Muñiz Cortes v. Intermedics, Inc. ( 2000 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-2193
PEDRO MUÑIZ CORTES and the estate of CLOTILDE DIAZ SUSTACHE,
composed by PEDRO ANGEL MUÑIZ DIAZ, LUIS MUÑIZ DIAZ,
JOSE ISMAEL MUÑIZ DIAZ, MARIA ANTONIA MUÑIZ DIAZ,
MARIA ELENA MUÑIZ DIAZ, LYDIA MARIA MUÑIZ DIAZ,
JORGE M. MUÑIZ DIAZ, MIRIAM MUÑIZ CABAN, and DIANA MUÑIZ
CABAN,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
INTERMEDICS, INC., SULZER INTERMEDICS, INC., ABC COMPANY AND
XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Ulpiano Falcón Matos, with whom Roberto Rafols Dávila was
on brief for appellants.
Joseph J. Leghorn, with whom Maria De Los A. Garay and
Manuel E. Andreu Garcia were on brief for appellees.
October 3, 2000
2
BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellants
Pedro Muniz Cortes and the estate of Clotilde Diaz Sustache
appeal from the district court's order of summary judgment
dismissing claims against defendant-appellees. We affirm.
I.
On December 14, 1994, Clotilde Diaz Sustache had a
pacemaker surgically implanted at the Hospital Bella Vista in
Mayaguez, Puerto Rico. The pacemaker was manufactured by
Intermedics. After this pacemaker failed, a second Intermedics
pacemaker was implanted. On August 18, 1995, following the
failure of the second pacemaker, Diaz Sustache died.
On January 12, 1996, appellants filed a complaint
against Intermedics and others in the Superior Court of Puerto
Rico. Appellants sought damages from Intermedics pursuant to
Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, alleging that
"manufacturing defects, design defects and/or insufficiency in
the warnings of the pacemakers and/or electrodes implanted in
the deceased were the proximate and immediate cause of her
death." On August 8, 1997, the Superior Court entered partial
summary judgment in favor of Intermedics on the ground that the
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Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act,
21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq., preempted appellants' claims.1
Appellants did not appeal from the superior court's
order of judgment. Rather, they filed another complaint against
Intermedics and others, this time in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico. There, appellants
reiterated their claim that Intermedics acted negligently under
Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code; they also alleged
that Intermedics failed to comply with Food and Drug
Administration regulations with regard to the pacemaker.
Intermedics moved for summary judgment on the ground that
appellants' claims had already been adjudicated by the Superior
Court of Puerto Rico and therefore were precluded. The district
court allowed Intermedics' motion for summary judgment on the
1
The superior court based its determination on 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(a), which provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
no State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement–
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this chapter to the
device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of
the device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device under this
chapter.
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grounds of "res judicata and/or collateral estoppel." Muniz
Cortes v. Intermedics, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 160, 165 (D.P.R.
1999).
II.
Appellants contend that the district court erred in
determining that preclusion barred their complaint. We review
a summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether there
exists a genuine issue of material fact. See Sheehy v. Town of
Plymouth, 191 F.3d 15, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1999).
Federal courts must give full faith and credit to final
judgments of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico courts. See
Baez-Cruz v. Municipality of Comerio, 140 F.3d 24, 28 n.1 (1st
Cir. 1998); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738. To determine the
preclusive effect of such a judgment in federal court, we look
to Puerto Rico law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Cruz v. Melecio, 204
F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2000). The Puerto Rico Civil Code sets
forth the operation of the doctrine of preclusion:
In order that the presumption of the res
judicata may be valid in another suit, it is
necessary that, between the case decided by
the sentence and that in which the same is
invoked, there be the most perfect identity
between the things, causes, and persons of
the litigants, and their capacity as such.
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P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3343. Although this provision speaks
of "res judicata," it additionally permits issue preclusion or
collateral estoppel. See Baez-Cruz, 140 F.3d at 29.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico has held that when
an issue "essential to the prior judgment is actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination
is conclusive in subsequent litigation among the parties."
Felix Davis v. Vieques Air Link, 892 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (1st
Cir. 1990) (citing Pereira v. Hernandez, 83 P.R.R. 156, 161
(1961)).
Appellants contend that res judicata does not apply
because the superior court's preemption ruling deprived that
court of subject matter jurisdiction. It is true that a
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not
considered to be "on the merits," and therefore is without res
judicata effect. See Northeast Erectors Ass'n of BTEA v.
Secretary of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 62 F.3d
37, 44 (1st Cir. 1995); 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller
& Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4436 (1981)).
We have some doubt about the proposition that a
dismissal on preemption grounds is not merits-based. But even
assuming arguendo that res judicata does not bar the federal
district court from adjudicating appellants' claims, the
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doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the court from
rehearing the issue of preemption.2 Dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction precludes relitigation of the issues
determined in ruling on the jurisdictional question. See
Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra; cf. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir.
1993) (determination of lack of jurisdiction was "on the
merits"); Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO,
630 F.2d 864, 870 (1st Cir. 1980) (same). Here, to the extent
that the superior court determined that it had no jurisdiction
over the matter, it was on the ground that appellants’ "causes
of action for defects in manufacture, design or inadequate
warning" were preempted by the Medical Device Amendments.3 Under
this ruling, the Amendments would preempt appellants' claims in
2As noted supra, the district court's opinion rested on the
dual grounds of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. See
Muniz Cortes, 63 F. Supp.2d at 165.
3Intermedics concedes that the superior court may have erred
in holding that the claims were preempted in light of recent
Supreme Court law. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470(1996). Substantive error, however, does not deprive a
procedurally adequate judicial proceeding of preclusive effect.
See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398
(1981) ("[a] judgment merely voidable because based upon an
erroneous view of the law is not open to collateral attack, but
can be corrected only by a direct review and not by bringing
another action"); Cruz, 204 F.3d at 19 (citing Bolker v.
Superior Court, 82 P.R.R. 785, 799-800 (1961)).
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federal court as well as in the superior court. Hence,
appellants may not relitigate the issue of preemption.
Appellants also take issue with the district court's
conclusion that there existed "perfect identity between the
things, causes, and persons of the litigants" as required under
the Puerto Rico law of preclusion. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,
§ 3343. They point out that the complaint filed in the superior
court was limited to commonwealth law, while the complaint filed
in federal district court alleged that the pacemaker failed to
comply with FDA regulations. Therefore, appellants argue, their
"causes" were not identical with the meaning of § 3343.
The fact that appellants advanced different legal
theories does not undermine the identity of causes, because the
commonwealth law claim presented in the superior court arose
from the pacemaker failure, just as did the claims later
presented to the federal district court. See Boateng v.
InterAmerican Univ., Inc., 210 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2000) (no
right to bring separate and successive suits on different legal
theories arising out of a single nucleus of operative facts)
(applying Puerto Rico law). A claim is precluded not only if it
was actually raised in a previous suit, but if it could have
been raised. See id.-8-
Finally, appellants contend that they are exempt from
the usual rules of preemption on the ground that "its
application would defeat the ends of justice, especially in the
presence of public policy considerations." Baez-Cruz, 140 F.3d
at 30 (citing Pagan Hernandez v. University of Puerto Rico, 107
P.R. Offic. Trans. 795, 807 (1978)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We see nothing in the facts of this case to support
such an exception. Appellants freely chose to litigate in the
superior court and then to forego appeal; "public policy does
not require giving them a chance to revisit [those] choice[s]."
Id.Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Intermedics. Because we decide this case on
preclusion grounds, we do not reach the issue of whether
appellants have a private right of action against Intermedics
under the Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 360c et seq.
Affirmed.
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