Aponte-Davila v. Municipality of Caguas ( 2016 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1800
JOSÉ APONTE-DÁVILA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MUNICIPALITY OF CAGUAS,
Defendant, Appellee,
CONSOLIDATED WASTE SERVICE CORPORATION; MAPFRE-PRAICO,
Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Appellees,
EDDIE JIMÉNEZ; EDDIE JIMÉNEZ-COSMO, Cafetería la Terraza de
Eddie; INSURANCE CARRIERS,
Third Party Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Pedro A. Delgado-Hernández, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
David W. Román, with whom José Luis Ubarri and Ubarri & Román
Law Office were on brief, for appellant.
Michael Craig McCall and Pablo H. Montaner-Cordero, with whom
The Law Offices of Michael Craig McCall, Luis E. Pabón Roca,
Clarisa Solá Gómez, and Faccio & Pabón Roca were on brief, for
appellees.
July 8, 2016
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. José Aponte-Dávila appeals from
the district court's dismissal of his negligence suit for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Aponte-Dávila invokes the federal
courts' diversity jurisdiction, arguing that because he was
domiciled in Texas and the defendants were domiciled in Puerto
Rico at the time the suit was filed, there was complete diversity.
The district court found, instead, that both Aponte-Dávila and the
defendants were domiciled in Puerto Rico and dismissed the case.
We conclude otherwise, that Aponte-Dávila had not abandoned his
Texas domicile while receiving medical care in Puerto Rico, and,
that in any event, he had reinstated his Texas domicile before
suit was filed. We reverse and remand.
I.
On May 9, 2013, Aponte-Dávila filed a complaint in the
Puerto Rico federal district court against the Municipality of
Caguas ("Municipality"), Consolidated Waste Service Corporation
("ConWaste"), and MAPFRE/PRAICO, ConWaste's insurance provider.
The issue in this case is where Aponte-Dávila was domiciled as of
May 9, 2013.
The complaint alleged that on July 13, 2009, Aponte-
Dávila was walking on a sidewalk in Caguas, Puerto Rico, when he
slipped and fell while trying to pass a dumpster partially
obstructing the sidewalk. As a result of the fall, Aponte-Dávila
suffered a series of injuries and was permanently rendered
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partially disabled. Aponte-Dávila alleged that the Municipality
and ConWaste, the owner of the dumpster, were negligent under
Puerto Rico law for failing to move the dumpster from the sidewalk,
and he sought damages for physical harm, mental and moral anguish,
loss of earnings, and medical expenses. He asserted that
MAPFRE/PRAICO, as ConWaste's insurer, was jointly and severally
liable under Puerto Rico law.
In the complaint, Aponte-Dávila stated that because he
was domiciled in Texas and each of the defendants was domiciled in
Puerto Rico, the district court had diversity jurisdiction over
his state-law tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Each of the defendants filed an answer denying subject-
matter jurisdiction. ConWaste and MAPFRE/PRAICO filed a third-
party complaint against "Eddie Jiménez Cosmo d/b/a Cafeteria La
Terraza de Eddie and/or Cafeteria La Terraza de Eddie" claiming
that it was responsible for the waste deposited in the dumpster
and for maintaining the area around the dumpster. Cross-claims
between the defendants were also filed that are not relevant to
this appeal. The district court held a status conference on
November 25, 2014, at which the court's subject-matter
jurisdiction was challenged. The parties suggested that "the issue
may be ruled on without an evidentiary hearing," and so "the Court
ordered the parties to file simultaneous briefs and supporting
documents on the issue."
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On January 26, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1). On the same day, Aponte-Dávila made a filing in
support of diversity jurisdiction.1 On March 6, 2015, the
defendants filed a motion to strike sixteen of the documents
appended to Aponte-Dávila's filing. The motion to strike was
denied on June 5, 2015.
The dispute between the parties boils down to whether on
May 9, 2013, the date the complaint was filed, Aponte-Dávila was
domiciled in Texas, creating complete diversity and affording the
federal district court jurisdiction, or Puerto Rico, defeating
complete diversity and depriving the federal district court of
jurisdiction.
II.
