United States v. Rodriguez-Leon ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-2693
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
VÍCTOR RODRÍGUEZ-LEÓN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
and Carter,* Senior District Judge.
Randy Olen, on brief, for appellant.
Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
H.S. García, United States Attorney, and Nelson Pérez-Sosa,
Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
March 17, 2005
*
Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Víctor
Rodríguez León ("Rodríguez") entered into a plea agreement on one
count of aiding and abetting in the possession with intent to
distribute and/or distribution of multiple kilograms of controlled
substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), for his involvement
between the ages of nine and seventeen1 in a drug organization in
which both of his parents were also involved. He alleges that his
competence to plead guilty was questionable and that a magistrate
judge erroneously recommended that he be transferred to adult
status. Consequently, he argues, the district court erred in
refusing to continue sentencing proceedings in order to investigate
his apparent dissatisfaction with his guilty plea. Because we find
no abuse of discretion in the district court's acceptance of the
guilty plea, failure to permit its withdrawal, or refusal to
continue sentencing, the decision below is affirmed.
I. Background
On September 19, 2001, Rodríguez was charged as a
juvenile in a sealed criminal complaint for conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
1
Rodríguez was born on September 14, 1983, but the government's
brief indicates that he was seventeen and a half years old when he
was charged on September 19, 2001 and appellant's brief indicates
that he was nineteen years old at the time of his transfer hearing
on May 3, 2002. Regardless of these discrepancies, there appears
to be agreement that Rodríguez's active participation in the drug
organization occurred when he was between the ages of nine and
seventeen.
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§ 846. On September 21, 2001, Rodríguez plead not guilty to the
charge and was placed in pretrial detention. On December 4, 2001,
the government filed a Motion to Transfer to Adult Status, and
amended the charge to aiding and abetting in the possession with
intent to distribute and/or distribution of multiple kilograms of
controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
An evidentiary hearing was held before Magistrate Judge
Aida M. Delgado Colón on May 3, 2001. At the hearing, Dr. Luis
Francisco Umpierre, a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Maria T.
Margarida Juliá, a clinical neuropsychologist, testified on behalf
of the Government and Rodríguez, respectively. Dr. Umpierre
determined that Rodríguez has an IQ of 62, corresponding to mild
mental retardation, and both experts found evidence of cognitive
dysfunction or brain damage. On June 13, 2002, the magistrate
judge issued a detailed Report and Recommendation. In the Report,
she made specific findings on each of the six factors that 18
U.S.C. § 5032 directs judicial officers to consider in deciding on
transfer to adult status.2 She found that Rodríguez's prior
2
The factors are "[1] the age and social background of the
juvenile; [2] the nature of the alleged offense; [3] the extent and
nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; [4] the
juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological
maturity; [5] the nature of past treatment efforts and the
juvenile's response to such efforts; [and 6] the availability of
programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems." 18
U.S.C. 5032. The guiding principle in weighing these factors is
whether "transfer would be in the interest of justice." Id.-3-
delinquency record,3 poor response to probationary supervision and
corresponding need for an institutional rehabilitation program, and
mental limitations on judgment and emotional control, in addition
to the lack of evidence of the existence of adequate non-penal
rehabilitation programs to suit Rodríguez's needs, all weighed in
favor of transfer to adult status. In addition, the magistrate
judge found that the nature of the alleged offense -- including
reliable government evidence of Rodríguez's participation in
murders and "hunting" rival drug gang members -- was sufficient,
standing alone, to warrant transfer to adult status.
The magistrate judge also made findings as to Rodríguez's
competency to stand trial. She determined, on the basis of the
psychological reports, that although his mental and judgmental
capacities were limited, Rodríguez was capable of distinguishing
right from wrong, understanding if one penalty was harsher than
another, understanding the implications of an alibi defense and
assisting his counsel by providing facts and information in support
3
Between December 2000 and February 2001, Rodríguez was found
guilty of possession of cocaine and six counts of possession of a
firearm; arrested on charges of attempted murder, first degree
murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and additional weapons
violations; and charged with four counts of illegal appropriation
of a vehicle. He was charged as an adult in the District of Puerto
Rico in these cases. Additionally, Rodríguez was charged in
commonwealth court with possession of drug paraphernalia and 135
bags of cocaine intended for distribution. Commonwealth
proceedings to transfer Rodríguez to adult status on these charges
were underway at the time the magistrate judge rendered her Report
and Recommendation.
