Jaques v. Town of Londonderry , 54 F. App'x 14 ( 2002 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1872
MICHAEL E. JAQUES,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF LONDONDERRY ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Farris,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Andru H. Volinsky, with whom Stein, Volinsky & Callaghan P.A.
was on brief, for appellant.
Donald E. Gardner, with whom Michael A. Ricker and Devine,
Millimet & Branch, P.A. were on brief, for appellees.
December 20, 2002
_________
*Of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. The case underlying this appeal arose out of
an unfortunate incident that occurred during the early morning
hours of September 16, 1997. At that time, police responded to a
911 call at a residence located at 17 Windsor Boulevard,
Londonderry, New Hampshire. They patiently attempted to take into
custody, and disarm, plaintiff-appellant Michael E. Jaques. As the
drama played out, gunfire erupted. Jaques was severely wounded by
a shot fired by Sgt. Gerard Dussault.
In the aftermath of the shooting, Jaques invoked 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and brought a federal civil rights suit against the
Town of Londonderry (the Town) and several Londonderry police
officers (including Sgt. Dussault, Chief Joseph Ryan, Officer Chris
Gandia, and Officer Jack Slade).1 He alleged, inter alia, that
Sgt. Dussault had used excessive force against him; that Chief Ryan
and the Town had instituted a series of wrong-headed customs,
policies, and practices; and, to make matters worse, that they had
inadequately trained the Town's police officers.
After protracted pretrial discovery, the district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Jaques v.
Town of Londonderry, No. 00-432, 2002 WL 1332491 (D.N.H. June 17,
2002). This appeal followed.
1
On appeal, Jaques pursues only his excessive force claim
against Sgt. Dussault and his municipal liability claims against
the Town and Chief Ryan.
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There is no need to tarry. The district court wrote a
lengthy, closely reasoned opinion addressing, and fully disposing
of, the appellant's claims. Having carefully considered the
record, the briefs, the appellant's assignments of error, and the
parties' arguments, we conclude, without serious question, that the
district court's disposition of the case was correct in all
respects.
We have made it an article of faith "that when a lower
court accurately takes the measure of a case and articulates a
cogent rationale, it serves no useful purpose for a reviewing court
to write at length." Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84,
86 (1st Cir. 2002); accord Maurice v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 235 F.3d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2000); Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods.,
Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1998); Ayala v. Union de
Tronquistas de P.R., 74 F.3d 344, 345 (1st Cir. 1996); Holder's
Capital Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co. (In re San Juan Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litig.), 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). This is a
paradigmatic example of the sort of case in which that principle
should be applied. Consequently, we affirm the district court's
judgment for substantially the reasons elucidated in that court's
thoughtful rescript. We add only four brief comments.
First: The appellant asseverates that summary judgment
was barred by a plethora of factual disputes. He overlooks,
however, that the mere presence of genuinely disputed facts does
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not pretermit summary judgment. "To achieve that end, the dispute
must relate to a material fact." Kearney v. Town of Wareham, ___
F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2002) (emphasis in the original) [No. 02-
1264, slip op. at 10]. A fact is material if — and only if — it
has the capacity to affect the outcome of the case. United States
v. One Parcel of Real Prop. (Great Harbor Neck, New Shoreham,
R.I.), 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992). The disputes to which
the appellant alludes are about facts that are not critical to the
proper adjudication of the summary judgment motion (and which,
therefore, are not material).
Second: As a result of his actions on the morning in
question, the appellant pled guilty to a criminal charge of
reckless conduct. See N.H. Rev. Stat. § 631:3. Under New
Hampshire law, see, e.g., Hopps v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 127 N.H.
508, 511, 514 (1985), that plea admitted the material allegations
contained in the indictment. Thus, the correct starting point for
analysis of the defendants' summary judgment motion was to take, as
a given, that the appellant "recklessly engaged in conduct which
placed another in danger of serious bodily injury." In the
circumstances at hand, that admission was damning. See Napier v.
Town of Windham, 187 F.3d 177, 184-85 (1st Cir. 1999).2
2
We find unpersuasive the appellant's effort to distinguish
Napier on the ground that, here, the admission did not encompass an
imminent threat of harm. While not an element of the offense to
which he pled guilty, the imminence of the threat posed by the
appellant's conduct is an inescapable inference from the undisputed
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Third: There is no question here that the appellant,
known to Sgt. Dussault to be a former Army Ranger, steadily
advanced on Sgt. Dussault; that he was armed; that he refused to
obey the officer's orders; that the officer retreated; that the
appellant fired the first shot; and that another officer (later
identified as Gandia) returned fire. Only then did Sgt. Dussault,
believing that a comrade was under attack and that he himself was
in jeopardy, discharge his weapon. Given the compressed time
frame, the highly charged environment, and the kaleidoscopic
sequence of events, a rational jury could not find that Sgt.
Dussault's return of fire was objectively unreasonable. See Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (explaining that "[t]he
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments —
in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving —
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation"); accord Napier, 187 F.3d at 184-85, 187; Roy v.
Inhabitants of City of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir. 1994).
Fourth: We say only a few words about the claims against
Chief Ryan and the Town. The bottom line is that the failure of
the appellant's cause of action against Dussault dooms his attempt
to impose liability on Chief Ryan and the Town. Without an
underlying constitutional violation — and if Dussault is not
facts of record.
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liable, there is no such violation here — a claim of municipal
liability necessarily fails. See Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46,
50 (1st Cir. 2001); Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1040 (1st Cir.
1996).
We need go no further. We hold that the district court
did not err in granting the defendants' motion for brevis
disposition.
Affirmed.
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