Diabate v. INS ( 2002 )


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  •        [NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 01-2243
    AHMET DIABATE,
    Petitioner, Appellant,
    v.
    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
    Respondent, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
    Ahmet Diabate on brief pro se.
    Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Terri J.
    Scadron, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Lyle D. Jentzer, Attorney,
    Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for appellee.
    April 3, 2002
    Per Curiam. Ahmet Diabate, a native and citizen of
    Guinea, appeals the district court's dismissal of the petition
    he filed for a writ of habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    .
    An Immigration Judge found Diabate removable on account of his
    conviction of an aggravated felony, pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii), but granted his application for withholding
    of removal under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3).               Diabate's § 2241
    petition alleged that his due process rights were violated
    during the INS's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
    ("BIA") because he was never provided a copy of the transcripts
    of the proceedings before the Immigration Judge.          Diabate also
    challenges the BIA's denial of withholding of removal, claiming
    that he established his eligibility for that relief as a matter
    of law.
    Although the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
    Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) eliminated judicial review
    of final removal orders based on an alien's status as an
    aggravated     felon,   federal    courts   "retain    subject   matter
    jurisdiction over [§ 2241] habeas petitions brought by aliens
    facing removal to the extent those petitions are based on
    colorable claims of legal error, that is, colorable claims that
    an   alien's   statutory   or     constitutional   rights   have   been
    violated."     Carranza v. INS, 
    277 F.3d 65
    , 71 (1st Cir. 2002);
    see INS v. St. Cyr, 
    533 U.S. 289
    , 314 n.38 (2001); Mahadeo v.
    Reno, 
    226 F.3d 3
    , 8 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 
    121 S.Ct. 2590
     (2001).
    -2-
    Accordingly, Diabate's due process claim was within
    the scope of § 2241 review.          However, since Diabate's brief to
    the BIA did no more than vaguely allude to the fact that he had
    not received the transcripts, we doubt that the due process
    claim was sufficiently exhausted.             See Bernal-Vallejo v. INS,
    
    195 F.3d 56
    , 64 (1st Cir. 1999); Ravindran v. INS, 
    976 F.2d 754
    , 761 (1st Cir. 1992).          Moreover, even if we assume that the
    claim was exhausted, we find no prejudicial error.1
    Whether     the   district     court    had   jurisdiction     to
    consider the withholding of removal claim is less clear since
    deciding whether petitioner established his eligibility for
    that    relief    involves     a   review   of    both   factual   and   legal
    findings.    In any event, even assuming that the scope of habeas
    review extends to this kind of claim and that the district
    court should have considered it, we think petitioner has failed
    to establish that he was eligible for withholding of removal as
    a   matter   of   law.       The   evidence      petitioner   presented    was
    insufficient to compel a finding that his membership on, or
    defection from, Guinea's national soccer team constituted a
    political opinion or "membership in a particular social group"
    as the BIA has interpreted that phrase.                    See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1
    To the extent Diabate contends that, under Accardi v.
    Shaughnessy, 
    347 U.S. 260
     (1954), no showing of prejudice was
    required because the failure to provide the transcripts violated an
    agency regulation or rule, we note that the argument is not
    properly before us since petitioner did not raise it below. See
    Amcel Corp. v. Int'l Exec. Sales, Inc., 
    170 F.3d 32
    , 35 (1st Cir.
    1999); United States v. Slade, 
    980 F.2d 27
    , 30-31 (1st Cir. 1992).
    In any event, the argument is meritless.
    -3-
    1231(b)(3); Matter of Acosta, 19 I & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA
    1985); accord Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 
    909 F.2d 1
    , 7 (1st Cir.
    1990).
    Affirmed.
    -4-