United States v. Nelson ( 2003 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    Nos. 00-1422                                         Volume II of II
    00-1457
    00-1534
    00-1560
    00-1561
    00-1628
    01-1150
    01-1873
    01-2248
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    MILTON A. NELSON-RODRIGUEZ; LUIS A. ROMERO-LÓPEZ;
    MIGUEL A. RODRIGUEZ-RIVERA; EDUARDO ARROYO-MALDONADO;
    CARLOS BONET-GONZALEZ; ANGEL CHEVERE-GONZALEZ;
    LUIS CARIBE-GARCIA; RAÚL RIVERA-PÉREZ; VICTOR M. VALLE-LASALLE,
    Defendants, Appellants.
    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Boudin, Chief Judge,
    Lynch, Circuit Judge,
    and Shadur,* Senior District Judge.
    * Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    Marlene Aponte Cabrera for appellant Nelson-Rodriguez.
    Rafael F. Castro Lang for appellant Romero-López.
    Jose A. Suarez-Santa for appellant Rodriguez-Rivera.
    Raymond L. Sanchez Maceira for appellant Arroyo-Maldonado.
    Mauricio Hernandez Arroyo for appellant Bonet-Gonzalez.
    Raymond Rivera Esteves for appellant Chevere-Gonzalez.
    Marlene Gerdts for appellant Caribe-Garcia.
    Linda George for appellant Rivera-Pérez.
    Luz M. Rios Rosario for appellant Valle-Lasalle.
    William C. Brown, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, with
    whom H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, was on brief for
    appellee.
    February 7, 2003
    H.   Apprendi (Nelson, Rodriguez, Arroyo, Bonet, Chevere, Caribe,
    Rivera, and Valle)
    All of the appellants except for Romero, who pled guilty,
    argue that their sentences were imposed in violation of Apprendi v.
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000).        Apprendi held that "[o]ther than
    the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty
    for a     crime   beyond   the   prescribed   statutory   maximum   must   be
    submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."          Id. at
    2362-63.    The defendants raise several distinct Apprendi claims,
    and we address each in turn.
    1.    Facial Challenge to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    The defendants make a facial challenge to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841.13
    Section 841(a) makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or
    intentionally distribute or possess with intent to distribute a
    controlled substance.        Section 841(b) lists the penalties for
    violation of section 841(a), which vary depending on the drug type
    and quantity.      Defendants say this renders the statute facially
    unconstitutional.
    This argument about § 841 is foreclosed by United States v.
    Collazo-Aponte, 
    281 F.3d 320
     (1st. Cir. 2002), which held that
    "there is nothing in the statutory language that explicitly defies
    13
    The defendants were convicted under 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , not
    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    , but they challenge § 841 because § 846 makes it
    unlawful to attempt or conspire to commit the offenses listed in §
    841. Therefore, the constitutionality of § 846 is dependent upon
    the constitutionality of § 841.
    -55-
    Apprendi" because "[t]he statute is silent as to who makes these
    findings and under what burden of persuasion."      Id. at 325.   Our
    decision in Collazo-Aponte is consistent with the decisions of all
    circuits that have addressed this issue.    See, e.g., United States
    v. Buckland, 
    289 F.3d 558
    , 562 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); United
    States v. McAllister, 
    272 F.3d 228
    , 232 (4th Cir. 2001); United
    States v. Brough, 
    243 F.3d 1078
    , 1079 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 889
     (2001).
    Collazo-Aponte similarly rejected the claim that § 841(b)
    includes a mens rea requirement as to the type and quantity of
    drugs.    Section 841(a) requires the defendant to "knowingly or
    intentionally" possess controlled substances with an intent to
    distribute.   The defendants argue that this mens rea requirement
    applies to all elements of the crime, including those listed in §
    841(b). However, as we held in Collazo-Aponte, "The plain language
    of § 841(b) requires the government to prove only that the offense
    'involved' a particular type and quantity of drugs, not that the
    defendant knew that he was distributing that particular drug type
    and quantity."     
    281 F.3d at 326
    .    The presumption in favor of a
    scienter requirement does not apply in this case because the
    elements in § 841(b) only set the penalty and do not criminalize
    otherwise innocent conduct.
    2.   Vague Allegations in Indictment
    Defendants argue that the indictment was inadequate in that it
    -56-
    made only vague allegations as to the type and quantity of the
    drugs involved in the conspiracy.              It is true that Apprendi
    considers any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases
    the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum to be an
    element of the crime.      But the indictment here easily meets this
    requirement.      The    superseding       indictment    charged   that     the
    defendants possessed with intent to distribute over 1,000 kilograms
    of   cocaine,   five    kilograms   of   heroin,   and    5,000    pounds    of
    marijuana. Furthermore, it provided the drug type and quantity for
    each of the planned importations at issue at trial, stating for
    example that Arroyo and Rivera met "two other persons known to the
    Grand Jury," CIS Hernandez and Diaz, to discuss the importation of
    approximately 1,200 kilograms of cocaine into Puerto Rico in May
    1997, and that Rivera, Torres, and Chevere received a shipment of
    250 kilograms of cocaine in July 1997.           Such detail is more than
    sufficient to meet Apprendi's mandate, and we therefore reject
    defendants' claim.
    3.   Lack of Jury Determination of Drug Type and Quantity
    Defendants argue that their sentences must be vacated because
    the jury did not determine drug type or quantity.             In fact, the
    jury verdict sheet asked simply whether a particular defendant was
    guilty of the one count in the indictment, a copy of which was
    provided to the jury.      The indictment charged that the defendants
    did unlawfully, knowingly, willfully, and intentionally
    combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together with divers
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    other persons to the Grand Jury known and unknown, to possess
    with intent to distribute amounts of cocaine, a Schedule II
    narcotic drug controlled substance, which amounts of cocaine
    exceeded One Thousand (1,000) kilograms; heroin, a Schedule I,
    Narcotic Drug Controlled Substance, which amounts of heroin
    exceeded Five (5) kilograms; and marijuana, a Schedule I
    controlled substance, which amounts exceeded Five Thousand
    (5,000) pounds of marijuana
    (emphasis added).    It also specified particular amounts and kinds
    of drugs for transactions in which those defendants participated.
    We understand the argument to have several parts, including
    first that the jury, at a minimum, had to decide the drug quantity
    and   type   for   the   underlying   conspiracy   (to   the   extent   of
    determining a quantity which sets the maximum sentence under § 841
    that would be applicable to the conspirators).       The argument moves
    to another level with the assertion that it was error for the trial
    judge to deny the requests of several defendants that the jury make
    an individualized determination as to the drug type and quantity
    which could be attributed to that defendant.        Both arguments have
    in common the assertion that Apprendi required these issues to be
    submitted to the jury in light of the fact that the defendants
    received sentences greater than the default statutory maximum. The
    relevant default statutory maximum is based on distribution of less
    than 50 kilograms of marijuana, which produces a maximum sentence
    of five years for first felony drug convictions and ten years if
    there is a prior such conviction.        
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(D).
    It is common ground, and the government concedes, that the
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    defendants were entitled to some form of jury determination as to
    quantity -- whether general or individual is a separate question --
    before being subject to more than the default statutory maximum.
    Here, there was no jury determination of either sort.               One might
    suppose from the indictment quoted above that the jury necessarily
    found the quantities there specified, but in fact review of the
    jury   instructions   confirms   that    the   jury   was   asked    only   to
    determine whether there was a conspiracy as charged, not whether it
    covered any specific amounts of drugs.          The government does not
    claim otherwise.
    However, the jury's failure to determine drug type and amount
    is not fatal if the evidence overwhelmingly establishes the amount.
    United States v. Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
     (2002).           In this instance,
    our review shows that this is so as to all defendants, whether the
    test is plain error or harmless error and whether the figure
    relates to the overall conspiracy or to the individual defendant.
    We will return to these calculations in due course.            But for the
    sake of future litigation, it is useful to say something more about
    both the requirements for preservation of Apprendi claims and the
    problem of general versus specific findings as to amount of drugs.
