United States v. Chanthachack , 483 F. App'x 580 ( 2012 )


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  •                Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 11-1309
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    BRIAN CHANTHACHACK,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Chief Judge,
    Lipez and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
    Stanley W. Norkunas on brief for appellant.
    Kelley Begg Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Carmen M.
    Ortiz, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    July 13, 2012
    Per Curiam.    Defendant-appellant Brian Chanthachack
    appeals from his within-guideline sentence following his guilty
    plea to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).        We affirm.
    I. "Crime of Violence"
    Chanthachack    argues     that   the    sentencing    court
    improperly classified his Massachusetts conviction of assault
    with a deadly weapon (ADW), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, §15B(b),
    as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(a).           The
    district court correctly determined that this contention is
    foreclosed by our precedents. See United States v. Am, 
    564 F.3d 25
    ,   33   (1st   Cir.    2009)(holding      that    conviction     for
    Massachusetts ADW qualifies as a predicate offense under ACCA's
    force clause); see also United States v. Hart, 
    674 F.3d 33
    , 44
    (1st Cir. 2012)(holding that a conviction for Massachusetts
    ABDW qualifies as a predicate offense under ACCA's residual
    clause).
    II. Enhancement Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)
    Chanthachack     argues that there was insufficient
    evidence to support the four-level enhancement on the ground
    that the defendant "possessed or transferred any firearm . . .
    with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be
    used or possessed in connection with another felony offense."
    §2K2.1(b)(6) (2010 Guidelines). "Where, as here, a defendant
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    challenges      the    factual       predicate      supporting       the    district
    court's application of a sentencing enhancement, 'we ask only
    whether the court clearly erred in finding that the government
    proved the disputed fact by a preponderance of the evidence.'
    '[W]here   there       is    more     than    one     plausible      view    of   the
    circumstances, the sentencing court's choice among supportable
    alternatives cannot be clearly erroneous.'" United States v.
    Cannon, 
    589 F.3d 514
    , 517 (1st Cir. 2009).
    We have "held that, as used in this provision of the
    Guidelines,      'the       phrase    "in    connection       with"    should      be
    interpreted broadly.'" 
    Id.
                 "We read the guideline through the
    prism of Application Note 14." United States v. Paneto, 
    661 F.3d 709
    , 717 (1st Cir. 2011).                      The application note was
    adopted in 2006, and "sheds a bright light on the scope of the
    phrase 'in connection with' and confirms that the guideline
    applies when the firearm 'facilitate[s], or ha[s] the potential
    of facilitating, another felony offense.' U.S.S.G. §2K2.1,
    comment. (n. 14(A))." Id.
    The sentencing court found that "at a minimum, the
    defendant had reason to believe that the firearm would be used
    or possessed in connection with a drug trafficking offense."
    In   support,    the    court        referred    to    the    fact    that    "[t]he
    defendant and the confidential witness [(CW)] discussed the
    CW's   drug      trafficking          activities"       and    that        they   had
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    specifically "discussed that it was a -- I think the words
    were, 'it's a war out there,' and that one needed to be armed."
    Appellant argues that it was error to apply the
    enhancement because there was insufficient evidence that the CW
    would resell (rather than consume himself) the 3.4 grams of
    cocaine that the defendant had sold him on 8/20/08 (eight days
    before   he    sold   him   the   gun),   or   that   he   would   wait   to
    distribute the cocaine until after he bought the gun.
    Appellant's argument is misplaced.           Application of
    the enhancement does not require a finding that the defendant
    knew that the CW would use the gun to facilitate a specific
    felony. See United States v. Malloy, 
    324 F.3d 35
    , 39 (1st Cir.
    2003) (noting that this court interprets the enhancement as
    applying "even where the defendant had no knowledge of a
    specific felony involving the transferred weapons").                 It is
    sufficient if Chanthachack sold the gun to the CW "with reason
    to believe that his customer planned to use it in connection
    with drug trafficking." United States v. Brewster, 
    1 F.3d 51
    ,
    54 (1st Cir. 1993).
    On this record, the district court did not clearly
    err in finding that the government proved by a preponderance of
    the evidence that Chanthachack had reason to believe that the
    gun he sold to the CW would be used in connection with drug
    trafficking.      "'A sentencing court is entitled to rely on
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    circumstantial     evidence,   and    draw    plausible     inferences
    therefrom' in determining whether an enhancement should apply."
    Cannon, 589 F.3d at 517.       As recounted in the Government's
    sentencing memorandum, the recorded conversation between the
    defendant and the CW on August 20, 2008 (the date of the drug
    sale) included the CW's references to the quantities in which
    he would re-sell the cocaine that he was purchasing from the
    defendant.    The defendant stipulated to the accuracy of the
    memo's summary of that conversation.          It can be reasonably
    inferred from that conversation that the defendant had reason
    to believe that the CW was engaged in drug trafficking.
    The sentencing court did not err in relying, in
    part, on the PSR's description of a conversation between
    Chanthachack and the CW on September 3, 2008.            Although this
    conversation occurred after the defendant's possession and
    transfer of the firearm on August 28, 2008, it may still be
    relevant to defendant's state of mind at the time of the
    offense.     See Molloy, 
    324 F.3d at 41
    .         Here, it could be
    reasonably   be   inferred   from   the   conversation    between   the
    defendant and the CW on September 3, 2008, which seemed to
    assume mutual familiarity with an interrelationship between
    drug trafficking and guns, that five days earlier the defendant
    had reason to believe that the weapon he sold to the CW would
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    be used to facilitate drug trafficking.        There was no clear
    error.
    III. Substantive Reasonableness
    Appellant argues that the sentence was substantively
    unreasonable in view of the nature and circumstances of the
    offense and the history of the defendant.      "Our review here is
    for abuse of discretion, taking into account the district
    court's explanation of the sentence, the parties' arguments,
    and the contents of the pre-sentence investigation report."
    United States v. Goergen, ___ F.3d ___, 
    2012 WL 1957988
    , *3
    (1st Cir. 2012).    "Challenging a sentence as substantively
    unreasonable is a burdensome task in any case, and one that is
    even more burdensome where, as here, the challenged sentence is
    within a properly calculated GSR." United States v. Clogston,
    
    662 F.3d 588
    , 593 (1st Cir. 2011).
    The   court   stated   that   it   had   "considered   the
    sentencing factors under 3553(a)," and taken into account the
    "nature of the offense."    The record reveals that the court
    considered the mitigating factors on which appellant relies.
    That the court "chose not to attach to certain [of them] the
    significance that the appellant thinks they deserved does not
    make the sentence unreasonable." 
    Id. at 593
    .
    Chanthachack's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
    See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1309

Citation Numbers: 483 F. App'x 580

Judges: Lynch, Lipez, Thompson

Filed Date: 7/13/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024