Doe v. Hopkinton Public Schools ( 2021 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 20-1950
JOHN DOE, by his Mother and Next Friend, JANE DOE; B.B., by his
Mother and Next Friend, JANE BLOGGS,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
HOPKINTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant, Appellee,
CAROL CAVANAUGH, in her individual capacity and official
capacity as Superintendent of the Hopkinton Public Schools; EVAN
BISHOP, in his individual capacity and official capacity as
Principal of Hopkinton High School,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Selya, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Alexandra H. Deal and Jeffrey P. Wiesner, with whom Jennifer
McKinnon, Paik, Brewington & Deal LLP, and Wiesner McKinnon LLP
were on brief, for appellants.
William G. Creeley, Seth B. Orkand, and Robinson & Cole LLP
on brief for Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, amicus
curiae.
Sophia Cope and Naomi Gilens on brief for Electronic Frontier
Foundation, amicus curiae.
Elizabeth F. Toner and Joshua R. Coleman, with whom Murphy,
Lamere & Murphy, P.C. was on brief, for appellees.
Maura Healey, Attorney General, Abrisham Eshghi, Douglas
Martland, and Joshua Olszewski-Jubelirer, Assistant Attorneys
General, on brief for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, amicus
curiae.
Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., John Foskett, and Valerio,
Dominello, & Hillman LLC on brief for National School Boards
Association, Maine School Boards Association, Massachusetts
Association of School Committees, New Hampshire School Boards
Association, and Rhode Island Association of School Committees,
amici curiae.
Patience Crozier and Bennett Klein on brief for GLBTQ Legal
Advocates & Defenders and Anti-Defamation League, amici curiae.
Ruth A. Bourquin, Rachel E. Davidson, Rebecca R. Krumholz,
and Matthew R. Segal on brief for the American Civil Liberties
Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae.
Nicolas Y. Riley and Institute for Constitutional Advocacy &
Protection on brief for Professor Daniel B. Rice, amicus curiae.
November 19, 2021
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. After an investigation, Hopkinton
High School ("School"), a part of the Hopkinton Public Schools,
found that eight students on the school hockey team, including
plaintiffs/appellants John Doe and Ben Bloggs, had bullied their
fellow hockey team member Robert Roe.1 The School disciplined all
eight students involved in the bullying. Doe was suspended for
three days, and Bloggs was suspended for five days.
Of the disciplined students, Doe and Bloggs chose to sue
in federal court challenging the constitutionality of their
discipline. They argued that they were exercising their First
Amendment rights and that the causal connection between their
conduct and the admitted bullying was insufficient. They further
argued that the "emotional harm" prong of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71,
§ 37O is unconstitutional. They also argued that the punishment
violated state law, specifically their student speech rights
guaranteed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 82.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the parties
agreed to proceed on a case stated basis. The district court
rejected Doe's and Bloggs's claims and entered judgment in favor
of Hopkinton Public Schools on all counts. See Doe v. Hopkinton
Pub. Schs., 490 F. Supp. 3d 448, 470 (D. Mass. 2020).
1 John Doe, Ben Bloggs, Robert Roe, and other references
to students are pseudonyms agreed to by the parties. The district
court granted the plaintiffs permission to proceed pseudonymously.
- 3 -
We affirm.
I.
We describe the relevant facts supported by the record.
At the time of the disciplinary investigation, plaintiffs Doe and
Bloggs were tenth-grade students at the School. Roe was a ninth-
grade student. Doe, Bloggs, and Roe were members of the School's
hockey team during the 2018-2019 season.
A. Facts
On February 4, 2019, Roe's father filed a bullying
complaint alleging that another high school student and member of
the hockey team, Student 1, had been bullying Roe. The written
complaint was filed on the School's standard bullying complaint
form. The complaint stated that Roe had observed Student 1 video-
recording him without his consent on multiple occasions and that
those video recordings had been circulated amongst other students.
The complaint further stated that Roe's parents had previously
reported Student 1 to the high school hockey coach in December 2018
for taking photos of Roe in the locker room without his consent.
Despite the prior complaint in December 2018, Student 1 had
continued to take photos and videos of Roe without his permission.
The complaint also listed three other members of the hockey team
as witnesses but not Doe or Bloggs.
With the complaint, Roe's parents contemporaneously
emailed School administrators, providing more specific information
- 4 -
about the bullying but acknowledging that they did not have
complete information. They stated that Student 1 had been video-
recording and photographing Roe without his permission. The
bullying was furthered by the fact that these video recordings and
photographs were circulated in a group chat. They stated that
this bullying had created a hostile environment for Roe and had
impacted his personal rights and well-being. Roe's parents
reported that they believed other students on the team were
involved in bullying Roe and that other team members were part of
the group chat engaged in the bullying. Roe's parents filed the
bullying complaint on the Monday after a weekend incident during
which Student 1 had filmed Roe without his consent on the hockey
team bus. Roe's parents also referenced the December 2018
complaint to the hockey coach and their understanding that this
conduct was not an isolated event but a pattern of repeated
bullying. Roe's parents asked that Roe be moved out of the physics
class in which two of the bullies were present.
Upon receipt of the bullying complaint, the School
promptly investigated the allegations as it was obligated to under
the Hopkinton School Committee Policy on Bullying Prevention &
Intervention ("Hopkinton Bullying Policy"). Massachusetts state
law requires the School to have a bullying policy, and the
Hopkinton Bullying Policy uses nearly the same definition of
"Bullying" as that in the Massachusetts anti-bullying statute.