    We begin with the latter.
    In United States v. Derman, 
    298 F.3d 34
    , 42-44 (1st Cir.
    2002), this court ruled that it was sufficient to satisfy Apprendi
    if the jury found that the conspiracy charged was to distribute, or
    -59-
    possess with intent to distribute, a specific quantity (assuming
    that this figure triggered the higher maximum sentence at issue).
    If   the   defendant   were   convicted   of   participating   in   such   a
    conspiracy, this necessarily meant that he was liable, for Apprendi
    purposes, for the quantity of the overall conspiracy. We therefore
    held that there was no Apprendi error where a jury
    has determined that the conspiracy involved a type and
    quantity of drugs sufficient to justify a sentence above the
    default statutory maximum and has found a particular defendant
    guilty of participation in the conspiracy[.]         [In this
    situation,] the judge lawfully may determine the drug quantity
    attributable to that defendant and sentence him accordingly
    (so long as the sentence falls within the statutory maximum
    made applicable by the jury's conspiracy-wide drug quantity
    determination).
    Derman, 298 F.3d at 43.
    A number of other circuits have taken the same view as to the
    issue required to be decided by the jury if the default maximum is
    to be exceeded.   See United States v. Thomas, 
    274 F.3d 655
     (2d Cir.
    2001); United States v. Patterson, 
    241 F.3d 912
     (7th Cir. 2001);
    United States v. Nance, 
    236 F.3d 820
     (7th Cir. 2000).          Of course,
    such a jury determination by itself merely establishes a new
    statutory maximum under Apprendi; it does not set the defendant's
    guideline sentence, which will often be less than the statutory
    maximum and which depends on numerous determinations specific to
    the individual defendant, including role in the offense, attributed
    relevant conduct, past criminal history, and the like.
    Derman thus answers in this circuit the defendants' claim that
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    they are entitled under Apprendi to a defendant-specific finding by
    the jury as to the amount of drugs properly attributed to an
    individual defendant in a conspiracy case.          But we recognize that
    this is not necessarily the last word on the subject. Conceivably,
    borrowing     from   related   doctrines,   one      could    construct   a
    foreseeability test of some kind -- attributing to each defendant
    the amount that the individual agreed upon, actually handled, and
    reasonably could have foreseen that others would handle -- and
    could ask the jury by special interrogatories to identify such an
    amount.
    Derman    itself   involved   a   relatively    simple    conspiracy:
    growing marijuana in an underground greenhouse, first on Derman's
    property, then on another's.       See 298 F.3d at 37.       In such cases,
    it would be a simple matter for the government to indict on the
    charge that a particular defendant joined an agreement to possess
    the quantity of drugs grown in the greenhouse, with the intent to
    distribute that quantity, and to seek a special verdict to that
    effect.     That simple approach may break down for more complex
    conspiracies involving multiple transactions of different amounts
    of drugs imported at different times, with a shifting cast of
    actors.   A series of problems implicating sentencing then arises.
    A particular defendant, for example, may have agreed to import
    seven kilograms of a drug, but not agreed to import ten, although
    it was reasonably foreseeable to him that his coconspirators would
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    import ten.     Or a particular defendant may have gone in and then
    out of a conspiracy.     See Edwards v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 511
    (1998).   There may be one conspiracy; there may be multiple
    conspiracies.     Or a defendant may raise Pinkerton issues.         See
    Pinkerton v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 640
     (1946).         Some of these
    problems might be solved by more specificity in indictments, by
    tailored instructions, and by special verdicts.
    Such an endeavor would pose issues of its own too numerous to
    recount in full.    It would implicate the instructions that define
    conspiracy, itself a tangled subject with built-in tension.           It
    could also have practical disadvantages for some defendants by
    compromising later arguments they might otherwise make to the judge
    concerning the application of the sentencing guidelines.             But
    Apprendi itself is a recent innovation; it is too early to expect
    all of its implications to be worked out, and only the Supreme
    Court can provide final guidance.        It is enough here that Derman
    provides provisional guidance for the circuit and that the outcome
    for the defendants in this case would not change even if Derman
    were overturned.
    In explaining this last determination, we consider first        the
    level of review to which each defendant is entitled and then
    examine   separately    the   evidence    bearing   on   drug   quantity
    attributable to each individual defendant.
    -62-
    a.     Preservation of Objection
    Valle's appeal raises the question, new to us, of what must be
    done at trial to preserve an Apprendi objection.                Valle was
    convicted at the second trial, after the Apprendi decision.14           In
    our   only    case   holding   an   Apprendi   objection   preserved,   the
    objection was raised both at trial and at sentencing.              United
    States v. Bailey, 
    270 F.3d 83
    , 88-90 (1st Cir. 2001).         Apprendi is
    primarily about sentencing, but it also has implications for
    indictment and trial, at least in relation to a sentence which
    rests on facts which elevate the sentence above the statutory
    minimum.
    For future cases, we think it sufficient if the defendant
    raises the issue at sentencing.        The defendant, of course, has no
    interest in being sentenced above the maximum and no incentive to
    request that the jury specifically determine those facts which
    would carry him above that level.           The government, on the other
    hand, does have an interest in going above the maximum, so it
    should bear the burden of requesting submission of the issue to the
    jury.      Further, a defendant will not know whether there is an
    14
    Apprendi was decided on June 26, 2000. We have been asked
    here to evaluate whether there was Apprendi error in two trials,
    one of which took place before Apprendi was decided and the other
    of which began after Apprendi. These cases were indicted in 1998,
    and the first trial came to verdict in October 1999. Five of the
    six appellants convicted at this first trial were also sentenced
    before the Apprendi decision; Caribe, the sixth, was sentenced on
    December 15, 2000. Valle and Rivera were convicted at the second
    trial, which began in September 2000, after Apprendi.
    -63-
    Apprendi error    until    sentencing,      and   then   only    if   the   court
    considers   a   sentence   above    the    maximum.      An     objection    from
    defendant at the point of sentencing will be timely.
    Rivera requested before the jury was charged that the district
    court submit the question of drug quantity and type to the jury in
    a special verdict. Valle joined in this initial objection. Rivera
    renewed his objection at sentencing, but Valle did not.                       The
    government argues that Valle waived his Apprendi claim by failing
    to renew his objection after the jury was charged or at sentencing.
    The district court denied Rivera and Valle's request, presumably
    because this court had not yet held that Apprendi applied to § 846
    prosecutions; under prior circuit law, the drug quantity and type
    determination for sentencing purposes was for the judge to decide.
    See, e.g., United States v. Lindia, 
    82 F.3d 1154
    , 1160-61 (1st Cir.
    1996).   It was not until January 2, 2001, some three months after
    the trial judge acted here, that this circuit decided that Apprendi
    applied to §§ 841 and 846.      United States v. Baltas, 
    236 F.3d 27
    ,
    40-41 (1st Cir. 2001).
    Thus, this case may be viewed as a transition case to a new
    post-Apprendi    regime,   before    this    court    applied     Apprendi     to
    prosecutions under §§ 841 and 846.           In this transition context,
    where the defendant did raise the issue and ask for a special
    verdict, we have sympathy for the argument that this is enough to
    preserve the Apprendi objection.           Still, given Bousley v. United
    -64-
    States,   
    523 U.S. 614
       (1998),   the   waiver   analysis   is   very
    complicated and we prefer to assume rather than decide that the
    issue was preserved in these circumstances.
    b.   Valle
    Valle's sentence of 360 months exceeds the default statutory
    maximum for cocaine offenses of twenty years and so raises a valid
    claim of Apprendi error.
    The jury found Valle guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
    participating in a drug conspiracy.        The only transaction in which
    Valle was alleged to be a participant was the planned importation
    of 1,100 kilograms of cocaine in the summer of 1997.         Therefore the
    jury must have found that Valle participated in this transaction.