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thereof. Thus, she concluded, he was competent to stand trial and
assist defense counsel.
Rodríguez initially filed a sealed objection to the
Report and Recommendation, but just over a month later, he
submitted a motion to proceed against him as an adult. The motion
states that "upon advise [sic] of counsel, [Rodríguez] voluntarily
waives all further transfer procedures in this case [and] requests
to be proceeded against as an adult for purposes of criminal
prosecution in this case." The same day, he waived indictment and
plead guilty to one count of distribution of various narcotic
drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
At the change of plea hearing before district court judge
Juan M. Pérez Giménez, Rodríguez's counsel orally withdrew his
opposition to the Report and Recommendation. After questioning
Rodríguez directly, the district judge accepted the Report and
Recommendation and waiver of transfer proceedings, found Rodríguez
competent to waive indictment, and accepted his guilty plea.
A sentencing hearing was held on November 22, 2002. At
the hearing, the following exchange occurred between the district
judge and Rodríguez's counsel:
MR. ANGLADA: Your Honor, let me put something on the
record before we start. I am ready for sentence and we
have reviewed the PSI with the client. The client would
like the sentence to be continued. One of the reasons is
that his mother was already sentenced and his father is
to be sentenced at an adjacent court on December 10th.
We are within the thirty-five days. I am ready but I
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have the duty and the loyalty to my client to inform the
court that he would prefer sentencing to be continued.
THE COURT: What is the reason?
MR. ANGLADA: The reason, Your Honor, is that he would
prefer sentence not to be imposed in accordance with the
written plea agreement. His father is to be sentenced by
the Honorable Court if the plea is accepted by that
neighboring court for a prison term of eighteen and a
half years and, of course, I am bound by the plea
agreement before this court and this plea calls for the
imposition of a sentence of thirty seven points with a
criminal history of two for the imposition of a sentence
of 240 months. So, I am ready, he would -
THE COURT: But the fact that his father may be sentenced
before or after he is sentenced, how does that affect his
own sentence?
MR. ANGLADA: Your Honor, in my opinion I don't see any
reasoning other than the generic attitude of his father
now that our plea agreement is not a satisfactory plea
agreement for his father and, therefore, for him,
remember that he is now 18 or 19 and his IQ is one of 62.
Now he is with his father at MDC and now he is again
under the influence of his father.
....
THE COURT: Again my question is, do you think it would be
beneficial for him to continue now under his father's
supervision or if I sentence him today ask the Marshals
to transport him out of Puerto Rico, so he is not under
that influence, which apparently is a very bad influence.
MR. ANGLADA: Well, Your Honor, as an attorney, as a
father, I have an opinion. I don't want to further
jeopardize my relationship to him, so, you know, I don't
know, if you are going to accept my words as an answer.
....
THE COURT: . . . . [W]e will proceed to sentence the
defendant today. I think that your actions in this case
were professionally carried out. You obtained the best
plea agreement you could with the government under the
circumstances and I would rather have him be sentenced
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today than leave the door open that might create problems
between yourself and your client, which apparently they
have been a very fruitful relationship.
Sentencing Transcript at 3-6 (emphasis supplied). Without directly
asking Rodríguez to clarify his reasons for wanting a continuance,
Judge Pérez Giménez sentenced him to 235 months in prison, eight
years supervised release, and a $100 assessment.
Rodríguez appealed, claiming that his counsel's remarks
at sentencing put the court on notice that he was challenging the
plea agreement and sought to withdraw his plea. Accordingly,
Rodríguez argues that the court erred in failing to further
investigate whether he was entitled to a change of plea, and in
denying the requested continuance.
