Ofori v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc. ( 2006 )


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  •                Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 06-1651
    KOMI OFORI,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    RUBY TUESDAY, INC.,
    Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro,          U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Lynch and Howard,
    Circuit Judges.
    Komi Ofori on brief pro se.
    Cornelius R. Heusel and Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent,
    Carrére and Denégre, L.L.P. and Jennifer L. Parent and McLane,
    Graf, Raulerson and Middleton, Professional Association on brief
    for appellee.
    November 17, 2006
    Per Curiam.     This appeal follows the denial of pro se
    appellant Komi Ofori's motion for "clarification" of his earlier,
    unsuccessful motion for reconsideration of the district court's
    decision granting summary judgment for his former employer, Ruby
    Tuesday, Inc.    Because Ofori's notice of appeal is untimely as to
    both   the   district   court's   January   27,   2006   summary   judgment
    decision, as well as the district court's February 21, 2006 denial
    of his first motion to reconsider, we review only the denial of
    Ofori's second post-judgment motion.
    Eight days after the district court entered summary
    judgment for Ruby Tuesday dismissing each of Ofori's race and
    national origin discrimination claims, Ofori filed a one-paragraph
    motion   for    reconsideration    which    argued   that   Ruby    Tuesday
    "falsified" its "issues to support their[] legitimate defenses to
    the Honorable Court."      This motion failed to identify any error of
    law or fact in the court's summary judgment decision. Because this
    motion was filed within ten days of entry of final judgment, it is
    properly viewed as motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to
    Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.            Under Rule
    4(a)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the filing
    of this Rule 59(e) motion suspended the time for appealing the
    underlying summary judgment decision until such time as the court
    disposed of the motion.      Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 
    118 F.3d 10
    , 14
    (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
    522 U.S. 1078
     (1998).
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    The   district     court   summarily       denied   the    motion   on
    February 21, 2006. A week later, Ofori filed a three-page pleading
    titled "Clarification," in which he explained in more detail the
    basis for his original request for reconsideration.               Because this
    pleading was filed more than ten days after the entry of final
    judgment, it is properly viewed as arising under Rule 60(b) of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.             Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).
    Rule 60(b) motions do not affect the time for appealing from the
    final judgment.    Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez, 
    22 F.3d 384
    , 389
    (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
    513 U.S. 1015
     (1994). The district court
    summarily denied this motion on March 6, 2006.
    Ofori filed his notice of appeal on March 27, 2006.                 It
    is timely only as to the March 6, 2006 denial of Ofori's second
    post-judgment motion.        Construing this second motion as arising
    under Rule 60(b), Ofori could only prevail in setting aside the
    original judgment if he could show "exceptional circumstances"
    entitling him to "extraordinary relief." Rodriguez-Antuna v. Chase
    Manhattan Bank Corp., 
    871 F.2d 1
    , 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Lepore
    v.   Vidockler,   
    792 F.2d 272
    ,   274    (1st   Cir.   1986)).      Ofori's
    "Clarification" fails to meet this exacting standard.                   "We have
    made   it   transparently    clear     that   relief    under   Rule    60(b)   is
    'extraordinary in nature'" and that             "motions invoking the rule
    should be granted sparingly."          Cintron-Lorenzo v. Departmento de
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    Asuntos del Consumidor, 
    312 F.3d 522
    , 527 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting
    Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 
    288 F.3d 15
    , 19 (1st Cir. 2002)).
    After careful review of the pleadings, it is clear that
    the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying
    Ofori's   motion.     Each   of   the   arguments   presented   in   the
    "Clarification" was previously presented to and fully considered by
    the district court.     Ofori attempts to reargue the facts, but
    simple disagreement with the court's decision is not a basis for
    reconsideration.    "[W]e recognize the district court's 'intimate,
    first-hand knowledge of the case,' and, thus, defer broadly to that
    court's informed discretion."      Cintron-Lorenzo, 
    312 F.3d at 527
    (quoting Karak, 
    288 F.3d at 19
    ).
    Insofar as Ofori's appeal seeks review of the January 27,
    2006 entry of summary judgment dismissing the case or the denial of
    his first motion for reconsideration, it is dismissed for want of
    appellate jurisdiction.      The order of the district court denying
    Ofori's second motion for reconsideration is affirmed.
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