    The only issue is the type and amount of drugs involved in this
    transaction, an issue that appears to have been undisputed at
    trial. See, e.g., United States v. Swatzie, 
    228 F.3d 1278
    , 1283
    (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming where there was no evidentiary basis
    for the jury to find that the defendant had possessed cocaine with
    intent to distribute but that the quantity of cocaine involved was
    less than five grams).
    CI Hernandez testified on direct examination at the second
    trial that the transaction involved 1,100 kilograms of cocaine. CI
    Diaz also testified that the transaction was to involve between
    1,000 and 1,200 kilograms of cocaine.          The drug type and quantity
    was not the subject of any questions on cross-examination; indeed,
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    defense counsels' questions appear to take the drug type and
    quantity as a given.   Nor did defense counsel raise the issue in
    closing arguments.   Finally, Valle does not point to any evidence
    on appeal that would cast doubt on the alleged drug type or
    quantity involved in this transaction. See, e.g., United States v.
    Martinez-Medina, 
    279 F.3d 105
    , 122 (1st Cir. 2002) (dismissing
    defendants' Apprendi claims under harmless error review in part
    because neither defendant seriously denied that the conspiracy
    involved at least five kilograms of cocaine).       We thus conclude
    that the Apprendi error as to Valle was harmless.
    c.   Rivera
    Any Apprendi error against Rivera was also harmless.     Rivera
    was sentenced to life imprisonment, while the default statutory
    maximum for a defendant with a prior felony drug conviction (such
    as Rivera) is ten years.     The government concedes that Rivera
    preserved his Apprendi claim because he raised it at trial and at
    sentencing.   The only issue, therefore, is whether the jury must
    have found Rivera guilty of conspiring to possess at least half a
    kilogram of cocaine with an intent to distribute.    The trial judge
    can sentence a defendant with a prior felony drug conviction to
    life imprisonment based on that amount of cocaine.     See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B).
    At trial, the government produced overwhelming evidence that
    the transactions in which Rivera participated involved at least
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    half a kilogram of cocaine.       CI Hernandez and CI Diaz testified as
    to the amounts involved in two planned cocaine importations of
    1,100    kilograms   and   700   kilograms.     Torres,   the   cooperating
    defendant, testified that Rivera was involved in the successful
    importation of 250 kilograms of cocaine.              Their testimony was
    supported    by   evidence   from   wiretaps    and   other   surveillance.
    Rivera's counsel did not contest the type or amount of drugs
    involved in any of these importations at trial.           Rivera argues on
    appeal that the jury could not have been sure of the drug type or
    quantity involved because these were "dry" conspiracies, which
    means that the government did not seize any drugs.            The amount of
    the drugs was clear, nonetheless.             There is simply no serious
    argument that the jury could have convicted Rivera believing that
    he participated in a conspiracy involving less than half a kilogram
    of cocaine.
    Rivera also relies on our decision in Collazo-Aponte to argue
    that an Apprendi error can never be harmless.          That case does not
    stand for this proposition.         The defendant in Collazo-Aponte did
    not preserve his Apprendi error at trial, which means that this
    court normally would have reviewed his claim under plain error
    review and, as part of that inquiry, examined the evidence against
    him.     We did not do so, however, because the government conceded
    that the error was plain.        Collazo-Aponte, 
    281 F.3d at 324
    .      Thus
    there was no reason for the court to go through the plain error
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    analysis.     Had the government not made this concession, we would
    have reviewed the evidence presented at trial to determine whether
    the defendant's Apprendi claim survived plain error review.
    d.   Arroyo
    Arroyo's sentence of 324 months was also contrary to Apprendi
    because it exceeded the ten-year default statutory maximum for
    prior offenders. Arroyo did not raise an Apprendi claim before the
    district court, and review is for plain error.      Arroyo, who was
    replaced as Rivera's lieutenant when he demanded a million dollars,
    was connected only to the first planned importation, involving
    1,100 kilograms of cocaine. The jury could have convicted him only
    on this basis.     Arroyo did not dispute at trial the drug type or
    amount involved in this planned importation, nor does he dispute
    these facts on appeal.   Moreover, no jury could have failed to find
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy involved some amount
    of cocaine, triggering a maximum sentence of thirty years.       CI
    Hernandez testified in great detail about their plans to import
    1,100 kilograms of cocaine, and CI Diaz testified to some of the
    same facts.    There was no plain error.
    e.   Caribe
    We review Caribe's Apprendi claim for harmless error because
    he raised the claim at sentencing.      Caribe was sentenced to 420
    months, which was above the applicable five-year statutory maximum.
    This sentence would be authorized by 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B) if
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    the conspiracy involved at least half a kilogram of cocaine or more
    than 100 kilograms of marijuana.              Caribe argues that the error was
    not    harmless     because     the    evidence     linking    him    to   the   drug
    conspiracy was slim and relied primarily on the testimony of
    government informants of dubious credibility. The evidence against
    Caribe was much stronger than his re-telling of it; but he has
    simply focused on the wrong target.                The jury did convict him of
    conspiring to possess drugs with an intent to distribute them; the
    only    remaining    issue      is    the   type   and    quantity    of   the   drugs
    involved.
    The jury could not have convicted Caribe without finding that
    he was involved in the conspiracy's final planned importation.
    Caribe did not dispute the type or quantity of drugs involved in
    that plan at trial and does not do so on appeal.                CI Diaz testified
    that the importation involved 700 kilograms of drugs.                       There is
    less evidence about the type of drugs involved.                      Diaz testified
    only that there were "700 kilos" involved; he never explicitly said
    what type of drugs the conspirators planned to import, although one
    question during his cross-examination referred to cocaine, and he
    did not correct defense counsel.               Nonetheless, it does not matter
    for Apprendi purposes what type of drug was involved.                       The only
    drugs    charged     in   the    indictment        were    cocaine,    heroin,    and
    marijuana. Under § 841(b)(1)(B), Caribe's sentence was permissible
    regardless of what type of drugs were involved, as long as the
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    conspiracy involved at least 700 kilograms of any of these types of
    drugs.
    f.   Bonet
    Bonet's sentence of 360 months was contrary to Apprendi
    because it exceeded the ten-year default statutory maximum for
    prior offenders.      His sentence would be valid under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(D) as long as he conspired to possess with intent to
    distribute any amount of cocaine or at least fifty grams of
    marijuana.   He argues that we should review his claim for harmless
    error because his co-defendant Nelson made an Apprendi objection.
    However, the trial judge required each defense counsel to make
    their own objections, and Bonet's counsel did not join in Nelson's
    Apprendi objection.    We review Bonet's claim for plain error.
    Like Caribe, the evidence tied Bonet to the conspiracy's final
    planned importation in the fall of 1997.    The same analysis that
    applied to Caribe also applies to Bonet: there was overwhelming
    evidence of a quantity of "700 kilos," and that quantity of drugs
    is sufficient to justify his sentence regardless of whether the
    type of narcotic was cocaine, heroin, or marijuana.   See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B).
    g.   Nelson
    Nelson's sentence of 293 months raises a potential Apprendi
    issue because it exceeded the ten-year default statutory maximum
    for prior offenders.     His sentence would be permissible if the
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    conspiracy involved at least 50 kilograms of marijuana or any
    amount of cocaine.     See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(D).      Nelson made an
    Apprendi objection only during trial; we review his claim for
    harmless error.
    The primary evidence against Nelson at trial concerned the
    planned importations of 36 kilograms of cocaine and approximately
    6,000 pounds of marijuana.          The jury could not have convicted
    Nelson without finding that he was involved in at least one of
    these ventures.     The Apprendi error was harmless because evidence
    establishing the amount and type of drugs involved in both of these
    plans was overwhelming and undisputed at trial.         CI Hernandez and
    cooperating   defendant    Torres    both   testified   that   Nelson   had
    attempted to bring 36 kilograms of cocaine into Puerto Rico. There
    was some dispute as to Nelson's motivations for participating in
    the transaction, but he never disputed the type or quantity of
    drugs involved.     As to marijuana, the government at trial played a
    recording of a conversation between Rivera and Nelson in which they
    discussed importing 6,000 pounds of marijuana.          Nelson offered no
    evidence to rebut this point, and at sentencing did not dispute the
    contention that the plan involved 6,000 pounds of marijuana.
    h.   Chevere
    Chevere's sentence of 540 months raised a potential Apprendi
    issue because it exceeded the five-year default statutory maximum.