The facts relevant to Aponte-Dávila's domicile, which
are largely undisputed, are as follows. Aponte-Dávila was born in
Río Piedras, Puerto Rico, in 1963. In the late 1980s, after
service with the U.S. Army Reserve in Puerto Rico and the Puerto
Rico National Guard, he moved to Florida to work as a professional
1 The district court "ordered the parties to file
simultaneous briefs and supporting documents on the issue not later
than 5:00pm on January 26, 2014." Aponte-Dávila has represented
that the district court did not permit the parties to reply to
each other's filings regarding jurisdiction. We caution against
such a practice of precluding parties from responding to each
other's arguments on issues such as this.
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truck driver. After a few years as a commercial dump truck driver
in Florida, he moved back to Puerto Rico, bringing his dump truck
with him.
In 1998, he moved to Arkansas and obtained an Arkansas
commercial driver's license. From 1999 to 2004, he worked as an
interstate truck driver based in Arkansas. In 1999, he purchased
his first semi-trailer truck, a 1995 Freightliner Condo.
In 2004, Aponte-Dávila left his job in Arkansas, moved
to Laredo, Texas, and began working for a trucking company called
Landstar. While working for Landstar, he traded in his semi-
trailer truck for a 1999 Freightliner Condo.
Later that year, Aponte-Dávila left Landstar, returned
his second semi-trailer truck, and relocated to Puerto Rico to
help his father, who had fallen ill, with his asphalt business.
In 2007, after his father's health improved, he returned to Texas
to continue his truck driving career and purchased, with the help
of a loan from First National Bank in Laredo, a third semi-trailer
truck, a 2001 Freightliner Condo. From 2007 to 2010, Aponte-
Dávila, based out of Laredo, worked for a trucking company called
Land Carrier. He stated that because he was a truck driver, he
would frequently stay in Laredo at a hotel, at the trucking
company's terminal, or in a small utility apartment, and while on
the road he often lived out of his truck. In 2008, he obtained a
Texas Class "A" commercial driver's license.
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On July 13, 2009, while in Puerto Rico to marry his
second wife, María Teresa Báez, Aponte-Dávila suffered the injury
giving rise to the instant lawsuit. He remained bedridden in
Puerto Rico until he was able to return to Texas. After the
accident, he obtained medical coverage through Puerto Rico's
government health plan, then known as "Reforma." When applying
for benefits, Aponte-Dávila provided Báez's address in Caguas,
Puerto Rico. He explained that he gave Báez's address because
that was where he was staying while recovering. He and Báez
divorced two years later in September of 2011.
Aponte-Dávila returned to Texas in late 2009 after
recuperating from his accident. The back pain caused by his
accident prevented him from completing his truck routes with Land
Carrier on schedule, so he eventually left Land Carrier and began
working for another trucking company called Hotfoot Logistics,
which had a terminal in Laredo. His time at Hotfoot Logistics was
short lived; after three months, he found that his persistent back
pain prevented him from continuing driving.
In September 2010, about a month after he left Hotfoot
Logistics, and still based out of Laredo, he started working for
Warren Transport. On a personnel form that Aponte-Dávila filled
out for Warren Transport titled "Warren Transport wants to get to
know you!!!" he wrote "Caguas, Puerto Rico" in the blank space
following "I make my home in." He later explained that he had
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been directed by Warren Transport to do so. The form also asked
him to provide the names of his family members as well as a list
of interests and hobbies. During his deposition, Aponte-Dávila
stated that a dispatcher had told him that the purpose of the form
was to list the names of individuals who would be authorized to
ride along with him in his truck and so he listed Caguas because
that is where Báez, to whom he was still married at that point,
lived. According to Aponte-Dávila, Warren Transport management
already knew that he lived in Laredo. On other Warren Transport
forms, he listed his address as a P.O. Box in Laredo.
For the tax years 2007 to 2012, Aponte-Dávila filed all
of his federal tax returns using his Texas address. From 2000 to
2014, he never filed state personal income tax returns in Puerto
Rico.