- 5 -
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, §§ 37H & 37O. The Hopkinton Bullying
Policy is available on the School's website and is distributed in
the Student Handbook, which must be signed by students' parents or
guardians every school year. The Hopkinton Bullying Policy defines
"Bullying" as:2
the repeated use by one or more students or by
a member of a school staff of a written,
verbal, or electronic expression, or a
physical act or gesture, or any combination
thereof, directed at a target that:
• causes physical or emotional harm to the
target or damage to the target's
property;
• places the target in reasonable fear of
harm to him/herself, or of damage to
his/her property;
2 Massachusetts state law defines "Bullying" as:
the repeated use by one or more students or by
a member of a school staff including, but not
limited to, an educator, administrator, school
nurse, cafeteria worker, custodian, bus
driver, athletic coach, advisor to an
extracurricular activity or paraprofessional
of a written, verbal or electronic expression
or a physical act or gesture or any
combination thereof, directed at a victim
that: (i) causes physical or emotional harm to
the victim or damage to the victim's property;
(ii) places the victim in reasonable fear of
harm to himself or of damage to his property;
(iii) creates a hostile environment at school
for the victim; (iv) infringes on the rights
of the victim at school; or (v) materially and
substantially disrupts the education process
or the orderly operation of a school. For the
purposes of this section, bullying shall
include cyber-bullying.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O.
- 6 -
• creates a hostile environment at school
for the target;
• infringes on the rights of the target at
school; or
• materially and substantially disrupts
the education process or the orderly
operation of a school.
Pursuant to the Hopkinton Bullying Policy, Josh Hanna and Justin
Pominville, assistant principals at the School, conducted the
investigation into the bullying.3
The investigation covered the various means of bullying,
including Roe's own reports of exclusion and feeling bullied, the
surreptitious audio- and video-recording and photographing of Roe,
the unauthorized sharing of photographs of Roe and his family, the
isolating of Roe, and the group communications between the members
of the hockey team bullying Roe. Hanna and Pominville met with
Roe's parents and Roe. They interviewed ten other members of the
hockey team, starting with those initially named in the bullying
complaint. Hanna and Pominville also met with law enforcement.
The School's athletic director interviewed the hockey coach.
We recount the general course of the investigation and
relevant factual findings made by Hanna and Pominville in the
School's Bullying Investigation Report ("Bullying Report").
3 Doe and Bloggs do not allege bias on the part of Hanna
and Pominville. Neither Hanna nor Pominville was listed as a
defendant in Doe's and Bloggs's lawsuits.
- 7 -
During his interview, Roe stated that he was actively
excluded at hockey team spaghetti dinners and on the team bus. He
reported that other team members whispered about him and looked at
him. He stated that as a result, he became aware of the existence
of the Snapchat group, which was discussed in front of him. Roe
told the investigators that the bullying included sneaking photos
and videos of him without his permission and sharing those photos
and videos of him in the group. He reported that he felt alone on
the hockey team bus and at hockey team events. Roe named four
students whose bullying had been evident to him: Student 1,
Student 3, Student 5, and Student 6. Roe reported that Student 1
had attempted to get him to say "I am gay" and "dick" while audio-
and video-recording him.
Hanna interviewed Student 2, one of the students listed
as a witness in the bullying complaint. Student 2 stated that
there was a Snapchat group composed of members of the hockey team.4
Student 2 gave his phone to Hanna to view. Upon viewing, Hanna
4 Snapchat is a social media application, which allows
users to share and edit photos, videos, and messages. Snapchat
servers automatically delete group photos, videos, and messages
after 24 hours. See When Does Snapchat Delete Snaps and Chats?,
Snapchat.com, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/article/when-
are-snaps-chats-deleted (last visited Sept. 10, 2021). Snapchat
users can take active steps to save a photo, video, or message at
any point. If a user saves a group photo, video, or message, it
remains available to all members of the Snapchat group. See id.
- 8 -
saw videos, photos, and messages, not yet deleted, communicated by
and among the Snapchat group members, including Doe and Bloggs.
Hanna and Pominville viewed and preserved the photos,
videos, and messages in the Snapchat group that had been saved or
not yet deleted. Hanna learned from those messages that eight
members of the Hopkinton hockey team were members of the group:
Student 1, Student 2, Student 3, Student 4, Student 5, Student 6,
Doe, and Bloggs. The members of the group confirmed as true Roe's
statement that he had been excluded from the Snapchat group. The
group was named "Geoff Da Man."5 Bloggs told the investigators
that the Snapchat group had been created in December 2018. The
group continued until it was broken up when the discipline was
imposed. The School maintains that the group would have continued
absent that discipline. The Snapchat postings were composed not
only of messages from members of the group but also videos and
photos of Roe taken without his consent, dating back to at least
January 19, 2019, and circulated among the members.
The preserved Snapchat messages included demeaning and
expletive-laced comments regarding Roe's appearance, voice,
intimate anatomy, parents, and grandmother. Doe and Bloggs each
received these ongoing exchanges and responded to them. They each
5 The Snapchat group was named after a tenth student,
Student 10, who was also excluded from the group. Roe, Student
10, and the eight members of the Snapchat group shared a locker
room together.
- 9 -
joined in these exchanges and sent derogatory messages about Roe
in response to photos and messages from other students. For
instance, in one exchange, Bloggs initiated a series of group
messages about Roe's family members:
Bloggs: "Was [Roe]'s grandma in the third
row"
Student 2: "They tied her to the hood"
Bloggs: "With bungee cords?"
. . .
