Joyce v. Town of Dennis, MA ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    Nos. 11-1887, 11-1928
    ELAINE JOYCE,
    Plaintiff, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
    v.
    TOWN OF DENNIS, ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
    [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Ripple,* and Lipez,
    Circuit Judges.
    Laura R. Studen, with whom Lawrence P. Murray, Jack S. Gearan,
    and Burns & Levinson LLP were on brief, for appellant/cross-
    appellee.
    Leonard H. Kesten, with whom Deidre Brennan Regan and Brody,
    Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP were on brief, for appellees/cross-
    appellants.
    Jonathan J. Margolis, Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz LLP, Ellen J.
    Messing, James S. Weliky, and Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. on
    brief for amicus curiae Massachusetts Employment Lawyers
    Association.
    Anne L. Josephson, Kotin, Crabtree & Strong, LLP, Sarah
    Wunsch, and ACLU of Massachusetts on brief for amici curiae
    American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Gay & Lesbian
    Advocates & Defenders, the Jewish Alliance for Law and Social
    *
    Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Action, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Economic
    Justice, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, and the National
    Police Accountability Project.
    June 17, 2013
    LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.        In May 2007, three days before
    plaintiff Elaine Joyce ("Joyce") expected to play golf with her
    father in a tournament at a town course in Dennis, Massachusetts,
    Joyce's father was told he would have to find another partner
    because women were not allowed in that "men's" tournament.                 The
    Town   Administrator   declined    to   reverse   the   course    officials'
    decision, and Joyce subsequently brought federal and state claims
    alleging gender discrimination against the Town, the golf course,
    and several individuals.          The district court granted summary
    judgment in her favor and thereafter held a trial on damages. This
    appeal addresses only the nature and extent of her remedy.             Joyce
    claims that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the
    jury on punitive damages, denying injunctive relief, and awarding
    attorney's fees in an amount substantially less than her request.
    The defendants claim that the court erred in concluding that Joyce
    was a prevailing party entitled to any attorney's fees.
    We find no error in the court's treatment of punitive
    damages, but must remand for further proceedings on injunctive
    relief and attorney's fees.       We reject the defendants' contention
    that the court should not have awarded any attorney's fees and
    instead conclude that the court erred in reducing the requested
    award based on, inter alia, Joyce's rejection of a settlement
    offer.    The   district   court    also   must   revisit   the    issue    of
    -3-
    injunctive relief and explain its decision to grant or refuse such
    relief.
    I.
    We recount in some detail the circumstances underlying
    Joyce's   complaint    of   gender   discrimination,   as    well   as   the
    procedural   history   of   the   case.    Although    appellees    do   not
    challenge the district court's finding of liability, the court's
    rulings on punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees
    must be reviewed in the context of the litigation as a whole.
    A.   The Events at Dennis Pines
    Elaine Joyce is an avid and proficient golfer who signed
    up with her father in April 2007 to play in a tournament at the
    Dennis Pines Golf Course the first weekend in May.1         The tournament
    was listed on the course schedule as a men's members-only event.
    Both Joyce and her father, Patrick, are members of the course and,
    in the fall of 2006, had been assigned a tee time for a similar
    tournament that was rained out.2
    On May 2, 2007 -- three days before the start of the
    tournament -- the Town's head golf pro, Russell Champoux, called
    Patrick Joyce and told him that the Golf Advisory Committee
    1
    Dennis Pines is one of two public golf courses in the Town
    of Dennis.
    2
    Joyce testified about the 2006 event, but there is no
    documentary evidence of either the Joyces' registration or the
    circumstances of the tournament's cancellation.
    -4-
    ("GAC"), a volunteer group responsible for course policy, had
    decided that his daughter could not play in the Dennis Pines men's
    tournament because of her gender.        Joyce was never contacted
    directly by Dennis Pines, but after her father relayed the news to
    her, she sent an email to the Town Administrator, Robert Canevazzi,
    seeking his help "to make certain that this discriminatory practice
    is not condoned by the Town of Dennis or any of its committees."
    In her message, sent early on May 3, Joyce asked Canevazzi to "act
    promptly to get the current decision reversed" so that she could
    play in the weekend tournament.    Joyce contacted Canevazzi because
    she had had a similar experience at a golf course in another town.
    After a prolonged effort to persuade club officials in that town to
    allow her to join a men's league, she was finally able to secure a
    policy change through the town administrator.
    Canevazzi replied to Joyce later the same day.         He
    reported that he had spoken to Champoux and members of the GAC, and
    he had decided to uphold Joyce's exclusion from the tournament
    because changing the rules so late "would not be fair to the 1600
    plus members of the Dennis Golf Courses who may either desire or
    not desire to play in such a tournament."     In addition, he noted
    that the Tournament Committee (a subcommittee of the GAC) had
    sought to schedule more women's tournaments "to allow greater
    opportunities for women to have such competitive events."        He
    stated that he did not view the club's tournament policies to be
    -5-
    discriminatory, but nonetheless had asked the chairman of the GAC
    to include discussion of the criteria for tournament participation
    at its May 14 meeting. Canevazzi did not expressly invite Joyce to
    attend that meeting, but he told her its time and location.
    The GAC's chairman, Jim Horvath, sent Joyce an email on
    May 4, in which he apologized for "any confusion and inconvenience
    that       you    encountered   in   how   you   learned   about   your   non-
    participation in this weekend's golf event." He explained that the
    GAC had voted in December to approve the schedule of tournaments
    set up by the Tournament Committee and the head golf professional.
    He wrote that, "[t]o me, it was clear then that there were balanced
    opportunities for both men and women to play in the first 3 events
    of this year," and noted, "I think that is still the case."3                He
    continued:
    As chairman of the GAC, I welcome open
    discussion on this matter and have placed it
    on the May 14 Golf Advisory Committee agenda
    (as Bob Canevazzi indicated to you yesterday).
    The meeting is at 5pm at Dennis Highlands. I
    hope that you can attend.         Please don't
    hesitate to contact me in the interim.
    3
    Dennis Pines' 2007 schedule listed five men's-only
    tournaments and two women's-only tournaments, for a total of ten
    men's-only tournament days and two women's-only tournament days.
    In addition, there were seven tournaments in which both men and
    women were scheduled to play in separate divisions, for a total of
    thirteen days (twelve for women). At least one of the tournaments
    included a mixed gender division, in which men and women played
    together on teams.
    -6-
    Horvath      then     thanked    Joyce    "for   bringing   this     issue   to   our
    attention."
    Joyce did not contact Horvath or attend the May 14
    meeting.       At that meeting, the GAC voted to ask the Tournament
    Committee to make a recommendation on the gender-based tournament
    policy and report back to the GAC "as soon as possible."                     At its
    next       meeting,    on    June   11,   the    GAC   accepted    the   Tournament
    Committee's recommendation that no changes be made to the 2007
    schedule and that, beginning in 2008, every tournament would have
    a women's field.4           Creating separate divisions was consistent with
    the opinion of Town Counsel as reported by Canevazzi at the
    meeting.       According to Canevazzi, counsel had expressed "alarm[]"
    that the course policy "could be perceived as discriminatory" and
    stated that "it must be made more gender-neutral offering more
    women['s] divisions within the Tournaments."                  But Champoux, the
    club pro, observed at the meeting that the change would not resolve
    Joyce's complaint, which stemmed from her desire to play with the
    men -- and not in a parallel division for women.                  At the GAC's July
    meeting, the "Gender Based Policy" issue was tabled because "no
    additional information ha[d] been received."
