DeWitt v. Wall , 121 F. App'x 398 ( 2004 )

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1351
FRED DEWITT,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
A.T. WALL, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lynch and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Fred DeWitt on brief pro se.
Patricia A. Coyne-Fague on Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Affirmance.
December 30, 2004
Per Curiam. Pro se appellant Fred DeWitt challenges a
district court judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit
against various Rhode Island prison officials and employees. After
careful review of the record and briefs on appeal, we affirm for
the following reasons.
1. We affirm the dismissal of the denial of court access
claim, essentially for the reasons given in the district court's
Memorandum and Order dated August 19, 2003. The court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing that claim as a sanction for
DeWitt's behavior during a pre-trial conference.
2. In affirming summary judgment for defendants on the
retaliation claim, we rely substantially on the reasoning in the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation dated January 22,
2004, which the district court adopted in its Memorandum and Order
dated February 19, 2004. Res judicata barred that claim because
DeWitt initially pursued it unsuccessfully in his state court
action; he then dropped the claim altogether, attempting to re-
litigate it in federal court. See DiBattista v. State of Rhode
Island, 808 A.2d 1081, 1086 (R.I. 2002) (explaining that res
judicata is intended to conserve courts' "finite resources" by
eliminating "duplicative litigation," so that "a party defeated in
one action may not maintain a later lawsuit based upon a ground
that properly could have been asserted in the previous litigation")
(citation omitted).
-2-
3. Regarding the grant of summary judgment in
defendants' favor on the due process claims, we agree in part with
the reasoning in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation
dated January 22, 2004, which the district court adopted in its
Memorandum and Order dated February 19, 2004. See Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (indicating that a due process
liberty interest is implicated only where state action "imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life").
But we direct the district court to amend its judgment to
dismiss without prejudice the due process claims based on the
disciplinary proceedings against DeWitt. The disciplinary
decisions took away accrued good-time credits, and DeWitt sought
expungement of those decisions, restoration of the lost credits,
and damages for the allegedly wrongful disciplinary decisions. He
could only obtain restoration of his credits in a habeas action,
Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming
28 U.S.C. § 1915A dismissal of such claim) (citing Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-92 (1973)), and he could only seek
damages under § 1983 after overturning such decisions. Id.
(applying Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), to damages claim
based on disciplinary decision that caused loss of good-time
credits); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997)
(applying Heck's favorable termination rule to § 1983 damages claim
-3-
challenging the procedures used to deprive inmate of good-time
credits).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. The
district court is directed to modify its dismissal of the due
process claims based on the disciplinary decisions against
appellant to be without prejudice. No costs are awarded.
-4-