Starting in 2010, Aponte-Dávila began traveling back to
Puerto Rico for longer visits to receive physical therapy, staying
at Báez's residence in Caguas. In September 2011, he applied for
and received a disability parking permit in Puerto Rico. In the
application for the permit, he stated that his address was in
Puerto Rico. In January 2012, he obtained a Puerto Rico driver's
license, which also listed his address as being in Caguas. He
explained that the address he provided was Báez's, even though by
that point they had been divorced for several months.
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On May 27, 2012, Aponte-Dávila suffered a bout of
paralyzing back pain that left him immobile on the ground of a
parking lot in Laredo. A week later, he resigned from Warren
Transport, sold his truck, threw away everything he had in the
truck including clothes and documents, and returned to Puerto Rico
to recover at his parents' house in Canóvanas. In early 2013, he
filed a Merchant's Registry Certificate with the Puerto Rico
Department of Treasury, listing his address as being in Caguas.
He also submitted an application to the Medicaid Program of the
Puerto Rico Department of Health. In February 2013, his Texas
commercial driver's license expired.
Aponte-Dávila returned to Laredo at the end of April
2013. He stayed with a friend and began looking for work as an
interstate trucker. He also arranged to attend, in Texas, medical
examinations for a Social Security Disability benefits application
that he had submitted before leaving for Puerto Rico. An official
record from the Texas Department of Public Safety indicates that
a medical certificate was issued to Aponte-Dávila on May 6, 2013,
as part of his application to renew his Texas commercial driver's
license. Aponte-Dávila says that a renewed Texas commercial
driver's license was issued to him on the same day. This was three
days before the complaint was filed.
On May 9, 2013, the day the instant lawsuit was filed in
federal district court in Puerto Rico, Aponte-Dávila says that he
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"was physically present in Laredo, Texas organizing his personal
and professional affairs to continue residing and working there as
he had done the previous nine (9) years since approximately 2004."
In July 2013, Aponte-Dávila leased an apartment in
Laredo. Around the same time, he set up electric and cable
services with local Texas providers. According to Aponte-Dávila,
once he moved into his apartment, he notified the Texas Department
of Public Safety of his new address, and on September 30, 2013, a
new Texas commercial driver's license was issued to him listing
the new address. He says that the Texas Department of Public
Safety took and kept the license that had been issued to him on
May 6, 2013.
Aponte-Dávila found a job as a contract driver for a
company operating out of Laredo in July 2013, but because of his
back pain he was only able to complete a handful of trips by early
2014. In September 2013, he filled out a Texas voter registration
application, and in November 2013 he voted in Texas. He also
purchased a Chrysler PT Cruiser in Laredo and obtained a Texas
license plate and disability parking placard.
On March 11, 2014, Aponte-Dávila received a Notice of
Decision from the Social Security Administration at his postal
address in Laredo informing him that he had been found completely
disabled as a result of the paralyzing incident in May 2012, and
soon after he began receiving monthly disability payments. In
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July 2014, unable to work and declared disabled by the Social
Security Administration, he returned to Puerto Rico. He rented an
apartment in Puerto Rico in December 2014 and as of January 2015
had not returned to Texas.
III.
On June 23, 2015, the district court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction,
finding that Aponte-Dávila was domiciled in Puerto Rico on the
date that his case was filed. Dávila v. Municipality of Caguas,
No. 13-cv-1367, 2015 WL 3889963, at *1 (D.P.R. June 23, 2015).
The court found that while Aponte-Dávila "was not a resident of
Puerto Rico from the early 1980s until around 2007," after his
2009 injury he reestablished domicile in Puerto Rico because "he
refocused his life to obtain medical treatment in Puerto Rico."
Id. at *4. The district court noted that by 2012 Aponte-Dávila
had "sold his Freightliner Condo truck, thr[own] away everything
he owned, . . . traveled to Puerto Rico," "let his Texas Commercial
Driver's License expire," and "severed relevant links to Texas,
making Puerto Rico his home." Id. The court also placed
particular emphasis on forms that Aponte-Dávila submitted to
several entities between 2009 and 2013 in which he listed his
residence as Puerto Rico. Id. at *5. According to the district
court, though he "may have sought to reestablish links with Texas
in July 2013 (lease agreement); September 2013 (car purchase, and
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Consumer Account Application with Wells Fargo Bank); and October
2013 (voting registration certificate)," these events all occurred
after May 2013 and therefore could not support a finding that he
had abandoned his domicile in Puerto Rico and established a new
domicile in Texas before the filing of the instant lawsuit. Id.