    4
    The meeting minutes indicate that the Tournament Committee
    at that time had an equal number of men and women.        Horvath
    testified in 2011 that it had seven members, four of whom were
    women.
    -7-
    B.   The Administrative Complaint and Aftermath
    Frustrated by the response to her concerns, Joyce filed
    a pro se complaint in July 2007 with the Massachusetts Commission
    Against Discrimination ("MCAD") against the Town of Dennis and
    Canevazzi.        After the filing, an attorney representing the Town,
    Kristin Harris, called Joyce twice and left messages asking her to
    call to discuss the dispute.       Joyce did not respond.    She also did
    not respond to a letter Harris sent her referencing the MCAD's
    mediation process, though Joyce asked the Commission if she was
    obliged to talk to the Town and was advised to wait until the Town
    filed its position statement.5
    The GAC again acted on the gender policy at its October
    2007 meeting.         After Horvath reported that the United States
    Golfing Association ("USGA") allows women to play in all events "as
    long as they play exactly the same as a man," the GAC voted
    unanimously to instruct the Tournament Committee to follow the USGA
    rules for all 2008 tournaments.            This was the tournament policy
    that Joyce originally had sought, allowing women to play alongside
    men.6       Although no general announcement of the change in policy was
    5
    Canevazzi testified that after receiving the MCAD complaint
    he instructed the Town's attorney to try to schedule mediation,
    which he understood to be the MCAD's recommendation.
    6
    Joyce asserts that no change in policy in fact was adopted
    in October 2007, but the record does not support that contention.
    We agree with the district court that the record, consisting of
    deposition and trial testimony and exhibits, can only reasonably be
    read to show that the GAC at its October 22 meeting "formally
    -8-
    communicated to members,7 the 2008 Tournament Information Packet
    included a statement (which did not appear in the 2007 Packet)
    advising that "[a]ll tournaments will follow USGA guidelines for
    participation."8   Canevazzi acknowledged that he would not have
    understood from that statement that a change in gender policy had
    occurred, although -- in another revision of the 2007 Packet -- the
    2008 tournament schedule eliminated the gender labels in the
    listings of members-only tournaments.
    The Town filed its MCAD position statement on November 2,
    2007, without mentioning the October vote.   Canevazzi, who signed
    the document, testified that the statement had been prepared weeks
    earlier, and he had failed to realize that it did not reflect the
    October meeting when he signed it.   The MCAD statement denied that
    the facts showed "discrimination of any kind," and noted that "once
    agreed to allow women to play in men's tournaments, as Joyce had
    originally requested." Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 
    705 F. Supp. 2d 74
    , 79 (D. Mass. 2010); see also Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d 285
    , 290 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting that defendants changed
    the tournament policy before Joyce filed her complaint).
    7
    Eric Oman, GAC chair in October 2007, testified about an
    email announcement sent by the assistant director of golf in April
    2008 to some members of the Town's golf clubs "restat[ing] the
    change in policy adopted by the Town of Dennis golf courses on
    October 22, 2007." The announcement stated that "[a]ll men's golf
    tournaments are open to women competitors." Joyce testified that
    the announcement also was posted on the "men's bulletin board" and,
    at least as of 2009, on "the website" -- which we presume to mean
    t h e     D e n n i s     G o l f     w e b s i t e .         S e e
    http://www.dennisgolf.com/guidelines.php.
    8
    The statement was added, in bold type, at the top of a list
    of "General Tournament Information."
    -9-
    the    Complainant's     concern   was     brought   to    the   Respondents'
    attention, the Respondents[] immediately evaluated the tournament
    schedule with the Golf Advisory Committee and agreed to modify the
    schedule, such that all tournaments would include a men's and
    women's division beginning in 2008."
    Joyce then hired an attorney, who filed a rebuttal to the
    defendants' statement in early January 2008.              After receiving the
    rebuttal, Harris, the Town's attorney, placed a call to Joyce's
    attorney and left a message requesting an opportunity to discuss
    the matter.      Joyce's attorney later reported that she was unaware
    of that message.
    C.    The Litigation
    On February 15, 2008, Joyce filed a complaint in federal
    court against the Town, its golf courses, Canevazzi, and three
    course professionals,9 alleging, inter alia, gender discrimination
    under federal and state law.10      A media relations consultant hired
    by Joyce's counsel notified the news media of the lawsuit, which
    was filed on the Friday before a three-day holiday weekend.              The
    suit quickly generated national publicity, including an article in
    The New York Times on February 19.           See Marcia Chambers, Barred
    9
    The three were Dennis Penner, Golf Director during part of
    2007; Michael Cummings, the Head Golf Course Superintendent at the
    time the complaint was filed; and Champoux, the Head Golf
    Professional.
    10
    By this time, Joyce had withdrawn her MCAD complaint.
    -10-
    From        Men's-Only   Event,   Woman    Sues   Public   Golf   Club,
    http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/sports/golf/19links.html?_r=0.
    The article reported that neither Canevazzi nor Harris returned the
    reporter's phone calls on February 18, which was the Presidents'
    Day holiday.11
    A few days later, an attorney for the Town called Joyce's
    attorney and noted that, as a result of the GAC vote the previous
    October, Joyce could play golf at Dennis Pines whenever and with
    whomever she chose.       In a follow-up letter in mid-March, defense
    counsel suggested trying "to resolve this matter in the best
    interests of our clients" and stated that the Town was "prepared to
    notify all members explicitly that women are welcome to play in all
    events, as long as they play from the same tees as the other
    competitors and have their handicaps adjusted accordingly."         The
    letter solicited reaction from Joyce and her attorney on the Town's
    proposals.       Defense counsel also pledged to investigate Joyce's
    allegation that she had been intimidated by "defendants and other
    male members" when playing at Dennis Pines after lodging her MCAD
    complaint, stating that "[m]y clients and I want to ensure that Ms.
    Joyce has a pleasant experience participating in all golfing events
    11
    Oman, by then the GAC Chair, testified that he learned about
    the lawsuit from "phone messages left at [his] place of business
    from various TV stations, newspapers, talk-show hosts throughout
    the country regarding wanting statements about the pending
    lawsuit."
    -11-
    in the Town of Dennis."    Joyce's counsel's lengthy response, dated
    March 31, concluded as follows:
    [N]either Ms. Joyce nor the Club membership
    has received a clear and unequivocal statement
    against   gender   discrimination,   and   the
    affirmative duty is upon the Defendants to
    propose a plan that addresses the issues that
    will otherwise be sought in a court ordered
    permanent injunction.    Be assured that Ms.
    Joyce intends to pursue her damages, including
    punitive damages. If the Defendants wish to
    make a settlement proposal at this juncture it
    may be prudent given that the attorneys' fees
    continue to escalate, and these are also
    recoverable by Ms. Joyce.       Once we have
    received your answer, I would like to schedule
    depositions.
    Defendants filed their answer to the complaint on May 28,
    2008, and the litigation proceeded.