    The sentence would be permissible under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A) as
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    long as he was involved in a conspiracy involving at least five
    kilograms of cocaine or 1,000 kilograms of marijuana.                 Chevere
    argues that his claim should be reviewed for harmless error because
    he says his counsel raised an Apprendi claim at sentencing.               The
    transcript   of   his    sentencing    hearing   shows   that   his   counsel
    challenged only Chevere's involvement in the conspiracy and the
    base level calculation, not the amount or type of drugs.          We review
    his claim for plain error.
    Although there was not evidence that Chevere conspired to
    import marijuana, the evidence did tie him to the successful
    importation of 250 kilograms of cocaine.          Torres, the cooperating
    defendant, testified that Chevere was in charge of security for
    that importation.       There was no dispute about the type or quantity
    of drugs involved. Torres was directly involved in the importation
    and testified that he and the other conspirators imported 250
    kilograms of cocaine.        He described in detail how he and Rivera
    split the load and how Rivera planned to send his share to New York
    for distribution. CI Hernandez also testified that Rivera told him
    that he successfully imported 250 kilograms of cocaine into Puerto
    Rico.
    Chevere claims that the transaction never took place despite
    Torres and Hernandez's testimony to the contrary.          To support this
    claim, he points to the fact that the FBI, which had Rivera's
    organization under surveillance, did not see the delivery of
    -72-
    cocaine.    However, the jury necessarily found that the transaction
    did   occur,    whether   or   not   it   was   observed    by   investigators
    directly.      There was no evidence that this importation involved a
    smaller amount of cocaine.
    i.   Rodriguez
    Rodriguez's sentence of 151 months was contrary to Apprendi
    because it exceeded the default statutory maximum of five years.
    The sentence would be permissible as long as Rodriguez participated
    in a conspiracy involving any amount of cocaine.                 We review his
    claim for plain error because he did not raise it at trial.
    The only evidence at trial relating to Rodriguez tied him to
    the successful importation of 250 kilograms of cocaine.                  Taped
    telephone conversations played at trial showed that Rodriguez
    delivered the cocaine imported in that transaction to New York,
    where it was distributed by Figueroa, Caribe's brother-in-law. The
    jury could not have convicted Rodriguez without believing that he
    was involved in this aspect of the conspiracy.             The amount and type
    of drugs in the successful importation were undisputed at trial,
    and thus we reject Rodriguez's Apprendi claim.
    I.    Substantial Assistance Departure (Romero)
    Romero pled guilty and presents one issue, a sentencing issue,
    on his appeal.       He argues that the sole reason the government
    failed to move that he be given a Section 5K1.1 sentence reduction
    for substantial assistance was an impermissible one: it was in
    -73-
    retaliation for his telling the truth in his third debriefing, a
    truth which was exculpatory as to codefendant Ortiz.
    U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 provides: "Upon motion of the government
    stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in
    the   investigation    or   prosecution       of    another      person    who   has
    committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines."
    See also 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (e) ("Upon motion of the Government, the
    court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level
    established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a
    defendant's      substantial     assistance        in   the    investigation      or
    prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.").
    Romero's plea agreement stated that "[t]he United States reserves
    its option to seek any departure from the applicable sentencing
    guidelines, pursuant to Section 5K1.1 . . . if in its discretion
    the United States determines that such a departure is appropriate."
    The agreement further specified that "[t]he defendant agrees that
    the   decision    whether   to   file   such   motion         rests   in   the   sole
    discretion of the United States."
    The district court, after hearing proffers from both counsel,
    rejected the argument and declined to take testimony from Agent
    Plichta, who conducted the debriefings at issue here.                        Romero
    argued that there was error in not holding an evidentiary hearing
    and in not compelling the government to file such a motion.
    Our review of questions of law is de novo; our review of the
    -74-
    fact-based conclusion of the district court as to the substantial
    assistance question is for clear error.                 See United States v. Doe,
    
    233 F.3d 642
    , 643-44 (1st Cir 2000).
    Implicit    in    the   question      presented        is    an    issue   of   law:
    assuming Romero's claims were true, whether it is permissible for
    the   government       to   decline   to    seek    a       substantial      assistance
    departure in retaliation for a cooperating defendant's truthful
    disclosure of exculpatory information about codefendants.                          In this
    area, the government acts under two constraints. First, the law is
    clear   that   the     government     may    not    base      its       decision    on   an
    unconstitutional motive, such as racial prejudice.                          See Wade v.
    United States, 
    504 U.S. 181
    , 185-86 (1992).                       Second, because the
    government entered into a plea agreement with Romero, it had to
    carry out in good faith the obligations it assumed under the
    agreement. See United States v. Alegria, 
    192 F.3d 179
    , 186-87 (1st
    Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Davis, 
    247 F.3d 322
    , 325 (1st
    Cir. 2001).      This good-faith requirement applies even though the
    plea agreement specifies that the "government retains absolute
    discretion with respect to the filing of a section 5K1.1 motion."
    Alegria, 
    192 F.3d at 186-87
    .
    Whether viewed as part of the Wade obligation or the Alegria
    obligation, the government may not base its refusal to seek a
    substantial      assistance     departure      on       a    defendant's         truthful
    disclosure of exculpatory information.              We can think of few things
    -75-
    more corrosive to the criminal justice system than prosecutorial
    retaliation against a witness for telling the truth. If these were
    the government's grounds, they would both be impermissible and have
    no rational relationship to a legitimate government end.                 Cf.
    Davis, 
    247 F.3d at 326
    .
    The district court held that Romero had not made a threshold
    showing of improper motivation by the government. See Alegria, 
    192 F.3d at 187
    .    In explaining to the district court its reasons for
    not filing a Section 5K1.1 motion, the government used language
    that was likely to arouse suspicion.        It complained that, because
    of Romero's statements and writings produced at the third of his
    four debriefings, the prosecution was forced to provide defense
    counsel with Brady and Jencks material. Appropriately concerned by
    these statements, the district judge investigated further and took
    proffers from both counsel.
    In   the   end,   the   district   court   was   satisfied   that   the
    government had reason to think Romero was not truthful at the last
    two debriefings and, while he had given assistance, he had not
    given substantial assistance. Romero's untruthfulness was shown by
    the fact that he did not disclose certain information helpful to
    Ortiz and Nelson until his third debriefing, and that this newly-
    disclosed information appeared to be inconsistent with information
    provided by another cooperating witness. As the trial judge noted,
    the government had told the court it intended to use Romero as a
    -76-
    prosecution witness at trial but then did not do so.        This decision
    not to call Romero as a witness was entirely consistent with the
    government's view, expressed at sentencing, that Romero was not
    truthful.    And, as the district court aptly noted, substantial
    assistance is a higher standard for a defendant to meet than mere
    cooperation.      Romero's   failure   to   be   forthcoming    in   earlier
    debriefings evidenced his failure to meet this higher standard.
    When faced with such Section 5K1.1 claims where there is a
    plea   agreement,   the   government     bears   the   modest   burden    of
    production, not persuasion.        Alegria, 
    192 F.3d at 187
    .             The
    government must offer "facially adequate reasons." 
    Id. at 188
    . It
    did so here.      The judge, who sat through a lengthy trial and
    inquired into this matter, found nothing impermissible about the
    government's reasons for declining to seek a substantial assistance
    departure.     Given the judge's extensive exploration of the issue
    with counsel, no separate evidentiary hearing was required.
