Freightliner LLC v. Puerto Rico Truck Sales, Inc. ( 2006 )

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1040
FREIGHTLINER LLC,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
PUERTO RICO TRUCK SALES, INC./FREIGHTLINER DE PUERTO RICO,
d/b/a Freightliner Truck Sales and Services; UNITED
CAPITAL & LEASING OF PUERTO RICO; LUIS CARRERAS; JANE DOE;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP L. CARRERAS/DOE; JOSE TORRES; JANE
ROE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP TORRES/ROE; MANUEL CARRERAS;
MARY DOE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP M. CARRERAS/DOE,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. Garcia-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Circuit Judge,
Baldock * and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges.
Javier López-Pérez and Ramon E. Dapena on the briefs,
for Appellants.
Richard Graffam and Roberto Abesada-Agüet on the brief
for Appellee.
November 21, 2006
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. Defendants appeal
the district court’s denial of their motion for preliminary
injunction and several evidentiary rulings made during the
course of the preliminary injunction hearing. We have
jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292. Because the district court subsequently dismissed
Defendants’ counterclaim due to discovery violations, we
dismiss Defendants’ interlocutory appeal as moot.
I.
Plaintiff Freightliner manufactures and sells
trucks worldwide. In 1996, Plaintiff and Defendant Puerto
Rico Truck Sales, Inc., executed an agreement (“Agreement”)
for the distribution of Freightliner products in Puerto
Rico. Defendant Freightliner Truck Sales and Services
(“FTSS”) later assumed Puerto Rico Truck Sales position in
the Agreement.
On September 10, 2004, Plaintiff terminated the
Agreement with FTSS and on September 13, 2004, it filed a
complaint against Defendants for damages and collection of
monies. Plaintiff based its termination of the Agreement on
FTSS’s alleged lack of payment of substantial overdue
amounts and FTSS’s alleged illegal or wrongful shipment and
importation of 18 Freightliner trucks into Puerto Rico. In
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addition to damages, Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
on the validity of its termination of the Agreement.
Defendants counterclaimed seeking damages and
alleging Plaintiff’s cancellation of the Agreement violated
their rights under Puerto Rico Law 75, P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
10, § 278 (“Law 75”), a statute prohibiting a principal from
terminating without just cause a distribution agreement with
its dealer. In connection with their counterclaim and
pursuant to Law 75, Defendants filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a motion for a
preliminary injunction. Defendants requested the court
dissolve Plaintiff’s cancellation of the Agreement and
enjoin Plaintiff from entering into a distribution agreement
with another Puerto Rican distributor. The district court
denied the motion for TRO and referred the motion for
preliminary injunction to the magistrate judge for a report
and recommendation (R&R). After a lengthy hearing, the
magistrate judge issued a R&R recommending denial of
Defendants’ motion for preliminary injunction, concluding
Defendants failed to establish the prerequisites for
preliminary injunctive relief under Law 75.
Defendants timely objected to the R&R. The
district court overruled the objections and adopted the R&R.
In a separate order, the court dismissed Defendants’
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counterclaims with prejudice due to discovery violations,
and entered a partial judgment as to those claims. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Defendants sought certification to
appeal the district court’s partial judgment pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court denied
Defendants’ request, finding the partial judgment did not
meet the criteria for immediate appealability set forth in
Spiegel v. The Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 43
(1st Cir. 1988). Defendants filed a notice of appeal
seeking review of the district court’s denial of their
motion for preliminary injunction and the court’s dismissal
of their counterclaims.
II.
Plaintiff argues Defendants’ appeal is moot because
the district court dismissed Defendants’ counterclaim
pursuant to Law 75. We agree. Defendants’ request for a
preliminary injunction was specifically grounded in its
counterclaim pursuant to Law 75. Because Defendants’
counterclaim no longer exists, they would have no recourse
in the district court even if we reverse its denial of their
motion for preliminary injunction. Chaparro-Febus v.
International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1575, 983 F.2d
325, 331 n.5 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting “preliminary
injunctions, which are interlocutory in nature, cannot
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survive a final order of dismissal”). Thus, Defendants’
appeal of the district court’s denial of their motion for
preliminary injunction is moot. Id. (“Because the district
court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was merged in
the final judgment dismissing the case, plaintiffs’
complaints regarding the preliminary injunction are moot.”)
(citations and quotations omitted).
In their reply brief, Defendants maintain this
court can entertain their interlocutory appeal because the
notice of appeal seeks review of the district court’s
partial judgment disposing of their counterclaim. We find
Defendants waived any arguments related to the district
court’s dismissal of their counterclaim in this
interlocutory appeal. “[W]e have steadfastly deemed waived
issues raised on appeal in a perfunctory manner, not
accompanied by developed argumentation.” Massachusetts Sch.
of Law v. ABA, 142 F.3d 26, 43 (1st Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted). Defendants make no mention of the issue in their
opening brief and only briefly address the issue in their
reply brief without explaining how the district court erred
in dismissing their counterclaim or in denying their motion
for a Rule 54(b) certificate of appealability.
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III.
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants’ appeal,
Defendants’ Motion to Supplement the Record with New
Evidence, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike are DISMISSED as
moot. We make no comment as to the remaining matters before
the district court.
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