    D.   The District Court's Decision on the Merits
    In   March   2010,   the   district   court   granted   summary
    judgment for Joyce against the Town and its golf courses on her
    federal equal protection claim, brought under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , but
    granted judgment for the individual defendants on that claim.
    Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 
    705 F. Supp. 2d 74
    , 81 (D. Mass. 2010).
    The court noted that the tournament policy excluding women from
    certain events expressly discriminated based on gender, and thereby
    established a suspect classification that required justification.
    The defendants did not meet that requirement, the court held,
    having attempted to do so with a single "conclusory statement":
    "[T]he defendants offer that the justification for the men's only
    -12-
    tournaments is the existence itself of equal opportunity for women
    golfers in terms of the women's only tournaments and the mixed
    gender tournaments." 
    Id. at 80
     (internal quotation mark omitted).
    The court further stated:
    Indeed, [defendants' statement] is not a
    justification at all but a reiteration of the
    question already answered (i.e., whether the
    treatment of women was unequal) . . . . Nor,
    for that matter, is an exceedingly persuasive
    justification as obvious with respect to the
    game of golf as opposed to football or some
    other contact sport. In any event, the burden
    lies with the defendants, not the Court, and
    they have not met it here.
    
    Id.
       The court emphasized, however, that "the holding in this case
    results   from   defendants'   failure   to   advance   a   persuasive
    justification for their acts, not necessarily because no such
    justification exists."   
    Id. at 82
    .
    The court thus took pains to limit its finding of
    unlawful discrimination under federal law. Following the statement
    above, the court continued as follows in a footnote:
    To that end, the Court carefully limits
    its holding to the circumstances of this case.
    What is critical here is that the burden lies
    with the defendants to justify their conduct
    and they have not done so. This decision does
    not require all public golf courses to have
    all mixed-gender tournaments.      Instead, it
    establishes that when the defendants draw a
    clear distinction based upon gender and their
    only explanation is to deny that any
    distinction existed, they will not prevail.
    
    Id.
     at 82 n.1.
    -13-
    The court also ruled for Joyce against all defendants on
    her state law gender discrimination claim, see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
    ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98,12 and granted judgment for the defendants on
    a state law consumer protection claim, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A.
    The   court   reached   three   significant    conclusions   about
    Massachusetts public accommodations law: (1) there is no "'separate
    but equal' exception to the statute's otherwise clear prohibition
    of gender distinctions or discrimination," 
    705 F. Supp. 2d at 84
    ,
    and, hence, (2) the plaintiff does not bear the burden to show
    differential treatment; and (3) a tournament at a public golf
    course is a public accommodations.     Id.13
    12
    Section 98 prohibits "any distinction, discrimination or
    restriction" on account of gender in "any place of public
    accommodation, resort or amusement," and further states, in part:
    All persons shall have the right to the full and equal
    accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of
    any place of public accommodation . . . subject only to
    the conditions and limitations established by law and
    applicable to all persons.
    Section 92A defines "[a] place of public accommodation" to include
    "any place . . . which is open to and accepts or solicits the
    patronage of the general public."
    13
    Technically, in rejecting the defendants' argument that the
    May 2007 tournament was a "non-public enclave" within the golf
    course, the court held only that the specific tournament at issue
    here was a public accommodation. See Joyce, 
    705 F. Supp. 2d at 84
    .
    Defendants' argument, however, swept more broadly. They noted that
    "[a] public accommodation can have a non-public enclave," and
    stated that "the holding of a non-public event in an otherwise
    public forum creates a private enclave, and takes the event out of
    the scope of being a place of 'public accommodation.'" Defs.' Mem.
    in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. and in Supp. of Defs.'
    Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., at 10.        Defendants relied on these
    -14-
    The court thus held that the defendants had violated
    Joyce's right to equal protection under federal law when they
    excluded her from the men's only tournament in May 2007 and, in
    effect, ruled that women may not be barred from similar tournaments
    on the basis of gender without justification.   As described above,
    the court also held that the defendants unlawfully discriminated
    against Joyce under Massachusetts law.
    The court left for the jury the determination of Joyce's
    damages.
    E.   Damages, Fees and Injunctive Relief
    In January 2011, in advance of the damages trial, the
    district court ruled that Joyce could recover attorney's fees under
    both federal and state law.     The court delayed setting an amount
    until after the damages verdict, however, because it viewed "the
    degree of success obtained" as "[a] major factor" in determining a
    reasonable fee.    Joyce v. Town of Dennis, 
    770 F. Supp. 2d 424
    , 427
    (D. Mass. 2011).     At the same time, the court rejected Joyce's
    request that the jury be instructed on punitive damages. The court
    principles in asserting that, because Dennis Pines did not allow
    the public to use the golf course during members-only tournament
    weekends, and tournament participants had to meet certain
    qualifications, "the golf tournaments thus were not a place of
    'public accommodation.'"     Id. at 10-11; see also id. at 11
    ("[D]uring such tournaments, the golf course was not a place of
    public accommodation.").
    Given these arguments, the court's ruling surely constitutes
    precedent for the general proposition that, absent some reason for
    an exception, tournaments at public golf courses are public
    accommodations.
    -15-
    explained    that   an   instruction    on   punitive     damages    "would   be
    inappropriate because there is no evidence of 'evil motive or
    intent' or awareness of a risk that the [golf course] rules were in
    violation of federal law."      Id. at 428.
    In   February   2011,    the    defendants    offered    Joyce     a
    settlement of $35,001, inclusive of costs and attorney's fees. She
    did not respond, and a jury subsequently awarded her $15,000 in
    compensatory damages.14 Following the verdict, Joyce requested more
    than $170,000 in attorney's fees and costs under state law, see
    Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 9, as well as an injunction
    ordering the defendants, inter alia, to adopt a policy barring
    gender-based discrimination.         In a ruling issued on June 30, 2011,
    the district court awarded $30,000 in attorney's fees, and $4,600
    in costs.    The court denied injunctive relief.
    On attorney's fees, the district court endorsed the
    defendants' contention that any award of fees would be unjust in
    the circumstances of the case, but it nonetheless concluded that
    Joyce was entitled to "modest" fees as the prevailing party. Joyce
    v. Town of Dennis, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d 285
    , 288 (D. Mass. 2011).               Among
    the factors cited by the court to support the sharply reduced award
    was the rejection of what the court considered a reasonable
    settlement    offer.     Although     the    court   acknowledged    that     the
    14
    After both sides presented their evidence,                   the   court
    declined to change its ruling on punitive damages.
    -16-
    defendants shared the blame for prolonging the case, it considered
    Joyce and her counsel as primarily responsible for the length of
    the proceedings.     The court thus found it "fair and reasonable" to
    substantially reduce plaintiff's requested fee award.               
    Id. at 291
    .
    On   appeal,       Joyce   challenges    the    district   court's
    attorney's fee award and also claims error in the court's handling
    of punitive damages and injunctive relief.15            The defendants filed
    a cross-appeal asserting that the court erred in awarding any
    attorney's fees.
    II.
    Joyce argues that the district court improperly refused
    to give a punitive damages instruction.           We review de novo whether
    the evidence was sufficient to warrant such an instruction.                 See
    McDonough v. City of Quincy, 
    452 F.3d 8
    , 23 (1st Cir. 2006).
