentiary rulings of the district court are reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Turner, 501 F.3d 59,
72 (1st Cir. 2007).
Ahrendt argues that because the government was required
to prove specific intent to convict him of the conspiracy charge,
the exclusion of the proffered expert testimony of Dr. Aston
(describing Ahrendt's view of drug use as "sacramental
consumption") was erroneous. Such testimony, he says, would have
been probative to his ability, vel non, to form the requisite
intent.
A defendant is allowed to present mental-condition
evidence short of establishing insanity under 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) if
the evidence is relevant to determining the defendant's ability to
form the requisite intent to commit the crime. United States v.
Schneider, 111 F.3d 197, 201 (1st Cir. 1997). Even if relevant,
though, such evidence may be excluded if its "probative value may
be substantially outweighed by confusion or delay" or if the
evidence is from an expert and fails to "meet the further
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requisites of scientific reliability and helpfulness to the jury."
Id., at 201; Fed. R. Evid. 702.
The government is indeed required to prove specific
intent, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(2), but Dr. Aston's testimony would
have had no bearing on this question. Ahrendt's beliefs in a
higher law are not probative of his ability to form the requisite
intent. See United States v. White, 766 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.
1985) (evidence of motivation for violating law, in this case
influence of defendant's mother, irrelevant if defendant is capable
of forming specific criminal intent.) Moreover, even if relevant,
Dr. Aston's testimony had significant potential to confuse or
mislead the jury. As the district court said,
Dr. Aston may not give voice to and implicitly
legitimize what he describes as Mr. Ahrendt's
'deviant' set of values without effectively
promoting jury nullification . . . . Further,
Dr. Aston's testimony could mislead the jury
into thinking that Mr. Ahrendt's idiosyncratic
philosophy amounts to a form of temporary
insanity or ameliorates the offense . . . .
See Schneider, 111 F.3d at 201 (in assessing medical evidence
offered regarding to defendant's ability to form requisite intent,
district court is "closer to the case" and has "comparative
advantage"). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the testimony.
C. Sentencing
The government argues that although Ahrendt may have made
two generic objections at sentencing, he never objected to the
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particular issues he now appeals: the leadership enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), and the classification of his prior
convictions under § 4A1.2(a)(2). See United States v. Jimenez, 512
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (defendant's failure to object to
particular findings of PSR waives objection). Ahrendt told the
court that he objected to the "whole thing" and that "[D]isrespect
is disrespect. That's all right." Even we were to adopt a
generous stance in light of Ahrendt's pro se status at sentencing,
his generic objections cannot be fairly interpreted as giving
notice to the court of these two very specific issues. Thus we
apply plain error review. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725(1993).
To succeed on plain error review, Ahrendt must show: "(1)
that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not
only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4)
seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings." United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60
(1st Cir. 2001).5 With respect to factual determinations, "[an]
5
We have at times applied a flexible standard in the sentencing
context with respect to the third and fourth prongs of plain error
review. United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78 (1st Cir.
2005); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74,
81-82 (2004). To meet the third prong, that the error "affected
the defendant's substantial rights" in the sentencing context, a
defendant must show on the sentencing record "a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, the district court would have
imposed a different, more favorable sentence." United States v.
Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 447 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing United States v.
Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal
-16-
error cannot be clear or obvious unless the desired factual finding
is the only one rationally supported by the record below." United
States v. Goodhue, 486 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Donnelly, 370 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Where the issue is a district court's
interpretation of the Guidelines, we will not find clear or obvious
error if the "challenged issue of law is unsettled." Goodhue, 486
F.3d at 57.
We can dispense quickly with Ahrendt's objection to the
leadership enhancement as he fails to meet even the first hurdle of
plain error review. Ahrendt makes two arguments: first, that the
record does not adequately support the imposition of a leadership
enhancement; and second, that the district court inadequately
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in this regard.
The Guidelines impose a two-level increase to a
defendant's offense level based on that defendant's status -- that
he or she acted as "an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in
any criminal activity other than [an activity involving five or
more participants or that was otherwise extensive]." U.S.S.G. §
3B1.1(c); see also United States v. Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 61-62
(1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d 105, 111
quotation marks omitted). To meet the fourth prong, a defendant
must then show that "leaving the error uncorrected would cause a
miscarriage of justice." United States v. McCoy, 508 F.3d 74, 80
(1st Cir. 2007).