II. Analysis
A. Change of plea
For purposes of our analysis, we will assume
arguendo that counsel's statements amounted to a request to
withdraw Rodríguez's guilty plea.4 The district court's failure to
permit withdrawal, or to inquire further into the basis for the
request are therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Isom, 85 F.3d 831, 834 (1996). A defendant does not have
4
Were we to hold otherwise, the district court's failure to
permit a change of plea would be reviewed under the more stringent
plain error standard. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
732 (1993); cf. United States v. Browne, 318 F.3d 261, 264-65 (1st
Cir. 2003) (noting that ambiguous request for evidentiary hearing
on change of plea motion would be reviewed for plain error if court
did not assume request had been made).
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an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, but rather must show
a "fair and just reason" therefor. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32(e);5
Isom, 85 F.3d at 834. The burden of persuading the court that such
a reason exists is on the defendant. See, e.g., United States v.
Moore, 362 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 2004); cf. Browne, 318 F.3d at
265 (holding that court need hear additional evidence in support of
a change of plea only if there was an adequate tender by
defendant). Rodríguez has offered no authority to support his
contention that, despite this burden, the district court was under
an affirmative obligation to inquire further into his reasons for
dissatisfaction with his plea.
We turn now to an evaluation of the reasons offered by
defense counsel. We have identified several factors that must be
considered in determining whether a defendant has shown a "fair and
just reason" for withdrawing a plea,
the most significant of which is whether the
plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent
within the meaning of [Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11]. The other factors
include 1) the force and plausibility of the
proferred reason; 2) the timing of the
request; 3) whether the defendant has asserted
his legal innocence; and 4) whether the
parties had reached a plea agreement.
5
The provisions governing withdrawal of a guilty plea were
altered and moved to Rule 11(d) by amendments that went into effect
December 1, 2002. As Rodríguez's request was made prior to this
date, our analysis is under the standards applicable to the earlier
Rule 32(e). See United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 41 n.6 (1st
Cir. 2004).
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Isom, 85 F.3d at 834 (quoting United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47
F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted)). If
these factors weigh in favor of permitting a change of plea, we
must then consider the prejudicial effect such a change would have
on the prosecution. Id. at 834-35.
1. Rule 11
Rodríguez argues for the first time on appeal that he
lacked competence to plead guilty, thus precluding a knowing,
voluntary and intelligent plea. Competence to plead guilty is
determined according to the same criteria as competence to stand
trial: the defendant must "understand[] the proceedings against
him and ha[ve] sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." United
States v. Lebrón, 76 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). In the absence of objection
below, we review for plain error.6 Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.
6
Given that defense counsel expressly withdrew opposition to the
magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation -- which contained a
finding of competence to stand trial -- and read testimony from the
psychological experts "where competence is highlighted" at the
change of plea hearing, it could very likely be determined that the
issue of competence was waived. See United States v. Rodríguez,
311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st Cir. 2002) ("A party waives a right when he
intentionally relinquishes or abandons it. . . . [A] waived issue
ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal . . . .") (internal
citations omitted). Nevertheless, defense counsel's assertions
were made in the context of addressing Rodríguez's withdrawal of
his objection to the magistrate judge's recommendation of transfer
to adult status, and the Report and Recommendation's findings
concerning competency were not explicitly addressed. Accordingly,
and in view of the concerns generated by Rodríguez's age and mental
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In support of the argument that he lacked competence to
plead guilty, Rodríguez relies on the findings of the expert
witnesses Drs. Umpierre and Margarida. Among these findings are
that he had an IQ of 62, within the range of mild mental
retardation, and that he suffers from brain dysfunction, which
affects in particular his memory and ability to process language.
Rodríguez also cites Dr. Umpierre's testimony at his transfer
hearing that "[h]e will have problems dealing with information,
analyzing it and responding in a very more mature or abstract way
of responding." Transfer Hearing Transcript at 48. Dr. Margarida,
the defense expert, found in her report that Rodríguez's
"understanding of the legal process and functions of the court
officials was at best simplistic and primitive." At the transfer
hearing, she also testified that Rodríguez would have difficulty
assisting in his defense, that his attorney would have to
diligently check to ensure he was understanding the proceedings,
and that he might be inclined to give faulty answers when
questioned in order to appease the questioner or to mislead the
court in order to preserve his own self-interest.
In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge
Delgado reviewed the findings of both experts in evaluating
Rodríguez's intellectual capacity, a component of the transfer
limitations, we will assume for the sake of analysis that the issue
of competence has merely been forfeited, not waived.