This appeal followed.
IV.
Though the issue of domicile is a mixed question of law
and fact, we nevertheless review the district court's
determination of the plaintiff's domicile for clear error. See
Meléndez-García v. Sánchez, 629 F.3d 25, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2010);
Padilla-Mangual v. Pavía Hosp., 516 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2008);
Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 365 (1st Cir. 2001).
This standard applies where, as here, the district court did not
hold an evidentiary hearing but instead relied on a paper record.
See Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 598 F.2d 698, 702 (1st
Cir. 1979). However, where the district court's result is based
entirely on documentary evidence, "the presumption that the court
reached a correct result is somewhat lessened relative to findings
based on oral testimony." Padilla-Mangual, 516 F.3d at 33–34
(citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
500 (1984) (noting that "the presumption of correctness that
attaches to factual findings" of the district court "has lesser
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force" where those "findings [are] based on documentary evidence"
as opposed to "oral testimony")).
V.
Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and where
the parties are "citizens of different States."2 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1). Diversity must be complete -- "the presence of but
one nondiverse party divests the district court of original
jurisdiction over the entire action." In re Olympic Mills Corp.,
477 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806)). "For purposes of diversity, a
person is a citizen of the state in which he is domiciled."
Padilla-Mangual, 516 F.3d at 31. "A person's domicile 'is the
place where he has his true, fixed home and principal
establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the
intention of returning.'" Rodriguez-Diaz v. Sierra-Martinez, 853
F.2d 1027, 1029 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting 13B C. Wright, A. Miller
& E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3612, at 526 (2d ed.
1984)). Proving domicile requires two showings: (1) "physical
presence in a place," and (2) "the intent to make that place one's
home." Valentin, 254 F.3d at 366. Necessarily then, domicile and
2 For the purpose of § 1332, Puerto Rico is a "State[]."
28 U.S.C. § 1332(e); see also Rodríguez v. Señor Frog's de la Isla,
Inc., 642 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2011).
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residence are not the same thing. After it is established, a
domicile "persists until a new one is acquired." Id.
"Once challenged, the party invoking diversity
jurisdiction must prove domicile by a preponderance of the
evidence." García Pérez v. Santaella, 364 F.3d 348, 350 (1st Cir.
2004). There are a variety of factors that are relevant to
determining a party's domicile: "current residence; voting
registration and voting practices; location of personal and real
property; location of brokerage and bank accounts; membership in
unions, fraternal organizations, churches, clubs and other
associations; place of employment or business; driver's license
and other automobile registration; [and] payment of taxes." Id.
at 351 (alteration in original) (quoting Wright, supra, § 3612).
"No single factor is dispositive, and the analysis focuses not
simply on the number of contacts with the purported domicile, but
also on their substantive nature." Id.
VI.
We believe that the district court committed clear
error. In a nutshell, the evidence establishes that Aponte-Dávila
was domiciled in Texas before his 2009 accident, that his stays in
Puerto Rico while obtaining medical care needed in the aftermath
of the accident were insufficient to effect a change of domicile
from Texas to Puerto Rico, and that accordingly he was domiciled
in Texas on the date his case was filed.
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No one seriously disputes that Aponte-Dávila was
domiciled in Texas before his accident. He first moved to Laredo,
Texas, in 2004 and began working for Landstar. Though he left
Texas in late 2004 to go to Puerto Rico, it is undisputed that the
purpose of this relocation was to help his sick father with his
business. There is nothing to suggest that this move was intended
to be permanent. In fact, once his father's health improved in
2007, Aponte-Dávila returned to Laredo. He then obtained a loan
from the First National Bank in Laredo to purchase a 2001
Freightliner Condo truck, and he spent the next two and a half
years working out of Laredo for a trucking company called Land
Carrier. In 2008, he obtained a Texas Class "A" commercial
driver's license. Laredo was his base of operations during his
tenure at Land Carrier. Moreover, for tax years 2007 to 2012, he
filed all of his federal tax returns using his Texas address. As
of the date of his accident, July 13, 2009, Aponte-Dávila was
clearly domiciled in Texas.