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(1st Cir. 1995). Relevant factors to consider include "the degree
of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature
and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and
authority exercised over others." U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4.
Ahrendt's leadership status is borne out by the record.
He may not have been the ringleader of this operation, but he had
some authority within the conspiracy in that he rented the
apartment where drugs were processed, packaged and sold, and held
money for short periods of time. He also played a role in
"organizing," as he provided the clientele in Bangor. Classifying
a defendant's role in a particular criminal enterprise is a "fact-
specific task," Thiongo, 344 F.3d at 62, and the district court's
determination that Ahrendt's role merited a two-level leadership
enhancement was not error.
Further, the district court did not, as Ahrendt now
argues, inadequately consider § 3553(a)(6): the "need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." Ahrendt
maintains that the disparity between his sentence of 210 months and
Brimley and Deloatch's sentences of forty-two and sixty-six months,
respectively, was unwarranted. But in addition to having different
criminal history profiles, Brimley and Deloatch pled guilty and so
were not "similarly situated" for sentencing purposes. See United
States v. Tom, 504 F.3d 89, 95 (1st Cir. 2007), vacated and
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remanded on other grounds in Tom v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1132(2008). Moreover, "section 3553(a)(6) aims primarily at the
minimization of disparities among defendants nationally." Martin,
520 F.3d at 94. Again, there was no error in the imposition of the
leadership enhancement.
Ahrendt's more significant objection to his sentence
concerns his argument that his prior convictions were erroneously
counted as separate "prior sentences" under § 4A1.1(a)(2).6
Specifically, Ahrendt contends that the district court should have
"consolidated" three of his four prior convictions because they
occurred "in a single temporal cluster" and because he was
sentenced for them by the same court on the same date.
Ahrendt was sentenced in January 2006 under the 2004
version of the Guidelines. The relevant language provides: "prior
sentences [for non-violent crimes] imposed in unrelated cases are
to be counted separately. Prior sentences imposed in related cases
are to be treated as one sentence . . . ." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2)
(2004). "Related cases" are defined in the application notes to §
4A1.2(a)(2) as follows: "[P]rior sentences are considered related
6
Ahrendt also argues on appeal that the court inadequately
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in this regard. He
contends that § 3553(a)(1) compelled consideration of his mental
health issues in analyzing whether his prior convictions were
unrelated. He does not develop any argumentation as to why those
mental health issues are relevant to this determination, and we
consider this argument waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d
1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
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if they resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the same
occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (C)
were consolidated for trial or sentencing." Id. at cmt. n.3.
The "consolidation" factor is at issue here. At the time
of Ahrendt's sentencing, we had made clear that with respect to
consolidation,
When dealing with 'offenses that are
temporally and factually distinct (that is,
offenses which occurred on different dates and
which did not arise out of the same course of
conduct), charges based thereon should not be
regarded as having been consolidated (and,
therefore 'related') unless the original
sentencing court entered an actual order of
consolidation or there is some other
persuasive indicium of formal consolidation
apparent on the face of the record . . .
United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 151 (1st Cir. 2005)
(quoting United States v. Correa, 114 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 1997).
Moreover, our rule was that a defendant could not show
consolidation merely by indicating that the "sentence was imposed
by the same judge at the same time." Id. (emphasis added).
In Ahrendt's case, the district court committed no error,
much less plain error, when it counted Ahrendt's three convictions
separately under § 4A1.2(a)(2). The record evidence supports a
finding that the offenses were temporally and factually distinct.
Ahrendt's three offenses occurred in Maine on March 14, March 15,
and March 19, 2001 respectively. The first two of these were
violations of a protection from abuse order prohibiting Ahrendt's
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contact with his ex-spouse and the third was a violation of a
condition of release that he not have contact with her. Moreover,
the record reveals neither a formal order consolidating the charges
nor any other evidence of formal consolidation.