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decision. In a separate section of the report, she also determined
that Rodríguez was competent to stand trial. This determination
was made on the basis of findings from both psychologists. She
noted that Dr. Umpierre determined that Rodríguez's mental status
was within normal limits, and that he was not psychotic. Report
and Recommendation at 22. The magistrate judge discussed
Dr. Margarida's findings that Rodríguez could offer only a
simplistic description of court proceedings, but noted that he
nonetheless could understand the roles of court proceedings and
officials. Id. When directly asked about competency, the
magistrate judge indicated, Dr. Margarida had stated that there are
different levels of competency and that Rodríguez was capable of
remembering general details and narrating facts. Id. Finally,
the magistrate judge reported that "it is understood [Rodríguez]
will be able to communicate with counsel. For example, it is
considered that if explained to him, [Rodríguez] may understand the
implications of an 'alibi' defense and will be able to provide
facts and information in support." Id. at 23.
Prior to discussing Rodríguez's guilty plea at the change
of plea hearing, the district judge inquired about the defense's
reasons for withdrawing objection to the Report and Recommendation,
focusing primarily on the recommendation of transfer to adult
status. In response, defense counsel reviewed portions of the
evidence from both psychological experts "where competence is
-11-
highlighted." Change of Plea Transcript at 7. In particular,
counsel noted that the prosecution expert had found Rodríguez to be
in general contact with reality; responsive in a logical and
coherent manner; capable of understanding the purpose of his
psychological evaluation; not delusional or psychotic; articulate
in an immature way; able to remember, interpret information
coherently, and carry out general care; that he understood the
nature of the accusations against him and the potential
consequences of a long prison sentence; and that he had a general
understanding of the court, defense, prosecution and judge,
although he did not understand the role of the jury. Defense
counsel indicated that the defense expert had agreed with the
prosecution's expert's findings.7 Id. at 6-7.
The district judge then engaged in dialogue with
Rodríguez, who affirmed that he understood his attorney's
explanations, the plea agreement, the potential length of his
sentence, and the potential consequences of opting to go to trial
instead. Id. at 10-13. The district judge determined that:
[t]here is a finding that based on the
assessment of both experts in psychology that
they consider that Víctor Rodríguez is
7
When questioned at the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate
judge on whether Rodríguez was competent to stand trial,
Dr. Margarida stated, "Yes, again it depends on, you know, a legal
term or what. I guess . . . I agree with Dr. Umpierre that he will
be able . . . I think he understands sort of the basic notions and
that . . . and he will remember general details . . . ."
Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 98.
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competent to stand trial and assist defense
counsel and that although not psychologically
or financial capable, not being independent,
within the drug organization he acted as if he
were an adult of greater age and experience.
. . . [H]aving heard from counsel and the
defendant and having reviewed the Magistrate’s
report and recommendation, the court will
accept the same and will accept the waiver of
the defendant for any further transfer
proceedings and the court hereby orders that
the defendant be processed, continues to be
processed in this court as an adult.
Id. at 15-16. The district judge then questioned Rodríguez in
detail about his understanding of the implications of waiving grand
jury indictment and deemed him competent to do so, finding that:
[h]e understands the explanations made by his
attorney as to the waiver of indictment by
grand jury and also from my questioning here
in court, I can see that he is reacting
positive[ly] to my questions and it appears to
me that he is understanding the right that he
has to be indicted by a grand jury and the
results of waiving that indictment by a grand
jury.
Id. at 18.
The district judge considered the findings of both
psychological experts, the detailed findings and recommendation of
the magistrate judge regarding competence, and his own direct
perception of the content and manner of Rodríguez's responses to
questioning. While the evidence in favor of competence was not
overwhelming, the district court did not plainly err in finding
Rodríguez competent.
Beyond competence, three core concerns guide our review
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of whether Rodríguez's plea met the requirements of Rule 11: (1)
absence of coercion, (2) understanding of the charges, and (3)
knowledge of the consequences of the plea. Isom, 85 F.3d at 835.
Because no objection was raised below, we review the court's
acceptance of Rodríguez's plea for plain error. See Olano, 507
U.S. at 732; United States v. Mescual-Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2004). We do so with awareness of the concern that Rodríguez's age
and significant mental limitations could affect the knowing,
voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea. See United States v.