Bloggs: "Are [Roe]'s parents ugly too [o]r
did he just get bad genes"
In response, Student 3 found photos of Roe's parents and shared
those photos with the Snapchat group. Bloggs then responded to
the photos:
Bloggs: "A family of absolute beauties"
Student 5 also posted a different photo of Roe that had been
surreptitiously taken without his consent. In response to that
photo, Doe and Bloggs both messaged the group:
Doe: "[Student 5] and [Roe] were made on the
same day[.] [Student 5] was the starting
product and [Roe] is what it turned into[,]
kinda like a game of telephone in 1st grade"
Bloggs: "[Roe]'s leather shampoo makes up for
the looks though"
Bloggs, in addition, disclosed to the group without Roe's
authorization one of Roe's online usernames.
On February 8, 2019, Hanna and Pominville concluded
their investigation and forwarded the nine-page Bullying Report to
the School's principal and the school district's superintendent.
- 10 -
Hanna and Pominville considered the interviews, the screenshots
and videos from the Snapchat group, and the written complaint
submitted by Roe's father in arriving at their findings. The
Bullying Report included summaries from interviews with ten
individuals: the eight members of the Snapchat group, Roe, and the
hockey coach.6 In addition to the facts described earlier, the
Bullying Report made additional specific findings. Student 1
stated, "we pick on [Roe]," and Student 2 stated that Roe was
"targeted." Student 5 stated that the intent was to "laugh[] at
[Roe]" and apologized for his conduct.
The Bullying Report concluded, based on the
investigation and Doe's and Bloggs's interviews, that they were
aware of, joined, participated in, and encouraged the bullying.
When asked if he had a sense that the students' conduct was not
appropriate, Doe responded, "Yes, I said something but not to the
point to end it." He also stated that he understood the conduct
was harassment.
Bloggs acknowledged that Roe was shy "so some people
take pictures and make fun of him." On February 4, 2019, after he
was interviewed, Bloggs sent an email to the hockey coach
6 Hanna and Pominville also interviewed Student 10 and
another witness, but the summaries of these two interviews were
not included in the Bullying Report.
- 11 -
apologizing for his conduct and stated, "I should have taken more
of a serious role in preventing anything else from happening."
The Bullying Report found that each of the eight students
"was an active participant in the SnapChat group" and that the
"[s]tudents admitted that [Roe] was excluded from Snapchat." The
Bullying Report detailed other activities by group members when it
stated:
4. The SnapChat group included:
a. Photos of [Roe] taken without his
consent
b. Videos of [Roe] taken and posted
without his consent
c. Photos of [Roe's] parents with
disparaging comments on their appearance
d. Disparaging comments regarding
[Roe's] appearance, voice, and anatomy
e. Attempts to get [Roe] to say
inappropriate statements and record him
doing this
The Bullying Report noted that the students admitted to "taking
videos and photos while on bus rides to away hockey games and while
at team gatherings."
The Bullying Report concluded that "[t]here was a
preponderance of the evidence showing that the 8 students bullied
and harassed [Roe]" as defined by the Hopkinton Bullying Policy.
The Bullying Report found that "[t]he conduct caused emotional
harm to [Roe], created a hostile environment for him during school-
sponsored events and activities and infringed on his rights at
school" in violation of the first, third, and fourth prongs of the
- 12 -
Hopkinton Bullying Policy and section 37O. The School suspended
all eight members of the Snapchat group from the hockey team for
the remainder of the 2018-2019 season.
On February 12, 2019, School principal Evan Bishop held
individualized suspension hearings for each of the eight students,
including Doe and Bloggs. The students' parents were invited to
the disciplinary hearings. These individualized hearings
constituted each "student's opportunity to provide [his] side of
the story and to dispute the allegations."
After the individual hearings, Bishop found that Doe
"made a disparaging comment regarding [Roe's] appearance." He
identified "[r]eports of additional videos and photos taken of
[Roe] throughout the season that have not been retained" on
Snapchat. He issued Doe a three-day suspension after the findings.
Bishop found that Bloggs participated in "[p]osting
photos of [Roe] without his consent," "[p]osting comments of
[Roe's] parents with disparaging comments on their appearance,"
and "posting of disparaging comments regarding [Roe's]
appearance." Bishop also identified "[r]eports of additional
videos and photos taken of [Roe] throughout the season that have
not been retained" on Snapchat. He issued Bloggs a five-day
suspension.7
7 Given the short length of the suspensions, the
disciplinary process ended with principal Bishop, and there was no
- 13 -
After the bullying, Roe obtained counseling from the
School's student therapeutic academy resource team, declined to
try out for the lacrosse team in the spring, and entered formal
mental health treatment. At the end of the 2018-2019 academic
year, Roe left the School to attend school in Quebec, Canada.
B. Procedural History
On August 16, 2019, Doe, by and through his mother Jane
Doe, filed an amended complaint in federal court alleging Hopkinton
Public Schools and its administrators violated his rights to free
speech and association under state and federal law. Doe also
requested a declaration that the "emotional harm" prongs of
Hopkinton's Bullying Policy and the enabling Massachusetts anti-
bullying statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, §§ 37H & 37O, are
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. On September 19, 2019,
Bloggs, by and through his mother Jane Bloggs, filed a complaint
in federal court alleging similar causes of action. On February
5, 2020, the district court consolidated Doe's case with Bloggs's
case.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. On
June 29, 2020, during the summary judgment hearing, the parties
agreed to proceed on a case stated basis. Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at
appeal to the School's superintendent, who did not play a role in
the disciplinary process. Nonetheless, superintendent Carol
Cavanaugh was named as a defendant in her individual and official
capacities in Doe's and Bloggs's complaints.
- 14 -
453. In a case stated decision "the parties waive trial and
present the case to the court on the undisputed facts in the pre-
trial record." TLT Constr. Corp. v. RI, Inc., 484 F.3d 130, 135
n.6 (1st Cir. 2007). "The court is then entitled to 'engage in a
certain amount of factfinding, including the drawing of
inferences.'" Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union Loc.