    Under Massachusetts law, punitive damages may be awarded
    in   the   context   of    a    discrimination      claim   "only   where   the
    defendant's conduct is outrageous or egregious."              Haddad v. Wal-
    Mart Stores, Inc., 
    914 N.E.2d 59
    , 75 (Mass. 2009); see also Mass.
    Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 9 (stating the availability of punitive
    damages for discrimination claims).16            Such an award "requires a
    15
    Although this appeal is brought by the Town, the golf
    courses, and the individual defendants, we at times refer to "the
    Town" to signify all appellees.
    16
    The Massachusetts public accommodation provisions have been
    integrated into the anti-discrimination scheme governed by chapter
    151B, and the same remedial provisions apply. See Currier v. Nat'l
    -17-
    heightened finding beyond mere liability and also beyond a knowing
    violation of the statute."     Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 75.        Determining
    whether punitive damages are warranted requires consideration of
    "all of the factors surrounding the wrongful conduct," which may
    include whether there was "a conscious or purposeful effort to
    demean or diminish the class of which the plaintiff is a part,"
    whether the defendant recklessly disregarded the likelihood of
    serious harm, the nature of "the defendant's conduct after learning
    that the initial conduct would likely cause harm," and "the actual
    harm to the plaintiff."     Id.
    In rejecting the instruction in its January 2011 pre-
    trial ruling, the district court observed that gender separation in
    sports had been upheld by federal courts, and it pointed to the
    policy change made by the GAC in October 2007, before the lawsuit
    was filed, to allow women to play with men, not only in separate
    divisions, but in all tournaments starting in 2008.        It also cited
    the defendants' invitation to Joyce to participate in discussions
    about changing the rules. The court concluded that the defendants'
    "rapid   and   considered   response   to   the   plaintiff's   complaint"
    foreclosed a jury finding that punitive damages were justified.
    Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 
    965 N.E.2d 829
    , 842 (Mass. 2012).     Joyce
    sought punitive damages under chapter 151B, and we accordingly
    analyze this issue solely as a matter of state law. Indeed, the
    only defendant against whom Joyce prevailed on her federal claim
    under section 1983 was the Town, which is immune from punitive
    damages under federal law. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
    Inc., 
    453 U.S. 247
    , 271 (1981).
    -18-
    Joyce, 
    770 F. Supp. 2d at 428
    .              As noted above, the court
    reaffirmed that decision after hearing the evidence presented at
    trial.
    We detect no error in the district court's ruling. It is
    of course undisputed at this point in the litigation that the
    defendants acted improperly.       The district court found that they
    unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender when they refused
    to let Joyce play in the May 2007 tournament.            A jury reasonably
    could have concluded as well that the GAC acted indefensibly when
    it   chose   to   delay   implementing    its   newly   adopted   tournament
    policies until 2008.      Moreover, the first change that was approved
    -- to add women's divisions in tournaments that previously were
    designated for men only -- did not eliminate the gender disparity
    challenged by Joyce.       A jury also could condemn the defendants'
    failure to communicate their new gender-neutral policy to golf club
    members in a clear and timely way, and could infer from their
    grudging behavior a resistance to the change.
    We must take into account, however, "all of the factors
    surrounding the wrongful conduct."          Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at 75.
    Though the defendants did not immediately change their gender-based
    tournament policy, they did immediately move to reconsider it.           As
    a result, they took action to increase gender equality twice within
    six months and ultimately adopted Joyce's desired policy, months
    before she filed her lawsuit.       In so doing, the GAC went beyond
    -19-
    what Town Counsel had told Canevazzi was necessary: "offering more
    women['s]   divisions   within   the   Tournaments."   Indeed,   Joyce
    acknowledged in her summary judgment memorandum that the Town's
    obligation to allow women to play in a tournament designated as
    "men's only" appeared to be a question of first impression.17       In
    addition, the Town made repeated efforts to communicate informally
    with Joyce and her attorney; each contact, however, was rebuffed.18
    Among those efforts was an attempt in March 2008, shortly after
    Joyce filed suit, to solicit Joyce's reaction to the Town's
    proposed plan to notify all golf club members that "women are
    welcome to play in all events, as long as they play from the same
    tees as the other competitors."
    Viewed against the backdrop of the actions the defendants
    did take in response to Joyce's objection to their gender policy,
    17
    Joyce also noted in her Response and Reply Brief on appeal
    that "this case was the first case to have directly addressed th[e]
    issue" of women seeking to play in a men's only tournament at a
    public golf course. Brief at 4; see also id. at 18 (noting that
    "none of the cases ever addressed the issue of the lawfulness of
    single sex tournaments at a public golf course").
    18
    We recognize that the conflict in this case began with a
    communications gaffe when Champoux, the club pro, called only
    Joyce's father to report the decision that she could not play in
    the May 5 tournament. Certainly, calling only Joyce's father was
    objectionable behavior and disrespectful to Joyce as a member of
    the course. Nonetheless, the failure to notify both members of a
    team, where Champoux's purpose was in part to tell the elder Joyce
    that he could select a new partner, cannot reasonably be viewed --
    in the context described above -- as sufficiently "outrageous or
    egregious" to support an award of punitive damages. Haddad, 914
    N.E.2d at 75.
    -20-
    their censurable conduct cannot properly be characterized as "so
    offensive     that     it     justifies     punishment    and   not     merely
    compensation."       Id.    Although the defendants arguably should have
    moved more quickly and more transparently to effectuate a policy
    change -- rather than waiting until 2008 -- they demonstrated a
    willingness from the outset to address Joyce's concern and conform
    to the law.    In arguing to the contrary, Joyce relies heavily on
    her assertion that the GAC did not in fact vote in October 2007 to
    open all men's tournaments to women, a contention we have rejected
    based on our review of the record.            See supra note 6.       She also
    asserts that the defendants had understood for years before her
    objection that their tournament policy was discriminatory, citing
    minutes from a GAC meeting in August 2005.               According to those
    minutes, a couple who spoke during a "Public Input" session
    observed that "this being 2005 it was very difficult to justify
    holding only 'Men's' tournaments and not including women."                 The
    husband of the couple also noted that his club in Lowell allowed
    women to play in any club event "as it is discriminatory to exclude
    women."
    There is more to this story, however.         Both Horvath, the
    GAC chair in 2005, and Oman, his successor, testified that as a
    result of the 2005 discussion more women's tournaments and women's
    divisions were added to the schedule.           Until Joyce challenged the
    gender restriction on men's-only tournaments in 2007, there was no
    -21-
    other complaint.   Particularly when viewed in light of the advice
    the GAC later received from Town Counsel, the Committee's response
    in 2005 -- adding tournament opportunities for women -- could have
    been thought sufficient to meet the concern expressed.19    On this
    record, a jury could not reasonably conclude that the defendants'
    failure to open all tournaments to women following the 2005
    discussion established "a conscious or purposeful effort to demean
    or diminish the class of which the plaintiff is a part" or any
    other factor justifying punitive damages.     Haddad, 914 N.E.2d at
    75.
    We thus find no error in the district court's refusal to
    instruct the jury on punitive damages.
    III.