Martínez-Martínez, 69 F.3d 1215, 1220 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Whether the
explanation of the charges and determination of the defendant's
understanding are sufficient for Rule 11 purposes varies depending
upon . . . the capacity of the defendant, and the attendant
circumstances.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
During a thorough plea colloquy, the district judge made
direct inquiries sufficient to establish that all three core Rule
11 concerns had been met. Rodríguez affirmed8 that he was not
8
Rodríguez's responses most often came in the form of one-word
answers, but Judge Pérez Giménez appears to have been satisfied
that the "yes" or "no" answers were not automatic, but rather based
on an understanding of the substance of the questions. In making
these determinations, the district judge had the benefit of
directly perceiving Rodríguez's demeanor while responding. Cf.
United States v. Jiménez-Villasenor, 270 F.3d 554, 560 (8th Cir.
2001) (noting district court's opportunity to observe demeanor of
defendant who had ingested sedatives in finding no clear error in
determination of competence). Furthermore, the one-word answers
were responsive to yes-or-no questions. In this case, we will not
second-guess the district judge's acceptance of Rodríguez's one-
word responses.
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threatened or forced to waive indictment, Change of Plea Transcript
at 16, and that he was not threatened, forced, or enticed to plead
guilty. Id. at 23, 28. He affirmed that he understood the charges
against him, as detailed by the district judge, Id. at 18-19,
admitted to guilt on those charges, id. at 29, 32, and affirmed
that his plea was made freely and voluntarily because he was, in
fact, guilty. Id. at 28. Rodríguez indicated that he knew the
potential sentence to be ten years to life. Id. at 22. Judge
Pérez Giménez went through the specifics of the plea agreement, and
asked questions to ensure that Rodríguez understood the recommended
sentence and that the judge would be free to impose a higher
sentence if he so chose. Id. at 24-28. Judge Pérez Giménez also
questioned and received affirmation from Rodríguez that he
understood the terms of supervised release after the sentence was
served, id., and that parole was unavailable, id. at 28. Judge
Pérez Giménez also delved further into Rodríguez's apparent
reluctance to accept the plea after Rodríguez indicated that he had
spoken to his mother and other relatives, who felt, as he did, that
the recommended 240-month sentence was too long. Id. at 10. The
district judge asked why, in that case, he was accepting the plea
agreement, and Rodríguez indicated that he did so because he felt
he could not get a more favorable agreement. Id. at 10-13.
The colloquy summarized above was comprehensive, and the
district judge adequately investigated the knowing, voluntary, and
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intelligent nature of Rodríguez's plea. Thus, we find no plain
error.
2. Other factors
Beyond compliance with Rule 11, other factors to be
considered in determining whether a defendant has offered a "fair
and just" reason for withdrawing a guilty plea are "1) the force
and plausibility of the proferred reason; 2) the timing of the
request; 3) whether the defendant has asserted his legal innocence;
and 4) whether the parties had reached a plea agreement." Isom, 85
F.3d at 834 (quoting Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 3-4 (internal
citations omitted)). Each of these factors weighs against plea
withdrawal in the instant case.
When asked why his client wished not to be sentenced
according to the plea agreement, defense counsel stated, "I don't
see any reasoning other than the generic attitude of his father now
that our plea agreement is not a satisfactory plea agreement for
his father [who had reached a plea agreement on related drug
charges for a sentence of 18.5 years] and, therefore, for him
. . . ." Sentencing Transcript at 4. Neither Rodríguez's, nor his
father's, dissatisfaction with the length of the sentence imposed
by the plea agreement required the district court to permit a
change of plea. See Miranda-González v. United States, 181 F.3d
164, 165 (1st Cir. 1999) ("A guilty plea will not be set aside
where a defendant has had a change of heart simply because . . . he
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is not satisfied with the sentence he has received."); see also
United States v. Elias, 937 F.2d 1514, 1520 (10th Cir. 1991) ("A
defendant's dissatisfaction with the length of his sentence
generally is insufficient reason to withdraw a plea."). The timing
of Rodríguez's request, which occurred at the sentencing hearing
over two months after entering his guilty plea, also calls the
fairness and justice of permitting a change into question. See,
e.g., Isom, 85 F.3d at 838 ("We have repeatedly noted that the more
a request is delayed -- even if made before sentence is imposed --
the more we will regard it with disfavor."). No reason has been
offered for this delay, nor did any change of circumstances occur
in the interval to support a change of plea. Rodríguez has not
asserted his innocence of the charged offenses, and the guilty plea
was properly accepted as part of a voluntary plea agreement. Thus,
all four of the Isom factors weigh against permitting a change of
plea.
