Ali v. Hubbard ( 1997 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 97-1047
YUSUF M. ALI,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SHEILA HUBBARD, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Yusuf M. Ali on brief pro se.
Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General and Susanne G. Levsen,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellees.
Brian W. Brady and Gillespie & Associates on brief for appellees,
John Chapman and Harry Collins.
Roger H. Randall and Law Offices of Bruce R. Fox on brief for
appellee Barbara Quinn.
August 27, 1997
Per Curiam. Plaintiff/appellant Yusuf M. Ali appeals
the dismissal of his federal civil rights claims arising out
of the revocation of his parole in 1994. We affirm.
Only one of Ali's claims merits extended discussion.
Ali claims that defendant parole board members violated his
right to due process when they failed to disclose to him,
during his parole revocation hearing, the actual documents on
which they based their decision. Assuming arguendo that such
a failure to disclose is a violation of federal due process,
see United States ex rel. Carson v. Taylor, 540 F.2d 1156,
1161-63 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (due process requires "disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him"), we nevertheless find that
Ali's claim was properly dismissed.
"[A] state prisoner's claim for damages [and declaratory
relief] is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 if 'a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,' unless the
prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
previously been invalidated." Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct.
1584, 1585 (1997) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487 (1994)). This is true not only when the prisoner
challenges the judgment as a substantive matter but also when
he challenges "procedures . . . such as necessarily to imply
the invalidity of the judgment." Id. at 1587. This
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principle applies to prison disciplinary hearings, id., as
well as to revocation and denials of parole, Butterfield v.
Bail, 1997 WL 414250 (9th Cir. July 25, 1997) (denial of
parole); Littles v. Board of Pardons and Paroles Div., 68
F.3d 122, 123 (5th cir. 1995) (revocation of parole); Schafer
v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 44-45 (8th Cir. 1995) (denial of
parole).
Ali claims that, "because the evidence used by the
hearing panel was withheld from him, . . . he was denied the
opportunity to meet the case against him in a meaningful
manner and was thus wrongfully condemned to reincarceration."
Appellant's Brief at 12. Thus, a judgment in favor of Ali's
due process claim would "necessarily imply the invalidity of
[the revocation of his parole]." Heck 512 U.S. at 487; see
also DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1993)
(granting habeas relief to prisoner whose parole had been
revoked in violation of due process), cert. denied, 511 U.S.
1032 (1994). Since Ali has not shown that the revocation of
his parole has been invalidated, his claim for monetary and
declaratory relief must be dismissed. See Butterfield, 1997
WL 414250 (no cognizable claim under 1983 where prisoner
alleged that defendants violated his due process rights in
finding him ineligible parole on the basis of incorrect
information); Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 1997 WL 409423 (7th Cir.
July 22, 1997) (claim that due process rights of prisoner
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were violated because record was devoid of evidence
supporting disciplinary action barred by Balisok).
As to Ali's other federal and state law claims, we
affirm the dismissal essentially for the reasons given by the
district court in its memorandum and order, dated January 26,
1996.
Affirmed.
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