    Joyce's petition for injunctive relief asked the district
    court to order the defendants to take five actions: (1) issue an
    19
    Indeed, it appears that the defendants could have understood
    that unequal opportunities for tournament play remained a focus
    even after Joyce complained. As reported in the minutes, Joyce's
    father raised that concern at the GAC's meeting on May 14, 2007,
    when the Committee first addressed her complaint:
    Mr. Patrick Joyce, father of Elaine who had submitted the
    letter concerning the fact that she was not allowed to
    play in the men's event stated that he felt the men have
    far more tournaments than the women and it was not an
    equal mix of tournaments.
    Oman, the GAC chair after Horvath, also testified that Mr. Joyce
    "voiced his concerns and opinions [at the meeting] that the
    committee should have . . . equal tournaments between men and women
    and more opportunities for women to play."
    -22-
    "affirmative directive" that play at the Dennis golf courses will
    be based solely on qualification and golf handicap, not gender; (2)
    issue a directive that, pursuant to state and federal law, "there
    shall be no distinction, restriction or discrimination on the basis
    of sex"; (3) adopt reasonable steps to insure that the golf courses
    "maintain[]   an   environment   that    is   neither   uncomfortable   nor
    emotionally taxing for Ms. Joyce"; (4) adopt and disseminate a
    written policy advising golf course members that it is unlawful to,
    inter alia, retaliate against anyone for supporting the exercise of
    protected rights; and (5) conduct staff training sessions on gender
    discrimination, including the obligation to maintain a comfortable
    environment for all golfers.            The district court denied the
    petition with little comment, stating only that the defendants had
    "gotten the message" and that any future conduct to the contrary
    would be met with severe sanctions.
    In asserting that the district court erred in denying
    injunctive relief, Joyce emphasizes her view that the defendants
    had not changed the tournament rules by the time she filed her
    lawsuit. More fruitfully, she also complains that the court failed
    to perform the analysis prescribed by our precedent for assessing
    the need for injunctive relief.          Under that four-part inquiry,
    injunctive relief may be ordered where (1) the plaintiff has
    prevailed on the merits, (2) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable
    injury in the absence of injunctive relief, (3) the harm to the
    -23-
    plaintiff would outweigh the harm to the defendants from an
    injunction, and (4) the injunction would not adversely affect the
    public interest. See Asociación de Educación Privada de P.R., Inc.
    v. García-Padilla, 
    490 F.3d 1
    , 8 (1st Cir. 2007).
    We review denials of injunctive relief for abuse of
    discretion, considering any underlying legal issues de novo.
    Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 
    623 F.3d 19
    , 26 (1st Cir. 2010).
    Here, the absence of explanation by the district court hampers our
    review.    It is possible that the court concluded that injunctive
    relief was unnecessary because the defendants had already adopted
    and disseminated the policy that Joyce had demanded, giving her
    equal access to all tournaments for which she has the requisite
    skills.   However, despite the change in their tournament policy in
    October 2007, the defendants vigorously litigated the case, raising
    various legal arguments in asserting that they bore no obligation
    to    include   women   in    men's-only    tournaments.    Their    initial
    dissemination of the October 2007 action was limited and, insofar
    as the change was presented as an adoption of the USGA guidelines,
    likely inscrutable to many of Dennis Pines' members.             In addition,
    the hostile reaction Joyce received from some male members after
    she filed her MCAD complaint suggests that discriminatory behaviors
    may    remain   at   Dennis    Pines,   notwithstanding    the    change   in
    tournament policy.       The court's reference to the possibility of
    -24-
    contrary behavior in the future suggests some doubt on its part
    about the permanence and scope of the defendants' actions.
    If    the   court   in   fact    was   concerned   about   grudging
    compliance with the October 2007 policy and thus perceived a risk
    of ongoing discrimination at the Dennis golf courses, its refusal
    to grant equitable relief would be less defensible because Joyce
    easily satisfies three of the four prerequisites for injunctive
    relief. She prevailed on the merits, no apparent harm would befall
    defendants from disseminating and following a policy that they
    already have adopted, and barring discrimination would plainly have
    no adverse impact on the public interest.          Moreover, it is unclear
    how sanctions could be imposed in the event of future misconduct
    absent injunctive relief, unless Joyce or some other party filed a
    new lawsuit.     Joyce should not bear the burden of initiating
    another action to protect the right to equal treatment that she won
    in this case.
    Hence, the key issue here in assessing the need for
    injunctive relief is the prospect of irreparable future harm.             We
    have stated that, "[t]o be entitled to a forward-looking remedy, a
    plaintiff must satisfy the basic requisites of equitable relief --
    'the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury,
    and the inadequacy of remedies at law.'"           Steir v. Girl Scouts of
    the USA, 
    383 F.3d 7
    , 16 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting O'Shea v.
    Littleton, 
    414 U.S. 488
    , 502 (1974)); see also Lopez v. Garriga,
    -25-
    
    917 F.2d 63
    , 67 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that "an injunction-seeker
    must show either that some past unlawful conduct has continuing
    impact into the future, or else he must show a likelihood of future
    unlawful conduct on the defendant's part" (citation omitted)).          We
    decline to uphold the district court's rejection of injunctive
    relief in the absence of its considered evaluation of that factor.
    It should address that deficiency in its analysis by conducting on
    remand, on the basis of the existing record, the four-factor
    inquiry set out by our precedent.20
    IV.
    Both parties challenge the district court's award of
    $30,000 in attorney's fees.              Joyce complains that the court
    considered improper factors in awarding less than one-fourth of the
    fees that she requested, and the Town argues that the court should
    not   have   awarded   any   fees   at   all.   Before   addressing   these
    contentions, we review the pertinent legal principles and the
    district court's rulings.
    20
    The district court noted that Joyce's complaint did not
    request the specific types of injunctive relief that she later
    sought in her petition and instead requested "only an Order
    enjoining the defendants from discriminating on the basis of
    gender." Joyce, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d at 292
    . The defendants have cited
    no precedent that would bar a plaintiff from making a more specific
    request for equitable relief after she has prevailed on the merits.
    -26-
    A.    Legal Framework
    Although         Joyce   prevailed   on    both   federal      and   state
    discrimination claims, she sought fees only under Massachusetts
    law.    The applicable fee-shifting provision states:
    If the court finds for the petitioner it
    shall, in addition to any other relief and
    irrespective of the amount in controversy,
    award the petitioner reasonable attorney's
    fees and costs unless special circumstances
    would render such an award unjust.
    Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9.               The amount of a reasonable fee
    under section 9 is "largely discretionary with the judge."
    Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 
    613 N.E.2d 881
    , 890 (Mass. 1993).                       Hence,
    our    review    of    the    district   court's      award   of    fees   under   the
    provision is for legal error or "manifest abuse of discretion."
    Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 
    704 F.3d 150
    , 153 (1st Cir. 2012).
    In    evaluating         reasonableness,     we   may    consider      both
    federal and Massachusetts precedent, as "attorney's fees available
    in both fora should, for the most part, be calculated in a similar
    manner."    Fontaine, 613 N.E.2d at 891.              The Massachusetts Supreme
    Judicial Court ("SJC") has adopted the "lodestar" method commonly
    used by federal courts, observing that "[a] fair market rate for
    time reasonably spent preparing and litigating a case is the basic
    measure of a reasonable attorney's fee under State law as well as
    Federal law."         Id.; see also Torres-Rivera v. O'Neill-Cancel, 
    524 F.3d 331
    , 336 (1st Cir. 2008) (describing the lodestar method of
    "multiplying the number of hours productively spent by a reasonable
    -27-
    hourly rate" as the typical starting point for calculating a fee).