    J.   Supervised Release Terms (Bonet and Rodriguez)
    Bonet and Rodriguez challenge the length of their terms of
    supervised release.    The district judge sentenced Bonet to twenty
    years of supervised release and Rodriguez to fifteen years.            Both
    defendants claim that these terms were invalid because they were
    disproportionately longer as a percentage of their total years of
    imprisonment than their codefendants' terms.            This argument is
    foreclosed by 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (a), which establishes the limited
    -77-
    circumstances in which a defendant can seek review of his sentence.
    As the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Rios-Calderon, 
    80 F.3d 194
    , 198 (7th Cir. 1996), "nothing in § 3742(a) allows review
    of a sentence imposed in conformity with the Guidelines on the
    ground that a codefendant was treated differently."                  See also
    United States v. Youngpeter, 
    986 F.2d 349
    , 356 (10th Cir. 1993)
    ("Sentencing differences due to individual conduct as considered by
    the      Sentencing   Guidelines       does      not    make     a   sentence
    disproportionate.").
    Rodriguez also argues that his supervised release term is
    barred by U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2.         We note at the outset that this claim
    was nearly forfeited because of the skeletal manner in which it was
    raised.     See Mass. Sch. of Law v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 
    142 F.3d 26
    , 43
    (1st   Cir.   1998)   (claim   is    forfeited    if   it   is   raised   in   a
    perfunctory manner unaccompanied by developed argumentation).              But
    we will give Rodriguez the benefit of the doubt and find that the
    claim was not forfeited. Rodriguez's counsel also failed to object
    to the length of the supervised release term at sentencing, which
    would normally mean that his claim could be reviewed only for plain
    error.    But we will again give Rodriguez the benefit of the doubt
    because he was not given advance notice in the presentence report
    or by the judge or prosecutor that he could be sentenced to more
    than five years of supervised release, the maximum term specified
    in the guidelines.
    -78-
    We now turn to the merits of Rodriguez's claim.      U.S.S.G. §
    5D1.2 states that supervised release terms for Class A or B
    felonies shall be "at least three years but not more than five
    years."   The relevant statute, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A), provides
    that the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of supervised
    release of "at least five years."   This court's recent decision in
    United States v. Cortes-Claudio held that these provisions should
    be read together to mean that a defendant convicted under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A) can be sentenced to only five years of supervised
    release unless the judge makes a permissible upward departure from
    the guidelines.   
    312 F.3d 17
    , 18-19 (1st Cir. 2002).   The judge can
    make such a departure if he finds that there are aggravating
    circumstances "of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
    consideration by the Sentencing Commission," and if the parties are
    given advance notice that the judge is contemplating making such a
    departure and of the grounds on which the judge is contemplating
    departing.   
    Id. at 24
    ; see also United States v. Burns, 
    501 U.S. 129
    , 138-39 (1991).
    The district judge in this case did not anticipate this
    court's decision in Cortes-Claudio and mistakenly concluded that
    the guidelines did not apply to the length of a supervised release
    term imposed under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    .      Thus he did not give the
    parties notice of a possible upward departure or make the required
    findings of aggravating circumstances to support the departure. We
    -79-
    accordingly vacate Rodriguez's fifteen-year supervised release term
    and remand to the district court for re-sentencing as to the length
    of the term of supervised release.                On remand, should the district
    court find that there are aggravating circumstances of a kind, or
    to   a        degree,   not   adequately    taken   into   consideration   by   the
    Sentencing Commission, it must still give the parties advance
    notice that it is contemplating departing and the grounds of the
    possible departure and give them an opportunity to respond.
    K.   Other Sentencing Guidelines Issues
    1. Drug quantities (Caribe, Bonet, Valle, Chevere, Arroyo,
    Nelson, Rodriguez)
    In sentencing, the district court took into account the amount
    of drugs that could be attributed to each defendant.                       Several
    defendants challenge these determinations, which are distinct from
    claims that the determination of quantity by the judge rather than
    the jury violated Apprendi.15              We review the trial court's factual
    determinations at sentencing for clear error. United States v.
    Damon, 
    127 F.3d 139
    , 141 (1st Cir. 1997). Legal interpretations of
    the sentencing guidelines are reviewed de novo. United States v.
    15
    As we noted above, Apprendi only requires the jury to
    determine the drug type and quantity involved in the conspiracy.
    After the jury has made this determination, the judge can make
    individualized   determinations  about   the   amount  of   drugs
    attributable to each defendant. Even though the jury did not make
    its initial determination, we found no reversible error as to any
    defendant, so that the judge could still determine the amount of
    drug attributable to each defendant.
    -80-
    Ranney, 
    298 F.3d 74
    , 80 (1st Cir. 2002).
    a.   Caribe
    Caribe argues that the court erred in setting his base offense
    level at 38, which is applicable to a quantity of 150 kilograms or
    more of cocaine.         The court set the base offense level after
    determining that 745 kilograms of cocaine could be attributed to
    Caribe.    The court held that Caribe was directly involved in the
    conspiracy to import 700 kilograms of cocaine in the fall of 1997.
    This determination was consistent with the testimony of CI Diaz,
    who testified that Caribe was a key player in several meetings to
    plan the details of this importation. It also attributed to Caribe
    45   kilograms     of   cocaine   out    of    the   successful    250   kilogram
    importation, which he sent to his brother-in-law in New York for
    distribution.       Torres had testified that Caribe was in charge of
    moving some amount of cocaine up to New York, and that he believed
    the amount to be "about forty-five" kilograms.               It was not clear
    error for the court to conclude that Caribe was responsible, at
    least in part, for distributing 45 kilograms of cocaine.                     This
    total quantity of 745 kilograms of cocaine supports the court's
    decision to set Caribe's base offense level at 38.
    b.   Bonet
    The court found Bonet responsible for at least 150 kilograms
    of   cocaine,    based    on   Bonet's        involvement   with   the   planned
    importation of 700 kilograms of cocaine.               This determination was
    -81-
    not   clear    error   considering       Bonet's    role    in     planning     this
    importation.
    Bonet argues that the court should have reduced the amount of
    cocaine attributed to the defendants because of the intensive
    involvement of CIS Hernandez and Diaz in the conspiracy.                    This is
    a type of improper sentencing factor manipulation argument, for
    which Bonet has the burden.        As stated in United States v. Montoya,
    "garden variety manipulation claims are largely a waste of time."
    
    62 F.3d 1
    , 4 (1st Cir. 1995).         It is insufficient to say that the
    idea of the conspiracy originated with undercover agents, or that
    conduct was     encouraged    by   the    government,      or     that    the   crime
    exceeded in degree or kind what the defendant had done before.
    Instead the defendant must show that elements like these were so
    extensive     that   "the   government's     conduct       must    be     viewed   as
    extraordinary misconduct."          
    Id.
     (internal quotations omitted).
    This standard is high in part because the defendant has the
    opportunity to raise an entrapment defense at trial.
    Bonet has fallen far short of this standard; he offers nothing
    more than conclusory allegations. Furthermore, Hernandez testified
    that the Colombians, not he or Diaz, set the amount involved in the
    cocaine     importations.       For      example,    in     the     700    kilogram
    importation, Hernandez testified that the Colombians wanted the
    organization to import 700 kilograms of cocaine as a test to
    determine whether its members had the capability to import larger
    -82-
    quantities of drugs in the future.    Bonet also bragged to Diaz that
    he and his team had been drug trafficking for years.           It is
    unlikely, therefore, that government agents encouraged Bonet or his
    coconspirators to engage in conduct in which they would otherwise
    have been unwilling to participate.
    c.   Valle
    Valle argues that the judge erred in attributing at least 150
    kilograms of cocaine to him.      He did not raise this claim at
    sentencing, and therefore it is waived. United States v. Shattuck,
    
    961 F.2d 1012
    , 1015 (1st Cir. 1992) ("We do not review sentencing
    guideline disputes which were not preserved before the district
    court."). We have discretion to review waived guidelines claims in
    "horrendous cases where a gross miscarriage of justice would
    occur."   United States v. Haggert, 
    980 F.2d 8
    , 11 (1st Cir. 1992).
