Burgos-Hernandez v. Laboy ( 2000 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-2054
ANGEL LUIS BURGOS-HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ZOE LABOY; JORGE COLLAZO-TORRES; JAIME RIVERA;
PEDRO J. RODRIGUEZ-FORTIER; CARMEN L. CORREA-GOMEZ,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
Angel Luis Burgos-Hernandez on brief pro se.
Gustavo A. Gelpi, Solicitor General, Rosa N. Russe Garcia,
Deputy Solicitor General, and Sigfredo Rodriguez-Isaac,
Assistant Solicitor General, on brief for appellees.
December 4, 2000
Per Curiam. Angel Luis Burgos-Hernandez, a
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico prisoner, appeals pro se from
the dismissal of his lawsuit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The district court interpreted the complaint to be
limited to a challenge to Burgos-Hernandez's transfer in
1981 from a prison in Puerto Rico to a federal facility in
Pennsylvania. Burgos-Hernandez makes no argument that this
interpretation was too narrow. The court concluded that the
transfer claim is barred by the one-year statute of
limitations applicable to § 1983 actions in Puerto Rico. We
agree.
Burgos-Hernandez's suggestion that his transfer
claim survives on a continuing violation theory is
meritless. The argument overlooks what "we have termed the
'critical distinction' between a continuing act and a
singular act that brings continuing consequences in its
roiled wake." Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51,
58-59 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Altair Corp. v. Pesquera de
Busquets, 769 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1985)). The transfer was
a discrete event that occurred in 1981. Burgos-Hernandez
cannot avoid the limitations period by claiming continuing
adverse effects from the transfer.1
1The alleged continuing adverse effects of the transfer
include lack of access to Puerto Rico legal materials and denial
Affirmed.
of good-time credits. Our disposition is without prejudice to
Burgos-Hernandez pursuing these matters as separate issues
(i.e., apart from the transfer decision) in a new action(s). We
express no opinion as to whether Burgos-Hernandez has viable,
separate claims or whether the denial of good-time credits can
be pursued in a § 1983 action (as opposed to habeas proceeding).
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