    The calculation may be adjusted up or down to reflect a variety of
    factors:
    In determining the amount of a reasonable fee,
    we consider "the nature of the case and the
    issues presented, the time and labor required,
    the amount of damages involved, the result
    obtained, the experience, reputation and
    ability of the attorney, the usual price
    charged   for  similar   services   by   other
    attorneys in the same area, and the amount of
    awards in similar cases."
    Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    920 N.E.2d 278
    , 281 (Mass. 2010)
    (Rescript) (quoting Linthicum v. Archambault, 
    398 N.E.2d 482
    , 488
    (Mass. 1979), overruled in part on other grounds by Knapp Shoes,
    Inc. v. Sylvania Shoe Mfg. Corp., 
    640 N.E. 2d 1101
    , 1104-1105
    (Mass. 1994));21 see also Torres-Rivera, 
    524 F.3d at 336
    .
    The United States Supreme Court has identified "results
    obtained" as "a preeminent consideration in the fee-adjustment
    process," Coutin v. Young & Rubicam P.R., Inc., 
    124 F.3d 331
    , 338
    (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 432,
    440 (1983)), but that factor has multiple facets:
    21
    The Massachusetts SJC has noted that the lodestar method
    need not be applied as "a two-step approach of lodestar and
    adjustments," which it described as "unnecessarily complex."
    Stratos v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 
    439 N.E.2d 778
    , 786 (Mass. 1982).
    As that court pointed out, some of the "adjustment[]" factors are
    properly subsumed within the calculation of reasonable hours and
    rates. 
    Id.
     The SJC thus concluded that "fair market rates for
    time reasonably spent should be the basic measure of reasonable
    fees, and should govern unless there are special reasons to depart
    from them." 
    Id.
    -28-
    It can refer to a plaintiff's success claim by
    claim, or to the relief actually achieved, or
    to the societal importance of the right which
    has been vindicated, or to all of these
    measures in combination.    We think that the
    last meaning is the best choice, and that, as
    a consequence, all three types of "results"
    potentially bear upon the amount of an ensuing
    fee award.
    
    Id.
       Consistent with this broad notion of the lawsuit's outcome,
    Massachusetts precedent emphasizes the need to consider, inter
    alia, "the interests that the statute in question is designed to
    protect and the public interest in allowing claims under that
    statute to proceed with competent counsel."       Haddad, 920 N.E.2d at
    281. Thus, "when a plaintiff's victory, although 'de minimis as to
    the extent of relief[,] . . . represent[s] a significant legal
    conclusion serving an important public purpose,' the fee award need
    not be proportionate to the damages recovered." Killeen v. Westban
    Hotel Venture, LP., 
    872 N.E.2d 731
    , 738 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007)
    (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Díaz-Rivera
    v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 
    377 F.3d 119
    , 125 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also
    De Jesús Nazario v. Morris Rodríguez, 
    554 F.3d 196
    , 207 (1st Cir.
    2009) (noting Supreme Court's rejection of the proposition that fee
    awards should be proportionate to the amount of damages recovered).
    Indeed, section 9's explicit statement that the award of
    fees shall be made "irrespective of the amount in controversy"
    confirms the limited significance of a plaintiff's modest monetary
    success,   including   when   the   plaintiff   had   sought   substantial
    -29-
    damages.   Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9; see also Olmstead v.
    Murphy, 
    489 N.E.2d 707
    , 709 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) ("When the public
    . . . has a particular interest in the vindication of a legal
    right, the market value of legal services . . . should not be
    automatically discounted because that value is high in relation to
    the amount recovered."). Moreover, even "[t]he fact that . . . the
    suit did not confer broad benefits on the public[] should not
    result automatically in major restrictions on compensable hours."
    Stratos,   439   N.E.2d   at   787.      At   the   same   time,   however,
    "compensable hours may be reduced if the time spent was wholly
    disproportionate to the interests at stake."         Id. at 786.
    B.   District Court's Rulings
    The district court's rulings on attorney's fees are
    briefly described in the procedural background section of this
    opinion.   For the reader's convenience, we reprise that background
    here, with additional detail pertinent to our analysis.
    1.    The Pre-Trial Ruling
    In January 2011, in a written decision issued before the
    jury took up the question of compensatory damages, the district
    court ruled that it would award Joyce "reasonable attorney's fees"
    because she was a prevailing party. Joyce, 
    770 F. Supp. 2d at 427
    .
    The court rejected the defendants' argument that Joyce had not
    prevailed because they had changed the tournament rules before her
    suit was filed. Although agreeing with the defendants that Joyce's
    -30-
    success was "very limited and pyrrhic in nature," the court held
    that she was entitled to fees based on its finding that she had
    been a victim of discrimination.     
    Id.
       The court stated that "[n]o
    special circumstances which would foreclose the award of fees are
    readily apparent and the defendants do not raise any."      
    Id.
    The court emphasized, however, that it would link the
    amount of fees to the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded
    by the jury, "if any."   
    Id.
       The judge explained that, "[i]f only
    nominal or limited damages are awarded, the reasonable fee will be
    correspondingly limited."    Id.
    2.   The Post-Trial Ruling
    After the jury awarded Joyce $15,000 in compensatory
    damages, she sought reimbursement for $167,855 in attorney's fees
    and $4,993 in other costs.     The Town objected on the ground that
    the amount sought was unreasonable and excessive, and it again
    asserted that special circumstances rendered any award of fees
    unjust.   In arguing for a finding of special circumstances, the
    Town cited Joyce's last-minute notice of her desire to play in the
    May 2007 men's tournament and her failure to engage with the
    defendants about her concerns.22
    22
    The defendants specifically noted Joyce's refusal to attend
    the GAC meetings at which her complaint was discussed and her
    failure to respond to either defense counsel's phone calls or the
    Town's settlement offer in February 2011.
    -31-
    Although   the   district    court   found    the   defendants'
    arguments "compelling," it concluded that Joyce was entitled to
    "modest attorney's fees . . . commensurate with the results she
    obtained and mitigated by the factors present in this case."
    Joyce, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d at 288
    .            In its analysis, the court
    described the degree of success obtained as "[t]he 'most critical
    factor' in determining the reasonableness of a fee."            
    Id. at 289
    (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 
    506 U.S. 103
    , 114 (1992)). It reiterated
    its view that Joyce had achieved limited results and stated that
    the lawsuit "could have easily been avoided or resolved well before
    trial."   Id. at 290.    The court deemed the results of the lawsuit
    "minimal" because the Town had changed its policy for 2008 before
    Joyce filed suit and because the court had "limited its summary
    judgment ruling to this case only."        Id.   Against this backdrop,
    the court concluded that "the requested fee of more than ten times
    the jury award is excessive and unreasonable."           Id.