Nevertheless, on November 1, 2007, while this appeal was
pending, the Sentencing Commission adopted a non-retroactive
amendment7 on this topic, in response to conflicts among the
circuits. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2007) & Supp. to App. C,
Amendment 709 (2007). The amendment strikes the term "related
cases" and the above definition from the 2007 Guidelines, and adds
new language such that § 4A1.2(a)(2) now reads: "[P]rior sentences
are counted separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from
offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the
sentences were imposed on the same day. Count any prior sentence
covered by (A) or (B) as a single sentence." (emphasis added).
Because Amendment 709 is non-retroactive, however, Ahrendt is not
entitled to the benefit of this amendment which we have observed
7
Retroactivity of amendments to the Guidelines is determined by
the inclusion of such an amendment under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c)
(2007). If an amendment is so listed, a defendant is permitted to
move for a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). An
amendment not listed in § 1B1.10(c) does not have retroactive
effect. Retroactivity in the Guidelines context is explicitly
distinct from the effect of statutory changes. See United States
v. Havener, 905 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.)
(distinguishing "common-law presumption that the repeal of a
criminal statute resulted in the abatement of all prosecutions
which had not reached final disposition in the highest court
authorized to review them" from retroactivity of amendments to
Guidelines (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
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"go[es] beyond any circuit's reading of the previous rule in a
manner favorable to the defendant." See United States v. Godin
("Godin II"), 522 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2008).
That said, we understand that if Amendment 709 had been
in operation during Ahrendt's sentencing, his three convictions
would have been grouped. Although the three charges underlying the
convictions had separate docket numbers, and although he was
sentenced for each conviction separately, all three sentences were
imposed on the same day. See § 4A1.2(a)(2) ("[P]rior sentences are
counted separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses
contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences
were imposed on the same day. Count any prior sentence covered by
(A) or (B) as a single sentence.").
Ahrendt is foreclosed from arguing that, despite
Amendment 709's non-retroactivity, we should nonetheless remand for
resentencing in light of the amendment. Although a non-retroactive
amendment could trigger a remand if that amendment is deemed
"clarifying" rather than "substantive," in Godin II we concluded
that Amendment 709 was substantive and not intended to be applied
retroactively. 522 F.3d at 134.
Nevertheless, Godin II suggests that another course may
be available. Like Ahrendt, Godin had prior convictions for which
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she had been sentenced on the same day,8 and, as in this case, the
convictions had been counted separately in her PSR. Id. Also
similar to the present case, at the time of Godin's sentencing the
pre-Amendment version of the guidelines was in force, and we made
clear in our decision that Godin's GSR remained valid. Id. at 135.
Nevertheless, motivated by the discretion vested in district courts
after Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), to consider the
Sentencing Commission's current thinking, we remanded for
resentencing. We suggested that the amendment was a statement of
the "Commission's current policy position . . . [that] may have
some influence on the judge's ultimate discretionary choice of
sentence." Id. at 136.
The government argues that taking a similar course here
is not justified and seeks to distinguish this case from Godin II
in three ways.
First, the government observes that, unlike Godin who
preserved her consolidation argument below, Ahrendt failed to
present the claim at sentencing and therefore must satisfy the
exacting plain error standard. We do not think this distinction is
of great significance in this case. We did not dwell on the
standard of review in our decision to remand for resentencing in
Godin II. Simply put, neither defendant was entitled, under either
8
The prior offenses at issue were two burglaries of the same
apartment building in the same week, for which she was sentenced on
the same day.
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a harmless error or plain error standard of review, to a remand
because neither could show that an error occurred at sentencing.
Second, the government argues that Ahrendt, unlike Godin,
never requested a departure or variant sentence. We do not think
that this fact forecloses a remand. In Godin II, our decision to
remand did not hinge on the fact that Godin sought a departure or
variant sentence. Moreover, although the district court in this
case noted Ahrendt's failure to pursue either of those options at
sentencing, neither did the court suggest that it would be opposed
to granting such a request, had one been made. Finally, we remain
cognizant of Ahrendt's pro se status at sentencing. Although this
status does not excuse him from the obligation to present colorable
arguments at sentencing, under the circumstances of this case we do
not weigh heavily Ahrendt's pro se failure to press an argument for
a departure or variant sentence on the basis that U.S.S.G. §
4A1.2(a)(2), as it stood at the time, resulted in an unduly harsh
sentence.
