Borrero-McCormick v. University of Health Sciences Antigua School of Medicine , 337 F. App'x 1 ( 2009 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-2284
RAMÓN ANTONIO BORRERO-McCORMICK,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH SCIENCES ANTIGUA SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Stahl and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
José Javier Santos Mimoso on brief for appellant.
July 17, 2009
Per Curiam. This appeal arises from a breach of contract
action brought by Ramón Antonio Borrero McCormick against the
University of Health Sciences Antigua School of Medicine, alleging
that the University breached its contract to provide him with a
medical degree despite his completion of all applicable
requirements, in particular, the required clinical rotations. By
way of relief, he sought both damages and equitable relief, i.e.,
a medical degree. The district court reserved the propriety of
equitable relief to itself, but the case proceeded to a jury trial
on liability and damages. After Borrero rested his case, the
University moved for entry of judgment in its favor, and the
district court granted the motion. This is an appeal from that
ruling.
As we recently reiterated, "[a] trial court confronted
with a motion for judgment as a matter of law must scrutinize the
evidence and the inferences reasonably extractable therefrom in the
light most hospitable to the nonmovant. In conducting that
perscrutation, . . . the court must not pass upon the credibility
of the witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or engage in a
comparative weighing of the proof. A motion for judgment as a
matter of law may be granted only if the evidence, viewed from this
perspective, adumbrates a result as to which reasonable minds could
not differ." Martínez-Serrano v. Quality Health Servs., Inc., 568
F.3d 278, 285 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Not only is
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that legal standard inhospitable to such motions, but also, as we
have repeatedly cautioned, interests of judicial economy counsel
against granting such motions, particularly before all the evidence
is in. Rather, "in most cases a trial court will be better
advised to reserve decision on . . . a motion [for judgment as a
matter of law], passing on the legal question only after submitting
the case to the jury. Mid-trial directed verdicts should be the
exception, not the rule." Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731,
735 n.4 (1st Cir. 1994); EnergyNorth Natural Gas, Inc. v. Century
Indem. Co., 452 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Unitherm Food
Sys. Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 405-06 (2006)).
Here, the district court purported to apply the above
standard. However, in fact, it expressly drew inferences against
Borrero and implicitly found him and one of his witnesses
incredible. Contrary to the district court's conclusion that "the
evidence in favor of Defendant is so overwhelming that reasonable
persons could not arrive at a contrary verdict," the evidence that
had been presented when the motion for judgment was granted was
legally sufficient--though conflicting and dubious in some
respects--for a reasonable jury to conclude that Borrero had
completed the required clinical rotations.
Specifically, at the outset of the trial, the parties
stipulated that the required rotations were as follows: internal
medicine, 12 weeks; surgery, 12 weeks; obstetrics and gynecology,
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8 weeks; pediatrics, 6 weeks; psychiatry, 6 weeks; family medicine,
4 weeks; and electives, 30 weeks. Near the end of Borrero's case,
they further stipulated to the accuracy of a chart showing that
Borrero completed the required number of weeks of internal
medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, and family medicine
and more than the required number of weeks of pediatrics,
psychiatry, and electives on particular dates. That chart was
consistent with Borrero's own testimony and with the dates
appearing on evaluations signed by the doctors who supervised each
of the rotations. In addition, two doctors at the hospital where
most of the rotations were performed certified that Borrero had
completed all of the required rotations.
To be sure, there was conflicting evidence (despite the
above-referenced stipulation) as to the dates on which some of the
rotations were performed. And, when confronted with that evidence,
the certifying doctors conceded that their certifications may have
been inaccurate in that respect. Nevertheless, at least one of
those doctors maintained that even if the dates certified were
incorrect, Borrero had put in the requisite time in each specialty.
Despite the University's efforts to impeach that witness's
credibility, the jury could have believed him.
From the University's opening statement and its argument
in support of its motion for judgment, it appears that its theory
of the case was that Borrero did not complete the required
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rotations because some of the rotations admittedly overlapped with
others. However, up to the point when the motion for judgment was
granted, there was no evidence that the University prohibited
medical students from performing overlapping rotations. Borrero
himself and the doctor in charge of the clinical rotation program
at the hospital where Borrero did his rotations testified that they
were not aware of any such prohibition; no such requirement
appeared in any of the written agreements introduced; and the jury
could have credited the testimony of one of the doctors that a
student could learn about more than one specialty at once because
treatment of one patient might involve interaction with doctors in
various fields; for example, delivery of a baby by Caesarian
section might involve obstetrics, anaesthesiology, surgery, and
pediatrics. Moreover, because it was stipulated that Borrero
performed more than the required number of weeks in several areas,
some overlap would not necessarily mean that he fell short of the
required weeks in each area.
Similarly, at the time the motion was granted, there had
been no testimonial or documentary evidence presented as to why the
University did not permit Borrero to graduate. Borrero testified
that the University never explained its decision to him and no
rationale appears in any of the documentary evidence that had been
admitted up to that point. In its opening statement, the
University promised that an explanation would be provided through
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the testimony of University officials, but that testimony was
pretermitted by the granting of the motion. Although it is true
that a court should defer to the professional judgment of academic
officials on such matters, Mangla v. Brown University, 135 F.3d 80,
84 (1st Cir. 1998), here there was no evidence of a judgment to
which the court could defer.
In sum, this is not a case where there was no evidence on
an essential element of the plaintiff's claim, cf. Martínez-Serrano,
568 F.3d at 287, or where the evidence that had been presented at
the time that the motion was granted was so one-sided that no
rational jury could have found in Borrero's favor, cf. Mangla, 135
F.3d at 84. Because the district court therefore erred in granting
the motion at that point, we vacate the judgment. In doing so, we
recognize the burden that this places on the district court;
however, that burden could have been avoided if that court had
heeded our advice of reserving judgment on a mid-trial motion for
judgment and allowing the case to go to the jury first.
Vacated and remanded. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c). No costs
are awarded.
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