    The court also criticized the plaintiff and her counsel
    for refusing the defendants' "reasonable" settlement offer of
    $35,001, which, in the court's view, "obviated the need for a jury
    trial[,] which alone accounted for 60 hours billed by plaintiff's
    counsel."    Id. at 291.23   The court invoked Federal Rule of Civil
    23
    The court stated that "the refusal by plaintiff's counsel
    to accept the settlement offer was unreasonable." Joyce, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d at 291
    .    We do not understand this statement as an
    assertion that counsel made the settlement decision without
    consulting Joyce -- a violation of ethical rules, see Mass. R.
    -32-
    Procedure 68, which requires a plaintiff who recovers less at trial
    than was offered in a formal pre-trial settlement proposal to pay
    the opposing party's post-offer costs, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d),
    and prevents shifting of post-offer attorney's fees and other
    costs, see Bogan v. City of Boston, 
    489 F.3d 417
    , 430 (1st Cir.
    2007). The court noted that Rule 68 did not technically apply, but
    concluded that its purpose "to promote settlement and avoid the
    expense of trial" made it reasonable to award Joyce none of the
    costs or fees that accrued after the defendants' offer on February
    4, 2011.24   Joyce, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d at 291
    .   The court observed that
    imposing on the defendants the full burden of this "avoidable
    litigation" would "encourage similarly situated plaintiffs to
    refuse all reasonable settlement offers and proceed to trial." 
    Id. at 292
    .
    The court also found that the number of hours claimed by
    plaintiff's counsel was excessive for the case as a whole and for
    Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.4 -- but we instead construe the court's
    unfortunate phrasing to reflect the view that counsel had advised
    Joyce against accepting the offer.
    24
    It is undisputed that the defendants made a formal offer
    under Rule 68. The court presumably, and correctly, characterized
    the rule as inapplicable because, based on the ruling it was about
    to issue, Joyce would be recovering an amount well in excess of the
    $35,001 offer, which was inclusive of attorney's fees and costs.
    She was awarded a total of $49,600: $15,000 in compensatory
    damages, $30,000 in attorney's fees, and $4,600 in other costs.
    See Bogan, 
    489 F.3d at 431
     (stating that the calculation under Rule
    68 "includes only the jury award and the pre-offer fees and costs
    actually awarded by the court," not the amount requested).
    -33-
    particular tasks, and it speculated that "a significant portion of
    the hours enumerated relate to the bickering between counsel over
    media coverage."   
    Id.
       In the court's view, many of the hours spent
    on the litigation were unjustified because the "case involved a
    relatively simple and straightforward fact pattern and . . . an
    uncomplicated legal theory."    Id. at 291.
    The court acknowledged that the defendants shared the
    blame for prolonging the case, noting that they had opposed summary
    judgment and failed to offer a formal settlement until just before
    the trial's start date.    Nonetheless, the court placed most of the
    responsibility for the length of the proceedings on Joyce and her
    counsel:
    [T]he Court finds that a fair and reasonable
    solution is to reduce plaintiff's requested
    fee award substantially, taking into account
    not only the limited results obtained but also
    the fact that the plaintiff was largely
    responsible for the unnecessary protraction of
    this litigation.     For the reasons already
    elucidated, the Court finds that the number of
    hours spent and the costs incurred by
    plaintiff's counsel were wholly unreasonable
    given the interests at stake and the benefit
    gained.
    Id. The court thus concluded that there were "abundant reasons for
    substantially reducing the requested fees and expenses," and it
    determined that $30,000, plus $4,600 in costs, was a reasonable
    award.   Id. at 292.
    -34-
    C.   No Fees At All?
    On appeal, the Town continues to insist that Joyce was
    not a prevailing party and that, even if we conclude otherwise, the
    statutory "special circumstances" qualifier applies to render an
    award of attorney's fees "unjust" in this case.     See Mass. Gen.
    Laws ch. 151B, § 9.    The Town again relies primarily on the fact
    that the tournament policy was changed consistently with Joyce's
    demands before the lawsuit was filed, rendering the litigation
    unnecessary and largely inconsequential.   It contends that Joyce
    insisted on proceeding with the case in the hope of obtaining "a
    financial windfall."
    As an initial matter, we may not lightly disregard the
    district court's judgment that, despite its concerns about how the
    case was litigated, some award of fees was appropriate.    Indeed,
    Joyce succeeded on her primary claims,25 and the litigation plainly
    produced results that inured to the benefit of Joyce and others.
    In finding that the defendants discriminated against Joyce in
    violation of federal and state law, the court rejected multiple
    defenses offered by the defendants in an attempt to show that her
    claim was not remediable under either regime.      In rulings not
    challenged on appeal, it held that the tournament from which Joyce
    25
    Neither the defendants nor the district court suggested that
    Joyce's fees should be limited because she prevailed on only some
    of her claims. Most of the unsuccessful claims were against the
    individual defendants and dismissed on the basis of qualified
    immunity.
    -35-
    was    excluded   was    a   "place    of    public   accommodation"   under
    Massachusetts' law, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 92A, that
    plaintiffs do not bear the burden of proving a denial of "full and
    equal accommodations" to establish discrimination under the state
    public accommodations law, see id. § 98, and that "separate but
    equal" facilities do not satisfy that law.              Moreover, the jury
    determined that Joyce suffered compensable harm as a consequence of
    the defendants' actions.
    Joyce's litigation victory was thus neither "'purely
    technical [n]or de minimis,'" Coutin, 
    124 F.3d at 339
     (quoting
    Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 117
     (O'Connor, J., concurring)).26 Particularly
    given the statutory mandate that fees be awarded unless it would be
    "unjust" to do so, we agree with the district court that Joyce is
    entitled to a reasonable amount of attorney's fees.             Whether the
    district court properly determined that fee is our next inquiry.
    D.    Calculating a Reasonable Fee
    Joyce asserts that the court made two legal errors in
    awarding her only $30,000 of the nearly $170,000 in fees that she
    requested: (1) linking the amount of compensable fees to the amount
    of damages, and (2) factoring in her refusal to accept the Town's
    settlement offer.       We agree that the court's reduction of the fee
    award based on those rationales was improper and, hence, an abuse
    26
    Of course, even "obtaining only nominal damages does not
    negate the possibility of a fee award." Coutin, 
    124 F.3d at
    339
    n.6.
    -36-
    of the court's discretion.       See Coutin, 
    124 F.3d at 336
     (stating
    that an abuse of discretion occurs, inter alia, "'when a material
    factor   deserving     significant   weight   is   ignored   [or]    when   an
    improper factor is relied upon'" (quoting Foster v. Mydas Assocs.,
    Inc., 
    943 F.2d 139
    , 143 (1st Cir. 1991))).
    The court began its discussion by describing at length
    the well established principle that a fees award should reflect the
    plaintiff's level of success, obliging the court to trim the base
    fee   generated   by    the   hours-times-rate     calculation      when    the
    litigation has achieved only modest results.           The district court
    also recognized that the "results" of litigation embrace more than
    the amount of damages awarded by the jury.