14 v. Int'l Paper Co., 64 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1995)). On
September 22, 2020, the court issued its Findings of Fact and
Rulings of Law.
The court found that the factual conclusions in the
Bullying Report were well-supported in the record. Doe, 490 F.
Supp. 3d at 456. As to the argument that the imposition of the
discipline violated the First Amendment rights of Doe and Bloggs,
the court ruled in favor of Hopkinton Public Schools on Doe's and
Bloggs's challenges. It held that the School's discipline under
its bullying policy and Massachusetts state law did not violate
Doe's and Bloggs's First Amendment rights to speech and/or
association. The court reviewed the Supreme Court's decision in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503(1969), and its holding that speech "may be regulated only if it
would substantially disrupt school operations or interfere with
the right of others." Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 457 (quoting Saxe v.
State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001)).
The court found that:
- 15 -
the Students' messages did not take place in
isolation; the students in "Geoff da Man" were
engaging in bullying. A reasonable official
could have found that Roe did suffer from the
speech and actions of the members of the
hockey team, coordinated through the Snapchat
group. This "repeated" conduct and speech "by
one or more students" was "directed" at Roe,
causing him "emotional . . . harm." Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O. A reasonable
official could have found this bullying was
"severe or pervasive." Norris, 969 F.3d at 29
n.18. This bullying therefore constituted an
infringement of Roe's rights and is not
protected by Tinker whether or not it caused
a substantial disruption. Id. at 29.
Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 461. The court found that "[a] reasonable
official could have found Doe and Bloggs to be participants in
group bullying that invaded Roe's rights." Id. at 465.
Doe and Bloggs contended that there was a lack of
causality between their actions and the bullying and that they
were thus being subjected to "guilt by association." See NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-19 (1982); see also
Humanitarian L. Project v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 463 F. Supp. 2d
1049, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2006). The district court rejected those
arguments, reasoning that "th[o]se precedents do not require
school officials to ignore the group context in which Doe's and
Bloggs' comments were made" and finding Doe and Bloggs "did not
merely 'associate' in the Snapchat but were active -- albeit minor
-- participants in the group targeting of Roe." Doe, 490 F. Supp.
3d at 463. The court cited to similar cases in which federal
- 16 -
courts had rejected the lack of causality argument. Id. at 463-
64; see Taylor v. Metuchen Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 18-cv-1842, 2019
WL 1418124, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2019); Shen v. Albany Unified
Sch. Dist., Nos. 3:17-cv-02478, 3:17-cv-02767, 3:17-cv-03418,
3:17-cv-03657, 2017 WL 5890089, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017).
After discussing those cases, the court made further
findings:
A reasonable official could conclude that both
Doe and Bloggs made derogatory comments about
Roe in the group conversation. That official
could easily find that Bloggs' comment about
the "game of telephone," amidst a litany of
insults against Roe's appearance, was not
innocuous. Snapchat Screenshots PO000036.
Doe's messages speak for themselves. Id. at
PO000034-36. Thus an official could find that
by posting these comments -- even if they were
themselves minor relative to the surrounding
nastiness -- Doe and Bloggs had signaled their
approval and encouragement of the bullying by
the other hockey teams members. Their
punishment would not have been constitutional
under the First Amendment if they were merely
members of the Snapchat group, cf. Shen, 2017
WL 5890089, at *9-10, but by actively
encouraging the group bullying, they could be
permissibly disciplined for its results.
This conclusion is consistent with the
causality analysis in Norris. In Norris,
"[t]he defendants do not assert that A.M.
directly participated in the bullying of
Student 1 at school, or that she was
responsible for the video or any of the rumors
being circulated about Student 1." 969 F.3d
at 31. Here, Doe and Bloggs were participants
in the bullying. This Court is persuaded by
Shen that the proper inquiry is whether the
group caused an invasion of Roe's rights and
whether Doe and Bloggs participated in the
- 17 -
group by encouraging its behavior. 2017 WL
5890089, at *9-10. A reasonable official
could have found these facts, and these
reasons align with the schools' explanations
at the time. See Doe Suspension, Bloggs
Suspension.
Lastly, the Massachusetts law contemplates
discipline of collective action. Section 37O
defines bullying as action "by one or more
students . . . directed at a victim" that cause
the listed harms. Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 71,
§ 37O. If the isolated conduct of each
student in the group had to individually meet
all the elements of "bullying," the words "or
more" in the statute would be read out.
Children often bully as a group. The children
who stand on the sidewalk and cheer as one of
their friends shakes down a smaller student
for his lunch money may not be as culpable,
but they are not entirely blameless.
Similarly, the "Geoff Da Man" group's conduct
as a whole was directed at Roe, and
Massachusetts law allows School officials to
consider Doe and Bloggs as members of that
group.
Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 464-65.
The court also ruled that the "emotional harm" prong of
section 37O and the Hopkinton Bullying Policy is neither overbroad
nor vague. Id. at 465-69. Lastly, the court ruled that Hopkinton
Public Schools did not violate Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 82. Id.
at 470.
Doe and Bloggs timely appealed.8
8 We acknowledge the amici curiae for their submissions in
this matter. The following amici submitted briefs in support of
Doe and Bloggs: the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation. The following amici
submitted briefs in support of Hopkinton Public Schools: the
- 18 -
II.
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court's legal conclusions de
novo. See United Paperworkers, 64 F.3d at 32. In a case stated
decision, "the parties waive trial and present the case to the
court on the undisputed facts in the pre-trial record." TLT
Constr. Corp., 484 F.3d at 135 n.6. We review the district court's
factual findings and inferences for clear error. United
Paperworkers, 64 F.3d at 31.
