United States v. Boot ( 1994 )


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  •                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    No. 93-2317
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER LEE BOOT,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    ERRATA SHEET
    The  opinion of  this Court, issued  June 7, 1994,  is amended as
    follows:
    Page 4, n.1, last line should read:  . . . comment. (backg'd.).
    Page 7, l.5 from bottom should read:  . . . comment. (backg'd.).
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    No. 93-2317
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER LEE BOOT,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
    [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
    Richard  S. Emerson,  Jr., with  whom Childs,  Emerson, Rundlett,
    Fifield & Childs was on brief for appellant.
    Michael M.  DuBose, Assistant  United States Attorney,  with whom
    Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
    June 7, 1994
    CYR, Circuit  Judge.  After the  district court reduced
    CYR  Circuit  Judge
    its  original sentence in response  to a recent  amendment to the
    Sentencing  Guidelines, see United  States Sentencing Commission,
    Guidelines Manual   2D1.1  (Nov. 1993), defendant Christopher Lee
    Boot brought  the present appeal challenging  the court's concur-
    rent refusal to reduce his prison term below the minimum mandated
    by statute.  Finding no error, we affirm.
    I
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant Boot  pled guilty to  distributing 11.6 grams
    of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) within 1000 feet of a school.
    See  21 U.S.C.    841(a)(1);    860(a) (1993).   For  purposes of
    determining both the statutory mandatory minimum sentence ("MMS"-
    ),  see  id.    841(b)(1)(B)(v)  (prescribing  five-year MMS  for
    distributing "1 gram or more of a mixture or substance containing
    a  detectable  amount" of  LSD),  and  the applicable  Guidelines
    sentencing range (GSR), see U.S.S.G.   2D1.1(c) (Nov. 1991),  the
    district court included  the entire weight of  the carrier medium
    used to distribute  the 599 doses of LSD.   See Chapman v. United
    States, 
    500 U.S. 453
    , 468 (1991) (broadly construing "mixture or
    substance," in  21 U.S.C.   841(b)(1)(B)(v),  as "requir[ing] the
    weight  of the carrier medium to be included"); U.S.S.G.   2D1.1,
    footnote *  (Nov. 1991) ("Unless otherwise  specified, the weight
    of  a controlled substance set forth in the [Drug Quantity Table]
    3
    refers  to the entire weight of any mixture or substance contain-
    ing  a detectable  amount  of the  controlled substance.");  
    id.,
    comment. (backg'd.).  (n.1) (Nov. 1991) ("'Mixture  or substance'
    as used in this guideline has the same meaning as  in 21 U.S.C.
    841.").    As a  result,  the  121-month prison  term  originally
    imposed under  the Guidelines (BOL:   32; CHC:  I;  GSR:  121-151
    months)  trumped the  five-year MMS  required under  21  U.S.C.
    841(b)(1)(B)(v)  for distributing one gram  or more of  LSD.  See
    U.S.S.G.   5G1.1(c).
    Effective  November  1993,   however,  the   Sentencing
    Commission  amended U.S.S.G.    2D1.1 ("Amendment  488"), see  28
    U.S.C.   994(p)  (empowering Commission to promulgate  amendments
    to U.S.S.G.,  subject only  to express congressional  "veto"), by
    prescribing a somewhat less  stringent (0.4 milligram "per dose")
    formula for  calculating LSD quantity  than the regime  upheld in
    Chapman.1   The Commission has  ordained that its  new 0.4 milli-
    1The  Commission  spelled  out  the  competing  policy goals
    addressed by Amendment 488 in new application note 18:
    Because  the  weights of  LSD  carrier  media vary
    widely  and  typically far  exceed  the  weight of  the
    controlled substance itself, the Commission  has deter-
    mined that  basing offense levels on  the entire weight
    of the LSD and carrier medium would produce unwarranted
    disparity among offenses involving the same quantity of
    LSD (but  different carrier  weights), as well  as sen-
    tences disproportionate to  those for other, more  dan-
    gerous controlled substances, such as PCP.  Consequent-
    ly,  in  cases involving  LSD  contained  in a  carrier
    medium,  the Commission  has established  a weight  per
    dose of  0.4 milligram for purposes  of determining the
    base offense level.