    The court's application of these principles, however, was
    flawed in multiple respects.          First, in assessing the benefits
    achieved by the litigation, the court emphasized the Town's pre-
    litigation change of policy and its own "limited" finding of
    unlawful discrimination that it had declared applicable to "this
    case only." The court overlooked, however, the potential impact of
    its state-law rulings characterizing the golf tournament as a place
    of public accommodation, rejecting a "separate but equal" exception
    to the public accommodation law, and clarifying the plaintiff's
    burden of proof.       It thus appeared to treat the damages award as
    the only significant result obtained.          Indeed, it stated that,
    "[i]n accordance with the substantial body of case law cited
    -37-
    herein, the award of attorney's fees here will be correspondingly
    circumscribed by the jury award of damages."        Joyce, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d at 290
    .      This limited view of the litigation's impact was
    incorrect.
    Relatedly, as the authorities described above make clear,
    even   if    Joyce's   lawsuit   had    achieved   nothing   other   than
    compensatory relief for her, it would have been an error of law for
    the district court to link the amount of recoverable attorney's
    fees solely to the amount of her damages.       Fee-shifting provisions
    in general reflect a legislative judgment that "'the public as a
    whole has an interest in the vindication of the rights conferred by
    the statutes . . . over and above the value of a . . . remedy to a
    particular plaintiff.'" City of Riverside v. Rivera, 
    477 U.S. 561
    ,
    574 (1986) (quoting Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at
    444 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
    concurring in part and dissenting in part)).        With respect to § 9
    in particular, the Massachusetts Attorney General has stated that
    "an 'appropriate award of attorney's fees promotes Chapter 151B's
    policy of enlisting the help of private attorneys general in the
    fight against discrimination.'"        Borne v. Haverhill Golf & Country
    Club, Inc., 
    791 N.E.2d 903
    , 917 n.17 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (quoting
    brief filed by Attorney General as intervenor); see also Stratos,
    439 N.E.2d at 786 (noting the purpose of fee-shifting provision "to
    encourage suits that are not likely to pay for themselves, but are
    nevertheless desirable because they vindicate important rights").
    -38-
    The district court appeared to recognize that the amount
    of damages is only "one element in the constellation of factors"
    that must be considered in determining a reasonable fee.                 Coutin,
    
    124 F.3d at 338
    .           As we have described, the court discussed a
    number of reasons for its decision.              Yet its pre-trial ruling on
    fees expressly stated that it would correlate the fee award to the
    jury's damages award: "If only nominal or limited damages are
    awarded, the reasonable fee will be correspondingly limited."
    Joyce, 
    770 F. Supp. 2d at 427
    .            The court confirmed its intent to
    draw   such    a    link   in   its   post-trial     ruling,   noting    that   it
    previously had advised the plaintiff that "any award of attorney's
    fees would be proportionate to her recovery at trial."               Joyce, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d at 291
    .          Whether or not the district court ultimately
    relied exclusively on the amount of the damage award to calculate
    the appropriate fee, it is apparent that it gave too much weight to
    that element.
    The    other      substantial     problem     with   the   court's
    calculation is that it unequivocally took into account Joyce's
    rejection of the settlement offer.              Although the court recognized
    that Rule 68 did not apply because Joyce's total award (damages,
    costs,   and       attorney's    fees)    exceeded    the   Town's   offer,     it
    nonetheless repeatedly pointed to her refusal to settle.                        It
    observed that the settlement offer was reasonable, that the offer
    "obviated the need for a jury trial," and that the refusal to
    -39-
    accept the offer was unreasonable.     
    Id.
       The court stated that, in
    keeping with "the principle" of Rule 68, it would be reasonable to
    award no costs or fees incurred after the offer was made on
    February 4, 2011.   
    Id.
       Indeed, it deleted from Joyce's requested
    costs the expenses incurred after that date.       Finally, the court
    concluded its fees discussion by commenting that placing the full
    cost of the litigation on the defendants "would encourage similarly
    situated plaintiffs to refuse all reasonable settlement offers and
    proceed to trial instead."   
    Id. at 292
    .
    We have held that "it is a mistake of law to reduce an
    award of attorneys' fees in a civil rights case in response to a
    plaintiff's rejection of a defendant's settlement offer when the
    subsequent judgment exceeds that offer."      Coutin, 
    124 F.3d at 341
    ;
    see also 
    id.
     (noting that the higher judgment amount "validates the
    appellant's rejection of the tendered settlement and immunizes her
    from detrimental consequences based upon that rejection").      It is
    plain that the district court committed such an error in this case
    and, hence, for that reason alone the fees must be recalculated.
    The court did not quantify the reduction it made on account of the
    rejected settlement, though it did not appear to entirely exclude
    payment for the post-offer fees.27     Hence, we cannot remedy this
    error by directing the court to add a specific amount or percentage
    27
    The court reported that plaintiff's counsel invoiced $48,254
    in attorney's fees after February 1, 2011.
    -40-
    to Joyce's fee award.     Instead, the court should calculate a new
    award on remand that eliminates as a factor Joyce's refusal to
    settle, and also rectifies its undervaluation of Joyce's success
    and its over-emphasis on the amount of the damages award.
    Moreover, the court should clearly and fully explain the
    basis for its recalculation. See 
    id. at 337
     ("[T]he order awarding
    fees, read against the backdrop of the record as a whole, must
    expose the district court's thought process and show the method and
    manner underlying its decisional calculus.").          That recalibration
    will not necessarily produce a fees award at or near the amount of
    Joyce's request.      The district court referred to a number of
    factors   that   it   could   properly    consider    in   evaluating    the
    reasonableness of the time expended.       These include "a relatively
    simple and straightforward fact pattern and . . . an uncomplicated
    legal theory," Joyce, 
    802 F. Supp. 2d at 291
    , and the attendance of
    two   experienced     litigators    throughout       the   damages      trial
    (representing sixty hours of billable time).
    We emphasize that we are not endorsing these factors as
    justifications for the court's substantial reduction of the fee
    request, but note them only as considerations the court properly
    could take into account.      On the other hand, the court could not
    properly ignore the Town's vigorous defense of the case.         Although
    the court recognized that the defendants bore some responsibility
    for the nature and length of the litigation, its incorrect focus on
    -41-
    the rejected settlement plainly colored its attitude toward the
    defendants' strategy.   Not only did the defendants oppose summary
    judgment on multiple (unsuccessful) grounds and propose settlement
    at the last minute -- factors noted by the district court -- they
    also repeatedly argued against any award of attorney's fees for
    Joyce (including in a cross-appeal).   In deciding whether, and how
    much, to adjust the baseline lodestar calculation, the court should
    not overlook Joyce's need to respond to such defense positions.
    As we have observed, "the trial court is in the best
    position to gauge the bona fides of a request for fees."   Spooner
    v. EEN, Inc., 
    644 F.3d 62
    , 70 (1st Cir. 2011).      So long as the
    court relies on proper factors, and "offer[s] reasonably explicit
    findings . . . to spell out the whys and wherefores," Coutin, 
    124 F.3d at 337
     (internal quotation marks omitted), we will not second-
    guess its judgment on the "time reasonably spent preparing and
    litigating [the] case," Fontaine, 613 N.E.2d at 891. Here, because
    the court's calculation incorporated multiple mistakes of law, we
    have no choice but to remand for reconsideration of a reasonable
    fee.
    V.
    For the reasons stated, we find no error in the district
    court's denial of Joyce's request for a jury instruction on
    punitive damages.   We vacate the denial of injunctive relief and
    the award of attorney's fees, and remand both of those issues to
    -42-
    the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    So ordered.   Costs to appellant.
    -43-