B. The School Did Not Violate Doe's and Bloggs's First Amendment
Rights.
To prevail on a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, Doe and Bloggs bear the burden of showing that (1) they
were engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) they were
subjected to adverse actions by the School, and (3) the protected
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse
actions. See D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26,
43 (1st Cir. 2012). The parties do not dispute that the second
Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the National School Boards
Association, Maine School Boards Association, Massachusetts
Association of School Committees, New Hampshire School Boards
Association, and Rhode Island Association of School Committees;
and GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders and the Anti-Defamation
League. The following amici submitted briefs in support of neither
party: Daniel B. Rice and the American Civil Liberties Union of
Massachusetts.
- 19 -
and third requirements have been satisfied. We thus focus our
analysis on the first requirement.
Doe and Bloggs contend that the School violated their
First Amendment rights to speech and association by punishing them
for what they call their "private messages" that they sent to their
friends over the Snapchat platform. They primarily argue that the
court's finding that there was a causal relationship between their
participation in the group and each of the three reasons given by
the school for imposition of the discipline was clear error.
1. The School's Decisions Regarding Student Speech and
Bullying Are Entitled to Deference.
The School's findings that Doe and Bloggs violated
school policy and the Massachusetts anti-bullying statute are
entitled to deference if they are reasonable.9 The Supreme Court
9 The amicus brief submitted by the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") of Massachusetts argues that the district
court's textual reading of the Massachusetts anti-bullying statute
was erroneous. The ACLU argues that the district court erroneously
read the statute expansively to encompass a theory of group
bullying. Doe and Bloggs thus could not be disciplined under the
statute as a matter of law based on the district court's factual
findings.
We do not address this argument because Doe and Bloggs
did not plead that the School exceeded its authority under the
Massachusetts anti-bullying statute, nor did they raise this
argument on appeal. We do not consider an argument raised by
amicus curiae where the "argument was not raised by the parties or
passed on by the lower court[]." FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys.,
Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 n.4 (2013); see Weaver's Cove Energy,
LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458, 467 (1st
Cir. 2009). The ACLU also does not argue that the School could
not act beyond the authority of the Massachusetts anti-bullying
statute as long as it did not violate the constitutional
- 20 -
has long held that schools have a special interest in regulating
speech that "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Tinker, 393 U.S.
at 513. "Courts generally defer to school administrators'
decisions regarding student speech so long as their judgment is
reasonable." Norris ex rel. A.M. v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist.,
969 F.3d 12, 30 (1st Cir. 2020); see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 403 (2007) ("Tinker held that student expression may not be
suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it
will 'materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline
of the school.'" (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513)); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Khulmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in
school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board."); Norris, 969 F.3d at 29 n.18 ("[S]chool administrators
must be permitted to exercise discretion in determining when
certain speech crosses the line from merely offensive to more
severe or pervasive bullying or harassment.").
At the time of the imposition of the discipline, the
School provided three justifications for Doe's and Bloggs's
suspensions and does not vary from those justifications in this
protections of the First Amendment.
- 21 -
litigation. Cf. Norris, 969 F.3d at 25-26 (requiring school
administrators to adhere to rationale provided at time of
discipline in litigation defending discipline). The School
determined that Doe's and Bloggs's "conduct [1] caused emotional
harm to [Roe], [2] created a hostile environment for him during
school-sponsored events and activities and [3] infringed on his
rights at school."
Tinker holds that schools have a special interest in
regulating speech that involves the "invasion of the rights of
others." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. The Supreme Court made clear
in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. ex rel. Levy that schools
have a significant interest in regulating "serious or severe
bullying or harassment" that invades the rights of others.10 141
S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (2021). This pedagogical interest remains even
in off-campus circumstances.11 In Mahanoy Area School District,
10 The amicus brief submitted by the GLBTQ Legal Advocates
& Defenders and the Anti-Defamation League cites to social science
research showing that bullying is an extensive and pervasive
problem amongst adolescents. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention has concluded that a considerable number of youth are
bullied. See Gladden et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Bullying Surveillance Among Youths: Uniform
Definitions for Public Health and Recommended Data Elements (1st
ed. 2014). National surveys estimate that anywhere from 11% to
28% of adolescents are victims of bullying. Id. at 5.
11 There is no merit to Doe and Bloggs's argument that their
speech is not subject to punishment because it did not occur on
campus. In Mahanoy Area School District, the Supreme Court
rejected the Third Circuit's on-campus/off-campus speech
distinction. 141 S. Ct. at 2045. Instead, the Supreme Court held
that "[t]he school's regulatory interests remain significant in
- 22 -
B.L. was disciplined for off-campus Snapchat posts, which were not
directed at any individual. The Supreme Court found that the
speech was more accurately characterized as "criticism of the rules
of a community of which B.L. forms a part," id. at 2046, and that
it did not satisfy the "substantial disruption" prong of Tinker,
id. at 2047-48. A general statement of discontent is vastly and
qualitatively different from bullying that targets and invades the
rights of an individual student. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141
S. Ct. at 2045; Norris, 969 F.3d at 29 ("[B]ullying is the type of
conduct that implicates the governmental interest in protecting
against the invasion of the rights of others, as described in
Tinker.").
2. Doe's and Bloggs's Speech and Conduct Are Not Protected
by the First Amendment.
Doe and Bloggs contend that their speech and conduct
were protected by the First Amendment and could not be disciplined
some off-campus circumstances. . . . These include serious or
severe bullying or harassment targeting particular
individuals. . . ." Id.