Where the district court erred was in concluding that
Aponte-Dávila had changed his domicile from Texas to Puerto Rico
after his accident, as of the time he filed suit in Puerto Rico.
The bulk of the district court's justification for
finding that Aponte-Dávila was domiciled in Puerto Rico is based
on representations that Aponte-Dávila made about his residence in
various forms including an application to participate in Puerto
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Rico's "Reforma" health plan,3 an application for Medicaid
benefits, an application for a disability parking permit, a form
submitted to the Puerto Rico Department of Treasury, and a form
submitted to Warren Transport. He also obtained a Puerto Rico
driver's license that listed an address in Caguas. The district
court reasoned that "[s]trong evidence of domicile is found in
representations a party has made on reports and documents submitted
to third parties," and, citing a treatise, that "[a]lthough
residence alone is not the equivalent of domicile, the place of
residence is prima facie evidence of a party's domicile."4 Dávila,
2015 WL 3889963, at *5.
3 The district court and the defendants add that the
"Reforma" health plan is limited to residents of Puerto Rico.
Dávila, 2015 WL 3889963, at *2, *5 n.3. Aponte-Dávila disagrees.
The relevant statute provides: "All residents of Puerto Rico may
be beneficiaries of the Health Plan established upon the
implementation of this chapter, provided that they meet the
following requirements . . . ." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 7029.
As Aponte-Dávila sees it, the statute does not expressly exclude
non-residents. We need not resolve this dispute, though we
question whether Aponte-Dávila is correct. For the purposes of
our inquiry, it does not matter whether the plan is actually
limited to residents or not -- residence is not the same as
domicile. See Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d 48, 53
(1st Cir. 1992). Rather, his participation in the plan is relevant
to the extent that it demonstrates his intent, by claiming Puerto
Rican residence, to make Puerto Rico his domicile.
4 While this court has never expressly recognized such a
principle, we note that other courts have. See, e.g., Krasnov v.
Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972); Walden v. Broce Constr.
Co., 357 F.2d 242, 245 (10th Cir. 1966) (citing Stine v. Moore,
213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954)). But see Mondragon v. Capital
One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2013) ("It does not
appear that this circuit has yet adopted this presumption."). The
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While the district court was certainly correct that
residence is relevant to the question of domicile and that
representations of one's residence in certain instances "are
entitled to significant weight," Lundquist v. Precision Valley
Aviation, Inc., 946 F.2d 8, 12–13 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam),
the court erred by placing altogether too much emphasis on this
factor in light of the circumstances. When considered in the
context of Aponte-Dávila's reason for being in Puerto Rico in the
first place -- medical treatment -- these representations about
his residence, many tied to getting such treatment, do not
themselves result in a change in domicile. See García Pérez, 364
F.3d at 351 (emphasizing that the court must consider the
"substantive nature" of the party's contacts with the state).
Aponte-Dávila shuttled back and forth between Texas and
Puerto Rico between 2009 and 2013 so that he could obtain medical
care and assistance from his family as he attempted to recover
from the injuries from his fall. The district court concluded
Supreme Court long ago stated that "[t]he place where a person
lives is taken to be his domicil until facts adduced establish the
contrary." Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694, 706 (1891) (emphasis
added); see also District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 455
(1941); Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 400, 423 (1852) ("Where
a person lives, is taken primâ facie to be his domicil, until other
facts establish the contrary."). This principle, however, does
not provide an end run around the longstanding test for domicile.
Looking at residency alone is an insufficient analysis if there
are other facts, and this court has consistently required a careful
analysis of a variety of factors to determine a party's domicile.
See Padilla-Mangual, 516 F.3d at 32; Bank One, 964 F.2d at 50.