    4
    gram  per-dose  formula may  receive  retroactive application  in
    appropriate  circumstances  to  effect  reductions  in  sentences
    previously imposed.   See  U.S.S.G.    1B1.10(a), (d)  (1993); 18
    U.S.C.    3582(c)(2); United States v. Holmes, 
    13 F.3d 1217
    , 1222
    (8th Cir. 1994) (district courts  have discretion to apply Amend-
    ment 488 retroactively in appropriate circumstances).2
    The dosage weight of LSD selected exceeds the Drug
    Enforcement Administration's standard  dosage unit  for
    LSD of 0.05 milligram (i.e., the quantity of actual LSD
    per dose) in order to assign some weight to the carrier
    medium.  Because LSD typically is marketed and consumed
    orally  on  a carrier  medium,  the  inclusion of  some
    weight  attributable to  the carrier  medium recognizes
    (A)  that  offense  levels for  most  other  controlled
    substances  are based  upon the  weight of  the mixture
    containing the  controlled substance without  regard to
    purity,  and  (B) the  decision  in  Chapman v.  United
    States, 
    111 S. Ct. 1919
     (1991) (holding  that the term
    "mixture  or substance"  in 21  U.S.C.    841(b)(1) in-
    cludes the  carrier medium  in which LSD  is absorbed).
    At  the same time, the weight per dose selected is less
    than the weight per dose that would equate  the offense
    level for LSD  on a  carrier medium with  that for  the
    same  number of  doses of  PCP, a  controlled substance
    that comparative assessments indicate is more likely to
    induce violent  acts and  ancillary crime than  is LSD.
    (Treating  LSD  on a  carrier  medium  as weighing  0.5
    milligram per dose would produce offense levels equiva-
    lent to  those for  PCP.)   Thus, the  approach decided
    upon by the  Commission will  harmonize offense  levels
    for LSD  offenses with those for  other controlled sub-
    stances and avoid any undue influence of varied carrier
    weight on the applicable offense level.
    U.S.S.G.   2D1.1, comment. (n.18).
    2Section 3582 provides, in pertinent part:
    The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it
    has been imposed except that
    ....
    5
    Absent  the  MMS   complication  posed  by   21  U.S.C.
    841(b)(1)(B)(v), Amendment 488 would have resulted in a dramat-
    ic decrease in  appellant's prison sentence, since  it sliced the
    GSR  from  121-151 months  (11.6 grams  of  LSD) to  27-33 months
    (0.239 gram).   Due to 21 U.S.C.    841(b)(1)(B)(v), however, the
    district court  refused to reduce  Boot's prison  term below  the
    five-year  MMS.   See U.S.S.G    5G1.1(b)  ("Where  a statutorily
    required minimum  sentence  is greater  than the  maximum of  the
    applicable  guideline  range,  the statutorily  required  minimum
    sentence shall be the guidelines range.").
    II
    DISCUSSION
    The long and the short of the district court ruling was
    that  the LSD quantity  calculation is controlled  by Chapman for
    MMS purposes and by Amendment  488 for GSR purposes.   Boot coun-
    (2)  in  the case  of  a  defendant who  has  been
    sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentenc-
    ing  range that  has subsequently  been lowered  by the
    Sentencing  Commission pursuant to  28 U.S.C.   994(o),
    upon motion  of the  defendant or  the Director of  the
    Bureau  of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may
    reduce the term of  imprisonment, after considering the
    factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that
    they are applicable,  if such  reduction is  consistent
    with applicable  policy statements  issued by the  Sen-
    tencing Commission.