Further, the School found that Doe's and Bloggs's speech
and conduct occurred both on campus and off campus and took place
during school-affiliated events. The district court agreed and
did not clearly err in this factual determination. Doe, 490 F.
Supp. 3d at 463. The students admitted to taking videos and photos
while in the locker room, on bus rides to school hockey games, and
at team gatherings. Doe's and Bloggs's speech and conduct were thus
unlike B.L.'s Snapchat message that was posted on her own time outside
of school at a convenience store. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141
S. Ct. at 2043.
- 23 -
by the School. They argue that they were punished solely for
sending messages over Snapchat and participating in the Snapchat
group -- and that they engaged in no offending conduct directed
towards Roe.
For the School to discipline Doe's and Bloggs's speech,
there must be a causal connection between their speech and the
bullying that invaded Roe's rights. Norris, 969 F.3d at 28, 31.12
Doe and Bloggs do not dispute that other group members directly
bullied Roe, such as by taking nonconsensual photos and videos of
him, attempting to get him to say inappropriate statements on
camera, and isolating him from the hockey team. They do not
dispute that this bullying could be regulated consistent with the
First Amendment. They challenge only whether their conduct
reasonably could be viewed as a ground for treating them as active
participants in such regulable conduct. As such, the relevant
question is whether the School reasonably concluded that Doe's and
Bloggs's messages and active participation in the group were
12 The causal connection concerns from Norris are not
present in Doe's and Bloggs's situations. In Norris, the
plaintiff, student A.M., posted a sticky note, which read "THERE'S
A RAPIST IN OUR SCHOOL AND YOU KNOW WHO IT IS;" it was not widely
distributed or viewed by members of the school community. Norris,
969 F.3d at 14-15. The note was in the girls' bathroom for a few
minutes and seen by two students. Id. at 32. Here, the School
reasonably concluded that Doe's and Bloggs's messages were viewed
by the members of the Snapchat group, who were all active
participants in the group. In Norris, the sticky note contained
several ambiguities. Included among those ambiguities was the
"rapist" and whether the "rapist" was even a student. Id.
- 24 -
causally connected to the direct bullying because they encouraged
other group members to continue bullying Roe.
As the district court stated: "Children often bully as
a group. The children who stand on the sidewalk and cheer as one
of their friends shakes down a smaller student for his lunch money
may not be as culpable, but they are not entirely blameless." Doe,
490 F. Supp. 3d at 464-65; see e.g., Taylor, 2019 WL 1418124, at
*6 (dismissing First Amendment claim where student had been
punished for encouraging his friend to publish a caricature of
another student on a social media website); Shen, 2017 WL 5890089,
at *9 (upholding school discipline against students that "liked"
or expressed approval of derogatory and racist Instagram posts
that targeted specific students).13
Here, the School and the district court both concluded
as a matter of fact that Doe's and Bloggs's speech and Snapchat
participation were causally connected to the other members'
bullying of Roe. That conclusion was reasonable, and we see no
clear error.
13 The amicus brief submitted by the National School Boards
Association, Maine School Boards Association, Massachusetts
Association of School Committees, New Hampshire School Boards
Association, and Rhode Island Association of School Committees
cites to social science research finding that "bullying is a 'group
process', and many researchers and policymakers share the belief
that interventions against bullying should be targeted at the peer-
group level rather than at individual bullies and victims."
Salmivalli, Bullying and the Peer Group: A Review, 15 Aggression
& Violent Behavior 112, 117 (2010) (citations omitted).
- 25 -
Doe and Bloggs both made derogatory comments about Roe
in the Snapchat group conversation. Doe stated, "[Student 5] and
[Roe] were made on the same day[.] [Student 5] was the starting
product and [Roe] is what it turned into kinda like a game of
telephone in 1st grade." Bloggs initiated an exchange about Roe's
family that led another student to post photos of Roe's parents.
Bloggs then made numerous derogatory comments about Roe's family
members and his appearance, including "Are [Roe]'s parents ugly
too [o]r did he just get bad genes" and "[Roe]'s leather shampoo
makes up for [his] looks though." Bloggs also sent a photo of
another student to the Snapchat group and shared with the group
one of Roe's online usernames without his consent.
Importantly, as the district court noted, Doe's and
Bloggs's messages demeaning Roe's appearance and family -- and
their continuous, active participation in the Snapchat group --
"did not take place in isolation." Doe and Bloggs both admitted
that they were aware that members of the group were bullying Roe.
They were aware that members of the group were taking nonconsensual
photos and videos of Roe and circulating them in the group. The
Snapchat group was formed in December 2018 and continued to exist
until at least the date of the investigation in early February
2019, months after Roe's parents filed their initial complaint
with the hockey coach that Student 1 had taken photos and videos
of Roe in the locker room without his consent. Doe and Bloggs
- 26 -
nonetheless continued to send demeaning messages about Roe and his
family. They were participants in an extensive back-and-forth
between the eight students that included numerous derogatory
comments and nonconsensual photos and videos. The students in the
Snapchat group continued to bully Roe during this time, until at
least February 2, 2019, when Student 1 again attempted to video-
record Roe on the hockey team bus without his consent and replayed
a video of Roe on his phone in front of him -- two days before
Roe's parents filed their bullying complaint.
The School reasonably concluded that Doe's and Bloggs's
messages and participation in the group fostered an environment
that emboldened the bullies and encouraged others in the invasion
of Roe's rights. The evidence shows that they were well aware of
the effects of that conduct on Roe. The School reasonably
concluded that this speech and conduct itself constituted,
contributed to, and encouraged the bullying.