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that Aponte-Dávila "severed relevant links to Texas." Dávila,
2015 WL 3889963, at *4. But the record shows that he never stopped
returning to Texas to work and that he continued to file his
federal taxes from Texas. He never filed tax returns in Puerto
Rico. When he was in Puerto Rico, he stayed with his parents or
with his ex-wife, Báez. After his last stay in Puerto Rico from
May 2012 to April 2013, he returned to Texas where he renewed his
Texas commercial driver's license, leased an apartment in Laredo,
reactivated his bank accounts at Wells Fargo, and registered to
vote in Texas. While several of these actions occurred after the
filing of the lawsuit, "subsequent events may bear on the sincerity
of a professed intention to remain." García Pérez, 364 F.3d at
351. In this case, the actions that Aponte-Dávila took in Texas
after filing his lawsuit are strong evidence that he never harbored
an intention to change his domicile to Puerto Rico.
To be sure, Aponte-Dávila's connections to Texas were
weakest in the period between the paralyzing incident in May 2012
and his return to Texas in April 2013. At the same time, though,
his connections to Puerto Rico during this period were not
meaningfully stronger than they were before the May 2012 incident.
The district court placed substantial weight on Aponte-Dávila's
representations about his residency in Puerto Rico between 2009
and 2013. Many of these representations were made before the May
2012 incident, when he maintained stronger ties to Texas. After
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the May 2012 incident, however, he continued to make the same types
of representations. So even if his ties to Texas were weaker after
the May 2012 incident, his later, equivalent representations about
his residency in Puerto Rico are insufficient to show that he
thereafter intended to change his domicile.
"Jurisdictionally speaking, residency and citizenship
are not interchangeable." Valentin, 254 F.3d at 361 n.1.
"[C]itizenship or domicile, not residence, is the basis of subject
matter jurisdiction." Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d
48, 53 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Lundquist, 946 F.2d at 10 ("[T]he
relevant standard is 'citizenship,' i.e., 'domicile,' not mere
residence."). Indeed, "[w]hile a person may have more than one
residence, he can only have one domicile." Bank One, 964 F.2d at
53. This is why residence is not dispositive of the domicile
inquiry but rather one of many factors that the federal courts
consider when determining a party's domicile. See García Pérez,
364 F.3d at 351. Given the circumstances of Aponte-Dávila's
ongoing medical treatment in Puerto Rico, the unremarkable fact
that he claimed a residence in Puerto Rico and listed it on a
variety of forms, several of which pertain directly to his medical
condition and treatment, is weak evidence of an intent to remain
in Puerto Rico indefinitely and give up his Texas domicile,
particularly in light of his continued ties to Texas while he was
recovering in Puerto Rico.
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Our conclusion here is guided by our prior decision in
Valentin. There, the plaintiff was a resident of Puerto Rico when
she began experiencing severe abdominal pain. 254 F.3d at 361.
Complications ensued as a result of surgery she received in Puerto
Rico, and so she moved to Florida to "seek[] more sophisticated
medical care." Id. While there, she stayed with her sister and
brother-in-law. Id. She did not terminate her employment in
Puerto Rico and instead used sick time donated to her by her co-
workers and, when that ran out, unpaid leave. Id. at 361–62. She
also left most of her belongings in Puerto Rico, kept her car
registered there, and maintained a Puerto Rico bank account. Id.
at 366. On the other hand, she obtained a Florida driver's license
and a charge card from a Florida bank, and she even took a Florida
nurse licensing exam and applied for nursing jobs. Id. at 366–
67. On appeal, we affirmed the district court's determination
that despite her contacts with Florida, the plaintiff remained a
domiciliary of Puerto Rico. Id. at 367. We held that "bearing in
mind that the plaintiffs [sic] primary purpose in going to Florida
in April of 1998 -- to secure advanced medical treatment for the
complications arising out of her surgery -- was fully consistent
with transient status as opposed to outright relocation, we cannot
say that the district court clearly erred in concluding that the
plaintiff had not become a Florida citizen." Id.
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Other cases from this circuit reinforce the importance
of context in cases involving individuals who relocate for periods
of time to a new jurisdiction for the purpose of obtaining medical
treatment. In García Pérez, two parents brought a medical
malpractice suit against a doctor and a hospital in Puerto Rico
after three of their four quadruplets died around the time of their
birth and the fourth suffered from a series of complications. 364
F.3d at 349. The family relocated to Florida to obtain medical
care for the surviving daughter. Id. We reversed the district
court's finding that the plaintiffs remained domiciled in Puerto
Rico, concluding instead that they had established a new domicile
in Florida. Id. at 355. This finding, however, was based on much
more than mere residence in Florida. The parents maintained much
stronger ties to Florida than Aponte-Dávila did to Puerto Rico.