    This is not one of those cases.   The evidence overwhelmingly tied
    Valle to the planned importation of 1,100 kilograms of drugs.     CI
    Hernandez testified extensively about Valle's involvement in this
    transaction and the amount and type of drugs involved.
    d.   Chevere
    Chevere argues that the district court erred in finding that
    he was involved in the importation of 250 kilograms of cocaine.
    Torres testified that Chevere was in charge of security for this
    successful transaction.    Chevere argues that the district court
    should not have used this transaction to set Chevere's base offense
    -83-
    level, because an FBI agent who was watching the delivery location
    testified that he did not actually see the drugs being delivered.
    Whether the FBI agent saw it or not, there was ample additional
    evidence at trial that the transaction took place, and that Chevere
    was involved in it.   There was no clear error.
    e.   Arroyo
    Arroyo argues error in the attribution of 1,200 kilograms of
    cocaine to him because the government did not show that he had the
    capability to transport such a large amount of cocaine.     Arroyo
    argues that the government never proved that Arroyo owned a boat
    that could be used to bring the cocaine to Puerto Rico.   Under the
    sentencing guidelines, if a planned drug transaction does not take
    place, the sentencing court should base the defendant's drug-
    quantity finding on the negotiated amount of drugs, in this case
    1,200 kilograms. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.12.     However, the
    court can use a lower amount if "the defendant establishes that he
    or she did not intend to provide, or was not reasonably capable of
    providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance."
    Id.   Thus the burden is on Arroyo to show that he was not capable
    of transporting 1,200 kilograms of cocaine. Arroyo has not met his
    burden in this case and there was no clear error.
    f.   Nelson
    Nelson argues that the district court erred in attributing
    99.5 kilograms of cocaine to him.     The court found that he was
    -84-
    involved in the successful importation of 250 kilograms of cocaine
    and had a role in distributing 50 kilograms from that shipment.
    Torres testified that Rivera gave Nelson some unknown percentage of
    Rivera's own share of the cocaine from this shipment.                Rivera also
    gave a percentage of his share to Caribe and to Chevere, but Torres
    did   not   know    exactly   how   much   each   of   the   three   defendants
    received; he only knew that together they received 50 kilograms.
    Nelson and Rivera, in recorded conversations, discussed the price
    at which they would be able to sell the cocaine.                The court also
    found that he had a role in the attempted importation of 36
    kilograms of cocaine and the transaction involving 6,000 pounds of
    marijuana.      It also could have based its overall findings on
    Nelson's more general involvement in distributing Rivera's share of
    the cocaine.       We see no clear error in the court's conclusion.
    g.    Rodriguez
    Rodriguez argues that the district court erred in determining
    that his base offense level was 34, which is applicable when the
    judge attributes at least 15 kilograms of cocaine to the defendant.
    The government alleged that Rodriguez was involved in delivering to
    Figueroa in New York approximately 45 kilograms of cocaine from the
    250   kilogram      shipment.        The    government       introduced   taped
    conversations in which Rivera told Figueroa that he had arranged
    for someone to deliver the cocaine to Figueroa.                The day before,
    Rodriguez had flown to New York from San Juan.           The government also
    -85-
    introduced a recording of a conversation in which Rodriguez and
    Rivera discussed     the    price   of   cocaine.       At   trial,    Rodriguez
    disputed that he had been involved in the cocaine delivery, but the
    jury could not have convicted Rodriguez otherwise.                     The only
    remaining issue is the amount of drugs that Rodriguez brought to
    New York; Torres testified that Rivera sent "about 45" kilograms
    there.     It was not clear error for the judge to attribute at least
    fifteen of those kilograms of cocaine to Rodriguez.
    2.    Minor Participant Adjustment (Bonet)
    Bonet argues that the court erred in not granting him a two-
    level reduction     under   U.S.S.G.     §   3B1.2(b)    for   being    a   minor
    participant in the conspiracy.           The commentary to this section
    states that "a minor participant means any participant who is less
    capable than most other participants, but whose role could not be
    described as minimal."       U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) cmt. n.5.            In seeking
    a § 3B1.2 adjustment, a defendant "has the burden of proving that
    he is both less culpable than most others involved in the offense
    of   conviction   and   less   culpable      than   most     other    miscreants
    convicted of comparable crimes."         United States v. Ortiz-Santiago,
    
    211 F.3d 146
    , 149 (1st Cir. 2000).              The court did not err in
    refusing to grant this adjustment.           The testimony at trial showed
    that Bonet participated in several of the meetings in which the
    conspirators planned the importation of 700 kilograms of cocaine.
    Bonet was also responsible for testing the radio equipment that
    -86-
    would be used.   Finally, Bonet told CI Diaz that he had been part
    of Rivera's drug trafficking team for many years.    It was entirely
    reasonable to conclude that Bonet was no minor participant.
    3.   Special Skills Enhancements (Valle and Bonet)
    Section 3B1.3 of the sentencing guidelines provides that the
    district court can increase the offense level two levels if the
    defendant "used a special skill, in a manner that significantly
    facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense."       The
    commentary to this section states, "'Special skill' refers to a
    skill not possessed by members of the general public and usually
    requiring substantial education, training or licensing. Examples
    would include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists, and
    demolition experts."    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.3.     We review the
    district court's legal interpretation of the term "special skill"
    de novo and its factual application for clear error. United States
    v. Noah, 
    130 F.3d 490
    , 499 (1st Cir. 1997).
    The district court increased Valle's offense level by two
    levels because it found that Valle was going to be the boat captain
    for the first planned importation of 1,100 kilograms of cocaine,
    thus exercising a special skill.        Valle did not object to this
    enhancement at his sentencing hearing, and therefore he waived the
    claim.    Haggert, 
    980 F.2d at 10-11
    .    Even if this claim were not
    waived, the record amply supports the determination.
    The district court enhanced Bonet's offense level by two
    -87-
    levels because it found that his coconspirators were "counting on
    his skills as a person knowledgeable with communication equipment."
    The record establishes that Bonet had a special skill.                   CI Diaz
    testified that on October 30, 1997, Bonet conducted a test of the
    20/40    radio   that    the   conspirators       were   planning    to   use   to
    communicate with the Colombians in order to complete the planned
    importation of 700 kilograms of cocaine.            A 20/40 radio is one that
    can be used to communicate with any part of the world.                      Bonet
    showed Diaz the antenna he had put on a tree outside his house.
    Bonet then set up the radio and tried to contact the Colombians;
    unbeknownst to him, the transmission was intercepted by the FBI.
    Bonet conducted the test over high and low frequency channels and
    had given the Colombians the same list of frequencies so that the
    two groups could communicate.         This evidence shows that Bonet had
    a special skill within the meaning of § 3B1.3.                    Accord United
    States v. Malgoza, 
    2 F.3d 1107
    , 1110 (11th Cir. 1993) (term
    "special skills" applies to an "advanced level of radio operating
    ability").
    A   defendant      does   not   need    to   have   formal   education     or
    professional stature to have a special skill within the meaning of
    § 3B1.3.    Noah, 
    130 F.3d at 500
    .          Instead "a special skill can be
    derived from experience or from self-tutelage."             
    Id.
         Nonetheless,
    the defendant must possess skills that members of the general
    public would not have.         Bonet's knowledge was more extensive than
    -88-
    merely turning on a radio and speaking; he also knew how to
    assemble the radio and its antenna and understood how to determine
    and locate the frequencies necessary to communicate with the
    Colombians.
    The   issue    remains      whether      Bonet's    skill   "significantly
    facilitated the commission . . . of the offense."                       U.S.S.G.
    § 3B1.3.      Diaz did not testify that Bonet would be the person
    operating the radios on the day the shipment was delivered.                    Two
    reasonable inferences support a determination that Bonet's special
    skill substantially facilitated commission of the crime. We review
    both possible determinations for clear error.
