United States v. Sierra , 186 F. App'x 16 ( 2006 )


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  •                Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 05-1564
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    PEDRO SIERRA,
    Defendant, Appellant,
    No. 05-1565
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    BRUNO MONTENEGRO,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Boudin, Chief Judge,
    Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Howard, Circuit Judge.
    Matthew V. Soares on brief for appellant Sierra.
    Michael R. Hasse on brief for appellant Montenegro.
    Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney,
    and H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    July 3, 2006
    -2-
    Per Curiam.   Pedro Sierra and Bruno Montenegro appeal
    from the sentences they received after their pleas of guilty to
    conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.     Their
    appeals have been consolidated for our review.
    Sierra and Montenegro, along with four other men, were
    aboard a fishing vessel that had sailed from the country of
    Colombia in October 2003, heading for Puerto Rico.   The vessel was
    apprehended by the United States Coast Guard off the southern shore
    of Puerto Rico.    The Coast Guard retrieved 654 kilograms of
    marijuana that had been dumped into the sea from the vessel when
    the crew realized it had been detected.     Sierra and Montenegro
    entered into identical plea agreements with the government.      The
    agreements specified a base offense level of 28 under the federal
    Sentencing Guidelines and called for downward adjustments for
    acceptance of responsibility and compliance with the "safety valve"
    provision.   The agreements went on to declare that no other
    adjustments would apply, but reserved to the defendants the right
    to argue at the sentencing hearing for a downward adjustment based
    on USSG § 3B1.2, which allows a decrease in the offense level of a
    defendant who played a minor or minimal role in the offense.    Both
    defendants were sentenced on March 15, 2005, at separate hearings,
    to terms of 46 months in prison.
    Each appeal raises a single issue: whether the district
    court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) by failing to rule
    -3-
    explicitly on whether the defendant qualified for a downward
    adjustment based on his role in the offense.      The pertinent facts
    concerning sentencing, however, are different for each of the
    defendants.
    Rule 32(i)(3)(B) requires that a court, at sentencing,
    "must — for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other
    controverted matter — rule on the dispute or determine that a
    ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect
    sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in
    sentencing."   Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).
    Appellant   Sierra   contends   that   the   district   court
    violated this rule by not making an explicit ruling as to whether
    Sierra was entitled to a downward adjustment for his role in the
    offense.   However, while Sierra reserved the right in his plea
    agreement to argue the role-in-the-offense question, he did not
    invoke that right or even mention the issue at his sentencing
    hearing.   This means both that there was no "controverted matter"
    that the judge would have been required by Rule 32(i)(3)(B) to
    decide and that Sierra forfeited the argument below.        A district
    court has no obligation to raise a role-in-the-offense question of
    its own initiative, the more so since a defendant bears the burden
    -4-
    of proving his or her entitlement to a downward adjustment.                       See
    United States v. Ocasio, 
    914 F.2d 330
    , 332-33 (1st Cir. 1990).1
    Defendant Montenegro, in contrast, did argue at his
    sentencing   hearing     that    he   played    only   a   minor     role    in   the
    marijuana    transport    and    that    he    was   entitled   to    a     downward
    adjustment accordingly.         In response, the government argued that
    Montenegro's role was not minor, but that he was in fact fully
    culpable and thus did not qualify for the downward adjustment. The
    district court imposed sentence on Montenegro without explicitly
    ruling on whether or not he was entitled to the adjustment, stating
    simply, "The Court has considered all the applicable adjustments
    under the new advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines."                    The court
    sentenced Montenegro to 46 months in prison, which was the sentence
    specified in the plea agreement under the parties' assumption that
    Montenegro     would   qualify    for    downward      adjustments        based   on
    acceptance of responsibility and "safety valve" but no other
    adjustments.     After the court pronounced the sentence, defense
    counsel did not object to the court's failure to explicitly resolve
    the role-in-the offense question.
    Because no timely objection was made, we review the
    district court's action for plain error.                See United States v.
    1
    The government argues that the waiver of appeal rights
    contained in Sierra's plea agreement should act to bar the present
    appeal. Because the appeal lacks merit in any event, we need not
    reach the waiver question.
    -5-
    Mastera, 
    435 F.3d 56
    , 61 (1st Cir. 2006).                  None exists here.
    Montenegro's reliance on Rule 32 is misplaced. The rule exists "to
    assure reliability" of the facts germane to sentencing, United
    States v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 344 (4th Cir. 2006), and applies
    if there is a relevant factual dispute or if the defendant has
    objected to a portion of the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report
    (PSR).    See, e.g., United States v. McCants, 
    434 F.3d 557
    , 561-62
    (D.C.    Cir    2006)   (obligations    of   Rule    32   applied   where    "key
    elements"       of   the   PSR's   sentencing       calculations    relied     on
    "contentious" factual assumptions); United States v. Darwich, 
    337 F.3d 645
    , 666-67 (6th Cir. 2003) (obligations of Rule 32 applied
    where PSR took a stance on defendant's leadership role in the
    offense and defendant disputed that stance in objections to the
    PSR).    Here, Montenegro raised no objections to the PSR and there
    was no pertinent factual dispute.              In any event, the court's
    imposition of the 46-month sentence contemplated by the plea
    agreement suggests a rejection of Montenegro's request for a
    downward adjustment not accounted for in the plea agreement's
    calculation.
    The sentences of appellants Sierra and Montenegro are
    affirmed.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-1564, 05-1565

Citation Numbers: 186 F. App'x 16

Judges: Boudin, Stahl, Howard

Filed Date: 7/3/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024