We noted that the parents had registered to vote in Florida, had
acquired Florida driver's licenses, had sold their car in Puerto
Rico and purchased two new cars in Florida, had rented out, but
not sold, their house in Puerto Rico, and had opened a Miami bank
account. Moreover, the father had studied for and passed the
Florida bar exam and expressed a clear intention of practicing law
in Florida. Id. at 352–53.
In Hawes, a husband and wife filed a tort claim against
various defendants after the husband was rendered a quadriplegic
when a horse jumped over a fence at a horse show the couple was
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attending and struck the husband's back with its front legs. 598
F.2d at 699–700. At the time of the show, the pair lived in Puerto
Rico, but they soon decided to move to New York so that the husband
could seek treatment at a rehabilitation center there. Id. at
700. The couple took their personal belongings to New York,
leaving their furniture in Puerto Rico with a friend. Id. The
wife closed her Puerto Rico bank accounts and opened a new one in
New York. Id. She also obtained a residence in New York. Id.
The couple's younger daughter moved with them to New York and
enrolled in school there, but the older one, an eighteen year old,
stayed in Puerto Rico. Id. While the wife did not quit her job,
she remained on leave without pay so that she could keep her
accumulated retirement benefits. Id. Eventually, though, she
obtained part-time employment in the suburbs of New York and then
full-time employment in Manhattan. Id. at 702–03. She also filed
federal income taxes from New York after the commencement of the
tort action. Id. at 700. On these facts, which again implicated
much more than just residence, the court concluded that "the
plaintiffs clearly intended to move to New York City for as long
as [the husband's] physical condition required," and that "they
made a deliberate decision to go to New York City for an indefinite
period of time." Id. at 702.
Because Valentin, García Pérez, and Hawes, like the case
at hand, were before this court on clear error review, we cannot
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-- and do not -- suggest that their outcomes are strictly
determinative of this case. But they do illustrate the need to
look beyond the facts regarding residence when faced with a party
who relocates to a new jurisdiction for the purpose of seeking
medical care. In the end, this case is most akin to the facts of
Valentin, where the plaintiff had minimal contacts with the
jurisdiction in which she sought medical care. Like Aponte-Dávila,
the plaintiff in Valentin stayed with family while receiving
medical care and obtained a local driver's license; she went even
further than Aponte-Dávila and applied for jobs. Both she and
Aponte-Dávila also maintained connections to their professions in
their home jurisdictions. Aponte-Dávila's ties to Puerto Rico are
quite superficial when compared to the parents in García Pérez.
And while Hawes presents a closer case -- somewhere between
Valentin and García Pérez -- the facts there strongly suggested an
indefinite intention to stay in New York that simply is not present
in this case in light of Aponte-Dávila's continued efforts to
return to his work as an interstate truck driver in Texas.
The district court also erred when it concluded that a
particular document submitted by Aponte-Dávila was "utterly
incompatible" with the conclusion that he renewed his Texas
commercial driver's license on May 6, 2013. Dávila, 2015 WL
3889963, at *3 n.2. The document at issue is a "Certified Abstract
Record" from the Texas Department of Public Safety, dated October
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14, 2013, which reflects relevant information pertaining to
Aponte-Dávila's Texas commercial driver's license. The form
states that a medical certificate was issued to Aponte-Dávila on
May 6, 2013, by a Texas doctor. It also states that the "Date
Last Issued" for Aponte-Dávila's commercial driver's license was
September 30, 2013.
Aponte-Dávila argues that the Texas Department of Public
Safety document shows that he renewed his Texas commercial driver's
license -- or at least began the process of renewing it -- on May
6, 2013, which required him to receive a medical examination and
certificate.5
5 The defendants pressed at oral argument that Aponte-
Dávila has waived any reliance on the Texas Department of Public
Safety document to prove that he was in Texas on May 6 to obtain
a medical certificate because the argument was not presented to
the district court. Not so. The document was attached as Exhibit
11 to Aponte-Dávila's Motion in Support of Diversity Jurisdiction.