    18 U.S.C.   3582(c)(2).
    6
    ters  that  by permitting  Amendment 488  to take  effect without
    modification in November 1993,  Congress evinced its clear inten-
    tion  to establish  a  unitary per-dose  "mixture and  substance"
    formula  for calculating  LSD weight in  MMS and  GSR sentencings
    alike.   Thus, unless  Amendment 488 is  to be converted  into an
    instrument  for  promoting  sentencing  disparity,  congressional
    acquiescence  in its  adoption must  be considered  tantamount to
    legislative  displacement  of  the  Chapman regime.    We  do not
    agree.3
    Although the  precise issue  presented is one  of first
    impression  in  the courts  of  appeals,4  the  Supreme Court  in
    Chapman concluded that Congress intended,  at the time it enacted
    3Contrary to Boot's contention,  Amendment 488, as presently
    interpreted,  eliminates considerable past  and future sentencing
    disparity in LSD cases, see U.S.S.G.   2D1.1, comment. (n.18), by
    substituting, in all non-MMS cases, a uniform 0.4  milligram per-
    dose  formula  for calculating  the  LSD  "mixture or  substance"
    weight in  place of the entire  actual weight of the  LSD and its
    carrier medium.  See supra note 1.  The very substantial 61-month
    reduction  in Boot's  sentence  underscores the  point.   Further
    efforts at reducing sentencing disparity in LSD cases must  await
    improved coordination  between Amendment  488 and  its preemptive
    counterpart    the  MMS regime     long recognized as an  "ad hoc
    deviation"  from  the  unitary  policy goals  of  the  Sentencing
    Guidelines, United  States v. McFadden,  
    13 F.3d 463
    ,  468 (1994)
    (Breyer, C.J., dissenting).
    4No  district court  has  yet adopted  the unitary  approach
    advocated by Boot.   See United States  v. Reddick,     F.  Supp.
    ,      (W.D.N.Y.  1994) [
    1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5978
    ,  at * 15
    (W.D.N.Y.  Apr. 20, 1994)];  United States  v. Neal,     F. Supp.
    ,     (C.D. Ill. 1994)  [
    1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4101
    , at  * 3-4
    (C.D. Ill. Mar.  29, 1994)];  Woolston v. United  States, 
    840 F. Supp. 1
    ,      (D. Me.  1993).  Cf.  United States v.  Tucker,
    F.3d    ,     (7th Cir. 1994) [
    1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5408
    , at * 6-
    7 (7th Cir. Mar. 23, 1994)].
    7
    the MMS statute in 1986, see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L.
    99-570,  
    100 Stat. 3207
     (1986), that the pivotal term "mixture or
    substance containing a detectable amount" of controlled substance
    required the sentencing court to include the entire weight of the
    LSD and its carrier medium.  Chapman, 
    500 U.S. at 461
      ("Congress
    adopted a 'market-oriented' approach to punishing  drug traffick-
    ing," and  intended courts  to sentence defendants  "according to
    the weight of the drugs in whatever form they were found      cut
    or  uncut, pure  or  impure, ready  for  wholesale or  ready  for
    distribution at the retail level.").
    III
    CONCLUSION
    Until the  Supreme Court  or the Congress  revisits the
    issue,  Chapman  governs the  meaning  of  the  term "mixture  or
    substance" in  21  U.S.C.   841(b)(1)(B)(v),  as  the  Commission
    itself acknowledged when it promulgated Amendment 488 in November
    1993:   "Nonetheless,  this  [new Guidelines]  approach does  not
    override  the applicability  of  'mixture or  substance' for  the
    purpose of applying any  mandatory minimum sentence (see Chapman;
    5G1.1(b))."   U.S.S.G.    2D1.1, comment.  (backg'd.). (n.18).
    Without more      and there is no more     we conclude that  Con-
    gress simply acquiesced in the restrictive reach of Amendment 488
    duly noted by the Commission in application note 18.  
    Id.
    8
    Affirmed.
    9