Rams v. Royal ( 1994 )

March 23, 1994 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 93-1802
MARIAN RAMS AND LEONARD RAMS,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISE LINES, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
ERRATA SHEET
The opinion of this court issued on March 3, 1994, is
amended as follows:
On page 2, line 9, change "May 8, 1992," to "April 6, 1990."
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 93-1802
MARIAN RAMS AND LEONARD RAMS,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISE LINES, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Walter Jay Skinner, U.S. Senior District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
James M. Lynch with whom Geoffrey A. Domenico was on brief for
appellants.
Frank H. Handy, Jr. for appellee.
March 3, 1994
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. This appeal tests the
applicability of a one year limitation provision in a passenger
cruise ticket to an injury suffered by a passenger while ashore,
on hotel property owned by the same entity which owned and
operated the cruise vessel.
In the spring of 1990, plaintiffs, Marian and Leonard Rams,
residents of Massachusetts, embarked on a Caribbean cruise on a
ship owned by defendant, Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd., a
Florida corporation. On April 6, 1990, while on a shore
excursion in Haiti at a tourist resort owned by defendant, Mrs.
Rams fell on a walkway, sustaining injuries. A little over two
years later, both Rams filed suit, alleging that defendant
"negligently maintained a defective and dangerous condition" on
the walkway, and seeking damages for personal injuries and loss
of consortium.
On the strength of an affidavit containing a copy of a
ticket contract identical to that given to plaintiffs, defendant
moved for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiffs had failed
to institute suit within the one year period allowed by the
contract.1 The Rams argued that their claim was not covered by
1The contract provides, in relevant part:
In no event shall the Carrier be liable for any
accident or harm to the Passenger which occurs off the
Vessel itself.
. . .
NO SUIT SHALL BE MAINTAINABLE AGAINST THE CARRIER OR
VESSEL FOR DELAY, DETENTION, PERSONAL INJURY, ILLNESS OR
DEATH OF THE PASSENGER UNLESS WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE CLAIM,
WITH FULL PARTICULARS, SHALL BE DELIVERED TO THE CARRIER OR
ITS AGENT AT ITS OFFICE AT THE PORT OF SAILING OR AT THE
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this time limitation, and urged the court to apply the three year
statute of limitations for tort actions provided by Massachusetts
law, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260 2A (1992).
The district court engaged in a maritime tort law analysis
and, apparently on the assumption that the complaint alleged a
failure to warn, concluded that a carrier's duty to warn
passengers of on-shore hazards was so intimately related to
traditional carrier-passenger relationships that the tort in this
case was maritime in nature even though occurring at the resort.
It then disavowed part of the ticket contract exempting the
carrier for liability for off-the-ship injuries as being in
contravention of public policy; noted that the ticket's one year
limitation provision complied with governing law, as it met the
statutory requirement of 46 U.S.C. 183b(a) (making it unlawful
for owners of passenger-transport ships to provide a statute of
limitations of less than one year for institution of suits for
loss of life or bodily injury), and the "reasonable
communicativeness" standard applicable to contracts of passage,
see, e.g., Lousararian v. Royal Caribbean Corp., 951 F.2d 7, 8-9
(1st Cir. 1991); and applied the limitation provision to grant
summary judgment for defendant.
PORT OF TERMINATION WITHIN SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE DAY WHEN
SUCH DELAY, DETENTION, PERSONAL INJURY, ILLNESS OR DEATH OF
THE PASSENGER OCCURRED AND IN NO EVENT SHALL ANY SUCH SUIT
FOR ANY CAUSE AGAINST THE CARRIER OR VESSEL FOR DELAY,
DETENTION, PERSONAL INJURY, ILLNESS OR DEATH BE MAINTAINABLE
UNLESS SUCH SUIT SHALL BE COMMENCED WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR FROM
THE DAY WHEN THE DELAY, DETENTION, PERSONAL INJURY, ILLNESS
OR DEATH OF THE PASSENGER OCCURRED, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY
PROVISION OF LAW OF ANY STATE OR COUNTRY TO THE CONTRARY.
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Our own view is that this case does not require us to delve
into either the locality or nexus requirements for a maritime
tort under Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S.