In the motion itself, citing to Exhibit 11, he stated: "A week
after arriving in Laredo, on May 6, 2013, Aponte renewed and was
issued on that same date his Texas Commercial Driver's License
. . . that had expired in February 2013 during his extended
recuperation in Puerto Rico." While no express mention was made
of the medical certificate, the relevance of the document was
plainly apparent. Indeed, the district court was aware of the
document's relevance to his presence in Texas, and addressed that
point. See Dávila, 2015 WL 3889963, at *3 n.2.
The defendants also raise a series of evidentiary
challenges to the Texas Department of Public Safety document. But
these arguments were not presented to the district court. Unless
a case involves "exceptional circumstances," we will not allow a
party to raise a new issue on appeal that it did not raise to the
district court. T I Fed. Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921,
929–30 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v.
Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 628 (1st Cir. 1995)). Such circumstances
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We think the district court's contrary conclusion is
based on a misreading of the Texas Department of Public Safety
document. It clearly states that the medical certificate was
issued on May 6, 2013 by a Texas "Medical Examiner." Absent any
evidence to the contrary, this document, along with Aponte-
Dávila's deposition testimony and statements in his affidavit,
could reasonably support the finding that Aponte-Dávila was in
Texas and either renewed his license on May 6, or, at a minimum,
began the process of renewal by obtaining the medical examination
and certificate on that date. That the document says the "Date
Last Issued" was September 30, 2013, does not, as the district
court assumed, foreclose such a finding. Aponte-Dávila explained
in his affidavit that he was issued a license on May 6, 2013, but
that he was also reissued a new license on September 30, 2013,
after he obtained a new address in Laredo. See Hawes, 598 F.2d at
704 (noting that where "the case was decided without a hearing,"
and the "facts set forth in the affidavit . . . are both reasonable
and logical and do not contradict any statements made by [the
plaintiff] . . . there could be no credibility determination made
adverse to [the plaintiff]"). The Texas Department of Public
Safety document is itself dated October 14, 2013, which would
explain why the "Date Last Issued" was September 30, 2013.
are not present here, and so these evidentiary challenges are
waived.
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In the end, that Aponte-Dávila, within days of returning
to Texas, renewed his commercial driver's license in order to
return to his truck-driving career in Texas is evidence that he
never intended to forego his Texas domicile in favor of Puerto
Rico.6
We find that on the evidence presented, Aponte-Dávila
has shown that he did not abandon his Texas domicile in favor of
a Puerto Rico domicile after his accident in 2009, and that Texas
necessarily remained his domicile until at least the date that his
lawsuit was filed. See Valentin, 254 F.3d at 366 ("[A] party's
former domicile persists until a new one is acquired."). We add,
however, that even if we were to agree that Aponte-Dávila had
shifted his domicile to Puerto Rico for the period during which he
was seeking medical treatment, we believe that the district court
erred in concluding that Aponte-Dávila had not reestablished Texas
as his domicile before filing his complaint. Aponte-Dávila
6 We also believe the district court erroneously
disregarded the significance of Aponte-Dávila's license renewal.
The district court appeared to equate Aponte-Dávila's commercial
license with a noncommercial one, stating that "[o]btaining or
renewing a driver's license is not necessarily a complicated
procedure for one who (like plaintiff) already has the skill, and
without more objective evidence of a domicile change is
insufficient to tilt the balance to plaintiff's side." Dávila,
2015 WL 3889963, at *5 n.6. Aponte-Dávila's renewal of his
commercial license, a more onerous task than renewing a
noncommercial driver's license, is indicative of his intent to
return to his longstanding career in Texas despite obtaining
medical care in Puerto Rico.
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returned to Texas, his prior domicile, and immediately took the
significant step of renewing his commercial driver's license in
order to resume his truck-driving career. Shortly thereafter, he
rented an apartment, reactivated his bank accounts, registered to
vote, and voted in Texas. Though events that happen after the
filing of the complaint are "not part of the primary calculus,"
they still "bear on the sincerity of a professed intention to
remain." García Pérez, 364 F.3d at 351.
VII.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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