Nevertheless, Rodríguez argues that an additional factor
should be weighed in favor of permitting a change of plea: the
magistrate judge's recommendation that he be transferred to adult
status was, he now argues, erroneous. Although Rodríguez initially
filed an objection to the magistrate's Report and Recommendation,
his counsel explicitly withdrew the objection, see Change of Plea
Transcript at 4, and submitted a motion to the district court for
Rodríguez to be proceeded against as an adult. A party waives a
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right when he intentionally relinquishes or abandons it, and a
waived issue ordinarily cannot be raised on appeal. See United
States v. Rodríguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st Cir. 2002); United
States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 807 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[W]here
there was forfeiture, we apply a plain error analysis; where there
was waiver, we do not.") (citing United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d
1203, 1207 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that "if there has been a valid
waiver, there is no 'error' for us to correct"). Accordingly, we
will not evaluate the merits of the decision to transfer Rodríguez
to adult status. The issue was waived, and may not be revived
collaterally during our review of Rodríguez's wish to change his
plea.
Rodríguez admitted to the factual bases of the charged
offenses and affirmed that he had knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered into a plea agreement with the government. The
district court did not plainly err in finding Rodríguez competent
to enter the guilty plea, nor in accepting the plea within the
strictures of Rule 11. Almost three months later, with no
explanation for the delay, Rodríguez offered only his and his
father's dissatisfaction with the sentence as a reason for changing
his plea. Even considering Rodríguez's impaired mental capacity,
we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion by
declining to permit a change of plea under these circumstances.
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B. Motion for continuance
Rodríguez also posits that the district court erred in
denying his motion to continue sentencing, arguing on appeal that
the district court ought to have granted the continuance in order
to more fully explore Rodríguez's reasons for dissatisfaction with
his plea. As we determined above, the burden of showing a valid
reason for seeking to withdraw the guilty plea was on the defense,
and the district judge was under no obligation to investigate
further.
"We grant broad discretion to a trial court to decide a
continuance motion and will only find abuse of that discretion with
a showing that the court exhibited an unreasonable and arbitrary
insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable
request for delay." United States v. Rodríguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d
1, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). On
review, we consider, inter alia, "the delay entailed, the reasons
for the request, whether the moving party is at fault, any
inconvenience to the court and litigants, and whether the denial of
a continuance unfairly would prejudice the moving party." Bogosian
v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 323 F.3d 55, 63 (1st Cir. 2003).
The reasons offered for continuance were the impending
sentencing of Rodríguez's father, along with both Rodríguez's and
his father's dissatisfaction with the length of Rodríguez's
sentence. As discussed above, dissatisfaction with the length of
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a sentence is insufficient to require a change of plea. Moreover,
even if sentencing had been postponed until after Rodríguez's
father received the expected shorter sentence on related charges,
this would not have entitled Rodríguez to change his plea. See
United States v. Santiago, 229 F.3d 313, 317 (1st Cir. 2000)
(finding that the fact that defendant's co-conspirators had
received lesser sentences lacked merit as a reason for permitting
a change of plea). Furthermore, after questioning defense counsel
about the reason for seeking continuance at length, the district
judge concluded that the plea agreement was the best Rodríguez
could obtain and that continuing sentencing would have had the
negative effect of returning Rodríguez to the same detention
facility as his father, who exerted a negative influence on him.
Thus, denial of the request did not cause unfair prejudice to
Rodríguez, whereas its grant would have inconvenienced the court
and litigants. The district judge's decision to deny a continuance
is not the kind of manifest abuse of discretion that would merit
reversal by this court.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the
district court is affirmed.
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