    First,    Bonet's      radio   test      in   and   of   itself   aided   the
    conspiracy.     He was responsible for making sure that Rivera's
    organization had the necessary radio equipment to handle such a
    large importation of drugs. The Colombians would not be willing to
    entrust Rivera's organization with the shipment if it could not
    make this showing.         Even though Bonet was unable to contact the
    Colombians during his radio test, it did show Diaz (who, as an
    intermediary,      acted    as   the   Colombians'       representative)       that
    Rivera's organization had at least some of the necessary equipment
    and skills.
    Second, an inference that Bonet would be the one operating the
    radios the day of the shipment could not be clear error.                   Bonet
    played an integral part in the meetings.             He told Diaz that he was
    -89-
    skilled as a boat captain, but that he would not be the boat
    captain for this shipment.        Bonet argues that he never got a chance
    to use his special skills to the full extent contemplated by his
    conspirators.       However, U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a) also covers intended
    offense     conduct    that    can   be   established      with   "reasonable
    certainty."     It was not clear error to conclude with reasonable
    certainty    that     Bonet   intended    to   use   his   special   skill   to
    facilitate the crime.         See United States v. Downing, 
    297 F.3d 52
    ,
    65 (2d Cir. 2002).
    4.    Firearm Enhancement (Caribe)
    The district court increased Caribe's offense level by two
    levels because the court determined that Rivera had a weapon in
    Caribe's presence during part of the planning of the 700 kilogram
    importation.     U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) provides that the judge can
    increase the offense level by two levels "if a dangerous weapon
    (including a firearm) was possessed."          The comment to this section
    states that the enhancement applies if a weapon was present, unless
    it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
    offense.     See U.S.S.G. §     2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3.
    The judge found that Caribe was present when Rivera gave CI
    Diaz a gun to give to CI Hernandez.            Diaz testified that he met
    with Caribe and Rivera on August 16, 1997.                 At the end of the
    meeting, Rivera gave Diaz a gun that he asked Diaz to give to
    Hernandez.    Rivera told Diaz that Hernandez could use the gun if he
    -90-
    had to because it was "clean."            Caribe claims that he left the
    meeting before Rivera gave Diaz the gun, but this claim is not
    supported by the record.       Caribe was the last person to arrive at
    the meeting, but Rivera gave Diaz the gun at the end of the meeting
    as they were saying good-bye.      It was not clear error for the judge
    to determine that Caribe remained at the meeting at this point.
    Caribe next argues that the government did not establish the
    required nexus between the gun and the conspiracy. The prosecution
    must show that the defendant (or in a conspiracy case, one of his
    coconspirators) possessed a weapon during the offense.                United
    States v. McDonald, 
    121 F.3d 7
    , 10 (1st Cir. 1997); United States
    v. Thornton, 
    306 F.3d 1355
    , 1358 (3rd Cir. 2002).           The prosecution
    does not have to show that the defendant or his coconspirators
    actually used the gun in perpetrating the offense or intended to do
    so.   McDonald, 
    121 F.3d at 10
    .        Once the prosecution has made this
    showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that a
    connection between the weapon and the crime was clearly improbable.
    
    Id.
         Caribe argues that the prosecution did not make its required
    showing because it relied on the uncorroborated testimony of CI
    Diaz.    It is routine, and certainly not clear error, for the trial
    judge    to   credit   a   witness's    testimony   in   making   sentencing
    determinations, even if the testimony is not corroborated by other
    evidence.      Nor did the judge err in determining that Caribe's
    coconspirator possessed the gun in connection with the conspiracy.
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    5.    Leadership Enhancement (Caribe)
    Caribe next argues that the court erred in increasing his
    offense level by three levels after determining that Caribe was a
    manager or supervisor in the organization.                 Section 3B1.1(b)
    permits the court to enhance the sentence if "the defendant was
    manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the
    criminal    activity   involved   five    or   more    participants   or   was
    otherwise extensive."      The court based its determination on CI
    Diaz's testimony about Caribe's role in planning the importation of
    700 kilograms of cocaine in the fall of 1997.             For example, Diaz
    testified that Caribe "controlled all of the beaches and the group
    from Humacao, including the captain and the boats."             Caribe also
    told Diaz that Ortiz, who was supposed to captain the boat that
    would bring the drugs into Puerto Rico, worked for him.           According
    to Diaz, Caribe said that "they [Rivera and Caribe] had the
    captains, the boats, and the personnel that was needed to carry out
    the job."     This evidence is sufficient to support the court's
    determination.
    6.    Downward Departure Requests (Valle and Nelson)
    The district court denied motions by Valle and Nelson for
    downward departures in their sentences.               Valle argues that the
    district judge abused his discretion by failing to depart from the
    sentencing guidelines because of a claimed disparity between his
    sentence and the sentence of some of his coconspirators.                   The
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    argument       fails;    a    court    cannot       depart      from    the        sentencing
    guidelines in order to correct a disparity between the sentences of
    coconspirators. See United States v. Ortiz-Santiago, 
    211 F.3d 146
    ,
    150     (1st     Cir.        2000)    ("Disparity          in    sentencing           amongst
    coconspirators, without more, is not enough to justify a downward
    departure.").16 Nelson argues for a downward departure based on his
    necessity defense that he participated in the conspiracy only to
    save    his    kidnapped      nephew.        This    was    committed        to     the   non-
    reviewable discretion of the district court.                     See United States v.
    Romero, 
    32 F.3d 641
    , 653 (1st Cir. 1994).
    L.     Procedural Errors at Sentencing (Caribe)
    1.     Right to Speedy Sentencing
    Caribe claims that his right to a fair trial was violated
    because of excessive delay in his sentencing. Caribe was convicted
    on     October    1,     1999.        All    objections         to     the     Presentence
    Investigation Report were submitted by April 25, 2000, but he was
    not sentenced until December 15, 2000.                 Thus, over fourteen months
    passed between the date of conviction and the date of sentencing.
    The    Sixth     Amendment      provides      that      "[i]n        all     criminal
    prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
    public trial."          U.S. Const. amend. VI.          The Supreme Court has not
    16
    It is far from clear that there was any disparity. Valle's
    sentence of 360 months was greater than four coconspirators'
    sentences and equal to or less than four other coconspirators'
    sentences.
    -93-
    definitively held that this right extends to the sentencing phase.
    See Pollard v. United States, 
    352 U.S. 354
    , 361 (1957) (assuming
    without deciding that the sentence is part of the trial for
    purposes of the Sixth Amendment). However, most circuits that have
    addressed this issue have held that the right to a speedy trial
    extends to this phase.   See, e.g., United States v. Yelverton, 
    197 F.3d 531
    , 535-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Burkett v. Cunningham, 
    826 F.2d 1208
    , 1220 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Reese, 
    568 F.2d 1246
    ,
    1252-53 (6th Cir. 1977).   Several other circuits, including this
    one, have assumed without deciding that the right extends to
    sentencing.   See, e.g., Katz v. King, 
    627 F.2d 568
    , 576 (1st Cir.
    1980); United States v. Rothrock, 
    20 F.3d 709
    , 711 (7th Cir. 1994).
    No circuit has held that the right to a speedy trial does not apply
    at this phase.17
    We assume for the purposes of this appeal that the right to a
    speedy trial extends to sentencing.      We analyze the defendant's
    claim under the four factors that the Supreme Court set out in
    Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 530 (1972):       the length of the
    delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of his
    right; and prejudice to the defendant.    None of these factors is a
    necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation
    17
    A judge is also required under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a) to
    sentence a defendant "without unnecessary delay." Caribe has not
    argued that the delay in his case violated this rule, and therefore
    we do not address whether he would have a possible claim
    thereunder.
    -94-
    of the right to a speedy sentencing.    See 
    id. at 533
    .
    Applying these factors to the case at hand, we conclude that
    any right to speedy sentencing was not violated.        A fourteen-month
    delay between the date of conviction and the date of sentencing is
    long enough to trigger an inquiry into the other Barker factors.