To be sure, there may be circumstances in which
encouragement is so minimal or ambiguous, the chain of
communication so attenuated, or knowledge of direct bullying so
lacking, that a school's punishment of certain speech would be
unreasonable. See Shen, 2017 WL 5890089, at *10 (finding certain
students' participation in online group containing racist content
not sufficiently active to warrant punishment). The speech and
conduct of the defendants in this case, though, actively and
- 27 -
extensively encouraged bullying and fostered an atmosphere where
bullying was accepted. Consequently, it does not present those
concerns and, thus, we have no occasion to explore those limits.
Doe and Bloggs point to a finding by the district court
that "[t]here is no evidence in the record of any non-speech
conduct by Bloggs or Doe directed at Roe, except for their failure
to intervene when other students mistreated him, which is certainly
insufficient alone to constitute bullying." Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d
at 461. But this reliance is misplaced because speech that
actively encourages such direct or face-to-face bullying conduct
is not constitutionally protected. Doe and Bloggs ignore the
district court's further conclusion that "an official could find
that by posting these comments -- even if they were themselves
minor relative to the surrounding nastiness -- Doe and Bloggs had
signaled their approval and encouragement of the bullying by the
other hockey teams members." Id. at 464. The record supports the
School's finding that Doe and Bloggs were participants in
encouraging the group and its bullying of Roe, and that bullying
went beyond speech and included activities such as taking
nonconsensual photos and videos of Roe, attempting to get him to
say inappropriate statements on camera, and isolating him from the
hockey team. The district court did not clearly err in finding
that Doe and Bloggs, through their active participation in the
- 28 -
Snapchat group, encouraged the bullying that -- they do not dispute
-- others engaged in that went beyond speech.
We reject Doe and Bloggs's argument that their speech,
though offensive, did not rise to the level of invading the rights
of others and thus could not be disciplined under Tinker and the
Massachusetts anti-bullying statute. Doe and Bloggs were not
punished because Roe was offended by the content of their messages.
As Doe and Bloggs themselves point out, Roe never saw the Snapchat
messages from them. Doe and Bloggs were punished because the
School reasonably found that their speech and participation in the
Snapchat group actively encouraged the repeated bullying that
occurred throughout the 2018-2019 season.
We also reject Doe and Bloggs's argument that they did
not intend or expect their messages to be viewed by Roe because
they expected the messages to be deleted. But there is no intent
requirement under Tinker. The test under Tinker is objective,
focusing on the reasonableness of the school's response, not the
intent of the student. See Norris, 969 F.3d at 25; Shen, 2017 WL
5890089, at *10.
In light of the evidence in the record, the district
court did not clearly err in finding that "Doe and Bloggs had
signaled their approval and encouragement of the bullying by the
- 29 -
other hockey teams members." Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 464.14 Speech
or conduct that actively and pervasively encourages bullying by
others or fosters an environment in which bullying is acceptable
and actually occurs -- as in this case -- is not protected under
the First Amendment.
C. Doe's and Bloggs's Facial Overbreadth and Vagueness
Challenges to the "Emotional Harm" Prong of the School Policy
and Massachusetts Statute Are Moot.
Doe and Bloggs in addition seek declarations that the
"emotional harm" prong of the Hopkinton Bullying Policy and section
37O are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. They contend that
these provisions have "chilled" their speech because they are open
to expansive and potentially arbitrary enforcement.
Under "First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute
is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of
protected speech." United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292
(2008). The doctrine rests on the notion that "the threat of
enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from engaging in
constitutionally protected speech," a chilling effect that
inhibits the free exchange of ideas. Id. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine, by contrast, is derived from the Due Process Clause of
14 The district court also correctly rejected Doe and
Bloggs's argument that their punishments violated their First
Amendment rights to free association. Doe and Bloggs were not
punished for associating with other members of the hockey team.
The School punished Doe and Bloggs for their conduct. They were
active members of the Snapchat group and encouraged the bullying.
- 30 -
the Fifth Amendment and is concerned with circumstances in which
a law is so vague that it does not provide fair notice of what
conduct it prohibits and creates a risk of arbitrary enforcement.
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
Courts have long recognized that when a vague law implicates First
Amendment interests, the injuries can be similar to and overlapping
with those in overbreadth claims, but the analysis takes place
under distinct tests. See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561
U.S. 1, 20 (2010); Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman
Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982); see also Wright & Miller,
13A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3531.9.4 (3d ed. 2021).
Doe's and Bloggs's claims as to facial overbreadth and
vagueness seek prospective relief, and they have presented no
argument that these claims are integrally intertwined with their
discipline claims.15 That being so, the facial overbreadth and
15 The facial overbreadth and vagueness claims, as pleaded
and argued, seek only prospective relief in the form of a
declaration of rights and injunctive relief against future
enforcement of the "emotional harm" prong. Doe's and Bloggs's
First Amendment Tinker claims, by contrast, request injunctive
relief to remove the discipline from their records. The district
court understood the claims as we do.
To the extent Doe and Bloggs challenge either the
Hopkinton Bullying Policy or section 37O insofar as they relate to
removing the past discipline from their records, those arguments
are waived. See United States v. Rodrigues, 850 F.3d 1, 13 n.6
(1st Cir. 2017).
- 31 -
vagueness claims as to the "emotional harm" prong of the Hopkinton
Bullying Policy and section 37O are moot.
"The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute
may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally
to others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982). First Amendment overbreadth challenges
are an exception to that general rule against third-party standing.
See Osediacz v. City of Cranston, 414 F.3d 136, 140-41 (1st Cir.
2005); see also United States v. Smith, 945 F.3d 729, 736 (2d Cir.
2019). "Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute
not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but
because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's
very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression."
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
Even so, the overbreadth doctrine does not dispose of
the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate Article III
constitutional standing. Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 141; see Serv.