Third, the government points out that in Godin II the
application of Amendment 709 would have prevented the defendant
from being designated a career offender, thus significantly
reducing Godin's Guidelines range. Therefore, its argument runs,
we had a greater reason to remand for resentencing in Godin's case
than here. Although perhaps not irrelevant, the difference in
impact on the Guidelines calculation ultimately is a difference in
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degree. In Godin II, we emphasized the posture of the case in
explaining our decision to remand. We observed that, "[T]he
posture of this case is peculiar: the amendment is not applicable
retroactively, but neither has the pending appeal yet resulted in
a final disposition, that is, a disposition that is no longer
subject to review on direct appeal in any court." Id. at 135. The
posture of this case is the same.
Ultimately, given the similarities between this case and
Godin II, we think a remand is justified. Although the district
court is under no obligation to modify Ahrendt's sentence, we
nevertheless think it prudent to allow the court the opportunity to
consider the Sentencing Commission's updated views.
For the reasons explained above, we affirm Ahrendt's
conviction but remand for resentencing in light of Amendment 709.
-Dissenting Opinion Follows-
-25-
MERRITT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I am under a duty as
an appellate judge to review the length and reasonablensss of
sentences, and I regard the 18-year sentence here for this
nonviolent crime as unreasonably long and not sufficiently
explained by the District Court.
With regard to the 18-year sentence, I do not agree with
the District Court’s two level enhancement of Ahrendt for
performing a “leadership role” in the drug conspiracy and the
court’s failure to address the large disparity (12 and 14 years)
between Ahrendt’s sentence and the sentence of the real leaders and
promoters of this group, co-conspirators Brimley and Deloatch. The
pre-sentence report indicates that these two leaders brought in the
drugs from Boston, collected the money and gave the instructions to
the other members of the conspiracy. The pre-sentence report
describes Ahrendt’s role in the offense as follows: “Aherndt both
sells cocaine and other drugs that include Percocet, Vicoden,
Oxycontin and Methadone. In addition to sales, he was engaged in
the cooking of the powder cocaine.” Then the pre-sentence report
makes the following recommendation as to Ahrendt’s sentence:
Adjustments for Role in the Offense: Pursuant
to U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c), there is a 2 level
increase because the defendant was a manager
or organizer of a criminal activity that
involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive. Although this office
does not believe that the defendant held as
high of management position as Brimley or
Deloatch in this conspiracy, he was clearly
the organizer of the distribution of crack and
was involved in other drug distributions.
At the sentencing hearing the defendant was pro se and appears to
object to all of the upward adjustments in the pre-sentence report.
He has obviously suffered from mental illness and remains on the
borderline, as the sentencing judge clearly recognized:
THE COURT: I’m still not quite sure
what to make of you. You certainly present as
somebody who is somewhat iconoclastic, maybe a
bit eccentric, and with a dose of nihilism,
and I am not denying that you have a right to
your own views about your use of drugs, and
there is certainly a certain subsection of
American society that would agree with you,
but Congress doesn’t.
I do not believe there are sufficient facts stated in the
presentence report or by the court below to justify the
enhancement. On this subject, all the sentencing judge said was:
Three, pursuant to United States
Sentencing Guideline Section 3B1.1(c), as the
defendant was a manager or organizer of a
criminal activity that involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive, there
is a two-level increase, bringing the offense
level to 34.
There is no indication of what participants Ahrendt managed or how
he “organized, led, managed or supervised them.” See requirements
of United States Sentencing Guidelines §3B1.1.
Neither can I find a justification for a 12-year
disparity between Ahrendt’s sentence and the real leaders of the
group. It is true that the two leaders pled guilty and did not go
to trial. But Ahrendt has the right of trial by jury and should
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not be punished for exercising it.9 The sentence also fails to
acknowledge the existence of § 3553(a)(6) which requires the
sentencing judge to take into account the need to “avoid
unwarranted disparity among defendants in the same case or provide
a reasonable justification for this disparity.”
9
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The friends and
adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing
else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury;
or if there is any difference between them it consists in this:
the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter
represent it as the very palladium of free government.”); see also
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that “the jury-trial guarantee was one of the
least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights”).
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