249 (1972). We view this as a straightforward contract case. To
illustrate why we think maritime tort considerations merely fog
the issue, we hypothesize the following: if the ticket in this
case had explicitly set forth a one year limitation period for
any personal injury claims, whether the injuries were suffered on
ship or shore, we strongly suspect that this suit would be
barred, whether or not the tort were maritime in nature, because
such a provision would meet the threshold one year minimum
requirement of 46 U.S.C. 183b(a).
The salient question in our minds is whether this
particular ticket contract limitations provision applies to
claims based on injuries suffered on shore after the passenger
clearly has left the ship. The contract in this case being one
for "transportation of the plaintiff," it is a maritime contract.
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. 411, 427 (1866); see also Hodes v.
S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 909 (3d
Cir. 1988). We see, however, nothing in this fact to change the
ordinary strictures governing our plenary review of the meaning
of a written contract, including the principle that "in case of
doubt, an instrument is to be taken against the party that drew
it." Chelsea Industries, Inc. v. Accuray Leasing Corp., 699 F.2d
58, 61 (1st Cir. 1983). On the contrary, if there were any
difference in approach between maritime and common law, we
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suspect that the former would be more solicitous of those in
plaintiffs' position. Cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375, 387 (1970).
Our inquiry into intent and ambiguity yields the following.
The ticket booklet given plaintiffs bears the cover caption
"Passenger Ticket CONTRACT." The term "passenger" is then
defined as "all persons travelling under this ticket." The word
"carrier" is defined as "Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.2 and all
Vessels either chartered, operated, or controlled by Royal
Caribbean Cruises Ltd." Subsequent provisions exclude liability
of the carrier "for any accident or harm to the Passenger which
occurs off the vessel itself" or "occurring onshore" and specify
that "[s]hore excursions are operated by independent contractors
and the Carrier shall not be responsible . . . for . . . injury .
. . arising out of any service provided by such independent
contractors."
These provisions are followed by the limitations clause,
which states, in bold letters, that "[n]o suit shall be
maintainable against the carrier or vessel for . . . personal
injury . . . of the passenger unless written notice . . . is
delivered to the carrier . . . within six (6) months from the
[date of personal injury] . . . and in no event shall any such
2The name of the defendant appearing in all the pleadings,
motions, memoranda of law, and the district court opinion is
"Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd." or "Royal Caribbean Cruise
Lines, Inc." In the ticket contract, however, it appears as
"Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd." There has been no explanation for
this discrepancy. We do not suggest that this has legal
consequences, in light of our conclusion.
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suit . . . be maintainable unless such suit shall be commenced
within one (1) year from the day when the . . . personal injury .
. . occurred . . . ."
Reading the contract as a whole, we conclude that its
reasonable intendment is to refer to claims of passengers for
injuries while on board ship. Not only does the definition of
passenger as one "travelling under this ticket" smell of the sea,
but this interpretation is strongly reinforced by the explicit
avoidance of liability for injuries sustained on shore. There is
even the added statement that shore excursions are in the hands
of independent contractors for whose actions the carrier has no
liability. Finally, the definition of carrier refers to Royal
Caribbean Cruises Ltd. "and all vessels . . . owned" by it.
There is no mention of "hotels or resorts" owned by it. As Judge
Aldrich wrote for our court in Chelsea Industries, "He who speaks
should speak plainly or the other party may explain to his own
advantage." 699 F.2d at 61 (quoting Opportunity Consultants,
Inc. v. Tugrul, 354 N.E.2d 698, 699 (Ohio 1976)).
Although we believe that the above reading of the ticket
contract is correct, we have absolutely no doubt that the
contract is at the very least ambiguous and that therefore it
must be construed against the defendant. Finally, even if the
relevant provisions were to escape the meaning we ascribe to them
and to hurdle the obstacle of ambiguity, they would fail to meet
our standard of "reasonable communicativeness" under such cases
as Lousararian. We could not say, for example, that after
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examining "the facial clarity of the ticket contract" that the
"language and appearance make the relevant provisions
sufficiently obvious and understandable." Id. at 8.
The grant of summary judgment for defendant is reversed and
the case is remanded to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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