Emps. Int'l Union, Local 3 v. Mun. of Mt. Lebanon, 446 F.3d 419,
423 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[L]itigants [asserting a First Amendment
overbreadth challenge], of course, must still meet the
constitutional requirement of injury-in-fact because their own
constitutionally unprotected interests will be adversely affected
- 32 -
by application of the statute." (first citing Note, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 423, 424 (1974);
and then citing Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J.
853, 860 n.33 (1991))). Nor does the void-for-vagueness doctrine
excuse a plaintiff from establishing the constitutional
requirement of injury-in-fact as to their own interests.16 See
Holder, 561 U.S. at 20 ("A plaintiff who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the
law as applied to the conduct of others." (quoting Vill. of Hoffman
Ests., 455 U.S. at 495) (quotation omitted)). To establish Article
III standing, a plaintiff must show: "(i) that he suffered an
injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant;
and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial
relief." TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021).
16 In addition, we note that Doe and Bloggs do not challenge
the third or fourth prongs that cover conduct that "creates a
hostile environment at school for the target" or "infringes on the
rights of the target at school." Hopkinton Bullying Policy; see
Mass. Gen. L. ch. 71 § 37O. The School determined that the conduct
for which discipline was imposed independently satisfied each of
the three prongs of the School policy and the Massachusetts
statute. Even assuming Doe and Bloggs could challenge their past
discipline by challenging the "emotional harm" prong as overbroad
and vague, the result would be the invalidation of the "emotional
harm" prong of the Hopkinton Bullying Policy and section 37O. Doe
and Bloggs would receive no relief from their injury because the
School had two separate and independent grounds for finding that
they engaged in bullying. See Signs for Jesus v. Town of Pembroke,
N.H., 977 F.3d 93, 100-01 (1st Cir. 2020).
- 33 -
The plaintiff must thus show "whether the risk that the Policy
will have a chilling effect on the speech of others is a sufficient
injury to the plaintiff to meet the first prong of the
constitutional test for standing." Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 142(emphasis in original). "[A] chill on speech sometimes may be a
cognizable injury," but "in order to have standing, the plaintiff
must be within the class of persons potentially chilled." Id.Having graduated -- and thus no longer subject to the
Hopkinton Bullying Policy or section 37O -- Doe and Bloggs do not
fall within the "class of persons potentially chilled." See Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) ("[A] case is moot when the
issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.").
An exception to the mootness doctrine exists for cases
that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). But this exception applies only
when: "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to
be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2)
there [i]s a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
w[ill] be subjected to the same action again." Id. (quoting
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)) (emphasis added).
Doe and Bloggs fail to satisfy the second prong of the
exception. They are no longer students at the School, and there
is no reasonable expectation that they will be subject to the same
- 34 -
discipline again under the challenged policy and statute. See
Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2009) ("[T]here is no reasonable expectation that [plaintiff]
will be subjected, post-graduation, to [the challenged policy].");
Donovan ex rel. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d
211, 217 (3d Cir. 2003); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist.,
228 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000).
D. The School Did Not Violate Doe's and Bloggs's Rights Under
the Massachusetts Student Speech Statute.
Doe and Bloggs further contend that the School violated
their rights under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 82, which provides in
relevant part: "The right of students to freedom of expression in
the public schools of the commonwealth shall not be abridged,
provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or disorder
within the school." They argue that the statute protects the free
speech rights of students limited only by the requirement that the
speech be nondisruptive. Doe and Bloggs argue that they thus
cannot be punished for speech that invaded the rights of another
but was not found to "cause any disruption or disorder within the
school."17
17 The district court correctly held that the School may
not rely on the "substantial disruption" prong of Tinker to justify
its actions. Doe, 490 F. Supp. 3d at 460. In Norris, we held
that the school "must rely only on the reasons originally provided
to A.M. for her suspension" and "may not rely on post hoc
rationalizations for the speech restrictions." Norris, 969 F.3d
at 25-26. Here, the Bullying Report found that Doe's and Bloggs's
- 35 -
Doe and Bloggs ask us to interpret section 82 in a manner
that directly conflicts with the plain text of the later-enacted
Massachusetts anti-bullying statute. When Massachusetts enacted
the anti-bullying statute in 2010, it adopted the language from
Tinker, and the plain text of the statute permits discipline based
on "Bullying" that "infringes on the rights of the victim at
school." Mass. Gen. L. ch. 71, § 37O(a). If Doe and Bloggs's
interpretation of section 82 were correct, entire paragraphs of
section 37O would conflict directly with section 82. We do not so
interpret section 82. See Town of Hadley v. Town of Amherst, 360
N.E.2d 623, 626 (Mass. 1977).
Doe and Bloggs's sole response is that the anti-bullying
statute states that it does not "supersede or replace existing
rights or remedies." Mass. Gen. L. ch. 71, § 37O(i). But
subsection 37O(i) is not plausibly read to limit school discipline
of bullying to the constraints provided for in section 82, as that
would render much of the anti-bullying statute meaningless. Given
the anti-bullying statute's focus on victims of bullying and the
responsibilities of school administrators in addressing bullying,
the more natural reading of subsection 37O(i) is that insofar as
"conduct caused emotional harm to [Roe], created a hostile
environment for him during school-sponsored events and activities
and infringed on his rights at school." The School may rely only
on these justifications for rationalizing the speech restrictions.
See id.
- 36 -
bullying covered by section 37O was already actionable under
Massachusetts law, it remains so.
We do not adopt Doe and Bloggs's reading of section 82.
The School did not violate either section 82 or Tinker in
suspending Doe and Bloggs for their speech and conduct.
III.
Affirmed.
- 37 -