    See Perez v. Sullivan, 
    793 F.2d 249
    , 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding
    a fifteen-month delay long enough to provoke an inquiry into the
    remaining three factors); see also Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 530
     ("Until
    there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no
    necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the
    balance"); Katz, 
    627 F.2d at 577
     (finding that a four-month delay
    is   "not   unreasonable   and   certainly   not   of    constitutional
    dimensions").
    Caribe does not make a persuasive showing on any of the other
    factors.    It took approximately seven months for the probation
    officer to complete the presentence report and for the parties to
    submit their objections.    This time was not excessive given the
    length of the trial, the number of defendants, and the complexity
    of the evidence, and indeed Caribe has not challenged this portion
    of the delay.     Much of the later delay can be attributed to
    Caribe's own motions.   He filed a series of motions to continue his
    sentencing: the first such motions were filed on December 17, 1999
    and February 1, 2000 and were denied on January 13, 2000 and
    February 4, 2000, respectively; the court acceded to later requests
    -95-
    from Caribe's counsel to postpone the sentencing, which had been
    scheduled for February 25, 2000; the court eventually denied
    Caribe's December 6, 2000 motion to continue his sentencing on
    December 13, 2000 and sentenced Caribe on December 15, 2000.
    Caribe also filed a motion for a new trial, which the court denied
    on December 15, 2000.
    Finally,    and   most    importantly,     Caribe    has    not   shown   he
    suffered any prejudice as a result of the fourteen-month delay. The
    prejudice resulting from a delay between indictment and trial is
    obvious: the accused must live with the anxiety and concern of
    facing trial; he may have to spend an extended length of time in
    custody; and his defense may be impaired if witnesses' memories
    fade.   However, "[m]ost of those interests diminish or disappear
    altogether once there has been a conviction."             Perez, 
    793 F.2d at 256
    . Thus, the courts have great reluctance to find a speedy trial
    deprivation   where    there    is   no     substantial    and    demonstrable
    prejudice.      
    Id.
        Caribe argues that the delay made it more
    difficult for him to challenge the contested factual allegations in
    the presentence report, but he does not explain which allegations
    or how he was prejudiced.       He also claims that the delay gave the
    government more time to persuade the probation officer to include
    unwarranted   enhancements      in   the    presentence     report,     but    as
    discussed below, Caribe was not prejudiced by these communications.
    Caribe may have been anxious about the length of the sentence the
    -96-
    judge would impose, but such anxiety is present in every sentencing
    and cannot be sufficient to meet the prejudice requirement.
    2.   Ex Parte Communications Between Prosecution and Probation
    Officer
    Caribe also argues that the prosecution violated Fed. R. Crim.
    P. 32(b)(6)(B) by having ex parte communications with the probation
    officer who wrote the presentence report.       Caribe apparently wants
    this court to eliminate the two enhancements added to his offense
    level and remand the case to the district judge for re-sentencing.
    Rule 32(b)(6)(B) provides:
    Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the
    parties shall communicate in writing to the probation officer,
    and to each other, any objections to any material information,
    sentencing classifications, sentencing guideline ranges, and
    policy statements contained in or omitted from the presentence
    report. After receiving objections, the probation officer may
    meet with the defendant, the defendant's counsel, and the
    attorney for the Government to discuss those objections. The
    probation officer may also conduct a further investigation and
    revise the presentence report as appropriate.
    The probation officer issued her initial presentence report to both
    parties on February 3, 2000.       This report did not recommend an
    enhancement for Caribe's leadership role in the conspiracy or
    possession of a gun during the conspiracy.         Caribe alleges that
    Agent Plichta then met with the probation officer and reviewed the
    evidence about Caribe's role in the conspiracy.            The probation
    officer   then   amended   her   report   to   recommend   a   four-level
    enhancement for a leadership role and a two-level enhancement for
    firearm possession.    Caribe's counsel was not given a chance to
    -97-
    rebut Agent Plichta's statements before the amended report was
    released, although he was able to file formal objections pursuant
    to Rule 32 and to raise his objections directly to the district
    court during     the    sentencing    hearing.      Caribe    filed    a    motion
    objecting to the ex parte communications and demanding disclosure
    of all documents that the probation officer used in preparing the
    presentence report.       The defendant also asked to be able to call
    the probation officer as a witness at the sentencing hearing to
    examine the extent of the communications.
    In a published opinion, United States v. Caribe Garcia, 
    125 F. Supp. 2d 19
     (D.P.R. 2000), the district judge denied the motion.
    The court held that there was no prosecutorial misconduct because
    "disclosing     information      to   the    probation   officer      [is]       the
    functional    equivalent    of   disclosing      information    to    the    court
    itself."     
    Id. at 21
    .    The court also stated that Caribe failed to
    show that he was entitled to a downward departure given that the
    presentence    report     only   recommends    a   sentence    and    the    final
    sentencing determination is made "after the Court hears arguments
    and objections to the presentence report in open court."                   
    Id.
       We
    agree with the second basis for the court's opinion but not the
    first.
    The first issue is difficult because of the discrepancy
    between the fairly formal procedure contemplated by Rule 32 and the
    more informal reality.      It is common for one side to speak with the
    -98-
    probation officer, either before or after the report is released.
    One district court has stated that, in that court's experience, ex
    parte communications between the government and the probation
    officer   preparing        the    report    are    "appropriate    and   regular."
    Roccisano v. United States, 
    936 F. Supp. 96
    , 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
    But we could not fully embrace such informality without reading
    Rule 32(b) out of the Federal Rules; Rule 32(b) does require a more
    structured process, at least in the fourteen-day period following
    the release of the presentence report.
    Rule     32(b)    is    literally       read    as   permitting     ex    parte
    communications initiated by either party both before and after this
    fourteen-day period.             During the fourteen-day period, however,
    while the parties are preparing their written objections to the
    presentence report, the parties, under the rule, should communicate
    with the probation officer only in writing, and all communications
    must be disclosed to the other party.                 This reading of the rule
    permits most of the present informality, while allowing both sides
    to know the scope of the objections.                      See Fed. R. Crim. P.
    32(b)(6)(B)    advisory      committee      notes    to   1994   Amendments     (the
    parties should have a "fair opportunity . . . to review, object to,
    and comment upon, the probation officer's report in advance of the
    sentencing hearing").            There are benefits to informality, but the
    parties   should      at    least    know   what    issues   are   on    the   table
    concerning the presentence report so they can present counter-
    -99-
    arguments if they desire.
    Even if contact with Agent Plichta did inadvertently violate
    Rule 32, Caribe has failed to show that he has suffered any harm as
    a result.    First, he does not explain what he hoped to accomplish
    by additional discovery or by calling the probation officer to
    testify at the sentencing hearing.         The revised presentence report
    apparently sets forth the additional evidence the probation officer
    relied upon in amending her recommendations, and all other facts
    appear to be undisputed.      Second, as the district court noted, the
    report is only a recommendation to the court; the court is not
    bound to accept these recommendations.         The district court in this
    case had notice that the second report was prepared after the
    prosecution's alleged ex parte contact and gave Caribe's counsel
    ample     opportunity    at   sentencing     to   dispute    the   report's
    recommendations.    The court then found that the enhancements were
    appropriate and sentenced the defendant accordingly.             Thus Caribe
    fails to show what harm he suffered as a result of the ex parte
    communications.    See, e.g., Montoya, 
    62 F.3d at 3
     (1st Cir. 1995)
    ("[T]he     sentencing    court   has   ample     power     to   deal   with
    [prosecutorial misconduct impacting the judge's sentencing options]
    by excluding the tainted transaction from the computation of
    relevant conduct or by departing from the [recommendation].").
    -100-
    M.   Conclusion
    We affirm the judgments and the sentences and reject each of
    the defendant's claims, except that we remand, in accordance with
    this opinion, the issue of the term of supervised release for
    Rodriguez and vacate that aspect only of his sentence. So ordered.
    -101-